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Abstract
Structural failures of bulk carriers continue to account for the loss of many lives every
year. Capes are particularly vulnerable to cracking because of their large length, their trade in
high density cargos, and the high rates of cargo operations. Rapid loss often occurs allowing
little reaction time which has alarmed the industry. The Cape market is extremely volatile
with ship values appreciating in some cases by over 500% and then returning to original
levels, all within a few years. Recent market changes have rendered conventional pricing
methods inaccurate and often inapplicable, resulting in a pressing need for alternate valuation
models. Very little research combines the closely interlinked technical and financial elements
which are crucial for valuation and decision making by various parties in the shipping
industry.
The present research involves the collection and analysis of one of the largest ship
cracking surveys. It is focused specifically on capes which lie at the core of the problem and
is based on the records of ship owners, classification societies and shipyards. A location
coding system was specifically designed to analyze the data and present the frequency, size
and estimated crack growth rates with respect to location and ship age. The results were
compared with existing knowledge based on surveys conducted over the past 50 years, the
stress distribution based on an investigation of loading patterns, and theoretical fracture
mechanics predictions. They were then combined with the frequency of crack failures,
derived from an investigation of an extensive fleet sample, to develop a reliability model
which yields the hazard function throughout the ship's life. Repair procedures and design
modifications were also examined and a model was designed to assess their cost
effectiveness based on the present value of projected crack costs. The crack repair costs were
calculated as a function of ship age to be used in conjunction with the safety assessment for
decision making by ship owners, insurance companies, classification societies and others.
A new state of the art valuation model was developed combining both technical and
financial aspects in a fundamental valuation based on risk-adjusted discounting of expected
cash flows. A forward view of the main parameters was obtained from derivatives and
financial securities that include shipping futures, FFAs, options, interest rate swaps and
inflation protected bonds. The inherent risk of cracks is treated as a fictitious credit risk,
derived from the reliability model, and is incorporated into the discount rate along with other
risk premiums. Other inputs include repair costs and off-hire time, which were calculated
with respect to ship age using a database of repairs, while the records of public and private
companies were used along with surveys to estimate operating expenses. The resulting
valuations were found to be in very close alignment with recent transaction prices across all
ship ages. The model also estimates the volatility of the ship value and uses it to price
optionalities that are often included in ship transactions.
The combination of technical and financial analysis of this thesis is valuable to many
involved in the shipping industry including brokers, accountants, analysts, shipping banks
and investors interested in valuation; ship owners when making managerial or investment
decisions; shipyards when designing ships, setting prices and deciding payment structures
and options; insurance companies when covering total loss or emergency repairs; the IMO
when setting regulations; and classification societies when scheduling inspections and
deciding which areas to focus on.
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Nomenclature
Chapter 2
Roman Upper Case
AR: Average revenue
ATC: Average total cost
EndVal: End value of vessel after the charter
I: Interest rate
MC: Marginal cost
MR: Marginal revenue
NPfV,,f: Net present value of profits
P: Profit
P(F) : Prior probability that a hypothesis is false
P(F I I): Posterior probability that a hypothesis is false given information "I"
Prof: Average annual profits
P(T) : Prior probability that a hypothesis is true
P(T I I): Posterior probability that a hypothesis is true given information "I"
Roman Lower Case
n: Number of years of the time-charter
Chapter 3
Roman Upper Case
A: Paris-Erdogan Law coefficient OR Influence function OR Area under
stress/strain curve
A.: Cross sectional area of plating
Ac: Cross sectional area involved by cracking damage
Ai=o:3  Functions of material properties and the peak stress
B: Specimen breadth OR Influence function OR Ship beam
C: Empirical Constant
Cb: Block coefficient at summer load waterline
Ci: Stress combination factors
CM: Germanischer Lloyd (GL) Distribution Factor
C 1: Coefficient defining the corrosion rate
C 2: Coefficient defining corrosion progress OR Function of block coefficient
E: Young's modulus under plain stress
E': Young's modulus under plain strain
F: Fahrenheit temperature (degrees) OR Correction factor
Fe: Joint geometry factor
Fg: Stress gradient
F,: Front free surface correction
Ft: Finite thickness
Fw: Back free correction
G: Strain energy release rate
G': Material Shear Modulus
Gc: Critical energy release rate of the material
H: Wave parameter depending only on ship length L
J: Elastic-plastic crack tip parameter
J, : Critical elastic-plastic crack tip parameter
J,: Elastic crack tip parameter
J,: Plastic crack tip parameter
K: Stress intensity factor
Kb: Function of block coefficient
Kc: Critical stress intensity factor
Keff: Effective stress intensity factor
Kmax: Maximum stress intensity factor
Kth: Threshold stress intensity factor
K1: Mode I (crack opening mode) stress intensity factor
Krl: Mode II (shearing mode) stress intensity factor
Kmll: Mode III (tearing mode) stress intensity factor
K1 : Constant relating to the mean S-N curve
L: Scantling length OR Ship length
Mk: Correction factor
Mk,b: Correction bending factor
Mk,m: Correction membrane factor
M,: Wave-induced bending moment
N: Number of stress cycles OR Number of cycles to failure
Nfi: Number of cycles to failure
P: Load
R: Stress ratio
Rxe: Factor of reduction due to crack damage
S: Surface OR Stress range
T: Time in years
Tc: Life of coating in years
Te: Time in years
Ti: Traction vector
Tt: Transition time
U: Potential energy
V: Volume
W: Strain energy density OR corrosion wastage in millimeters
W': Specimen width (along direction of crack)
Y: Geometry factors
Yb: Geometry bending factor
Ym: Geometry membrane factor
Zm.in: minimum Hull Girder Section Modulus
Z: Original section modulus of deck or bottom
Z': Final section modulus of deck or bottom
Roman Lower Case
al,2,3: Tabulated constants depending on the ship type and dimensions
b/B: Ratio of damaged to total length
degC: Celsius temperature (degrees)
f: Crack opening function OR Ship service factor
k: Ramberg-Osgood constant
m: Inverse slope of S-N curve
n: Paris-Erdogan Law coefficient OR Empirical constant OR Ramberg-Osgood
constant
ni: Number of stress cycles
p: Empirical constant
q: Empirical constant
r: Distance from crack tip
r(t): Corrosion rate in millimeters per year
s: Distance along F
t: Traction vector (normal to the contour)
tr: Corrosion wastage
si: Stress amplitude
u: Displacement
ui: displacement vector
vo: Ship Speed
Greek Upper Case
F: Path independent contour enclosing the crack tip
A: Displacement
A.6: Cyclic strain
H: Potential energy
Greek Lower Case
a: Crack length
ac :Critical crack length
p : Applied load angle
6: Crack tip opening displacement
45: Critical crack tip opening displacement
6: Strain
11: Tabulated geometry factor (For tension ~ 0.5, bending ~ 1)
0: Angle measured anticlockwise from the crack plane
9: crack branching angle
v :Poisson ratio
a: Applied stress OR crack opening stress OR standard deviation of log(N)
GA,B: Stresses or other measurements at two convenient locations A, B
a :Bending stress
ai: Stress component
aL: local stress in a critical area which is to be determined
c-,: Membrane stress
aT: Total stress
axu: Ultimate axial strength of cracked plating
axuo: Ultimate axial strength of un-cracked plating
ae: Hoop stress
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Roman Upper Case
A: Paris-Erdogan Law material constant OR Bathtub curve constant
A,: Cracked Area
AGE: Ship age (in years)
AR Ship reliability model parameter for current repair period
AR-1 Ship reliability model parameter for previous repair period
AO: Area of intact plate
B: Alternative model dimensionless parameter OR Bathtub curve constant
%BMW: Average percentage of allowable bending moment at location " t "
%BMK,: Average percentage of allowable bending moment at location " f " under
loading condition "K"
C: Alternative model dimensionless parameter OR Bathtub curve constant
C1: Criticality parameter 1
C2 : Criticality parameter 2
D: Alternative model dimensionless parameter
DA,: Danger contribution of location "i" in ships of age "A"
Danger contribution of locations 10 to 13 in ships of age "A"
Danger contribution of compartment "j" in ships of age 6 to 10
Danger value of crack "c"
Danger of crack "c" in location "i" and compartment "j" of ship age "A"
Danger contribution of location "j" in all ships
Mean ship danger value (Ds) at the end of repair interval R
Ship danger value
DA,i=io:13 :
DA= 6:io,:
Dc:
DcEAij
DR
F(T):
F(t)
I:
K:
LDGsi,j:
M:
MW:
N:
P:
P(x)
P(fail)
Pc(fail)R
PM(fail)R
R:
RA:
A,:
R CorrosionEffect
RDesignEffect
R.:
ROniginal:
Rs:
Rtotai:
S. :
S':
Weibull cumulative probability density function
Cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.)
Second moment of area (in longitudinal direction)
Geometric constant of Modified Paris Law 3 OR Stress intensity factor
Location Danger
Alternative Danger Model location factor
Vertical Bending Moment
Wave induced (global/principal) bending moment
Number of stress cycles
Load
Probability of event "x" occurring
Probability of failure
Probability of failure implied by DR for a given repair interval
Measured probability of failure in repair interval "R"
Longitudinal strength knockdown factor OR Repair interval
Mean crack growth rate of all cracks in the database
Mean crack growth rate in ships of age "A"
Mean crack growth rate in location "i", compartment "j", ship age "A"
Mean crack growth rate in compartment "j" from all ships of age "A"
Contribution of corrosion to crack growth rate function
Contribution of repair design modifications to crack growth rate function
Mean crack growth rate of cracks in location "j" from all ships in database
Original (at ship age A = 0) value of mean crack growth rate function
Mean crack growth rate of cracks in ship "S"
Mean crack growth rate function (Bathtub Curve)
Ship safety parameter of alternative model
Average ship safety parameter for ship age "A"
Stress concentration factor of location "i"
S, :
S(t)
Strength(new):
Strength(old):
T:
F
TC
*
T
C
Tf
V:
Y:
Z :
Ship safety parameter
Survivor function
Strength of racked plate
Strength of un-cracked plate
Time variable in Weibull function OR Wave period OR Repair interval
Time to failure of crack "c"
Dimensionless time margin of crack "c"
Time to failure
Ship velocity
Geometric parameter
Section modulus
Roman Lower Case
a
ac:
aD:
aR:
aR-I:
ao:
b
bD:
bR
bR-1
Weibull distribution model parameter
Constant of RCorrosionEffect function
Constant of RDesignEffect function
Ship reliability model parameter corresponding to current repair interval
Ship reliability model parameter corresponding to previous repair interval
Constant equal to Roriginal
Weibull distribution model parameter
Constant of RDesignEffect function
Ship reliability model parameter corresponding to current repair interval
Ship reliability model parameter corresponding to previous repair interval
SCF :
CD: Constant of RDesignEffect function
CR Ship reliability model parameter corresponding to current repair interval
CR-1: Ship reliability model parameter corresponding to previous repair interval
d: Regression constant for relationship between Pm(fail)R and DR
dD: Constant of RD,,ig,,Eff,,, function
e Regression constant for relationship between PM(fail)R and DR
f(t) Probability density function (p.d.f.)
f(T): Weibull probability density function (p.d.f.)
fR Total % drop of hazard function during repair just before repair interval R
fRI Percentage drop of hazard function due to imperfectly inspected areas
fRu Percentage drop of hazard function due to areas not inspected
g: Gravitational acceleration (9.8 1m/s 2)
h: Water depth
k: Wave number
kf: Knockdown factor to account for dynamic stress cycles
m: Paris-Erdogan Law material power constant
sac11 : Additional crack growth required to reach critical length for fast fracture
sce51 : Distance from crack tip to the end of the component
ss, : Distance from crack tip to the side shell
t: Time since crack was 1mm OR Time since last inspection OR Time vector
t': Time since crack length was equal to the relevant measurement resolution
%t,: Average time under each loading condition "K"
r: Ratio of cumulative P(fail) half way through repair interval to final value
rDR: Ratio of average Ds half way through repair interval R to DR
rM: Ratio of failures in first half of all intervals to total number of failures
r(t): Expected residual lifetime function
wi: Weighting function for combining PM(fail)R and Pc(fail)R to get P(fail)
w2: Weighting function for combining rm and rDR to get rR
y: Vertical distance from the neutral axis
Greek Upper Case
AK: Applied stress intensity amplitude
Ao: Applied stress amplitude
Ac-,: Effective stress amplitude of location "i"
Greek Lower Case
a: Crack length
a :Mean crack size
af: Final crack length
a0 : Initial crack length
a: Crack length of crack "c"
p: Weibull parameter
1: Weibull parameter
K: Loading condition
X: wavelength
X(t): Hazard function
pt: Angle between propagating directions of ship and waves
Gb: Bending stress
(Yxx: Bending stress in the "x" (longitudinal direction)
-,1 : Ultimate Tensile Strength (UST)
1r: Temporary integration time variable
co: Wave frequency
aO: Wave encounter frequency
Upper Case Subscripts
A: Ship age
C: Calculated
D: Based on danger value data
M: Measured
R: Current Repair Interval
R- 1: Previous Repair interval
S: Ship
Lower Case Subscripts
i: Code of ship location within a compartment
j: Ship compartment along the length from stem to bow
j Area on ship
s Ship
Frame or bulkhead location
k: Crack size group in 50mm increments
c: Crack
Lower Case Greek Subscripts
K: Loading condition
5:
Matrices
2-D matrix of average crack lengths in all ships of the database
2-D matrix of average crack lengths in ships of age "A"
2-D Matrix of critical crack lengths
2-D matrix of crack length measurement resolutions
2-D matrix of average crack lengths in ship "S"
3-D matrix of number of cracks in each location, compartment and crack size
group in all ships of the database
3-D matrix of number of cracks in each location, compartment and crack size
group in all ships of age A
3-D matrix of number of cracks in each location, compartment and crack size
group in ship S
2-D Matrix of Criticality parameters C1
2-D Matrix of Criticality parameters C2
1 -D Matrix of adjustment factors of criticality parameters
2-D matrix of total crack length in each location and compartment of ships of
the database
2-D matrix of total crack length in each location and compartment of ships of
age A
2-D matrix of total crack length in each location & compartment of ship S
2-D matrix of number of cracks in each location and compartment of all ships
of the database
2-D matrix of number of cracks in each location and compartment of all ships
of age A
2-D matrix of number of cracks in each location & compartment of ship S
as:
Cs:
C1:
C2:
LA:
N:
R :2-D matrix of mean crack growth rates across all the ships of the database
RA: 2-D matrix of mean crack growth rates for ships of age "A"
s 2-D matrix of mean crack growth rates for cracks in ship "S"
3-D matrix of crack sizes (varies only in one dimension)
if :2-D matrix of inspection intervals for ships of age "A"
~F
Toa :2-D Matrix of minimum failure times absent of visible cracks for ship age "A"
fI 2-D Matrix of minimum failure time margins absent of visible cracks for ship
age "A"
Matrix Elements
": Mean crack length in location i, compartment j, in all ships of database
ia : Mean crack length in location i, compartment j, in ships of age "A"
[5] : Critical crack length of location "i" and compartment "j"
[5rj : Crack length measurement resolution for location "i" in compartment "j"
[s : Mean crack length of cracks in location i, compartment j, in ship "S"
[]ijk: Cracks in location "i", compartment "j", size group "k" in whole database
[aA ]ijk: Cracks at location "i", compartment "j", size group "k" in ships aged "A"
[sI iik: Cracks at location "i", compartment "j", size group "k" in ship "S"
[.-i ]: Criticality parameter C1 corresponding to location "i" in compartment "j"
C 2 .. : Criticality parameter C2 corresponding to location "i" in compartment "j"
([]: Adjustment factor of criticality parameters for compartment "j"
[Lj : Total crack length at location "i", compartment "j", of whole database
['A]j: Total crack length at location "i", compartment "j" in ships aged "A"
[L ]. Total crack length at location "i", compartment "j", of ship "S"
[2SI] Cracks at location "i" and compartment "j" in whole database
N .:' ] Cracks at location "i", in compartment "j", of all ships of age "A"
PS : Cracks at location "i", in compartment "j", of ship "S"
Mean crack growth rate in location i, compartment "j" of all ships
[ RA] 1 j: Mean crack growth rate in location i, compartment "j", ship age "A"
[S ]ij: Mean crack growth rate in location i, compartment "j" of ship "S"
[ ij,k: Crack size (in mm) corresponding to size group "k"
[Ai] : Crack inspection interval in location "i", compartment "j" at ship age "A"
[FJ]: Minimum time to failure absent of a visible crack in location "i" and
compartment "j" of ships of age "A"
[ii A~: Time margins to failure for barely unidentifiable cracks in location "i" and
compartment "j" of ships of age "A"
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Roman Upper Case
Constant
Ageo:
ARF(Age):
B:
BCI}:
BCIn:
C:
CAPEX:
CCo:
CF;:
CFy:
%Com:
CP:
CT:
D:
Days:
DEP:
Deposit:
E:
ECF:
ED(Age):
EBITDA:
Age of ship at time of valuation
Earnings reduction factor due to ship age
Annual operating cost OR Constants
Equivalent daily revenues of a new (Baltic) Cape for year "j"
Daily revenues of a Baltic Cape (new ship) in month "n"
Value of call option today
Capital Expenditures
Combined operating costs
OR Constant
Cash flow in year "j"
Cash flow in year "y"
Address commission plus broker commissions
Cost parameter for ship
Annual net charter rate at time "t"
Cost of time
Effective duration of cash flows OR Debt OR Constant
Time in days
Depreciation
Deposit amount
Value of equity OR Constant
Levered cash flow to equity holders
Earning days per month as a function of age
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
E (St): Expected value under the objective measure (not risk-neutral)
F: Price of option (either a put or a call option)
FailCost: Cost of failure due to cracks
FCF,: Free cash flow (Unlevered) in year "t"
FM (t, T,): Futures level for month "m" with maturity T
FQ (t, T,): Futures level for quarter "q" with maturity T
F : Futures price
F (t, T,): Futures level for calendar year "y" with maturity T
Icc: Combined operating and dry dock cost inflation
ICt: Invested capital in year "t"
in :Average US monthly inflation until month "n"
Ioc: Operating cost inflation
1(t): Inflation from yield spread of TIPS and T-Bills until time "t"
K: Strike price
Life: Number of months in ship's life
LTAV: Long term asset value
M: Ship's age in months at the time when the operating costs are evaluated
MRP: Market risk premium
N: Month at which operating costs are evaluated OR Cumulative distribution
function of standard normal distribution OR Number of assets in portfolio
NetICt: Net invested capital at year "t"
NOPLA T,/: Net operating profit less adjusted taxes for year "t"
NPV: Net present value of all cash flows
OC: Operating costs
OCN(n): Nominal Operating costs in $/day at "N" months from today
OpExp,: Real operating expenses in $/day, "n" months from the valuation date
P(fail),: Probability of failure due to cracks during month "n"
PV(K): The value of the strike price discounted from maturity
PV(LongF): Present value of a long futures position
PV(ShipRev): Present value of the expected earnings of the un-hedged ship
PV(TS): Present value of tax shields (from tax deductibility of interest payments)
PV(Xi 2 , = xy): Present value of cash flow "x" in one year
RC: Repair cost
ROE: Return on equity
Revn: Daily Revenues during month "n"
Revo: Initial daily revenues
RepCostsn: Repair costs during month "n"
RP: Risk premium over CAPM model
RT: Repair time
RTNoCracks: Repair time without cracks
R W: Residual value of ship
S: Price of underlying stock option today
ShipValue: Ship value today
SRP: Systematic risk premium
S (t): Survivor function OR Value of underlying asset of exchange option
T : Time (years) OR Time to maturity (tenure) OR Remaining life (years)
Tons: Weight of steel
TV: Terminal value of company at year "T" (PV of a growing perpetuity)
V: Value
VBSPA-Cape (t): Value of the BSPA-Cape index
VS&P 500 (t): Value of S&P 500 index at time "t"
UCFt: Unlevered cash flows at time "t"
Roman Lower Case
c: Constant that defining risk averseness
C1 : Constant to account for commissions, age and off-hire time in year "j"
C2j Constant to account for the non-revenue cash flows in year "j"
dt: Dividends at time "t"
dt: Incremental change in time
dV: Incremental change in value
g: Assumed annual growth of future cash flows
i: Discount rate (constant)
i": Discount rate for month "n"
m: Index that denotes the month
m : Area in m2
n: Months from valuation date OR Number of compounding periods per year
p: Returns on portfolio
q: Index that denotes the quarter
r: Discount rate without ship risks
rCAPM: Capital asset pricing model returns
rD: Cost of debt
rE : Cost of levered equity
r (): Cost of equity
rf: Continuously compounded risk free interest rate
rf (t): Risk free rate
r, Annual interest compounded "n" times per year
r.: Cost of unlevered equity
rWACC. :Annual inflation adjusted continuously compounded WACC
rwAcc (t) : Weighted average cost of capital
rwAcc (t) : Inflation-adjusted weighted average cost of capital
rwAcc,: Monthly inflation adjusted continuously compounded WACC
t :Continuously compounded interest rate (varies with time)
r.s Discount rate adjusted for ship risks
r : Constant continuously compounded annual interest rate
t: Time variable (typically in years)
u: Utility of cash flow "x"
x: Principal amount
x Return on principal over an infinitesimal time increment
x,: Returns of asset "i"
XT: Cash flow at time T
Xl2m: Cash flow in one year
x1y: Cash flow in one year
w Percentage of portfolio in asset "i"
y: Year in the ship's life
z: Wiener Process
Greek Upper Case
AB VND: Change in value of net debt
ANWC: Change in net working capital
Greek Lower Case
/8, (t): Beta of equity
2(r): Hazard function (function of time variable T)
A(n): Hazard function for ship age corresponding to month "n"
AS :Risk premium to account for ship risks
p : Drift term
PBSPA-Cape,S&P500,T: Correlation between BSPA-Cape and S&P 500 over time "T"
pu: Correlation between returns of asset "i" and "j"
a : Volatility
UBSPA-Cape,T : Black-implied volatility of BSPA Cape index for tenure "T"
oi :Volatility of returns on asset "i" (% volatility of asset "i")
ai :Covariance of returns of asset "i" and "j"
US&P500,T : Black-Implied volatility for S&P 500 index for tenure "T"
(S,T: Black-Implied volatility of the exchange option with tenure "T"
T : Time to expiration (years) OR Tax rate
Upper Case Subscripts
S: Ship OR Underlying asset
Lower Case Subscripts
Equity
Crack OR Portfolio Asset
j: Ship Location with Crack OR Portfolio asset
k: Repair process
m: Month
n: Month
t: Continuous compounding
u: Unlevered
y: Year
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Abbreviations
ABS American Bureau of Shipping
AET Acoustic Emission Technology
APV Adjusted Present Value
AR Average Revenue
ARA Absolute Risk Aversion
ARF Age Reduction Factor
BCI Baltic Cape Index
BDI Baltic Dry Index
BE Book Value of Equity
BEM Boundary Element Methods
BM Bending Moment
BOD Board of Directors
BPI Baltic Panamax Index
BSPA Baltic Sale and Purchase Assessment Index
BV Bureau Veritas
BVND Book Value of Net Debt
C.D.F. Cumulative Distribution Function
CAGR Cumulative Average Growth Rate
Cape Capesize bulk carrier
CAPEX Capital Expenses
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CF Cash Flows
COLREG Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing
CoV Coefficient of Variation
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSRP Company Specific Risk Premium
CTOD Crack Tip Opening Displacement approach
DCF Discounted Cash Flow
DD Dry Dock
DNV Det Norske Veritas
DRYS Dryships
DSX Diana Shipping
EBIAT Earnings Before Interest After Tax
EBITDA Earnings Before Interest Depreciation and Amortization
ECF Equity Cash Flow
EndVal End value of vessel after the charter
EOS Economies of Scale
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
FCF Free Cash Flows
FEA Finite Element Analysis
FFA Freight Forward Agreement
FTE Flow to Equity
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GL Germanischer Lloyd
HAZ Heat Affected Zone
HHI Hyundai Heavy Industries
HIMP Hull Inspection and Maintenance Program
HMX Handimax
HTS High Tensile Steel
I Interest Rate
IACS International Association of Classification Societies
IISI International Iron and Steel Institute
ILO International Labor Organization
IMO
IPO
ISM
ISM
LCN
LEFM
LL
LNG
LOA
LP
LTAV
MC
MOU
MR
MRP
MS
MWC
NAC5
NASL
NDT
NDT
NK
NOPLAT
NPV
NSC
NWC
NYSE
OBO
OC
International Maritime Organization
Initial Public Offering
International Safety Management
International Safety Management
Lifedream Compania Naviera
Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics
Load Line
Liquefied Natural Gas
Length overall
Longitudinally Profiled
Long Term Asset Value
Marginal Cost
Memorandum of Understanding
Marginal Revenue
Market Risk Premium
Market Share
Modified Wohler Curves
New Anti-Corrosion No 5
North American Steamship Limited
Nil Ductility Temperature
Non-Destructive Testing
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Tax
Net Present Value
Nippon Steel Corporation
Net Working Capital
New York Stock Exchange
Ore Bulk Oil
Operating Cost
OPEX Operating Expenses
P.D.F. Probability Density Function
P/E Price-to-Earnings
PMX Panamax
PNU Pussan National University
PSC Port State Control
PV Present Value
RAFL Risk Adjusted Forward Looking Ship Valuation Model
RC Repair Cost
RO Recognised Organisations
ROA Return on Assets
ROE Return on Equity
RP Risk Premium
RT Repair Time
S&P Sale and Purchase
SCF Stress Concentration Factor
SMX Suezmax
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
SRP Systematic Risk Premium
SS Special Survey
SS2 Second Special Survey
STCW Standards of Training Certification and Watch-keeping
T-Bills Treasury Bills
TC Time Charter
TIPS Treasury Inflation Protected Securities
TMCP Thermo-Mechanical Control Process
TV Terminal Value
TVR Time Variant Reliability
UCF Unlevered Cash Flow
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USCG United States Coast Guard
USD US Dollars
VLOC Very Large Ore Carrier
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital
WS World Scale
WTO World Trade Organization Collisions at Sea
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Capesize Bulk Carriers
The overwhelming majority of the world's commodities and raw materials are
transported by sea. Since this is unlikely to change in the future, the safety of bulk carrier
ships is of outmost importance to society.
Bulk carriers were introduced in the 1950s for the more efficient transportation of
cargo in the form of bulk. They are divided into various size-groups whose definitions have
changed over time following technological developments and the shift to greater sizes for
economies of scale.
Traditionally the three main groups starting from the smallest are the Handysizes
(typically geared), the Panamaxex (maximum size that can transit the Panama Canal), and the
Capesizes which are larger and hence have to sail around the cape. Today the groups most
commonly referred to, are the Mini-bulker (<10,000dwt), Handy-size (>10,000dwt),
Handymax (>40,00dwt), Supramax (-52,000dwt), Panamax (-75,000dwt), Kamsarmax
(-82,000dwt), Post-Panamax (-90,000dwt), Capesize (>100,000dwt), Newcastlemax
(-206,000dwt Coal Carriers) and VLOC (very large ore carriers).
The design of bulk carriers in general has remained more or less the same since they
were introduced in the mid 1950's. What is even more interesting is that apart from
scantlings and size, the cross section of a large Capesize bulk carrier (Cape) is almost
identical to that of a Handy. The structural details in the cargo hold region of a typical bulk
carrier are outlined in Fig 1.1-1 while Fig 1.1-2 provides an outline of the whole cargo hold
configuration.
Capesizes started with deadweight of about 110,000 dwt in the 1960s and gradually
progressed to the typical size of 172,000dwt. They are typically gearless with 9 cargo holds
of approximately the same size, equal to about 25 meters deep. Their overall length (LOA) is
typically 292 meters and the beam is about 50m, which exceeds the permissible required for
transiting the Panama Canal. Therefore, they need to sail round the Cape Horn and that is
where the name "Capes" originates from. When loaded, they also have to sail around the
Cape of Good Hope instead of transiting the Suez Canal. They are used mainly in the
transport of high density cargos such as iron ore or coal within specific trade routes. Most
common destinations include China, Australia, Holland, Brazil and South Africa.
11. Strength Deck
Plating
2. Strength Deck Longi 30 Hatch Coa0ming
10. Sheerstake Litial
12. Hatch Coaming2, Top Side Tank Deck
Transverse Web
29. Hatch Side
26, Top Side Tank Side Girder
Tranwmse Web
13. Top Side Tank
24. Tap Side Tank Sloping Plating
Shell Longs
25 Top Side Tank
2 Top Side Tank Sloping Sloping Tramv.Web
Plating Longs
9 Side Shedl Plating 22 Sie Shel
Frame
21 Hopper Tank Sloping
Plating Longs 8. Hopper Tank
Sloping Plating20 Hopper Tank Side Sligi
17 Hoppe Tank Side 1$. lopper Teak Sloping
TranVne Web Tranwene Web
19. Bilge Longs 7. Inner Bottom
6. Bilge Plating
16. Hopper Tank Bottom
Transverse Web
15 lnner 004m Longs
5. Double Bottom rank Floor
4. Double Bottom Side (irden.
3. Bottoni Shell Plating
1. Keel Pnate2. ottle Lom C
2, Double Bottom Centre Girdler
Fig. 1.1-1: Capesize Bulk Carrier Mid-Ship section, Structural Items [Loukakis 20051
Fig. 1.1-2: Typical cargo hold configuration [IACS (a)
These ships today are designed for a fatigue life of about 30 years. Their trading life
however is affected both by structural and economic factors and often exceeds this. Life
extension is worthwhile as long as returns over the projected remaining life of a ship
outweigh the required costs.
A steady increase has been observed in the world fleet of Capes since the early 1970s
(Fig 1.1-3) and this is projected to continue given the high orderbook. As of April 15th 2010
the world fleet stands at 1,001 Capes of 178.6Mdwt while there are another 768 of
146.8Mdwt on order including VLOCs of 400,000dwt.
Fig. 1.1-3: The Capesize Fleet Development since 1970 [Clarksons 20101
1.2 The Problem of Cracks
Structural failures of bulk carriers continue to account for the loss of many lives every
year. The problem is particularly important in Capes which are vulnerable to cracking for
three main reasons: (a) their large size/length, (b) their trade in high density cargoes (such as
iron ore), and (c) the exceptionally high rates of loading and discharging. As a consequence,
there have been several dramatic casualties in the past where there was not enough reaction
time available to even send an SOS message. Naturally, this has attracted public attention and
it has caused great concern about fractures particularly in Capes.
The problem of fractures is more severe in Capes than in smaller ships because of
their large size and the consequent large bending moments and stresses. This is illustrated in
Fig 1.2-1 which compares the number of cracking and fatigue incidences between the various
bulk carrier size groups. While this is the case, no extensive survey has ever been carried out
focusing specifically on cracking in Capes.
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Fig. 1.2-1: Comparison of Cracks as a percentage of total damages between the three main Bulk Carrier Size
Categories [DNV 20021
Capes have a relatively standard size and configuration and they are also used in
specific trades as discussed above. This means that they are all subjected to similar loads
throughout their service life and it is possible to make direct comparisons between different
ships regarding their fracture behavior.
Cracks have been of great concern for many decades to all parties involved in
shipping including ship owners, charterers, classification societies, the IMO, insurance
providers, and shipyards - each for different reasons. Owners are concerned with the safety
of their ship and crew, repair costs and time lost in port while ship yards are constantly trying
to pin-point the problem in order to improve design and introduce new ships. The big trade-
off which designers and owners often face in the construction of a new ship is whether to
invest in a fatigue resistant design, or to produce a lower cost structure and incur the repair
costs as cracks emerge later in the ship's life. This kind of choice has to be made for
hundreds of locations throughout the ship's hull. Shipowners also need an understanding of
the cost and safety implications of cracks as a ship ages in order to make decisions such as
buying, selling, repairing or scrapping ships of a certain age given the market level and
expectations. Banks that finance ship acquisitions, other investors, brokers and analysts have
similar concerns when estimating the value of a ship.
Charterers and cargo owners are concerned about cargo damage and delays. They are
often called to choose between chartering a new ship or an older one at a lower cost.
Occasionally, they also make decisions such as restricting some trades to particular ships for
safety purposes, in which case they usually make distinctions by ship age or design
specifications. Iron ore terminals, continuously try to increase loading rates in order to
improve productivity but this can have serious consequences related to cracks and ship
losses.
Regulatory groups such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) are
responsible for the seaworthiness of ships, the safety of the crew and protection of the
environment. They are highly concerned with cracks as it is their responsibility to ensure
safety through regulations regarding design, loading rates, minimum inspection standards etc.
Insurance companies rely on existing knowledge about the likely crack costs and probability
of failure when deciding the insurance premiums for repairs or ship loss. Classification
societies are concerned about the safety implications of cracks and use their existing
knowledge to set the frequency of inspections and examine the right locations in each survey.
Inspectors of flag authorities and the port state control also need guidance as to where cracks
are likely to be found depending on the ship's age.
Cracks develop and propagate due to corrosion or fatigue and may ultimately lead to
failure and sinking of the ship. Corrosion cracks manifest by the well-known mechanism of
stress corrosion cracking. Furthermore, the structure is fatigued by the alternate loads due to
sea waves, and during cargo operations with rates often exceeding 16,000 tons per hour.
There is practically no ship entirely free of cracks. Their origin, type and size however may
differ widely from one ship to another. Some cracks develop at an early stage, for example
due to bad design, while others may develop later as a result of fatigue. Since it is impossible
to prevent the development of cracks throughout the ship's life, it is essential to minimize
this effect in the vulnerable areas, and to detect cracks before they grow to a critical size.
This is possible by improving design, minimizing stresses during operation and through
regular inspections and repairs.
Due to the high stakes involved by a wide range of parties, a lot of work has been
carried out to assess the problem of cracks. Theoretical, analytical and numerical methods
have been developed to assess the problem in many ways. Modeling of the marine
environment however and accurately predicting the actual conditions and stresses which a
ship encounters throughout its service life is practically very difficult to materialize. It is
therefore essential to take direct measurements from ships and any conclusions derived as
such will be much more reliable for the time being.
Several statistical studies have been carried out using ultrasonic gauge readings in
order to assess corrosion wear distribution throughout the ship hull. Similar studies on
cracking however are very limited due to the high confidentiality and unavailability of data.
Most are performed by classification societies using data from their fleets in order to develop
their rules. Furthermore, very few surveys have been performed specifically on cracks while
most cover a wide range of damages or failures including dents, buckling, corrosion etc. The
majority of the work also covers a wide variety of ship types and sizes.
Possible reasons for the scarcity of detailed information in the published literature
include the fact that classification societies generally treat such information as confidential in
order to protect the interest of their clients; ship-owners try to minimize the time spent in
repairs which limits data acquisition while there is limited feedback to shipyards after the
guarantee period; damages are very often attributed to heavy weather, an accepted peril of
the sea; and most importantly, fatigue cracking is not always regarded as a serious problem
that may affect the overall ship integrity so there is no immediate need to document it.
Furthermore, cracks in a large ship are so many that recording them by size, location and
origin is not considered to be part of normal survey work.
1.3 The Cape Market
The capesize bulk carrier market is highly cyclical both in terms of charter rates and
in terms of ship prices. This creates tremendous investment opportunities with exceptionally
high returns over short periods for those who enter and exit at the right time. There are
however many factors contributing to the outcome of the market, making it highly
unpredictable. An extensive historical analysis of market cycles has been conducted by
[Stopford 2009]. Fig 1.3-1 shows dry bulk shipping cycles since WW2, and Fig 1.3-2, which
is based primarily on coal, goes back to the 18th century.
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22 shipping cycles are identified over the past two and a half centuries, with an
average duration of 10.4 years and a standard deviation of 4.9 years [Stopford 2009). The
Cape market is particularly volatile with ship values appreciating in some cases by over
500% and then returning to original levels, all within a few years. An investor is presented
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with the decision of timing, what ship to buy (age is an important parameter), how to employ
it (e.g. long term charter), when to sell it, and whether to hedge some of the risk through the
futures market. A critical issue in these decisions is the safety and maintenance cost
associated with the ship depending on its age.
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Recent market changes have rendered conventional pricing methods inaccurate and
often inapplicable, resulting in a pressing need for alternate valuation models. Very little
research combines the closely interlinked technical and financial elements which are crucial
for valuation and decision making by various parties in the shipping industry.
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1.4 Objectives and Thesis Outline
The objective of this work is to examine the capesize industry both from a technical
and a financial perspective and to analyze data to produce results that will be valuable to
various constituents of the shipping industry. We will examine both market and structural
safety characteristics of Capes as well as maintenance costs and hedging options to
ultimately produce results that can guide important decisions and also to create a state of the
art valuation model that is urgently needed in the industry. The work of this thesis is
interdisciplinary and as such, goes into depth on various topics which may not be of interest
to all readers. The main contributions are in Chapters 4 and 5. I encourage the readers to refer
to the following outline and to the table of contents so they can be directed to the relevant
chapters and sections.
In Chapter 2, the Cape market and the economics of the industry are analyzed.
Historical market trends, in terms of ship-values and freight rates for Capes of various ages,
are examined along with the factors that determine the market outcome. A database of
previous fixtures, secondhand transactions and newbuilding orders is compiled and analyzed
to derive conclusions regarding the charter-free/survey-passed value of ships of various ages
as well as the employment opportunities that arise for each throughout the market cycles. The
capesize paper market, which has been in existence since 2002, is also examined regarding
its relation to the physical market and the hedging opportunities that it provides.
Chapter 3 presents the relevant technical background related to factors such as
fracture mechanics, monitoring, repairing and designing against cracks, ship design, steels,
operating stresses and cargo operations etc.
Chapter 4 presents the technical work related to cracks beginning with an analysis of
cracks recorded in Capes. The purpose is to derive conclusions regarding the critical areas,
frequency and distribution of cracks throughout the hull, crack size, the effect of age and the
origins and repairs of the various types of cracks. Note that the terms "crack" and "fracture"
are taken to be synonymous in the context of this investigation. The work presented involves
the collection and analysis of one of the largest ship cracking surveys which is focused
specifically on Capes that lie at the core of the problem. The data are sourced from the
records of ship owners, classification societies and shipyards. The size, location and repair
procedure of each crack is extracted from the records and recorded into a database for further
analysis. Fig 1.4-1 shows the cross section of a capesize bulk carrier compartment showing
some of the possible locations for cracks or steel renewals.
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Fig. 1.4- 1: Structural Configuration of a Typical Capesize Bulk Carrier [MER 2002a]
A location coding system is specifically designed to analyze the data and present the
frequency, size and estimated crack growth rates with respect to location and ship age. The
results are compared with existing knowledge based on surveys conducted over the past 50
years, the stress distribution based on an investigation of loading patterns, and theoretical
fracture mechanics predictions. They are then used to develop a relative safety assessment
model that yields a safety parameter as a function of ship age. The records of a large fleet
sample are separately used to estimate the frequency of crack failures (emergency repairs and
losses) as a function of ship age. The two sets of results are compared for validation purposes
and ultimately combined to create a reliability model that yields the hazard function
throughout the ship's life.
Chapter 5 combines the insights gained from earlier chapters, along with some new
analysis to produce results and tools useful for important decision making by the various
parties of the shipping industry. Repair procedures and design modifications of the crack
database are examined and a model is designed to assess their cost effectiveness based on the
present value of projected cracks. The crack repair cost is also developed as a function of
ship age to be used in conjunction with the relative safety assessment for decision making
that involves cost and safety tradeoffs.
Steel renewals account for a large fraction of repair costs and most of the remaining
repair costs such as staging, cleaning, coating and sand blasting also scale with steel
renewals. With that in mind, a large database of repairs is compiled and analyzed to estimate
repair costs as a function of age. The operations of public and private companies are
compared, before using records and conducting surveys with both types and carrying out an
inflation analysis to project operating expenses.
A new state of the art valuation model is then developed combining both technical
and financial aspects in a fundamental valuation based on risk-adjusted discounting of
expected cash flows. A forward view of the main parameters is obtained from derivatives and
financial securities that include shipping futures, FFAs, options, interest rate swaps and
inflation protected bonds. The inherent risk of cracks is treated as a fictitious credit risk,
derived from the reliability model, and is incorporated into the discount rate along with other
risk premiums. Other inputs including repair costs, operating expenses and off-hire time, are
sourced from the earlier analysis. The model is extended to also estimate the volatility of the
ship value and uses it to price optionalities that are often included in ship transactions.
Finally, the results are validated with real data, the possible uses of the results and methods
developed are discussed and recommendations are made for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Economics of Capes
- Adapted from [Hadjiyiannis 2007]'
1 Note: With the exception of Sections 2.1 and 2.7, the bulk of the research presented
throughout Chapter 2 was carried out in early 2007, with the data available at the time.
2.1 Market Overview
2.1.1 Introduction
The cape market has closely followed the dry bulk market since the introduction of
capes in the late 1960s. It is highly cyclical, creating big investment opportunities with
potential for high and fast returns. China's recent economic expansion has impacted capes in
particular as they account for the vast majority of iron ore transportation. The rapid increase
in demand combined with the short-run inelasticity of supply due to capacity constraints has
led to a record-high market. This combined with lack of confidence has some very interesting
implications. The price gap between newer and older vessels has narrowed significantly,
while a modem cape is worth about 50% more than ordering a newbuilding. Since 1986
when a 9-year-old cape was of scrap value, the market has moved to the opposite extreme
with a 13-year-old cape worth as much as a newbuilding.
The industry and its development will be analyzed before focusing on market
prospects. Extensive analysis will be presented on a wide range of factors contributing to the
outcome of the market in terms of freight rates, time charter rates, ship values and
newbuilding prices. Examples include Chinese steel production and iron ore imports,
Australian port congestion and queue lengths, oil prices, newbuilding orders and delivery
times, the orderbook and the scrapping pool, all of which are at record high levels. Other
factors include exchange rates, GDP growth, policies and demolition rates.
The analysis is carried out using databases of newbuilding orders, fixtures and S&P
transactions as well as a wide range of numerical data from a variety of sources. The futures
market will also be investigated, as well as its relation to the physical market. A wide range
of current investment opportunities are finally considered from a buyer's and a seller's
perspective. These are analyzed and compared before making the relevant recommendations.
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2.1.2 Background on the Cape Market
Bulk Carriers are divided into five main size groups which focus of different trades
though there is substantial overlap. The smallest ones are the Handysize vessels or "Handys",
which are between 1OKdwt and 35Kdwt. These are usually geared, they are very flexible due
to their size, and they are used in a wide variety of trades. Handymax vessels cover the range
of 35Kdwt to 60Kdwt. These are also usually geared and transport a wide range of cargo.
Panamaxes are the largest vessels that can transit the Panama Canal, which imposes a
restriction of 32.2m on the beam. Due to developments in design, materials and naval
architecture, the permissible size in terms of capacity has grown substantially over the years
and is currently about 75Kdwt. Panamaxes are mainly used in the transportation of coal, iron
ore, grain and phosphates. Following the announcement of the Panama Canal expansion,
which will be complete by 1914, there will no longer be a need for vessels of these particular
dimensions. Other considerations will come into play and a new and larger Panamax design
will evolve.
Bulk carriers larger than Panamaxes have to sail around Cape Horn and hence they
are called "capesize bulk carriers" or "capes". They are typically around 175Kdwt and are
mostly used for the transportation of coal and iron ore. Though Capes are not involved in the
transportation of most cargos, changes in these markets can have a significant impact on the
demand for capes through a knock-on effect. When Chinese steel exports increase for
example, as in 2005, the demand for Handymaxes increases. More Handymaxes are used in
this trade and Panamaxes become more heavily involved in trades that are shared between
the two vessel types. This effectively reduces the supply of panamax ships in the grain or
iron ore trades. The demand for capes therefore goes up as it did significantly in 2005 for this
reason. The markets of the various size groups follow each other though there tends to be
short periods of divergence. This is also shown in Fig. 2.1-1.
Fig. 2.1-1: Shows the ratio of cape earnings to panamax earnings over time. This has
varied within the range 1.2 to 2.8 over the past five years. The average value is about 2.
101
Fig. 2.1-1: Bulk Carrier Earnings tend to go Together [SSY 2007b}
Fig. 2.1-2: Ratio of Cape to PMX Earnings Over Time [SSY 2007bj
Specialized ore carriers are designed specifically for high-density cargoes such as
iron ore. Due to the high stowage factor of the cargo, these are compact and have a capacity
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that often exceeds 300Kdwt with only a modest increase in overall dimensions. This however
renders them inefficient for the transportation of the high stowing coal and has made them
less profitable over the past few decades. They are therefore few in number and the majority
of iron ore is transported in Capesize vessels. The largest iron ore carrier in the world is the
Berge Stahl, built in 1986, shown in Fig. 2.1-3. It measures 343m long and its deadweight
capacity is 364,767dwt.
The Berge Stahl
Fig. 2.1-3: Berge Stahl - The World's Largest Dry Bulk Carrier [Van Dyck 20041
As of 2006, there were 711 capes in the world fleet with a total capacity of
120.6Mdwt. About 10% of these are over 200Kdwt and about 1% are over 300Kdwt. 185
capes of 37Mdwt are currently on order until 2012, of which 28 are large ore carriers and 17
are over 300Kdwt. Only 1 cape has been scrapped since last year so the capesize fleet is
increasing at a high rate [Clarksons 2007b].
Capes are designed for a fatigue life of about 30 years. Their trading life however is
affected both by structural and economic factors. Life extension is worthwhile when the
market (or expected market) is such that predicted returns over the projected remaining ship
life outweigh the required costs. Fig. 2.1-4 shows the age distribution of the fleet along with
the current orderbook.
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Fig. 2.1-4: The Capesize Fleet Development since 1970 - using data from [Braemar 20061
The 711 capes in the world fleet are divided among 162 owners. The biggest one is Mitsui
O.S.K. Lines with 35 vessels of an average 176Kdwt at an average age of 9 years. This fleet is
worth about $3bn in today's market but only accounts for 4.9% of the world fleet. The top 50
owners own three quarters of the world fleet while the top 20 own about half and the top 10 own
about a third. This is shown in Fig. 2.1-5, as the percentage owned by the top 5 owners (1st to 5 th
the second five owners (6thto 10th) and so on.
Capesize Fleet Distribution by Number
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Fig. 2.1-5: The Capesize Fleet Distribution Among Owners using Data from [Clarksons 2006c, LR 2007]
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The number of owners owning 4 to 35 vessels is indicated in Fig. 2.1-6, which shows the
fleet distribution among the top 50 cape owners.
[ Cape Fleet Distrubution Among the Top 50 Owners
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Fig. 2.1-6: The Capesize Fleet Distribution Among to 50 Owners by Number of Vessels - using Data from
[Clarksons 2006 & GSD 20071
As mentioned earlier, Capes are mainly used mainly in the transportation of iron ore
and coal within specific trade routes. Most common destinations include China, Australia,
Holland, Brazil and South Africa. The largest importer of iron ore is China while the largest
exporters are Australia and Indonesia [LR 2005b]. The prevalence of iron ore over other
cargos however is clear in Fig. 2.1-7, which shows the approximate shares of commodities
transported by capes as tabulated by values from [Braemar 2007a] and [DNV 1997].
Iron ore as a commodity is crucial to economic development and its consumption per capita
is an index measuring the standard of living. Many countries depend heavily on its transportation
and since the sea separates producers from consumers, typically by a large distance, this makes
marine transportation of iron ore a vital aspect of economic growth.
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Fig. 2.1-7: Capesize Trading Cargoes using data from [Braemar 2006 & DNV 19971
Marine transportation of iron ore has been increasing steadily for the past several years
while China's expansion has caused a tremendous increase in demand since the start of the new
millennium. Currently, 716 million tones (the vast majority) of iron ore are being transported by
sea annually making it the largest dry bulk trade as shown in Fig. 2.1-8.
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Fig. 2.1-8: Seabome Dry Bulk Trades in Mt for the years 2004 - 2006 rSSY 2006al
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At its origin, iron ore is extracted from the ground in mine fields and then transported
to nearby ports via trains. It is then stockpiled onto big land surfaces within the ports and
from there loaded onto ships by means of conveyor belts. Ships then transport the cargo to
other terminals in which it is unloaded using large grabs and then taken to close by steel
plants (the final destination) by trains. Almost all iron ore (98%) is used to make iron and
steel [Kirk 2006].
The dry bulk shipping is highly competitive with relatively low barriers to entry.
These include knowledge, ISM certification and other regulations, high prices and economies
of scale. Economies of scale however are much more significant on a ship and its size as
opposed to the size of a firm and its fleet. A new entrant therefore also has access to these
EOS reducing the significance of this barrier. The market consists of many relatively small
charterers and shipowners and deadweight capacity is distributed relatively evenly amongst
them. The influence of a single player on the market's outcome is therefore very limited
creating a highly competitive environment.
To a great extent, the above also applies to the more specific cape industry. The cape
fleet however is relatively small. Furthermore, the cape market is highly sensitive on supply
and if that is reduced by say 15% when the market is already on an upward trend, this can
have a big impact on rates. A Taiwanese owner, Nobuyoshi Morimoto managed to take
advantage of this and cornered the market to some extent in 2005, making in excess of $lbn
through a series of futures and subsequent charters.
Shipping is a highly cyclical market both in terms of charter rates and in terms of ship
prices. This creates opportunities for high profits if one enters and exits at the right time.
There are however many factors contributing to the outcome of the market and this makes it
very unpredictable. Fig. 2.1-9 shows an overview of the dry bulk market over the past twenty
years since the great shipping crisis in 1986. The main peaks and bottoms are then outlined
below.
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2003: The current boom was largely driven by China's expansion but America's
demand in 2006 has led to an increase in backhaul rates. The increase in oil prices
has also led to the economic expansion of oil producing countries and to increased
use and transportation of steam coal
2.1.3 Market Characterization
2.1.3.1 Introduction
The type of market in which capes are operated and traded is of great importance to
valuation. By market type, in this context, I refer to the economic definition of markets such
as perfect competition, monopoly, oligopoly, collusive oligopoly, monopolistic competition
etc. The market type and competition levels drive both the returns that an asset is expecting
to generate in its lifetime (the asset's value), and the price that it can command.
The cape market is entirely dependent on supply (of ships) and demand (for cargo
transportation) at any given time. There are many factors affecting the long and short term
supply and demand for capes, which are discussed extensively in the next two chapters. For
this reason the shipping market is very volatile and unpredictable. Furthermore, speculation
is very important. If owners speculate that the market is improving they will act differently
than if they are pessimistic, and this will have a significant effect on the market and ship
values. Economies of scale (EOS) are more significant on a ship and its size as opposed to
the size of a firm and its fleet.
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2.1.3.2 Characteristics of Perfect Competition
Perfect competition consists of many small firms selling a homogeneous product or
service. All firms are price takers facing a perfectly elastic demand curve. If an individual
firm marginally increases its price, the demand it faces falls to zero. Their aim is to maximize
profits, so they produce a quantity such that marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue
(market price). There is perfect knowledge, factors of production are perfectly mobile and
there are no barriers to entry.
The industry is in long-run equilibrium, when all firms make normal profits. Only in
this case is there no incentive for firms to enter or leave the industry. In other words, MC =
MR = AR = P = ATC. If firms make supernormal profits in the short run, new firms enter,
shifting the industry supply curve to the right until price decreases, eliminating excess
profits. If firms are making less than normal profit in the short run, some firms exit shifting
the supply curve to the left so price increases until all remaining firms are making normal
profits.
Perfect competition is productively and allocatively efficient but dynamically
inefficient. Productive efficiency ensures minimum average costs while allocative efficiency
means that the optimal amount is produced to maximize social welfare (consumer and
producer surplus). Dynamic efficiency involves innovation which can improve quality and/or
reduce costs. Perfect competition is dynamically inefficient because of free knowledge,
which does not allow copyrights or patents.
2.1.3.3 Characteristics of Oligopolies
An oligopoly consists of a few firms who are price makers but the effect of a price
change depends partly on the reaction of competing firms (strategic interaction). Various
models have been studied in game theory including the Cournot oligopoly that involves
simultaneous competition on Quantity, the Stackelberg oligopoly, which involves sequential
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competition on quantity (sequential decisions on output by firms) and the Bertrand oligopoly
with simultaneous competition on price.
An oligopoly is characterized by the fact that each firm is sufficiently dominant to
influence the market, yet not dominant enough to ignore the actions of rival firms. Each
firm's behaviour is therefore conditioned by its relationships with rival firms. This is the
most common market structure in manufacturing. Oligopoly is usually measured with respect
to concentration ratios. Perfect oligopoly exists when the product is homogeneous and
imperfect when it is differentiated.
Another important characteristic of oligopolies is that prices are sticky (rigid) as they
are in a monopoly. Firms face a kinked demand curve meaning that a price cut will be
matched by rivals but a price increase may not, so price cuts are to some extent irreversible
and can lead to price wars in which all suffer. Furthermore, price changes are expensive as
they involve changing price lists and notifying customers as well as loss of consumer and
retailer loyalty. Since cost curves are usually U-shaped because of the divisibility of fixed
factors, firms can maximise profits by setting the profit-maximising price for normal
demand. Variations in demand are then met by variations in output as opposed to price. Non-
price competition involves competing on quality, product differentiation, after sales servicing
and though marketing and distribution. Prices change when changes in costs or demand are
expected to be permanent.
2.1.3.4 Collusive Oligopoly
Collusion refers to non-compete agreements between rivals to eliminate uncertainty
and maximize joint profits. For example, firms may agree to maintain a common price or
they may split the market and act as monopolists. Collusion can be tacit (informal) or explicit
(formal). It is more likely to occur when there are few producers of a homogeneous product
in an expanding industry with high barriers to entry (natural like EOS or man-made like
predatory pricing) and with a dominant price leader which other firms follow. It comes to the
expense of the consumer as it results in reduced output, higher prices, reduced consumer
I1
choice as well as productive and allocative inefficiency. Technical economies of scale are
also seldom achieved. A cartel is an organisation of producers like OPEC, in which
producers limit competition by agreeing to restrict output and keeping prices high. Individual
members of a cartel have an incentive to cheat by reducing their prices and increasing output.
2.1.3.5 Other Market Types
A monopoly involves only one firm selling a product or service. The firm maximizes
its profit by producing a quantity at which its marginal cost is equal to its marginal revenue
(MC=MR). This quantity is less than the optimal and results in a deadweight loss (net loss to
social welfare compared to perfect competition). Producer surplus is maximized while
consumer surplus is far less than optimal. The deadweight loss can be eliminated if the
monopolist has the ability to apply perfect price discrimination, whereby the producer takes
the entire surplus and each consumer pays an amount exactly equal to their willingness to
pay. Some industries such as the army are natural monopolies meaning that an alternative
model would not be feasible.
A duopoly is a special case of oligopolies in which only two firms compete. This can
have interesting strategic implications on the Bertrand, Stackelberg and Cournot variations
which are studied in game theory. An example is the PC industry where Macintosh and
Windows are the two main participants.
Monopolistic competition includes many sellers of slightly differentiated products.
An important characteristic is the lack of barriers to entry. This leads to more intense
competition causing demand to be more elastic in the long run.
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2.1.3.6 Classification of the Cape Industry
The cape industry is characterized by continuous heavy investments in improved
ships and technologies. Short-run supernormal profits provide firms with the liquidity and the
incentive to invest. Dynamic efficiency applies, as technology evolves, raising service quality
and sophistication of operations. Technical EOS exist with increasing ship sizes but also
financial EOS (cheaper borrowing for firms with higher revenues) favor big incumbent firms,
particularly in high markets, helping them retain market share. Another entry barrier is the
international safety management code (ISM), recently introduced by the IMO, which requires
both the managing company and each ship in its fleet to be certified. In order to enter the
industry, besides certification, one also needs to find experienced personnel to perform the
required functions onboard and on shore, and wait up to several months for a ship to be
delivered. In this sense, the cape market resembles oligopolistic structures. Furthermore, as
shown by the market concentration ratios in Fig. 2.1-5, the top 50 owners own 3/4 of the
world fleet. The industry could therefore actually be classified as an oligopoly.
On the other hand, the cape market is very competitive with no significant EOS as
entry barriers on the fleet level. Having a fleet does not substantially reduce costs of
operating each ship individually. Operators exit during market crises and new ones enter in
market booms driving down supernormal profits. The latter was very pronounced during the
past few years. Information flow and transparency is very high with real-time information on
all ships, their characteristics and respective freight rates. Freight rates are uniform with little
firm influence and only account for a small fraction of total cargo value. Firms operate with
high productive efficiency, keeping costs down to remain competitive. These parameters
show that the cape industry closely resembles perfect competition more than an oligopoly.
Furthermore, due to the size of the market, collusion is very rare. Since the market is cyclical,
prices are not sticky as in oligopolies and a kinked demand curve does not apply. As in
perfect competition, the demand curve that each firm faces at any point in time is perfectly
elastic.
One could also compare the industry to a monopolistic competition. Arguably, the
services provided by firms are slightly differentiated based on the age and technology of the
ship, its fuel consumption (paid by the charterer on period charters), reputation and track
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record etc. Other similarities include the lack of significant entry barriers in the long run and
the perfectly elastic demand curve faced by firms. Monopolistic competitive firms also face
an elastic demand in the long run.
To conclude, the capesize bulk carrier industry behaves as a perfectly competitive
market. However, the adjustment of supply is slow, resulting in the lack of normal profit
equilibrium. Due to the continuous shifting of external factors, equilibrium is rarely sustained
for considerable time at normal profit levels. Hence, there are periods of high investment and
supernormal profits, or pronounced downward cycles.
2.1.4 Porter's 5 Forces Analysis
2.1.4.1 Introduction
Shipping is a very competitive and profitable industry. That is due to its high
cyclicality and the inelasticity of supply which allows for very high short term profits. As we
saw in Section, 2.1.2, the Capesize sector is fairly concentrated with the top 20 owners
owning approximately half the world fleet. In this section, we will apply Porter's five forces
to analyze the attractiveness of the industry:
1) Bargaining Power of Suppliers
2) Barriers to Entry
3) Threat of Substitutes
4) Degree of Internal Rivalry
5) Customer Power
The suppliers include the hired ship crew, the suppliers of spare engine parts, stores
and food, and the providers of bunkers. However, note that under time charters, which are
more common in Capes, bunkers are provided by the charterer. The customers are the
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charterers who may be the cargo owners or intermediaries. Substitutes include existing and
alternative transportation solutions for the same cargo, or alternative cargos.
2.1.4.2 Supplier Bargaining Power
- The dynamics between crews and ship-owners/managers are complex. The union of
seafarers, ITF, has significant bargaining power and tries to maintain high standards
and wages for crews. Its power has declined over the years but it has been known to
arrest ships at ports following reports from its members
- Over the last 50 years, there has been a shift to crews from low cost countries. Deck
crews are typically from the Philippines while Engineers are from former Soviet
countries. Chinese operators use crews from China who are even lower cost, but due
to language barriers, they are rare in non-Chinese companies
- In cases where a special flag is required, for the example in Jones Act trade which is
only for US ships, the flag state may require a certain number of the crew to be of that
nationality. The same applies with the Greek flag. This gives more bargaining power
to the crew. However, there are "flags of convenience" such as the Panama, Malta,
and Cyprus which have more lenient requirements
- As oil prices fluctuate daily, total transportation costs are impacted. The shipping
company has limited power over the bunker suppliers. The ship can choose in which
port to get fuel and bunker costs can also be hedged using derivatives. Note that fuel
is covered by the charterer under period charters
115
2.1.4.3 Barriers to Entry
= High costs are involved in entering the market. CAPEX which include vessel
acquisitions often prohibit new entrants in this sector. High operating expenses also
require significant working capital
= Established relationships and a strong network is required for obtaining long term
contracts at favorable rates is also very important. A new entrant has to establish the
critical set of relations within the industry that will lead to profitable operations
- New entries also have limited access to loans with reasonable terms that are necessary
to financing costly ship purchases. Lenders require established relations and a good
reputation in the industry that is developed over time
- There are specialized companies providing technical management to owners who
don't have a big enough fleet to justify managing their own vessels
= Economies of scale that established companies enjoy. These apply in financing,
management costs, acquiring supplies and spare parts etc
- Brand identity of the company and of its classification society: High reliability is
usually combined with IACS classification societies (DnV, ABS, BV etc) which leads
to increased operating expenses
- Many cargo operators own their ships and limit the amount of cargo available for
transport especially for new entries
2.1.4.4 Threat of Substitutes
- Seaborne transportation competes with mainland transportation (e.g. rail). However,
seaborne trade is very cost effective and the transported volumes are much higher
than feasible by other modes of transport. Substitutability of marine transportation is
low and often impossible due to seaways
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" The most important substitute for cargo owners is management of their own fleet of
ships. This can be expensive as they lack the expertise and specialization, but it
removes the market risk
- Another substitute is transporting cargo from closer locations to reduce ton-miles
(e.g. China importing iron ore from Australia instead of Brazil)
- Port access limitations due to vessel size make smaller bulk carriers good substitutes.
Their attractiveness will increase in 2014 after the Panama Canal is expanded to
accommodate bulk carriers up to 120,000dwt
E Substitutes of coal for electricity generation include different energy sources such as
oil natural gas and renewable energy
2.1.4.5 Degree of Rivalry
- Timing and competitive advantage are crucial and rivalry can be high between those
competing for the same cargo. Differentiation in terms of reputation, ship age and
reliability also play a role giving large companies the competitive advantage. This is
supported by the industry concentration
- The volatile market can result in huge losses pushing companies to operate below
cost and forcing them to shut down. The first to exit the market are usually companies
that end up with low cash reserves and high leverage during a market crisis because
of bad investment timing
* Reputation and relations with cargo operators are important. This requires long-term
commitment to the industry and favors the big players
- Fixed costs are high and the value of an owning company lies mainly in its assets.
Most of the value of an operating company lies in the management personnel
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2.1.4.6 Customer Power
- Specialized vessels are often built (specialized ore carriers or Newcastlemax coal
carriers etc.) to the specification of charterers, particularly when a long term charter is
secured before the construction. This demonstrates the power of customers to shape
the trends in the orderbook
- The Cape market ranges across all continents but the limited number of major
charterers and the limited flexibility of the ships gives them bargaining power
- Demand is inelastic because reliability at the end of the supply chain is crucial.
However, large iron ore companies try to hedge that risk by owning ships (backward
integration), thereby removing the power of independent shipping companies
- Substitutes such as rail transport are limited, capital intensive, lack economies of
scale and take time to construct. It is also costly to make changes in transportation
needs by modifying the supply chain. This gives ship owners bargaining power
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2.2 Demand for Capes
2.2.1 Economic Factors
Demand for shipping is closely related to the global economy. The domestic growth
of any country requires imports and also increases its output thereby creating exports. A
country's demand for shipping is therefore related to its gross domestic product (GDP). Fig.
2.2-1 shows how the GDP of China and the world average GDP has varied over the years.
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Fig. 2.2-1: World and China GDP Growth - using data from [Clarksons 2007al
China is a developing country and therefore has a higher GDP growth rate than the
world average. Its growth currently dictates the dry bulk shipping market and particularly the
capesize market more than any other factor. The previous shipping boom was also driven by
China's demand in 1995 when GDP was at high levels (see Fig. 2.1-9).
As one would expect, the world average GDP growth fluctuates less than that of
China but is still far from stable and this has implications on the demand for shipping. Fig.
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2.2-2 shows the world average GDP growth along with that of developing and advanced
countries and the annual growth in dry bulk trade since 1997.
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Fig. 2.2-2: Disproportionate effect of GDP on Shipping - using data from [Braemar 2007a
It can see that not only is dry bulk trade related to GDP, but it is affected
disproportionately with peak growth being as high as the GDP growth of developing
countries and bottom growth being as low as the GDP growth of advanced countries.
According to OECD, a slow down in European economic growth is expected from 2.6% in
2006 to no more than 2.2% in 2007. This is also supported by the unexpected slowing of the
services sector (the largest sector in the European economy) in December and the reduction
in manufacturing and retail sales [Clarksons 2007d}
GDP accounts for a number of sectors such as housing and services. The most
relevant to shipping however is industrial production because it translates directly to imports
and exports creating demand. China and the USA are big markets and therefore have a
greater effect. Fig. 2.2-3 shows the industrial production of various big markets.
One can see by comparing Fig. 2.2-2 and Fig. 2.2-3, that industrial production has a
similar trend to GDP growth. Chinese Industrial production has been high overall while
Europe and the USA have been growing at similar levels.
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Fig. 2.2-3: Industrial Production Increase - using data from [Clarksons 2007a]
Economic activity is also closely linked to shipping. The stock market crises in 1998
and 2002 both resulted a shipping crisis in 1999 and 2002 respectively. Fig. 2.2-4 shows the
major world market Indices. These are affected by GDP growth.
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Fig. 2.2-4: The Major World Market Indices - using data from [Clarksons 2007al
USD exchange rates affect the market in particular because shipping business is
conducted (and measured) in USD. A low USD boosts the shipping market because
commodities, ship chartering and ships are all cheap. The low USD is one of the reasons why
the market is currently very high. Fig. 2.2-5 shows how the USD has varied against other
important currencies.
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Fig. 2.2-5: Variation of the USD against the other important currencies - using data from [Clarksons 2007a]
Low interest rates help the shipping market as they promote investment and. business,
which creates imports and exports. This leads to an increase in freight rates. Furthermore,
nearly all ships have a debt, so when interest rates are low, the capital cost of buying a ship is
lower. This leads to an increase in ship prices. Fig. 2.2-6 shows how LIBOR has varied since
the beginning of the 1990s.
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Fig. 2.2-6: LIBOR since 1989 - using data from [Clarksons 2007al
2.2.2 Dry Bulks
Transportation of commodities such as iron ore, coal and grain typically accounts for
a small percentage of total cost while profit margins on finished steel are relatively high
(UNCTAD 2005). Furthermore, though there are many owners of capes and PMXs, there are
no competing transportation modes. This makes demand relatively inelastic for the industry
as a whole, but very elastic as perceived by each individual owner.
Due to the existence of combination carriers or Ore Bulk Oil vessels (OBOs), which
constitute part of the dry fleet, the demand for oil transportation also plays a role. Demand
for oil transportation is partly met by combination carriers and therefore translates to dry bulk
demand. As the number of combination carriers is decreasing, their effect is becoming less
significant. Fig. 2.2-7 shows this trend since the beginning of the 1980s, when there was a
larger number of OBOs
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Fig. 2.2-7: The Effect of Oil Demand on Dry Bulk Demand - using data from [Marsoft 2007a}
As shown in Fig. 2.2-8, capes are used mainly in the transportation of iron ore and
coal. Fig 18 shows the increase in global demand for iron ore and coal along with the total
demand for dry bulk cargos since 1980.
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Fig. 2.2-8: Global Demand for Dry Bulk, Iron Ore and Steam Coal [Marsoft 2007a]
The coal that is transported in capes is either metallurgical or steam coal.
Metallurgical coal is used with iron ore to produce steel while steam coal is used in power
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plants to produce energy. A large fraction of the cargo transported in capes is therefore
derived from the demand for steel. Fig. 2.2-9 shows the steel related cargos and steam coal as
a percentage of total dry bulk cargo for various major countries, the world average and for
capes.
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Fig. 2.2-9: Steel Related Cargos and Steam Coal as a fraction of Dry Bulk Cargos -
Using data from [Braemar 2007a]
As shown in Fig. 2.2-9, steel related cargos account for a significant fraction of dry
bulk trade, particularly for the major traders, while capes are heavily involved in their
transportation. Demand for steel is therefore critical for capes even though steel is usually
transported in handymax vessels. Capes are also used occasionally in the transportation of
grain. Fig. 2.2-10 Shows the global demand for cape cargos along with the demand for steel
since 1980.
As shown in Fig. 2.2-9 and Fig. 2.2-10, there has been a steady increase in demand
for all cargos transported by capes, particularly steam coal and iron ore. Fig. 2.2-11 shows
how the world consumption of steel and steam coal has increased since the 1990s and how it
is expected to increase until 2015.
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Fig. 2.2-10: Global Demand for Cape Cargos and Steel - using data from [Marsoft 2007a
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Fig. 2.2-11: World Consumption of Steel and Steam Coal using data from [Braemar 2007a
These projections suggest a very high demand for dry bulk shipping, particularly for
capes over the next ten years. According to current data, iron ore trade is expected to grow by
5% to 10% per year and dry bulk trade is expected to grow by at least 3% per year until 2015
while China and India are the biggest drivers of the market [Braemar 2007c]. China actually
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accounts for about one third of global iron ore imports and over a quarter of the world's steel
production [UNCTAD 2005]
2.2.3 Iron Ore
Iron ore transportation has been increasing steadily over the past 10 years and the
fraction transported by sea has increased substantially since 2000 as shown in Fig. 2.2-12.
Fig. 2.2-12: Total and Seaborne transportation of Iron Ore - using data from [Clarksons 2007a ,
China's expansion since the start of the century is the driving force behind the great
increase in demand for seaborne iron ore that has led dry bulk freight rates to unsurpassed
values over the past few years. This is clearly demonstrated in Fig. 2.2-13, which shows the
annual imports by the largest importers and the world total since 1980.
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Fig. 2.2-13: Annual Iron Ore Imports of today's 5 Largest Importers and the World Total Since 1980 using data
from [SSY 2006a & SSY 2006c1
The largest importer in Europe is by far Germany (Rotterdam), followed by France,
Italy and the UK [SSY 2006a]. Fig. 2.2-14 shows the annual exports by the largest exporters
and the world total since 1980.
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Fig. 2.2-14: Annual Iron Ore Exports of today's 5 Largest Exporters and the World Total Since 1980 -using
data from [SSY 2006a & SSY 2006cl
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Fig. 2.2-15 shows the monthly imports of the world's greatest importer since 2002,
just before the start of the ongoing shipping boom. Fig. 2.2-16 shows China's monthly
imports for each year since 2004 superimposed on the same graph.
Fig. 2.2-15: Iron Ore Imports by the World's Geatest Importer since 2000 -
Using data from [Doll 2006 & Braemar 20061
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Fig. 2.2-16: China's Monthly Iron Ore Imports Each Year Since 2004 [Clarksons 2007b]
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Besides importing, China's internal output of iron ore has also increased significantly
to facilitate its rapid expansion. Fig. 2.2-17 shows the Chinese annual iron ore output and
imports along with projections until 2010 and the equivalent number of additional capes
required in the world fleet to meet the demand.
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Fig. 2.2-17: Chinese Output and Imports of Iron Ore with Projections until 2010 and Estimated Additional
Capes Required - using data from [SSY 2007a1
Based on simple calculations, an additional 134 to 198 capes will be required to meet
the Chinese demand for iron ore imports in 2010 according to the projections. Chinese iron
ore is of low Fe-content and its production costs are about 45 - 60 $/ton. This is high enough
to justify the imports from Brazil and Australia who are producing at a cost of 10 - 15 $/ton
[Carksons 2006b].
Domestic Chinese production is expected to peak at about 550Mt [Carksons 2006b].
Pig iron and steel production are increasing while stocks will be required for a better
negotiation base for next year so imports are expected to increase substantially. Port stocks
are currently 40Mt and the capacity is 60.5Mt [Clarksons 2006b]. Fig. 2.2-18 shows China's
iron ore imports by country along with projections until 2015 by Braemar Seascope Ltd.
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Fig. 2.2-18: Chinese Iron Ore Imports by Country - using data from [Braemar 2007al
Brazilian Iron Ore is of a higher grade than the Australian and is therefore more
desirable. The China - Brazil trade is also better for Capesize demand as the Iron Ore is
imported over a longer distance. Most of Indian iron ore is on spot and fluctuates according
to competitiveness with Chinese prices. It also competes with domestic needs and its exports
are declining due to internal consumption. It is relatively cheaper for China to import from
India than Brazil but India is finding it difficult to get this trade because of fixed contracts
with Brazil.
The demand for marine transportation of iron ore is forecasted to keep increasing for
a number of years as illustrated in Fig. 2.2-19. China is expected to continue expansion
throughout the current decade and other countries such as India or Brazil are expected to
follow and gradually become importers. Demand may therefore remain at high levels for a
number of years.
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Fig. 2.2-19: Total Global Iron ore Imports for the Current Decade [Marsoft 20061
2.2.4 Coal
Unlike iron ore, which is transported primarily in capes and the larger specialized ore
carriers, coal is also transported in smaller bulkers. Fig. 2.2-20 shows the share of each bulk
carrier size group in the transportation of coal.
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Fig. 2.2-20 Coal Transportation by Bulk Carrier Tvne with nroiections - using
data from FBraemar 20()7n]
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The amount of coal transported is increasing steadily and this is expected to continue
for all bulk carrier types. The increasing demand for steel creates demand for the
transportation of metallurgical coal, which is required for its production. Meanwhile, power
plants around the world are converting to coal because of the high oil prices. This creates
demand for the transportation of steam coal. Fig. 2.2-21 shows the monthly imports of the
major coal importers and Fig. 2.2-22 shows the monthly exports of the major exporters since
the early 1990s.
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Fig. 2.2-21: Imports by the Major Coal Importers - using data from [Clarksons 2007al
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Fig. 2.2-22: Exports by the Major Coal Exporters - using data from [Clarksons 2007al
Though China appears not to be playing a significant role in the coal trade, quite the
opposite is actually happening. Its annual coal production is about lbn tonnes and most of it
is consumed internally. Chinese coal trade balances however have a big impact on the
market. Fig. 2.2-23 shows China's imports and exports of coal since the start of the shipping
boom in autumn 2003.
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Fig. 2.2-23: China's Coal Imports and Exports since 200303 [SSY 2007b]
China used to export to nearby countries but is increasingly consuming its produce
and becoming an importer. This has caused other countries to go to Australia for imports
leading to high congestion levels in Australian coal ports. This is currently the most
important factor responsible for the very high temporary charter rates. The steady decrease in
Chinese coal exports, is clear in Fig. 2.2-24, which shows the Chinese dry exports since
2002. The increase in steel exports is also evident.
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Fig. 2.2-24: Chinese Dry Exports since 2002 - using data from [Braemar 2007al
2.2.5 Steel
Though capes do not transport steel per se, its high demand has resulted in growing
trade of steel-making raw materials and this has had a big impact on the cape market. The
strong increase in steel production led to increased iron ore imports in 2006 and steel is
expected to continue to drive the market over the next few years. Fig. 2.2-25 shows the
monthly production of the major steel producers since the early 1990s along with the steel
trade weighted index.
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Fig. 2.2-25: Steel Production by the Major Steel Producers - using data from [Clarksons 2007a]
As shown in Fig. 2.2-26, China is responsible for the increase in global steel
production since 2002 and is expected to be the driver well into the future according to
current projections.
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Fig. 2.2-26: Global and Chinese Steel Production - using data from [Braemar 2007a]
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China currently accounts for 8.9% of steel output for the international market
[Clarksons 2007b]. A large amount of its steel production is also consumed internally. Fig.
2.2-27 shows the amount of steel used domestically and that which is exported from China
each year since 2001.
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Fig. 2.2-27: Sources of Demand for Chinese Steel Production - using data from [SSY 2007al
It is clear from Fig. 2.2-27 that Chinese steel production depends heavily on both the
internal and the global markets. Fig. 2.2-28 shows the annual percentage growth in China's
domestic steel demand and steel exports along with base, high and low scenario projections
by SSYShipbrokers Ltd.
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Fig. 2.2-28: Chinese Steel Demand and Export Growth - using data from [SSY 2007a]
China's steel consumption per capita is much higher in the coastal regions, but the
average is 269kg/capita, which is low relative to its neighbors [Clarksons 2006b]. The same
applies to India. Fig. 2.2-29 shows the consumption per capita and the population of various
countries including China and India.
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Fig. 2.2-29: Steel Consumption Potential - using data from [Braemar 2007a]
The big difference in consumption per capita of China and India with the other
countries, combined with their high population indicates that there is potential for very high
demand for steel as they develop and catch up (in consumption per capita). Fig. 2.2-30 shows
previous trends and current projections of steel consumption per capita and population for
China and India until 2015.
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Fig. 2.2-30: Chinese and Indian Consumption per Capita and Population Trends -
Usine data from [Braemar 2007al
According to the National Development and Reform Commission of China the
domestic steel product consumption will increase by 10% up from last years 9.8%. Table 2.2-
1 shows the steel demand for 2006 and estimates for 2007 by the International Iron and Steel
Institute (IISI). A growth of 5.2% is expected, which is mainly driven by China, as it would
only be 2.5% if China were excluded.
Until 2003, Japan was very steel intensive and therefore the Japan steel plate price
has been a key figure for the shipping market with implications on demand and newbuilding
prices. Fig. 2.2-31 shows how this has varied since the end of the 1990s.
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IISI Steel Demand Estimates
China (Mt) 374 413 39
Asia - Other (Mt) 239 248 9
Europe (Mt) 204 204 0
Nafta (Mt) 152 151 -1
FSU (Mt) 47 51 4
RoW (Mt) 105 112 7
Total (Mt) 1121 1179 58
Growth (%) 8.9 5.2
Growth ex China (%) 6.4 2.5
Table 2.2-1: IISI steel demand estimates for 2007 [Reuters 20071
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Fig. 2.2-31: Japan Steel Plate Commodity Price - using data from [Clarksons 2007a}
High steel price implies a high market for two reasons. High steel price is the result of
high demand for steel, which translates to a high freight market. Furthermore, when steel is
expensive, newbuildings are expensive and therefore ship values are high.
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2.2.6 Conclusions
e GDP growth has a disproportionate effect on dry bulk shipping and this explains why
China and India are the drivers of the current market. There is also high potential for
future steel demand by both.
" The weak $ and low interest rates are helping the market to stay strong
" Chinese iron ore demand is the key indicator of the freight market
* China is gradually becoming a coal importer and its exports are decreasing while
coastal coal movements were high in 2006. This led to increased demand for
Australian coal with serious implications on port congestion.
" India's increasing coal/grain imports and steel/iron ore exports have a strong positive
effect on the market
" World steel demand grew rapidly in 2006 creating import demand for raw materials.
This led to very high freight rates. Steel production is expected to increase,
supporting iron ore import growth despite further increases in supply of low-grade
Chinese iron ore.
" Chinese steel production growth in 2006 was powered by domestic demand (+36 Mt)
and net exports (+33 Mt). The future Chinese steel output (& iron ore imports)
therefore depends on global as well as domestic markets.
" The world economy should be strong enough in 2007 to deliver healthy growth in
steel and energy demand and thereby creating a strong demand for capes
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2.3. Supply
2.3.1 Supply and its Elasticity
Supply is limited by the capacity of the shipyards. It takes several months to construct
a newbuilding vessel, during which the ship is mainly in block stage, while the berth is
occupied for just two months. The limited number of berths combined with a high and
increasing demand as that of today however, can lead to high prices and delivery times
ranging to a couple of years. As of 2006, the next berth is only available in 2010 / 2011. This
constraint makes supply very inelastic in the short run.
Distance between the location of ships and the ports where they are needed has a
similar effect. The number of ships that can arrive at a given location, or in other words
supply at that location, increases with time. Unexpected accidents or events that affect supply
locally can have a dramatic impact on prices, which further emphasizes the inelasticity of
supply in the short run. In 2005 for example, VLCC rates exceeded $200k/day for about a
week due to a Suez grounding. Ship owners on the other hand, are faced with a number of
alternatives such as coal or grain trades so the quantity of ships available for trading iron ore
will decrease substantially following a decrease in iron ore freight rates. This increases price
elasticity of supply.
Other factors which influence the elasticity of supply in the medium term are the
possibility of conversions and lay-ups. The availability of suitable ships of other types, which
can switch to iron ore trading like the few existing OBOs, or ships of other types, which can
be converted to capesize vessels can have a big impact. Approximately 50 tankers have been
converted into bulk carriers between 2006 and 2009 [Clarksons 2009a]. The 'lay up' of ships
can also impact supply in the medium term. Ships are temporarily withdrawn from the
market when freight rates drop below daily operating cost and are expected to remain low for
considerable time.
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2.3.2 Capesize Fleet, Scrapping and Newbuildings
The supply of ships is controlled through ordering and scrapping of vessels. Following
the increase in demand over the past several decades, supply has adjusted and the world fleet
of capes has increased steadily since their development in the late 1960s as illustrated in Fig.
2.3-1. Deliveries, demolitions and losses per month are shown as bars whose value is read
from the left axis while the resulting fleet size is shown as a line whose value is indicated on
the right axis.
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Fig. 2.3 -1: The Capesize Fleet Development since 1970 -
using data from [Clarksons 2007a, Intercargo 2004, Lloyds 2003 & Intercargo 20021
A similar graph in terms of total deadweight instead of number of vessels can be
found in Fig. 2.3-2.
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Fig. 2.3-2: Capesize Orderbook and Monthly Contracts over the past 10 years -
using data from [Clarksons 2007a & Clarksons 2007c
Scrapping was very low until the 1990s because the capesize fleet was still modem.
Today, scrapping rates are again very low because of the very high freight rates since 2003.
Fig. 2.3-3 shows the net change is the capesize fleet over the past 10 years along with
predictions until 2008.
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Unlike deletions, which depend on the level of the market and other uncontrollable
factors such as accidents, the number of additions over the next few years is relatively easier
to predict. This is because the orderbook is almost full until the end of 2011 and only minor
changes are expected. Fig. 2.3-4 shows how the order book has varied over the past 10 years
along with the number of contracts per month. Fig. 2.3-5 shows it in terms of deadweight in.
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Fig. 2.3-4: Capesize Orderbook and Monthly Contracts over the past 10 years -
Using data from [Clarksons 2007a & Clarksons 2007c0
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Fig. 2.3-5: Cape Sales per Month and Average Sale Prices - using data from [Braemar 2007b,
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Clearly, the orderbook is currently at very high levels historically indicating that there
will be a significant increase in supply over the next several years. Table 2.3-1 shows how
cape newbuilding contracting currently compares with other ship types.
Newbuilding Contracting
Contracting in 2006
(Mdwt)
Increase since 2005
(Mdwt)
All 10,000+ DWT Vessels
Tankers 76.0 +44.2
Dry Bulk Carriers 36.0 +16.0
Containers 17.6 +0.2
Gas Carriers 5.4 -0.1
TOTAL 135 +60.3
Dry Bulk Carriers
Capesize 15.0 +7.3
Panamax 7.9 +2.5
Handymax 8.7 +5.4
Handysize 4.5 +2.2
TOTAL 36.1 +17.4
Table 2.3-1: Newbuilding Contracts of 2006 and Change from 2005 for Main Ship Types - [LR Fairplay 20071
As shown in Table 2, contracting of tankers is far higher than that of bulk carriers but
it should be noted that the majority of those vessels are replacing single hull tankers that are
being phased out. Capes account for over 40% of bulk carrier and over 10% of all
10,000+dwt vessel newbuilding contracts by dwt. Cape newbuilding contracts also increased
since 2005 by more than all other dry bulk carrier types. Fig. 2.3-6 shows the current
orderbook compared to the existing fleet for capes of various sizes and for other dry bulk
carrier types.
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Fig. 2.3-6: Existing Fleet and the Current Orderbook for Dry Bulk Cariers -using data from [Braemar 2007a]
It is clear from Fig 45 that the cape orderbook is relatively large compared to the
existing fleet. Furthermore, it consists of relatively large vessels so the anticipated supply
will have a big impact. Many of the 85-120Kdwt ships were ordered in response to the
decision of widening the Panama Canal in 2014 so they can also be considered as modem
panamaxes. Fig. 2.3-7 shows the age distribution of the capesize fleet over 120Kdwt.
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Fig. 2.3-7: Ca-pesize Fleet Age Distribution and Oderbook -using data from [Braemar 2007a]
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120Kdwt+ Capesize Fleet and Orderbook
Unlike the handy and handymax fleets, the capesize fleet is relatively modem with a
decreasing average age, which is currently less than 10 years. All orders are currently over
150Kdwt with the typical size being about 180Kdwt. The modernity of the cape fleet
compared to other dry bulk carriers is clear in Fig. 2.3-8, which shows the orderbook and 20
and 25-year scrapping pool for the dry bulk carrier groups.
Fig. 2.3-8: Orderbook along with 20 & 25-year Scrapping Pool for Bulk Carrier Groups -
Usine data from [SSY 2007al
There are currently between 700 and 800 capes in the world fleet and approximately
one cape per week is going to be delivered on average in 2007. Furthermore, the number of
orders per month since the beginning of 2007 has been increasing along with the market and
has been much higher than 2006 meaning that the orderbook is increasing. Table 2.3-2 shows
the number of contracts per month for the various bulk carrier groups since January 2007.
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Month CAPE PMX HANDYMAX DRY BULK
No. KDwt No. KDwt No. KDwt No. KDwt
Jan 10 1,673 18 443 27 3,830 64 6,494
Feb 20 3,732 21 579 46 1,248 93 5,679
Mar 41 7,293 7 1,768 22 2,614 74 11,875
Apr 33 6,084 5 1,404 67 1,475 125 9,239
Total 104 18,718 51 4,194 162 9,167 356 33,286
Table 2.3-2: Dry Bulk Carrier Newbuilding Contracts Since Jan-2007 -
Using data from [SSY 2007a, Clarksons 2007a, Clarksons 2007c, Braemar 2007a}
There were only 2 demolitions in 2005 and another 2 demolitions and 2 losses in
2006. High demand for steel combined with minimal scrapping due to the high opportunity
cost of the good market has led to record-high scrapping prices. A record-high price was set
in October by a Bergen product tanker that was sold for $48 1/ltd [Lillestolen et al 20061. Fig.
2.3-9 shows the demolition prices in India and Bangladesh, where the vast majority of cape
scrapping takes place, along with the average scrapping value of capesize bulk carriers.
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Fig. 2.3-9: Demolition Prices and Average Cape Scrap Values - using data from [Clarksons 2007a]
Minimal scrapping due to high earnings along with the optimistic market outlook
indicates that the scrapping pool is going to increase. Fig. 2.3-10 shows projections of the
scrapping pool for the various bulk carrier groups based on the current age distribution and
the market outlook. A 23-year scrapping pool is chosen because that has been the average
scrapping age over the past 30 years.
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Fig. 2.3-10: 23-year Scrapping Pool Projections for the Various Bulk Carriers -
using data from [Braemar 2007al
The scrapping pool is expected to increase substantially as long as the market remains
firm. This is true for all bulk carriers but for the handymax fleet in particular as it is relatively
old. A high scrapping pool means that if earnings decrease, old vessels will be scrapped
which will help prevent a market crisis.
Historically, owners in the dry bulk industry order more ships as earnings increase and
fewer when earnings are decreasing. As a result, the annual change in deliveries with time
has been almost out of phase with the change in earnings as illustrated in Fig. 2.3-11.
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Fig. 2.3-11: Out of Phase Annual Change in Fleet and
U
Annual Change in Eamings [Clarksons 2006b
By comparing Fig. 2.3-4 with Fig. 2.1-9, it is also observed that the capesize
orderbook has been approximately in phase with the dry bulk market, which leads to the
same conclusion. These results due to the rush of shipowners to order new vessels when the
market is high combined with the limited capacity of shipyards that makes supply inelastic in
the short-run. The rush is similar for buyers in the secondhand market as shown in Fig 51,
which indicates that cape sales volume is higher when ship prices are high.
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Fig. 2.3-12: Cape Sales per Month and Average Sale Prices - using data from
[Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 2007, Vafias 2007, Levene 2006, Clarksons 2006a & Clarksons 2006c]
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A similar graph with sales in terms of volume is shown in Fig. 2.3-13.
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Fig. 2.3-13: Cape Sales per Month and Average Sale Prices - using data from
[Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 2007, Vafias 2007, Levene 2006, Clarksons 2006a & Clarksons 2006c
2.3.3 Shipyards
The vast majority of capes have been built in the Far East. Japan has always been the
major supplier with numerous relatively small shipyards. Korea has had a strong presence for
many years with few relatively large shipyards. Taiwan has also built a significant number of
capes and China is currently emerging with shipyards of a wide range of experience and
quality. Table 2.3-3 provides a summary of the number of shipyards of the existing capesize
fleet and of the fleet on order for each country.
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Capesie Fle an OdrbyS irdCunr
Country .Number ot Shipyards of
Existing Capesize Fleet
Number of Shipyards with
Capesize Orders
Japan 22 7
Korea 6 3
China 3 5
Taiwan 2 1
Other 16 0
TOTAL 49 16
Table 2.3-3: Cape Shipyards of Each Country - using data from
[LR 2007, Braemar 2007a, SSY 2007a, Clarksons 2007c0
As of the end of 2006, the existing fleet consisted of 711 capes and 185 capes on
order. Fig. 2.3-14 shows the distribution of the 711 existing capes amongst the 49 shipyards
that built them.
Existing Cape Fleet Shipyards
Fig. 2.3-14: Caesize Fleet Distribution Amongst Shipyards - using data from
[LR 2007, SSY 2007a, Clarksons 2007al
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Korea-Ulsan based Hyundai Heavy Industries (H.H.I.), which is the largest shipyard
in the world, has built 101 of the 711 capes. As shown in Fig. 2.3-14, it is significantly larger
than any other shipyard in its share of the existing capesize fleet. Fig. 2.3-15 shows the
number of capes of the existing fleet by shipbuilding country.
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Fig. 2.3-15: Capesize Fleet Distribution Amongst Countries - using data from
[LR 2007, SSY 2007a, Clarksons 2007a]
Fig. 2.3-15 shows the dominance of Japanese and Korean capes in the existing fleet
while only 44 vessels have been built in 16 yards in 10 other countries that are not in the Far
East. The next largest country in its share of the existing capesize fleet after China is Italy
with a total of 8 capes, followed by Rumania and Brazil with 7 each. Fig. 2.3-16 shows the
distribution of the 185 capes on order amongst their 16 shipyards.
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Fig. 2.3-16: Capesize Orderbook Distribution Amongst Shipyards - using data from
[Braemar 2007a, SSY 2007a, Clarksons 2007c
China-Shanghai based Waigaoqiao S/Y (SWS) is by far the largest shipyard in the
world in terms of current capesize orders with an orderbook of 51 capes out of the 185. Being
the most experienced, it is also generally the most preferred shipyard out of the ones in China
and is relatively more expensive. Fig. 2.3-17 shows the number of capes on order by
shipbuilding country.
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Orderbook by Shipyard Country
Fig. 2.3-17: Capesize Orderbook Distribution Amongst Countries - using data from
[Braemar 2007a, SSY 2007a, Clarksons 2007c
It is evident by comparing Fig. 2.3-15 and Fig. 2.3-17 that China is becoming a major
player in capesize newbuilding while Korea's share has decreased substantially. Japan
remains strong and there are zero orders in countries out of the Far East.
2.3.4 Port Congestion
Port capacity is another constraint that makes supply inelastic in the short-run. The
inability to cope efficiently with demand has resulted in high congestion of ships at both iron
ore and coal terminals particularly in Australia. Delays measured in weeks are not
uncommon while average charter rates are currently in excess of $1 00K daily.
According to a study performed by [Clarksons 2006b], congestion in capesize iron
ore terminals corresponds to a decrease in supply by about 28% for ships discharging in
China. Congestion may be affected by several factors such as the Chinese New Year or bad
weather. Fig. 2.3-18 shows the average mid-month delays at iron-ore terminals in Australia
until Sept 2006.
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Fig. 2.3-18: Australian Iron Ore Port Congestion Indices [SSY 2006b}
Fig. 2.3-19 shows the average delays and the queue length at Australian iron ore ports
between January-22 and April-30 2007.
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Fig. 2.3-19: Australian Iron Ore Port Congestion and Queue Length [Clarksons 2007b1
Increasing iron ore loading rates can reduce congestion, but this is dangerous
particularly for older vessels that have a lower deballasting capacity. Loading rates depend
on the loading abilities of existing vessels and are mainly limited by their deballasting
capacity. Peak loading rates of up to 16,000-18,000t/hr have been achieved in Ponta de
Madeira (Brazil) while some ports are aiming in the future to go up to 32,000t/hr [Ferguson
et al 1993]. Though average rates are usually close to 50% of peak values, high loading rates
are known to be the cause of serious failures and ship losses [Corbett 2006a, Isbester 1998,
Intercargo 1998, IACS 1997, MER 1997].
Improving loading rates at already fast ports will only further compromise safety.
Doing so in other parts of the world however by investing in more efficient conveyor belt
systems may be effective as equipment in most ports is rather old. Congestion can also be
effectively improved by newer ships with high deballasting rates; larger ships that will
reduce the number of berthing/unberthing delays; more loaders, loading terminals and berths
that will increase turnover; higher storage capacity at terminals that will buffer against inland
accidents, bad weather etc.; aligned improvement of inland transportation, loading and
discharging ports to avoid bottlenecks etc.
Both Ponta de Madeira in Brazil and the port of Dampier are adding one terminal
each this year. Improving tracks, boogies and locomotives that operate between mines and
ports can also be effective. "Breakthrough teams" working for Hamersley achieved a great
increase in rail system capacity by reducing the time spent by trains unloading at Dampier
port before returning to the mine from 90 to 30 min. [Renwick 2002].
It is important to understand however that these solutions may be effective in the
short-run, but they involve heavy investment and will be a huge loss in the long run if
Chinese demand drops or the world economy goes into recession.
An allocating system was implemented last year in Australia and was very effective
in reducing congestion. There has been criticism however that it favored some shippers over
others and that has delayed its re-implementation this year.
Besides iron ore port congestion, coal port congestion increased substantially during
the final quarter of 2006 and this had a big impact on freight rates. As discussed earlier, the
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main reason for this is that China is becoming a net importer and the countries to which it
previously exported have now turned to Australia.
Waiting time at the Australian port of Newcastle reached 20 days at the end of 2006
with queues of up to 55 vessels waiting to load [Clarksons 2007d]. Congestion has further
increased since then causing charter rates to reach record high levels. Fig. 2.3-20 shows the
Australian coal port congestion index until January 2006 and Fig. 2.3-21 shows the average
delays along with the queue length since then.
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Fig. 2.3-20: Australian Coal Port Congestion Index FSSY 2007b}
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Fig. 2.3-21: Australian Coal Port Congestion and Queue Length [Clarksons 2007b]
Fig. 2.3-22 shows the transpacific capesize daily earnings along with average coal
port delays until January 2007.
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Fig. 2.3-22: Transpacific Caesize Eamings and De1gys rSSY 2007bl
It is clear from Fig. 2.3-22 that there is a close correlation between freight rates and
congestion. According to [SSY 2007b], congestion corresponds to a decrease in supply of the
order of about 50% and this is what has caused freight rates to be so high. One can treat
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congestion as a reduction in supply because it corresponds to a number of vessels being idle.
On the other hand, congestion can be interpreted as a decrease in overall productivity of the
fleet. This leads to an increase in demand, as more ships of a lower productivity are required
to transport the same amount of cargo. The latter approach is the one adopted by Marsoft in
their estimates of fleet utilization to predict freight rates.
2.3.5 Oil Prices and Operating Costs
The increasing price of crude oil translates to an increase in bunkering costs for
shipowners. It therefore shifts the supply curve to the left and increases price (freight rates).
This has the opposite effect of improvements in naval architecture, materials, technology and
automation, which increase efficiency and reduce operating and construction costs, shifting
the supply curve to the right. Fig. 2.3-23 shows marine diesel oil prices in Rotterdam and
Singapore, the two major bunkering ports for capes.
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Fig. 2.3-23: MDO Prices in Rotterdam and Singapore - using data from [Clarksons 2007a]
The increase in operating costs alone would reduce output and revenues if demand
were elastic. This however has been greatly offset by the increase in demand for
transportation. The demand for steam coal transportation increases significantly with oil
prices as many factories and power plants around the world switch to coal. This has a
positive effect on dry bulk freight rates. Fig. 2.3-24 shows crude oil prices (in red) along with
the Baltic Dry Index (in blue).
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Fig. 2.3-24: Baltic Dry Index (blue) and Crude Oil (red) [Investment Tools 20061
2.3.6 25-Year Age Limit on Ore-Trading Capes
High-density cargos like iron ore have been the cause of several dramatic casualties
in the past with not enough reaction time to even send a distress signal. Examples include the
capes Alexandre P., Pasithea and Algarrobo, all of which disappeared virtually without trace
in 1990 while loaded with iron ore [LR, Peckham, Ferguson 1991] and the Mineral Diamond
in 1991 again loaded with iron ore.
Most recently, only 7 out of the crew of 33 were rescued after the rapid failure and
sinking of Alexandros T. in May off the coast of Port Alfred in South Africa. The ship was
transporting iron ore from Brazil to China - a very common route. Naturally, this has
attracted public attention and has been of great concern to many involved in the shipping
industry.
Cargo owners and charterers have recently responded by introducing a 25-year age
limit on vessels that are allowed to transport iron ore. This will force the older vessels out
leading to a reduction in supply that will counteract the effect of deliveries and perhaps push
the rates up over the coming years.
2.3.7 Conclusions
* Port and shipyard capacity constraints as well as the distance between the location
and demand of ships, make supply inelastic in the short-run
e Substitutability between capesize trades make supply price elastic causinlg freight
rates along the various routes to move in parallel
* Minimal scrapping due to high rates and excessive ordering has led to a record
high net fleet growth and newbuilding orderbook
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* The inability of shipyards to cope with demand has led to record high prices and
delivery times
* Fleet annual cargo carrying capacity will increase substantially and the supply
increase is expected to have a big impact on shipping
* China is quickly becoming a major player in the cape newbuilding industry while
capturing a great portion of Korea's share of the market
e Bulk carriers are likely to become a key target for shipbuilders this year
* Newbuilding ordering is in phase with earnings causing deliveries to be
approximately out of phase with the cyclical market
e The sharp increase in Australian coal port congestion during the final quarter of
2006 led to record-high freight rates that are ongoing
* Solutions to improve congestion are available but they include drawbacks such as
safety, investment risk and criticism of favoring certain shippers
e The soft spot in the market will be dictated by the resolution of the Australian port
congestion problem and pacific rates will be the first to drop
* The increasing scrapping pool as a result of low scrapping creates a buffer
because a decline in rates will induce scrapping, leading to a market recovery
* The 25-year age limit imposed on iron ore transporting capes effectively leads to
a decrease in supply
* Congestion effectively decreases supply, though it can also be treated as a
decrease in the fleet productivity and therefore an increase in demand
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" Increasing oil prices effectively decrease supply as they imply higher operating
costs. This however is more than offset by the corresponding increase in demand
for steam coal transportation as factories switch to coal
" The availability of suitable ships of other types, which can switch to iron ore
trading like the few existing OBOs, or ships of other types, which can be
converted to capesize vessels, affect the elasticity of the short term supply curve
* The long term supply curve is governed by the shipbuilding capacity (i.e. the
number and size of shipyards)
* The 'lay up' of ships can also impact supply in the medium term. This happens
when freight rates drop below daily operating cost and are expected to remain low
for considerable time.
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e The Capesize market follows the dry bulk market due to the knock-on effect between
the various bulk carrier size groups. The current shipping boom however has had a
bigger impact on capes
* The market is very volatile with huge percentage changes in freight rates over
relatively short periods of time, particularly for capes
e TC-Equivalent voyage earnings and TC earnings along various routes move in
parallel, as they constitute substitutes. Substitutability however is limited by the need
to ballast from one port to another
* Coal and iron ore freight rates along the same routes are very close substitutes and
therefore yield similar earnings
e China's demand for iron ore has resulted in flow irregularities resulting in much
higher front haul than back haul rates. This however is counteracted by America's
increasing demand
e Time charter rates are less volatile for longer time charter periods meaning that
shorter period rates are higher in a strong market and lower in a weak market
* Time charter rates are less volatile and on average lower than spot rates
* The time lag between TC rates and spot rates and between TC rates of various
lengths, is dependent on the TC period length and independent of ship size
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2.4 Market Equilibrium and Ship Earnings
2.4.1 Equilibration of Supply and Demand
Shipping is a cyclical market and the large number of factors that affect it renders it
almost impossible to make future predictions. The fact that it is cyclical however implies that
it is not totally random. As for any good or service, the market price for a voyage or a period
charter is determined by supply and demand at any given location and time. In practice,
equilibrium may never be achieved due to the high dynamics of the market but average
prices and trends will always be governed by supply and demand. Fig. 2.4-l shows the
supply and demand for capes since 1995 with extrapolations until 2010.
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Fig. 2.4-1: Supply and Demand of Capes along with a 23-year scrapping scenario -
using data from [Braemar 2006 & Braemar 2007a]
The demand projection (in million tonnes transported per year) is based on WTO
(World Trade Organization) predictions about the industries related to capesize trades (iron
ore, coal and grain). The summation of the estimated demand for capesize deadweight
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capacity along the various trade routes gives the total demand curve shown. Estimates of
GDP growth in major players such as China have also been incorporated, using historical
correlations between GDP growth and the bulk carrier market.
The supply projection is based on the existing fleet and the capesize orderbook, which
is known until the end of 2010. The red projection assumes that there will be no capesize
scrapping while the green projection assumes that all capes above 23 years old will be
scrapped. 23 years is the 30-year average scrapping age but a 30-year scrapping age or no
scrapping at all is more likely in today's market. The red and green curves therefore provide
a useful upper and lower bound for supply until 2010.
A tight balance between supply and demand is therefore expected for capes until
2010 but supply has the potential of decreasing significantly if demand drops. This means
that old vessels will be scrapped following a decline in rates so a market crisis is unlikely.
It is reasonable to assume that demand for transportation is price inelastic because
prices of the final products are relatively high and they usually have high profit margins.
Freight rates are therefore driven by annual changes in demand and supply while the volume
transported is to a large extent unaffected by freight rates. Fig. 2.4-2 shows the annual
percentage change in bulk carrier supply and demand over the past 10 years.
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Fig. 2.4-2 Annual Percentage Change in Supply and Demand for Bulk Carriers - using data from rSSY 2007al
When the demand is rising faster than supply, meaning that the blue line is above the
red line in Fig. 2.4-2, freight rates increase and vice versa.
Marsoft base their predictions of the market on their estimates of fleet utilization.
Utilization is defined as the percentage ratio of demand to supply. The forecast of demand in
tonne-miles is based on extensive data of countries' trade predictions and geographical
distances. Tonne-miles are then converted to deadweight (MDwt) using the estimated fleet
productivity, which incorporates port congestion, average sailing speed and other parameters.
Supply is based on the anticipated scrapping and newbuilding deliveries.
The Idle fleet is simply the difference between supply and demand while fleet
utilization is the percentage ratio and is used as an indicator of the market. Note that supply,
demand and the idle fleet can be measured in deadweight, deadweight per year, tonne-miles
or tonne-miles/year. Fig. 2.4-3 shows the fleet size, demand and the idle fleet in MDwt along
with fleet utilization as a percentage since 1980.
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Fig. 2.4-3: Fleet Utilization and its Components since 1980 - using data from [Marsoft 2007a]
Note that Fig 65 shows only actual historical data without predictions. We are now
experiencing record-high utilization rates while there is a very tight balance between supply
and demand and this explains the record-high market. By comparing Fig. 2.4-3 with Fig. 2.1-
9, it can be seen that the peaks in utilization rate coincide with the peaks of the dry bulk
market (1980, 1985, 1989, 1995, 2001 and now) and so do the bottoms (1983, 1986, 1993,
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1999 and 2002). The utilization rate therefore is a good market indicator though it is hard to
predict.
The above fleet utilization is for dry bulk carriers. A cape-specific pseudo-utilization rate is
derived using cape specific data of supply and demand and then incorporated. Its effect
however is not very significant, as the cape market tends to follow the dry bulk market
closely. Historical correlation between freight rates and (100 - fleet utilization) is used to
predict the market because fleet utilization is usually close to 100 and small percentage
changes are common.
2.4.2 Dry Bulk Earnings
The Baltic Index for capes has closely followed the dry bulk market over time. The
current boom over the last few years however is more intense for capes than for other bulk
carriers. That is because it is driven by China and iron ore imports while the majority of iron
ore is transported in Capes. Fig. 2.4-4 shows the daily earnings of capes and other bulk
carriers since 2001.
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Fig. 2.4-4: Dry Bulk Carrier Average Earnings [Baltic Exchange 20071
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The similarity between the trends of the cape market and the other dry bulk markets
explain why the effect of the cape specific factor not very significant in the fleet utilization.
The reason for this similarity is the knock-on effect between the dry bulk markets as
discussed in Section 1. The relatively higher percentage increase in cape earnings compared
to other bulk carrier groups in the current boom is shown in Table 2.4-1.
Increase in Bulk Carrier Earning.s BetwNeen Sept-2001 and Dee-2004
Average Rates Cape PMX HMX
Sept-10, 2001 $6,140/day $6,306/day $8,070/day
Dec-7, 2004 $105,520/day $49,518/day $33,945/day
Increase 1,619% 685% 321%
Table 2.4-1: Increase in Average Rates from Sep-2001 to Dec-2004
It should be noted that a similar increase occurred
cape earnings reached $96K/day and today the market
earnings of about $115K/day and further increasing.
- uiindata from rI
by January 15t 2004 when average
is even higher with average cape
2.4.3 Freight Rates and Earnings
The main cargos transported by capes are coal and iron ore and the main destinations
are China and Rotterdam. Iron ore freight rates along the main routes to Rotterdam and China
by capesize bulk carriers are shown in Fig. 2.4-5 and Fig. 2.4-6 respectively.
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Fig. 2.4-5: Iron Ore Freight Rates along the Main Routes to Rotterdam [Clarksons 2007a}
Fig. 2.4-6: Iron Ore Freight Rates along the Main Routes to China - Beilun [Clarksons 2007a]
The highest iron ore freight rates appear to be from Brazil (Tubarao) to China and the
cheapest route is from Australia to China. One however should consider the fact that a
shorter distance corresponds to higher ship earnings per day (time charter equivalent) which
is the effective price seen by suppliers (shipowners). This ought to be more balanced across
the various routes.
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The Baltic Exchange keeps track of the average freight rates (average of coal and iron
ore) along the main routes to China and Rotterdam for capesize bulk carriers. These are
shown in Fig. 2.4-7.
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Fig. 2.4-7: Average Baltic Cape Index Freight Rates Along the main Routes -
using data from [Baltic Exchange 20071
It can be seen that these are not very different than the iron ore freight rates along the
corresponding routes. That is because the iron ore and coal are close substitutes for the
shipowner and both are usually available on these routes.
The typical ways in which a vessel is employed are on voyage charter, time charter,
which can be for a single voyage or up to 10 years, and bareboat charter, which is typically
for longer term and may conclude with delivery of the vessel to the charterer (bareboat
lease). Besides period length, the main difference between those is in the costs paid by the
charterer and the shipowner.
Crudely speaking, costs can be divided into CAPEX (Capital costs/expenses
including asset cost and repairs), OPEX (operating expenses including manning, insurance,
maintenance, stores and equipment etc.) and VOYAGE costs (fuel, port expenses, canal fees
etc.). CAPEX are fixed costs, OPEX are only time dependent and VOYAGE costs are route
dependent. In a bareboat charter, the shipowner only pays CAPEX. In time charter, the owner
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also pays OPEX and in voyage charters (spot charter), the owner incurs all costs including
VOYAGE.
Since there is high variation in the costs incurred by the shipowner, the time-charter
equivalent is calculated for each employment option in order to enable direct comparisons.
Fig. 2.4-8 shows the freight rate, the voyage costs and the resulting daily earnings for a
typical cape along the Brazil/Rotterdam route and how these have varied since 1980.
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Fig. 2.4-8: Freight Rates, Voyage Costs and Resulting Cape Earnings - using data from [Marsoft 2007a}
Fig. 2.4-9 shows how the resulting daily earnings along that route compare with
average earnings and 1-year time charter rates.
174
100,000
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000-
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
1980
Tm.. '~ A n. 'rc ~ ~ ~ ~1 ~th 1 .. V~ir TC i~rnina~ - ii~inu data from FMarsoft 2007a1rw.. L. 't~Y. I ~ LA.ILL1Va1~kiL L a11iii~ rnkVL&i~& ~ -- ,-.-,- -- ~-- -.----.--- - -- -.
It is clear from the graph how the equivalent earnings from a voyage charter are
aligned with the earnings from time charters.
The daily cape earnings on the main coal voyages to Rotterdam and China are shown in
Fig. 2.4-10 and Fig. 2.4-11.
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Fig. 2.4-10: Coal Freight Rates along the Main Routes to Rotterdam [Clarksons 2007a]
I U ;_ P 14 11,741k1 -VAnr (" nrn;,n Q - mina data from rMarsoft 2007alrig. LA-7: 1 11- SJU a V,11 L al 1L ra Up.LgC4,L %, b
Coal Voyage Earnings to Beilun, Baoshan
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000-
20,000
0 -
Jan-98
-- Saldanha
Bay/Beilun 165Kt
- Tubarao/Beilun
165Kt
-- W. Aust/Beilun
165Kt
Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07
Date
Fig. 2.4-11: Iron Ore Freight Rates along the Main Routes to China - Beilun [Clarksons 2007a}
As can be observed, the freight rates along the various routes are closely related and
run parallel to each other. This is because they constitute very close substitutes (for
shipowners). An increase in freight rates along a particular route leads to a corresponding
increase in quantity along that route and a decrease in supply along the remaining options.
This forces freight rates along other routes to follow the trend. Differences in rates exist
because substitutability between routes is limited by the need to ballast from one region to
another. Iron ore and coal cargos along the same route however constitute closer substitutes
and therefore rate differences between them are small.
2.4.4 Spot Charter Rates
China's demand for iron ore, which is currently driving the market, has created flow
irregularities. Capesize earnings are therefore significantly higher along front hauls (Atlantic
to Pacific) compared to backhauls (Pacific to Atlantic). The gap between them however has
narrowed lately as a result of America's increasing demand. This is demonstrated in Fig. 2.4-
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12, which shows the daily earnings for transatlantic and transpacific rounds and front-haul
and backhaul voyages.
Baltic Cape (172KDwt) Earnings
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Fig. 2.4-12: Earnings along the 4 TC Routes - using data from [Baltic Exchange 2007 & Clarksons 2007al
Besides the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), today the Baltic Exchange also produces indices
for the various size groups of bulk carriers such as the Baltic Cape Index (BCI) and the BPI
(Baltic Panamax Index). These are composed daily using the input of several panelists and
they reflect the daily freight market. Fig. 2.4-13 shows the BCI since its introduction in 1999
along with the BCI and average earnings. "Average earnings" is simply the average of the 4
TC routes shown in Fig. 2.4-12.
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Fig. 2.4-13: BCI. BDI and Average of the 4 TC Routes 2001 - using data from
[Baltic Exchange 2007 & Clarksons 2007a]
The close alignment of BCI with the average earnings of the 4 TC routes shows that it
is an accurate measure of the market. Again comparing BCI with BDI shows how cape
earnings have followed the dry bulk market while being affected slightly more by the current
boom since 2003.
2.4.5 Period Charter Rates
Period charter rates tend to be slightly less volatile than spot rates depending on the
period length. In other words, 1-year charter rate peaks are lower than those of spot rates and
higher than those of 3-year charters. The highest 1-year fixture ever reported was that of the
2004-built "Cyclades" earlier this month at $92,500/day [Lewis 2007c]. The highest spot
charter ever fixed was last week (May 2007) at $145,000/day. Average spot earnings are
currently about $15,000/day higher than this value and on an upward trend. This conclusion
is also clear in Fig. 2.4-14, which shows 170Kdwt cape spot and time charter earnings for
various period lengths.
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Fig. 2.4-14: Spot and Time Charter Earninigs for 170KDwt Capes - using data from
[Baltic Exchange 2007, Braemar 2007a & Clarksons 2007a]
The reason is that one would be more likely to charter at a rate closer to the average
spot market when chartering for a longer time. Fluctuations about an average value are
therefore smaller for longer period charters. It should be noted that the "average" is not
necessarily a historical average. It is what the people in the current market believe to be an
average market and this can change significantly after a big crisis as in 1986 or after a big
boom as in 2003. 10-year charter rates today for example are about $40,000/day, which is
remarkably high compared not only to the 15 or 20-year average but also to the pre-2003
record high spot market rates.
It can also be seen in Fig. 2.4-14 that average time charter rates are lower than those
of the spot market and decrease with t/c length. This is because they provide a steady, long
term and secure income, which is valued by many owners, particularly IPOs. Note that the 6-
month time charter is almost equivalent to spot chartering since a typical voyage charter lasts
for a few months.
For a given charter period length in a given market, the rate depends on the reliability
of the charterer and the number and quality of assets that they own. When chartering a vessel
on period in a high market, one relies on the fact that the charterer will continue to pay the
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agreed rate if the market goes down. The risk of having to renegotiate varies depending on
the integrity of the charterer and the probability of the market declining. Each individual
owner may also interpret it differently. More importantly, time charter rates depend on
market expectations.
Time charter rates today are substantially below spot rates and decrease significantly
with period length. This is because many people believe that the current market, which is
very strong compared to historical averages, will not last for very long. The opposite was true
in the 1983 crisis when people were very optimistic about the future and period rates were
thus higher than the spot market. During a shipping crisis, time charter rates usually increase
with period length and the opposite is true in a shipping boom. This can be seen in Fig. 2.4-
15 and Fig. 2.4-16, which show historical 6-month, 1-year and 3-year charter rates for
150Kdwt and 127.5Kdwt capes respectively.
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Fig. 2.4-15: Spot and Time Charter Eaminigs for 150KDwt Capes - using data from
[Baltic Exchange 2007 & Clarksons 2007al
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Fig. 2.4-16: Spot and Time Charter Earninigs for 127.5KDwt Capes - using data from
[Baltic Exchange 2007 & Clarksons 2007a]
One can also see that there is a time lag or a phase difference between the charter
rates of various lengths. 3-year charter rates for example increase and decline later than 1-
year charter rates. The 3-year charter rate curve therefore appears to be slightly shifted to the
right (forward in time) compared to the 1-year time charter rate curve.
The time lag is analogous to the period length. This is because the period length
corresponds to the level of commitment involved in chartering. After a market change, new
rates are often perceived as temporary. People therefore often wait until the new market level
is somewhat established before chartering for a long period, as this takes a more
sophisticated decision than a short charter.
It is also observed by comparing Fig. 2.4-14, Fig. 2.4-15 and Fig. 2.4-16 that charter
rates for similar periods are significantly higher for larger vessels. This is clearer in Fig. 2.4-
17, which shows 1-year and 3-year time charter rates for 170Kdwt and 150Kdwt capes.
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Fig. 2.4-17: 1-year and 3-year Time Charter Rates for 170KDwt a nd 150KDwt Capes - using data from
[Baltic Exchange 2007, Braemar 2007a & Clarksons 2007a]
Fig. 2.4-17 clearly shows the decrease in rates with period length and the decrease in
rates with ship size. It is also clearly shown that the time lag is consistently dependent on
period length for the two ship sizes, and independent of ship size.
2.4.6 Conclusions
e Freight rates depend on the fleet utilization and their direction is driven by changes in
global supply and demand
* There will be a tight balance between supply and demand until 2010 but the
increasing scrapping pool will allow supply to decrease if demand drops and this will
prevent freight rates from dropping significantly
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2.5 Ship Values and the S&P Market
2.5.1 Introduction
Ship values are dictated by their earning capacity, their age, the newbuilding price
and the scrap value. The drastic changes that have taken place since the fall of 2003 however,
has had a big impact on the Sale and Purchase (S&P) market, and has made ship valuations a
complicated task. Some remarkable phenomena have been observed making this a very
interesting topic to explore. As commented by Mr. Sydney Levine for example, the ratio of
prices between a 20-year-old and a 5-year-old vessel increased steeply in 2003 after being
steady for decades. Furthermore, the newbuilding has not only become cheaper than the
secondhand, but is now also cheaper than the 10-year old vessel.
2.5.2 Database
Mr. Sydney Levine provided a large database of capesize S&P transactions that have
taken place between December 1987 and December 2006 [Levine 2006]. This S&P database
was completed by adding data that was collected from reports by Harry Vafias [Vafias 20071,
Braemar Seascope Ltd. [Braemar 2007b], and transactions reported in Tradewinds
[Tradewinds 2007]. The complete S&P database consists of 285 secondhand dry bulk cape
transactions between December 1987 and March 2007. This does not include newbuilding
orders and newbuilding resales, which were kept separately. The details of the S&P database
are summarized in Table 2.5-1.
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DATABASE DETAILS
Period Dec'87 - Mar'07
Number of Ships 285
Average Size 163,373 dwt
Average Price $30.9 m
Average Age 11.3 years
Table 2.5-1: S&P Database Information
2.5.3 Time Distribution of S&P Transactions
While bearing in mind that year 1987 only includes December and year 2007 only
includes the first quarter, it is safe to assume that the S&P database is fairly complete
meaning that it includes most reported deals. Fig. 2.5-1 shows how the 285 capesize vessel
transactions that took place in the investigated period, were distributed over time.
2nd Hand Cape Transactions per Year
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Fig. 2.5-1: Number of Transactions Recorded from the Database for Each Year
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Interestingly, it is observed that the frequency of transactions was higher during the
years when the market was high (e.g. 1995 and 2003 until today). Fig. 2.5-2 shows the
number of transactions per quarter along with the 1-year time charter rates for a 150Kdwt
cape to illustrate this. The historical values of time charter rates were obtained from
[Clarksons 2006a] and completed by considering relevant fixtures in the charter market.
Fig. 2.5-2: Number of S&P Transactions per Quarter along with 1-year TC Rates
Consider 2007 QI (far right)
Legend Meaning Value
Capes/Q Number of cape deals between 1-Jan-07 and 31-Mar-07 16
150KDWT Average 1-year time charter rates between 1-Jan-07 and $62,900/day
lyr TC rates 31-Mar-07 for a 150,000dwt cape
Table 2.5-2: How to read Fig. 2.5-2
Clearly, activity in the S&P market is closely correlated to freight rates. Since
earnings affect prices, the same can be also said about activity in the S&P market and prices.
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Fig. 2.5-3 shows the frequency of transactions along with the price of a 10-year-old typical
cape.
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Fig. 2.5-3 Number of Transactions per Quarter and Typical Cape Prices
Consider 2007 QI (far right)
Legend Meaning Value
Capes/Q Number of cape deals between 1-Jan-07 and 31-Mar-07 16
10yr Old Average value of a 10-year old cape between 1-Jan-07 and $78.2m
Cape Value 31-Mar-07
Table 2.5-3: How to read Fig. 2.5-3
As shown on the diagram, it appears that when the S&P market is strong, meaning
that prices are high, there is more activity going on which is obviously to the benefit of the
sellers.
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2.5.4 Determinants of Ship Values (Size, Age, Capacity &
Time)
The data was analyzed in order to examine the factors that determine ship values. Due
to the size of the database, it is feasible for qualitative purposes to examine the independent
effect of each parameter while ignoring all others and assuming that they average out. A
graph of price against ship size for example was constructed using the whole database as
shown in Fig. 2.5-4. Each point on the graph represents a single transaction while the black
line is a linear regression through these points. As shown by its gradient, price generally
increases with size but the low value of R2 (0.011) indicates that other factors have a big
impact.
The model indicates that on average, one would pay an extra $30,000 for each
additional 1,000dwt on size. This is significantly lower than the real value for the size range
that we are concerned with. The price difference between a 15OKdwt and a 175Kdwt vessel
for example is usually higher than $750,000, perhaps by an order of magnitude. It is a small
number of large and old (cheap) ore carriers in the 200Kdwt+ range that can be identified at
the right end of the graph, leading to this result.
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Fig. 2.5-4: Impact of Size on Ship Value
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Consider 259,587dwt
Legend Meaning Value
Price The price of a transaction involving a ship of 259,587dwt $14m
Linear Linear Regression model prediction for the price of an $33.5m
(Price) average 259,587dwt vessel
Table 2.5-4: How to read Fig. 2.5-4
A similar graph was produced to evaluate the effect of age on vessel price. This is
presented in Fig. 2.5-5. Again a linear regression model has been used representing a
straight-line depreciation.
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Fig. 2.5-5 Impact of Age on Ship Value
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Consider 22 years of Age
Legend Meaning Value
Price The price of a transaction involving a 22-year old vessel $18n
Linear Linear Regression model prediction for the price of an $8.3m
(Price) average 22-year old vessel
Table 2.5-5: How to read Fig. 2.5-5
The y-intercept of the regression model is $55m while the gradient is -$2m/year. This
means that based on the collected data, the model values a new ship at about $55m, and the
vessel is depreciated by an average of $2m per year. One can see on the y-axis of the graph
(x=0), that all the points lie above the y-intercept. The reason for this is that all new vessel
transactions took place in the period between 2004 and today, during which prices were
significantly above average.
The x-intercept of the graph is 26 years meaning that model predicts the value of an
average ship to drop to 0 at that age. If one however assumes an average scrap value of $5m,
the model predicts the scrapping age at 23.5 years, which is about right. The values predicted
by this model are all reasonable while the R value (0.368) is much higher than that of the
previous model. This indicates that age has a greater impact on price than ship size.
Since it has been established that price increases with size and decreases with age, an
attempt is made to combine the two parameters on one graph. Price was therefore first
divided by capacity to produce $/dwt, and then plotted against age as shown in Fig. 2.5-6.
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Fig. 2.5-6: Impact of Age on Ship Price/dwt
Consider 22 years of Age
Legend Meaning Value
$/dwt The price/capacity of a transaction involving a 22-year old 101$/dwt
vessel
Linear Linear Regression model prediction for the price/capacity 57$/dwt
($/dwt) of an average 22-year old vessel
Table 2.5-6: How to read Fig. 2.5-6
Fig 2.5-6 looks like Fig. 2.5-5 with a similar level of scatter. The regression model of
this graph values a new 175,000dwt at $58m and predicts its rate of depreciation at $2.2m per
year. If one assumes a scrapping price of $6m, the scrapping age is predicted to be 23.8
years, which again is about right. The value of R2 (0.365) is about the same and shows no
increase from that of Fig. 2.5-5 (0.368). This shows that dividing price by capacity (to
account for the effect of size) does not improve the scatter or accuracy of the model.
The above analysis provides an insight on the effect of the examined parameters on
price. The data however was very scattered and the accuracy of the regression models was
low with R2 always less than 0.4. This is because the most important parameter has been
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ignored. That is the market, or in other words, time. Ship values are very closely related to
ship earnings so when the market is high, prices are up and vice versa. To account for this, a
graph of price vs. time and a graph of price/capacity vs. time were plotted as shown in Fig.
2.5-7 and Fig. 2.5-8 respectively. As shown earlier, age has a big impact on prices so the data
was divided in age groups of 5 years span.
Fig. 2.5-7: Price vs. Time for the various Age Groups
Consider March 2007
Legend Meaning Value
0 to 4 Price of a 0-4 year old cape deal on 03/12/07 $112m
10 to 14 Price of a 10-14 year old cape deal on 03/20/07 $62m
20 to 24 Price of a 20-24 year old cape deal on 03/24/07 $33m
25 to 30 Price of a 25-30 year old cape deal on 03/24/07 $19m
Table 2.5-7: How to read Fig. 2.5-7
192
Cape S&P Transactions
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Fig. 2.5-8: Price/Capacity vs. Time for the various Age Groups
Consider March 2007
Legend Meaning Value
0 to 4 Price/Capacity of a 0-4 year old cape deal on 03/12/07 640$/dwt
10 to 14 Price/Capacity of a 10-14 year old cape deal on 03/20/07 392$/dwt
20 to 24 Price/Capacity of a 20-24 year old cape deal on 03/24/07 222$/dwt
25 to 30 Price/Capacity of a 25-30 year old cape deal on 03/24/07 147$/dwt
Table 2.5-8: How to read Fig. 2.5-8
As shown on the graphs, dividing into age groups greatly reduced the data scatter.
Prices or prices per capacity of the age groups move parallel to each other along with the
fluctuating market. The market affects all age groups while the newest ones are higher. There
are some exceptions to this because of data scatter, which is explained by the age range of the
groups. To overcome this, another graph was produced, shown in Fig. 2.5-9, which shows
price vs. time for vessels of 0, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years old.
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Fig. 2.5-9: Price vs. Time for Multiples of 5 Age Vessels
Consider March 2007
Legend Meaning Value
0 Price of a 0 year old cape deal on 03/12/07 $112m
20 Price of a 20 year old cape deal on 03/24/07 $33m
Table 5.5-9: How to read Fig. 2.5-9
The scatter in this graph has greatly been reduced to the extent that it is sensible to
connect the data points as shown in Fig. 2.5-9. The lines connecting the data points move
relatively parallel with the newest ones being on top. Overlapping only occurs when there is
lack of data for a specific point in time.
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Cape S&P Transactions
2.5.5 Critical Age Discounts
As we have seen, ship values fluctuate with the market and are highly dependent on
age. Besides the decrease of price with age however, there are also known to be
discontinuities in the age/price relationship. These typically occur at ages that are multiples
of 5 after the age of 10 years for a variety of reasons.
US investors or IPO's for example, do not approve for vessels older than 10 years
old. Furthermore, there are many Japanese companies whose policy is to operate vessels until
the age of 10 and then sell them. They also construct them accordingly with a high
percentage of high tensile steel, which provides some benefits but also has many drawbacks,
which become more important during the later stages of a ship's life. Since these owners and
IPO's constitute a significant portion of the market, this creates an abrupt decrease in ship
values at the age of 10 years.
Most banks do not finance vessels over 15 years old while it is almost impossible to
get finance for vessels over 20 years old. This creates a similar effect in the age/price
relationship at the age of 15 and 20 years. Furthermore, there is an age limit of 25 years for
all vessels carrying iron ore. Since iron ore is the main commodity transported by capes, this
also has a big impact.
In addition to these factors there are also various age limitations of cargo contracts,
which also contribute to the discontinuities in the age price relationship. In order to
investigate these discontinuities, the database was used to create graphs of Price vs. Time for
transactions of vessels of the critical age (e.g. 10 years old), one and two years younger, and
one year older. The purpose is to show the relatively larger decrease in price at the critical
age (e.g. between 9 and 10) compared to one year younger (between 8 and 9) and one year
older (between 10 and 11). This was carried out for the age of 10, 15, 20 and 25 years and the
graphs are shown in Fig. 2.5-10, 2.5-11, 2.5-12 & 2.5-13 respectively. Graphs of
Price/Capacity vs. Time were also plotted for the same ages and shown in Fig. 2.5-14 to 2.5-
17.
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Ship Values Around Age 10
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Fig. 2.5-10: Vessel Price vs. Time to Show the Discount at 10 Years Old
Ship Values Around Age 15
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Fig. 2.5-11: Vessel Price vs. Time to Show the Discount at 15 Years Old
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Fig. 2.5-12: Vessel Price vs. Time to Show the Discount at 20 Years Old
Ship Values Around Age 25
35
30
25
20 *23
+ 24
15 +25
+26
10
5
0
Jan-87 Jan-89 Jan-91 Jan-93 Jan-95 Jan-97 Jan-99 Jan-01 Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09
Date
Fig. 2.5-13: Vessel Price vs. Time to Show the Discount at 25 Years Old
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Ship Values Around Age 10
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Fig. 2.5-14: Vessel Price/Cavacities vs. Time to Show the Discount at 10 Years Old
Ship Values Around Age 15
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Fig. 2.5-15: Vessel Price/ Capacities vs. Time to Show the Discount at 15 Years Old
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Fig. 2.5-16: Vessel Price/Capacities vs. Time to Show the Discount at 20 Years Old
Ship Values Around Age 25
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Fig. 2.5-17: Vessel Price/ Capacities vs. Time to Show the Discount at 25 Years Old
Unfortunately, the discontinuity in the age-price relationship is not clear in the
diagrams. There could be many reasons for this but the most important one is insufficient
data. Due to the small size of the capesize fleet and the small number of transactions each
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month, it is almost never the case that a buyer will be given the choice between say a 9-year
old vessel and a 10-year old vessel at a specific point in time. Buyers are therefore forced to
go with what is available and their preferences therefore do not show up in the results.
Furthermore, it is unknown whether the 10, 15, 20 and 25 year old vessels have passed their
special survey, which is due every 5 years. One should note that passing a special survey not
only involves the actual cost of the repairs and fees (which is usually in the millions for old
vessels), but also the loss of earnings when pulling the ship out of the market for several
weeks which can be very high in a strong market.
2.5.6 Other Determinants of Ship Values
So far, the effect of the market (time), ship age and ship size on prices has been
studied. There are other factors that also play a significant role. These can be examined by
considering a sample of transactions from the S&P database. The list of the reported capesize
deals from January Is 2007 to March 3 0 th 2007 is presented in Table 2.5-10 Please note that
the market (freight rates and prices) has had an upward trend during this period.
Date Name Built Size Notes Price
02/Jan SPRING BRAVE 1995 151,066 Delivery in May 62
08/Jan MONTEGO II 1993 149,391 TC: 30k/d - Dec'08 50
08/Jan CHS MOON 1990 151,227 - 45
10/Jan BRILLIANT CORNERS 1981 105,496 - 8.7
26/Jan LOWLANDS BEILUN 1999 170,162 TC: 37.4k/d-Mar/Jun'10 72.5
05/Feb YUE MAY 2007 175,000 - 99
14/Feb DYNASTY 1982 132,082 - 15
14/Feb PANTELIS SP 1999 169,883 TC: 47.5k/d - Feb'08 83
22/Feb THIOS COSTAS 1982 145,229 Delivery in May 18
02/Mar CAPE PELICAN 2005 180,235 - 110
200
05/Mar JOHNNY K 1994 174,770 POLAND BLT 63
12/Mar ANANGEL WISDOM 2007 175,000 - 112
19/Mar CAPE KASSOS 2004 171,480 Delivery in Sept 100
20/Mar MARTHA VERITY 1995 157,991 - 62
Mar AMERICANA 1987 148,982 - 33
Mar IKARIA 1981 129,237 - 19
Table 2.5-10: Reported Capesize Deals from Janua 14 2007 to March 30th 2007
[Vafias 2007, Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 20071
2.5.6.1 Ship Builder
The shipyard, or more generally the country where the ship was built, can have a
significant effect on the price. Rumanian, Polish or Brazilian ships for example have always
been discounted compared to similar Japanese or Korean vessels. To illustrate this, one can
compare the JOHNNY K, which was built in Poland, with the MARTHA VERITY. The
JOHNNY, being one year older and 10.6% (17,000dwt) larger, was sold for only 1.6% ($1m)
more during the same month (two weeks difference).
2.5.6.2 TCAttachment
A t/c attachment may increase or decrease a ship's value depending on the t/c rate
compared to the current market, the length of the t/c contract and the risk involved. The risk
depends on the trustworthiness of the charterers and the number and kind of assets that they
have. The value of a time charter attachment is equivalent to the net present value of the
difference between the earnings of the attached charter and the earnings of a charter of the
same period length at the current market rate. If the charter attachment is of low risk, the
value of the time charter is superimposed on the vessel's charter-free price.
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This can be illustrated by comparing the LOWLANDS BEILUN and the PANTELIS
SP. These are very similar vessels that were sold within a few days from each other, allowing
for only a small market increase. They had different t/c attachments, which explain the
difference in their price. Table 2.5-11 shows some crude calculations in order to approximate
the charter-free value of the two vessels.
LOWL A NDSBEILUN PA NDELISSP
Deal Date 26-Jan-07 14-Feb-07
Approx. TC Period 3 years 1 year
TC Rate $37,400/day $47,500/day
Market Rate at Deal Date for TC Period $53,000/day $65,000/day
Rate Difference -$15,600/day -$17,500/day
Assumed days per year 355 355
Approximate TC Value -$16.6m -$6.2m
Price $72.5m $83m
Approx. Charter-Free Price $89.1m $89.2m
Table 2.5-11: Comparison of Capesize Deals to Illustrate the Value of TC Attachments
The charter-free value of the two vessels is very close which shows that the difference
in the prices is due to the time charter. A 10-year old, charter-free, 170Kdwt vessel during
the same month was worth about $83m while a 5-year old was worth $98m. It can therefore
be seen that the estimated value of $89m for the 8-year old vessels is very reasonable. In fact
it is the exact value one obtains through linear interpolation.
One should note however that the above are only crude approximations for illustrative
purposes. Net present value calculations were not performed. Furthermore, one important
factor that was not considered is the vessel's age after the charter. This will affect its residual
value but in this example, and more generally in the current market, this is of relatively low
importance as the later years are discounted at a much lower rate.
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2.5.6.3 Delivery Time
Another factor whose importance has been highlighted over the past few years is the
time of delivery of a vessel. When the market is at high levels, the earnings projected over
the period that the market is expected to last affect ship prices significantly. 25 and 26-year-
old small capes such as the THIOS COSTAS and IKARIA for example will be scrapped
immediately if a market crisis finds them in the spot market. They are only selling at circa
$20m because of their high earnings in today's market. It is therefore understandable that a
later delivery time costs money and therefore reduces the value of the ship in a good market.
Consider the CAPE PELICAN that was sold for $110m, the CAPE KASSOS that
went for $100m and the ANANGEL WISDOM that went for $112. The CAPE PELICAN is
slightly more modern than the CAPE KASSOS, which has a delivery date in September. The
1-year age difference however does not explain the $10m difference in price since the
ANANGEL WISDOM, which is 2 years younger than the CAPE PELICAN, only went for
$2m higher.
Six-month charter rates in March on the other hand (until September) were about
$72,000/day, so if one assumes running costs of about $5,500/day, this corresponds to
earnings of about $12m. Similarly, this explains why a typical newbuilding with delivery in
2010 only costs about $80m even though it will be more modern and larger than the above
vessels.
As discussed earlier, if a ship is SS-due or DD-due, meaning that it has to pass its
special survey or intermediate survey (Dry Docking), this also involves having to wait for
several weeks. The special survey is due every 5 years and there is an intermediate between
every two consecutive special surveys. The special survey itself and all the repairs may cost
about $lm for a 15-year old cape. Today, the loss of earnings at the daily rate of over
$100,000/day for say a duration of 40 days deviation to the yard and repair time is about four
times as much.
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2.5.7 Historical Cape Prices and Price Ratios
Ship brokers and other companies, such as Marsoft, that carry out research for the
maritime industry, try to keep track of ship prices, among other things. These are primarily
based on actual deals like the ones in the current database. In order to be consistent however,
one must keep track of a specific vessel type, age and size.
As shown earlier, ship values are affected by several factors while the few cape
transactions taking place each month involve ships that differ in many aspects. As such,
experience and perhaps some empirical formulae are required to convert the prices of the
actual deals to those matching the chosen vessel type, age and size.
To account for age differences, one needs to use some sort of depreciation curve
along with newbuilding prices for relatively new ships or scrap values for older vessels. To
account for size, one needs to use their experience and historical data. Consider a 5-year old
170Kdwt vessel and a 5-year old 150Kdwt vessel for example. Fig. 2.5-18 shows the values
for these ships since the beginning of 1990 until today based on data from [Carksons 2006c]
and actual transactions from the database.
Cape Values
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Jan-90
- 170K DWT 5
Years Old
150K DWT 5
Years Old
Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-06 Jan-08Jan-92 Jan-94 Jan-96 Jan-98 Jan-00
Date
204
Fig. 2.5-18: Track Record of 5-Year Old 170Kdwt and 150Kdwt Cape Values since January 1990 -
Using data from [Clarksons 2006c, Levine 2006, Vafias 2007, Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 20071
As it can be seen, the values have been relatively parallel. The price ratio of the
170Kdwt vessel to the 150Kdwt vessel has been fairly constant with an average value of 1.2.
By noting the deadweight ratio of 1.13, one can see the economies of scale, which explain
the steady increase in the typical size of capes over the years.
Besides converting prices from actual deals to account for factors such as size, age,
shipyard, engine size etc., when there is lack of deals in the market, freight rates may also be
used to predict what the prices would have been had there been a transaction. These records
are therefore not exact but they are nonetheless very useful in following and trying to
understand the behavior of the market.
Fig. 2.5-19 shows the historical prices of 170,000dwt capes of various ages and their
scrap value. The graph was compiled using data from [Marsoft 2007a] and actual fixtures
and S&P transactions from the database.
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Fig. 2.5-19: Historical Track of 170Kdwt Cape Values along with Scrap Values -
Using data from [Marsoft 2007a, Levine 2006, Vafias 2007, Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 20071
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Consider February 2001
Legend Meaning Value
Newbuilding Average price of a 170,000dwt newbuilding cape $38.3m
5yr Old Average price of a 170,000dwt 5 year old cape $28.1m
10yr Old Average price of a 170,000dwt 10 year old cape $19.1m
15yr Old Average price of a 170,000dwt 15 year old cape $12.3m
Scrap Scrap value of a 170,000dwt cape $5.8m
Table 2.5-12: How to read Fig. 2.5-19
Prior to the market boom, which began in 2003, ships used to be valued to a crude
approximation using a straight-line depreciation curve with a lifetime of 20 years. The scrap
value was neglected for relatively young ships in order to account for increasing operating
costs with age. The price of a newbuilding was therefore about 2 times that of the 10-year old
vessel while that of a 5-year old vessel was half way between. In February 2001 for example,
a 170Kdwt newbuilding was worth about $38m while a 5-year old was worth about $28m
and a 10-year old was worth about $19m. Assuming a straight-line depreciation, using a 20-
year lifetime and neglecting scrap value yields a gradient of $2m/year. Charter rates were
about $15,000/day for 170Kdwt ships and average running costs were about $5000/day
resulting in operating profits of about $3.5m/year, which is reasonable.
As shown on the graph, ships values were always capped by the NB price. Ship
values therefore lied between the newbuilding price and the scrap value (minus the cost of
transporting and scrapping the ship). Things obviously changed after the market boom. Spot
rates went up until they exceeded $100,000/day but there was no confidence that this will
last. A straight-line depreciation curve was therefore no longer appropriate.
If a straight-line depreciation curve applied, one would expect values of ships of
different ages to diverge as they increase while the price ratios remain relatively constant.
Instead, we see that ship prices move in parallel meaning that they increase by the same
amount. This shows that the period for which the market is expected to last is valued much
higher than the remaining ship's life. It is also valued approximately the same for all capes
regardless of their age. Consequently, as the market stays strong, very few vessels are
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scrapped. This combined with the high demand for steel causes scrap values to reach record
high levels.
Fig. 2.5-20 shows the historical prices of 150,000dwt capes of various ages along
with 6-month charter rates for vessels of that size. The graph was compiled using data from
[Clarksons 2007a] and actual fixtures and S&P transactions.
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Fig. 2.5-20: Historical Track of 150Kdwt Cape Values along with 6-Month Carter Rates -
Using data from fClarksons 2007a, Levine 2006, Vafias 2007, Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 20071
Consider February 2001
Legend Meaning Value
5 Years Old Price of 150Kdwt 5-year old capes in March 2007 $77.38m
10 Years Old Price of 150Kdwt 10-year old capes in March 2007 $67m
15 Years Old Price of 150Kdwt 15-year old capes in March 2007 $57m
20 Years Old Price of 150Kdwt 20-year old capes in March 2007 $40m
6 Month Rates 6-month charter rates for 150Kdwt capes in March 2007 $62K/day
Table 2.5-13: How to read Fig. 2.5-20
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As the freight market stayed at high levels, cash reserves were built up and
confidence improved. This increased buying interest so prices kept rising. One can see that
even though charter rates in March 2007 were significantly lower than the peaks of February
2004 and December 2004, ship values were much higher due to the better confidence in
sustainable high levels. That is why a 20year old 150Kdwt vessel today is worth about $40m
whereas in a bad market it would be of scrap value.
Since the good market is experienced by vessels of all ages, while spot rates are
relatively independent of age, prices remain parallel. Fig. 2.5-21 explores this phenomenon
and its impact on price ratios. It shows the ratio of prices of 150Kdwt vessels of various ages
with respect to time, along with 6-month charter rates for 150Kdwt vessels, which are
indicative of their earnings. The graph was compiled using data from [Clarksons 2007a] and
actual fixtures and S&P transactions from the database.
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Fig. 2.5-21 Historical Track of 150Kdwt Cape Value Ratios along with 6-Month Carter Rates -
Using data from [Clarksons 2007a, Levine 2006, Vafias 2007, Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 2007]
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Consider March 2007
Legend Meaning Value
5yrs/20yrs Price(5yr-old) / Price(20yr-old) for 150Kdwt in Mar-07 1.935
10yrs/20yrs Price(10yr-old) / Price(20yr-old) for l50Kdwt in Mar-07 1.675
15yrs/20yrs Price(1 5yr-old) / Price(20yr-old) for 150Kdwt in Mar-07 1.425
5yrs/15yrs Price(5yr-old) / Price(l5yr-old) for 150Kdwt in Mar-07 1.358
1Oyrs/I5yrs Price(10yr-old) / Price(15yr-old) for 150Kdwt in Mar-07 1.175
5yrs/Oyrs Price(5yr-old) / Price(10yr-old) for 150Kdwt in Mar-07 1.155
6 Month Rates 6-month charter rates for 150Kdwt capes in Mar-07 $62K/day
Table 2.5-14: How to read Fig. 2.5-21
When the market is low compared to previous levels, the price ratio of new to old
vessels is high. New vessel prices are related to the new building cost while old vessels are
related to their scrap value. In a good market however, people discount the projected earnings
over the period for which they expect the good market to last (e.g. 2 years). Both new and old
vessels feel the good market. The t/c rates and particularly spot rates increase
disproportionately for old vessels compared to new ones. Spot rates in a good market are
about the same for all vessels regardless of their age. The added value of the good market is
therefore similar for all vessels. Consequently, the ratio of prices for new to old vessels
decreases substantially in a good market. This is particularly evident when comparing vessels
up to 10 years old that were previously valued close to newbuilding price with vessels 20
years old and over that are priced near scrap value in a bad market.
Fig. 2.5-22 and Fig. 2.5-23 show the historical prices of typical capes of various ages
along with spot rates and 3-year charter rates. Typical cape refers to the predominant size of
vessels at each point in time. That for example would be about 140-145Kdwt in the 1980s,
l50Kdwt in the early 1990s, 170Kdwt in the late 1990s, 175Kdwt today, while the vessels
that are being ordered today for delivery in 2010 are about 180Kdwt.
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Fig. 2.5-22: Historical Track of Typical Cape Values along with spot and 3-Year Carter Rates - using data from
[Braemar 2007a, Levine 2006, Vafias 2007, Tradewinds 2007, Baltic Exchange 2007, Clarksons 2007a]
FConsider March 2007
Legend Meaning Value
Newbuilding Price of newbuilding typical size cape in March 2007 $112m
5 Years Old Price of 5-year old typical size cape in March 2007 $8 1m
10 Years Old Price of 10-year old typical size cape in March 2007 $98m
NB Resale Price of new typical size cape in March 2007 $83m
3 Year tc Rates 3-year time charter rates for 170Kdwt in March 2007 $55,000/day
Spot Rates Average spot rates for 172Kdwt cape in March 2007 $90,906/day
Table 2.5-15: How to read Fig. 2.5-22 and Fig. 2.5-23
The graph (Fig. 2.5-22) was compiled using data from [Braemar 2007a] and the S&P
database for the ship values, [Baltic Exchange 2007] for the spot rates and [Clarksons 2007a]
and actual fixtures for the 3-year charter rates.
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Fig. 2.5-23: Historical Track of Typical Cape Values along with spot and 3-Year Carter Rates - using data from
[Braemar 2007a, Levine 2006, Vafias 2007, Tradewinds 2007, Baltic Exchange 2007, Clarksons 2007a]
The year 2003 was the first time that current months were valued so high compared to
the rest of the ship's life making secondhand prices higher than that of newbuildings that
have a late delivery. Today, the difference between a resale and a newbuilding is at a record
high and while a 10-year old vessel is now worth more than a newbuilding.
The market started valuing the next few months much higher than the remaining ship
life began when the market boom started. That is also why t/c rates were higher than the spot
market and decreased with period length. The number of months that were valued higher
gradually increased as the market remained at high levels and confidence built up. The
following Chinese-build cape deals that took place in October 2006 illustrate this.
- Diana paid $91m for an SWS Cape resale to be delivered in Dec. 2006
- Transmed sold its last Bohai Cape newbuilding (Delivery in Nov. 2007) for $81.5m
- Golden Union ordered a 177Kdwt Cape in Waigaoqiao for $61m (delivery in 2010)
Looking at these prices, each year until 2010 was valued at around $10m. This is
reasonable as one could charter a cape in October for the next three years to earn
significantly more than that also to account for ageing. What is most remarkable is that the
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following years of the ship's lifetime were discounted at a rate of only around $3m per year
(Golden Union order), which is similar to pre-2003 valuations.
A newbuilding resale today is worth about $112m while a newbuilding for delivery in
2010 is worth about $80m. Again this puts a value of about $10m per year. When ordering a
vessel, it is common practice to pay 20% upon signing, 25% on steel cutting, 20% on keel-
laying (about 3 months before delivery), and 30% on delivery. Table 2.5-16 shows the
amount of each payment for a $80m newbuilding order, and its present value using a
discount rate of 5%.
Net Present Value of a Newbuilding Order
Time (years) % of Price Amount PV (i= 5%)
Signing 0 20% $16m $16.Om
Steel Cutting 2 25% $20m $18.1m
KeelLaying 2.75 20% $16m $14.Om
Delivery 3 35% $28m $20.7m
Total 100% $80m $68.9m
Table 2.5-16: Net Present Value of a Newbuilding Order using a Discount rate of I = 5%
If one uses a linear depreciation curve after 2010, with a 20-year lifetime and zero
scrap, today's value of a 3-year old vessel in 2010 is worth 17/20 times the NPV of the
newbuilding. Table 2.5-17 shows the NPV of a newbuilding for a discount rate of 5%, 8%
and 10% along with the corresponding today's value of a 3-year old vessel in 2010.
NPV of an Order and Equivalent PV of a 3-yr old Vessel in 2010
NPV for new vessel in 2010 NPV for 3yr-old in 2010
I=5% $68.9m $58.5m
I=8% $65.1m $55.4m
I=10% $62.9m $53.4m
Table 2.5-17: NPV of a NB Order and the Equivalent PV of a 3-yr Old Vessel with Delivery in 2010
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If one charters the resale from March 2007 until 2010 (3 years), rates are about
$55,000/day. One can also assume 355 days per year and average running costs of about
$6,000/day over the next 3 years for a new vessel. If the NPV of the operating profits over
the three years are subtracted from its current value of $112m, this yields the effective cost of
buying a 3-year old vessel for delivery in 2010. This calculation is again performed using a
discount rate of 5%, 8% and 10% in Table 2.5-18.
NPV 'of'Resale's; Profits and Equivalent PV of a 3-yrOdVse n21
NPV of Earnings NPV for 3yrold in 2010
I=5% $47.Om $65.Om
I=8% $45.1m $66.9m
I=10% $43.9m $68.1m
Table 2.5-18: NPV of Resale's Profits and the Equivalent PV of a 3-yr Old Vessel with Delivery in 2010
By comparing Table 2.5-16 and Table 2.5-17, one can see that it does not make sense
to buy a resale and charter it for 3 years at $55,000/day. Using a discount rate of 5%, this is
equivalent to paying only $3.9m less for a 3-year old vessel in 2010 instead of a new vessel
whereas by assuming linear depreciation, it should be worth about $10.4m less. If a higher
discount rate is assumed, it is equivalent to paying even more for a 3-year old vessel than a
new vessel. If one chooses the resale over the newbuilding therefore, one has to assume
higher earnings during the next 3 years than can be obtained through a 3 year charter. In
other words, one has to be speculative about the market. If one takes this view however, it is
simpler to charter in a vessel on a 3-year time charter and then charter it out on the spot
market.
The numbers show that ordering at $80 for delivery in 2010 makes far more sense
than buying a resale today at $112m. Many IPO's however are concerned about other issues
such as the numbers that show up on their accounts. Paying for an asset that will not be
delivered and make any money for the next three years does not seem to impress investors
for example.
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By comparing the spot rates to the 3-year time charter rates, one can see that spot
rates are usually more volatile with higher peaks and lower bottoms. They are also first to go
up or down and are then followed by the 3-year time charter rates after a short time lag. In
general, the shorter the charter period, the higher the peak rates, the lower the bottom rates,
and the shorter the time lag from spot rates. This is primarily because they represent a bigger
commitment. Similarly, there is a time lag between freight rates and ship values. The fact that
it takes longer to sell a ship than to charter it has little relevance. People usually wait after a
market change and often perceive new levels as temporary. It takes a far more sophisticated
decision to sell a vessel than to charter it. That is also why the time lag is smaller between
prices and long time charter rates. Spot rates for example began rising significantly in
December 2002, 3-year charter rates picked up in July 2003, and ship values started
increasing steeply in October 2003.
Optimism or pessimism about the future of the market and the owners' position
regarding ships and capital is what drives ship prices. The good market helps build up
healthy cash reserves and shipowners' optimism so it may take a considerable time of a bad
market to depress expectations and for prices to drop. In other words, there is a very low
short-term price elasticity of supply for second hand vessels as there is for newbuildings.
Fig. 2.5-24 shows the percentage by which 150Kdwt cape prices increased from
October 2002 until the two subsequent price peaks in February 2004 and April 2005, and
until today. The chart was compiled using data from [Clarksons 2007a] and actual S&P
transactions from the S&P database.
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Fig. 2.5-24: 150Kdwt Cape Price Increase from Oct.2002 until the 2004 and 2005 Price Peaks and until Today -
Using data from [Clarksons 2007a, Levine 2006, Vafias 2007, Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 20071
Consider "To March 2007"
Legend Meaning Value
5 Year Old Increase in price of 5yr old 150Kdwt from Oct'02 to Mar'07 241%
10 Year Old Increase in price of 10yr old l50Kdwt from Oct'02 to Mar'07 253%
15 Year Old Increase in price of 15yr old 150Kdwt from Oct'02 to Mar'07 470%
20 Year Old Increase in price of 20yr old 150Kdwt from Oct'02 to Mar'07 700%
Table 2.5-19: How to read Fig. 2.5-24
As shown, the values of older vessels increased more than newer ones while each
subsequent peak in prices since October 2002 was higher. This chart also highlights the
critical age of 15 and 20 years that was discussed earlier. In a low market, vessels over 15
years old are less likely to survive to the next market boom and are therefore less preferred.
Hence they are relatively cheaper. As the market picks up, people become less picky and
these vessels therefore gain relatively more on prices.
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Fig. 2.5-25 shows the percentage by which 150Kdwt and 170Kdwt cape prices
increased from October 2002 until today, but now also accounting for ageing. This means
that we are considering a specific 5, 10, 15 and 20-year old vessel in 2002, which is 5 years
older in 2007. Again the chart was compiled using data from [Clarksons 2007a] and actual
S&P transactions from the S&P database.
Again the following chart shows that the older the vessel, the higher the percentage
increase in its price. Furthermore, the prices of 175Kdwt vessels increased slightly more than
those of 150Kdwt vessels. This chart also accounts for the five years of ageing between
October 2002 and March 2007 and that is why the percentage increase in price is lower
compared to the previous chart. However, we have not considered the earnings of the vessels
over these 5 years.
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Fig. 2.5-25: 150Kdwt and 170Kdwt Specific Cape Price Increase from Oct.2002 until Today
rClarksons 2007a, Levine 2006, Vafias 2007, Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 20071
Consider 175,000 DWT
Legend Meaning Value
Built 1997 Price increase of a 1997-built 175Kdwt from Oct'02 to Mar'07 219%
Built 1992 Price increase of a 1992-built 175Kdwt from Oct'02 to Mar'07 224%
Built 1987 Price increase of a 1987-built 175Kdwt from Oct'02 to Mar'07 300%
Built 1982 Price increase of a 1982-built 175Kdwt from Oct'02 to Mar'07 371%
Table 2.5-20 How to read Fig. 2.5-25
Average spot rates (average of the 5 routes) between October 1 t 2002 and March 2 9th
2007 for a Baltic Cape (172Kdwt) were $50,750/day [Baltic Exchange 2007]. Assuming 355
days per year (for earnings) and average running costs of $5,500/day, results in annual profits
of $16m. Assuming cumulative interest of 5%, this amounts to about $78m of profits in
March 2002 over the 4.5 years. This is about the same for all the ships considered above
since spot rates are relatively nondependent on ship age, running costs only increase
marginally, and the number of days in a year would be only as low as 345 for the oldest ship.
This means that the increase in the percentage return on investment for older vessels would
be much greater that that for newer ships.
Consider the 1982 built 175Kdwt ship, which was worth $7m in October 2002 and
$33m in March 2007. To be conservative, assume average earnings of 35,000/day, running
costs of 6,500, 340 days in a year and a 5% interest rate over the 4.5 years. The value of the
total profits is worth about $46.5m in March 2007. If this is also included in the price
increase, we get a total increase of 1,036% within 4.5 years.
The question of selling or chartering a vessel is a major one in shipping. As shown
above, prices are very volatile and there are times when selling seems the best option. Even
though charters involve some risk and renegotiations occasionally take place, experience has
shown that even before the market boom, selling was rarely the best option. Consider a 1974-
built 120Kdwt vessel, which is typical of the first capes. Fig. 2.5-26 shows how the price of
that particular ship varied from July 1980 until scrapping along with 3-year charter rates for
l20Kdwt vessels. The graph was created using data from [Clarksons 2006c]
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Fig. 2.5-26 Price of a 1974-built 120Kdwt Cape until Scrapping along with 3-year TC Rates -
Using data from [Clarksons 2006c
Consider December 1991
Legend Meaning Value
Price Price of a 1974-built l20Kdwt cape in December 1991 $15.5m
3 Year Rates 3-year t/c rates for 120Kdwt capes in December 1991 $16,750/day
Table 2.5-21: How to read Fig. 2.5-26
If there were a point in time when it would be worth selling, that would clearly be in
December 1991 for $15.5m. Average 3-year charter rates between December 1991 and the
scrapping date of February 2002 were $12,562/day. If one conservatively assumes earnings
of $12,000/day, running costs of $6,000/day, 345 days per year (only for earnings) for the
10.17 years, and a discount rate of 5%, the net value of the profits in December 1991 would
be about $14.8m. The scrap value in February 2002 was $2m, which translates to $1.2m in
December 1991 with the same discount rate. The value of keeping the ship was therefore
$16m, which exceeds its price of $15.5m. Furthermore, if one chose a 3-year charter as
opposed to selling the vessel on December 1991, then they would get a rate of about
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$16,750/day and average out significantly higher than $12,000/day for the remaining life of
the ship
2.5.8 Conclusions
* Ship values are dictated by their earning capacity, age, newbuilding price, and scrap
value. Capacity is less important than age while the current market is the most
important factor
* Other parameters include the ship builder, time charter attachments that can have a
positive or negative value, delivery time which is very important in a high market,
SS/DD survey position, vessel and eng type etc.
* Discontinuities in the age-price curve exist for a number of reasons but are difficult to
identify due to the small number of ships available in the market as well as data
scatter
* Frequency of S&P transactions closely follows charter rates and ship prices
* Ship valuations have become more complicated after the market boom in 2003.
Linear depreciation based on the newbuilding price and the scrap value that was once
used is no longer appropriate
* The current market is not expected to last so the next few months/years are valued
much higher than the remaining ship life. The period that is valued much higher
increases the longer the market remains at high levels and optimism builds up
* All vessels experience the good market with similar earnings irrespective of the ship
age. Prices of all ages therefore go up in parallel in a market boom reflecting potential
earnings. Hence, the price ratio of newer to older vessels decreases
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* There is a time lag between freight rates and ship values. This is explained by the
level of commitment and peoples perception of how temporary current rates are
e The price of older vessels fluctuates significantly more percentage-wise than that of
newer vessels while 175Kdwt vessel prices fluctuate slightly more than 150Kdwt
vessel prices
e It is very rarely a better choice to sell a vessel than to charter it based on an analysis
over the period from 1980 until today
e The market boom since 2003 has led to record-high newbuilding and second hand
prices along with record-high freight rates and daily earnings
e Despite record-high scrap values, there has been negligible scrapping since autumn
2003 due to the extremely high earnings
e Investing $7m to buy a 1982 175Kdwt vessel in October 2002 and keeping it in the
spot market would yield a return of over 1,000% until March 2007 (4.5 years)
e Delivery time has become a very important parameter making the newbuilding
(delivery 2010/11) worth about as much as a 13-year old or 150% the price of a
modern vessel. This is the opposite extreme of the 1986 crisis when a 9-year old
vessels was worth its scrap value
e It currently makes more economic sense to order a vessel at $80m for delivery in
2010 than to buy a resale at $112m but there are also issues such as the numbers that
show up in the accounts of IPOs and related cash flow considerations
e The good market helps to build up healthy cash reserves and shipowners' optimism
so ship values are unlikely to drop for a relatively long time even if rates go down
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2.6 Newbuildings
2.6.1 Introduction
As for secondhand capes, a database of cape orders was used in order to examine
newbuilding prices. The records of [Braemar 2007a] were used and these were completed by
adding data from [SSY 2006c], [Vafias 2007] and subsequent reports from [Braemar 2007b].
The database includes a total of 194 orders from May 2003 until March 2007. May 2003 was
chosen in order to capture the last few months before the market boom.
The 194 orders include some large ore carriers but no newbuilding resales or
newbuilding options. John Angelicousis for example who sold the "Anangel Wisdom" in
March 2007 for a record high $112m, ordered 4 capes the same month from Daewoo-
Mangalia at $78 each, with an option for another 4 at the same price. Only the original 4
were included.
It has to be noted that some orders are occasionally not reported. Furthermore,
shipyards have started building vessels in some cases without having an order and these are
therefore not reported either. They do this in order to sell the vessels close to the delivery
date and take advantage of the much higher resale prices. As such, a database like the current
one can never be complete. Due to the multiple sourcing of data and cross-referencing
however, it can be treated as complete in terms of the reported orders. Details regarding the
database are summarized in Table 2.6-1.
DATABASE DETAILS
Period May'03 - Mar'07
Number of Ships 194 Orders
Average Size 181,934 dwt
Average Price $66.3 m
Average Wait 38 months
Table 2.6-1: Newbuilding Database Information
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2.6.2 Time Distribution of Newbuilding Orders
The first part of the analysis was to examine how the newbuilding orders were
distributed through time. In order to compare with the S&P market, a graph was constructed
showing the time distribution of orders per month along with secondhand transactions per
month over the same period. This is shown in Fig. 2.6-1.
Secondhand Transactions and Newbuilding Orders
Fig. 2.6-1: Monthly Orders and S&P Deals using data from the S&P Database and the Newbuilding Database
Between May 2003 and March 2007, 145 secondhand transactions and 194
newbuilding orders were reported. The frequency of newbuilding orders appears to have
increased substantially over the past few months while activity in the secondhand market has
been relatively constant. Interestingly, it is observed that as for the secondhand transactions,
the number of orders per month was higher during the months that the market was strong.
Fig. 2.6-2 shows the number of orders per month over the investigated period along with the
average spot rates. The time series of the average of the 4 TC routes for Baltic Capesize
Index (BCI) was obtained from [Baltic Exchange 2007].
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Fig. 2.6-2: Orders per Month along with Spot Rates
Usiniz data from the Newbuilding Database and [Baltic Exchange 20071
Legend Meaning Value
Spot Rates Average of the 4 t/c routes for 172Kdwt on Mar-29-2007 $90,906/day
Orders Number of newbuilding orders placed within March 2007 40
Table 2.6-2: How to read Fig. 2.6-2
There is clearly a strong correlation between ordering and daily earnings. This may at
first seem reasonable but if one notes the average delivery time of 38 months along with the
fact that it is a highly cyclical market, it is clear that the ships being ordered in the high
market will not necessarily be delivered in a high market. Furthermore, a strong market is
most likely associated with high newbuilding prices. Fig. 2.6-3 shows the number of orders
per month along with newbuilding prices.
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Fig. 2.6-3: Orders per Month along with Newbuilding Prices - Using data from the Newbuliding Database and
[Braemar 2007a]
Consider March 2007
Legend Meaning Value
Orders Number of newbuilding orders placed within March 2007 40
NB Price Average typical cape newbuilding price in March 2007 $81m
Table 2.6-3: How to read Fig. 2.6-3
It can be seen that indeed more ships are ordered when newbuilding prices are high.
One way to view this is that more orders are made when the market is high and therefore
newbuilding prices are also high. Another way to look at it is that newbuilding prices
increase when many orders are made.
The average price of typical NB Cape between May 2003 and March 2007 was $62m.
By taking the average price of all orders in each month, and by interpolating for the months
without orders, a price for that type of Capes that were actually ordered is obtained for each
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month. The average of this price between May 2003 and March 2007 was $55.3m. The
average price of all orders during the same period was $66.3m, which is significantly higher
than both and verifies the argument that relatively more ships are ordered when newbuilding
prices are high.
Fig. 2.6-4 shows the total amount of money invested in newbuilding capes per month
along with the spot rates. Some approximations had to be made to create this graph due to
lack of data. When the price an order was unknown, the average price of the other orders
within the same month was taken as an approximation. When the prices of all orders in a
month were unknown, linear interpolation was used to assign a value.
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Fig. 2.6-4: NB Investment per Month along with Spot Rates -
Using data from the Newbuilding Database and [Baltic Exchange 20071
Consider March 29 2007
Legend Meaning Value
Invested Money Money invested in cape orders within March 2007 $3.125bn
Spot Rates Average of the 4 t/c routes for 172Kdwt on 03/29/07 $90,906/day
Table 2.6-4: How to read Fig. 2.6-4
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A total of about $12.9bn was invested in newbuilding capes between May 2003 and
March 2007 and about a quarter of that was in March 2007 alone. Again it is clear from the
graph that more money is invested in newbuildings when earnings are high even though the
market is cyclical and average delivery times exceed 3 years. Fig. 2.6-5 shows the actual
prices and points in time at which the 194 capesize orders were placed since May 2003.
Fig. 2.6-5: Order Times and Prices for all reported orders since May 2003 along with Spot Rates -
Using data from the Newbuilding Database and [Baltic Exchange 20071
Consider June 1" 2005
Legend Meaning Value
Price Price of an order that was placed in June 2005 $61m
Spot Rates Average of the 4 t/c routes for 172Kdwt on 06/01/07 $39,070/day
Table 2.6-5: How to read Fig .2.6-5
It is clearly shown that the majority of orders were made at high prices when spot
rates were high. Furthermore, one can see that shipyard prices remained low during the
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beginning of the boom, which was then only perceived as very temporary, and then sudden
increased in early 2004.
There are two vessels that stand out as more expensive towards the end of 2006. The
one that was contracted in December 2006 for $93m was a 250Kdwt Ore Carrier. The $80m
vessel that was contracted on Nov-2006 was a typical 175Kdwt but it had a delivery time of
only 14 months, making it significantly more expensive than the other November orders that
had delivery times of 37-62 months.
2.6.3 Delivery Times
Fig. 2.6-6 shows the delivery time (in months) along with the time each order was
placed for the 194 orders of the database. The vessel that was ordered in Nov-2006 and stood
out in Fig. 2.6-5 as being significantly more expensive, can also be identified in Fig. 2.6-6 as
the one with the lowest delivery time (14 months).
Months to Delivery for Capes 140-200K DWT
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Fig. 2.6-6: Newbuilding Capesize Delivery Times for all reported orders since May 2003
It can be seen that even though prices were late to catch up, waiting times were high
since the beginning of the boom. The average delivery time was 38 months (3.17 years) and
the range was 14 to 65 months. Evidently, orders with reasonable delivery times are still
available but a high premium is usually paid for this as examined below.
An analysis was carried out to investigate the value of delivery time for newbuilding
orders. Ore carriers were ignored for this part of the analysis while only capes of 170 -
181Kdwt for which the price was reported were considered. Graphs of price against time
until the delivery date were plotted for each month. This was done for December 2006,
January 2007, February 2007 and March 2007 and all orders within the size range for which
the price was known, were included. Newbuilding resales with zero delivery time were also
used when available in order to obtain the y-intercept of each graph. Regression models
(least squares) were added to provide the basis for qualitative discussion. The results are
shown in Fig. 2.6-7 to 2.6-10, while Fig. 2.6-11 shows all the orders considered between
December 2006 and March 2007 on one graph.
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Fig. 2.6-7: Newbuilding Price against Delivery Time for all Orders Reported in December 2006
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January 2007 Prices for Capes 170-180K DWT
120
110
100
904
80
70-
60
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time to Delivery (Months)
Fig. 2.6-8: Newbuilding Price against Delivery Time for all Orders Reported in January 2007
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Fie. 2.6-9: Newbuilding Price against Deliverv Time for all Orders Renorted in February 2007
March 2007 Prices for Capes 175-181K DWT
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Fig. 2.6-10: Newbuilding Price against Delivery Time for all Orders Reported in March 2007
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Fig. 2.6-11: Price against Delivery Time for all Orders Reported between December 2006 and March 2007
The regression models show that price decreases with delivery time towards a
plateau. The point at which this plateau is reached is the time after which there is no discount
for a later delivery date. However, the relationship for February seems to be linear (perhaps
due to lack of data), and the relationship for March can also be approximated as linear
without much loss in accuracy (R2 = 0.9336 as opposed to R2 = 0.9551 for a third order
polynomial regression).
The purpose of using a linear regression is to obtain a constant gradient, which
indicates the value of each month in delivery time. This is equal to $718,000/month for
February and $975,000/month for March. Intuitively if people are paying about $lm for each
month earlier delivery, this means that over the next three or four years (when the plateau is
reached), a vessel is expected to earn about $1m per month more than compared to the rest of
its life.
The average capesize spot earnings from April 1999 when the Baltic started reporting
them, until September 2003 when the market boom started, were $17,157/day. From October
2003 until March 2007, which was the good market, the average was $57,621/day. This
difference between the two values corresponds to about $1.2m/month, which is close to the
$1m. This shows that people expect the average market in the remaining life of the ship to be
almost as low as the period between April 1999 and September 2003 before the market
boom.
The y-intercept, which is the price of a new ship with immediate delivery, is $99m for
February and $112m for March. We can see that besides the increase in actual ship values,
there is also an increase in the value of delivery time. This is more clearly shown in Fig. 2.6-
12, which is a combination of all the above graphs (Fig. 2.6-07, Fig. 2.6-11).
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Fig. 2.6-12: Price against Delivery Time for the Orders of Each Month from December 2006 to March 2007
It is shown that during the months from December 2006 until March 2007 when the
market was increasing, prices have increased for all delivery dates. This is indicated by the
fact that the lines are relatively parallel with minor overlapping while the ones of the more
recent months are higher. The fact that the blue line, which refers to March 2007, is slightly
steeper than the other ones indicates that the value of delivery time is also higher. The
regression models show that price decreases with delivery time towards a plateau level. Their
accuracy, which is relatively high, is indicated by the R2 values that are highlighted on the
diagram with corresponding colors to the lines of the regression models and the data points.
2.6.4 Other Determinants of Newbuilding Prices
The above analysis examined the effect of delivery time on newbuilding prices. There
are several other factors that play a role and some of these will be discussed by considering
the Newbuilding orders and newbuilding resales that took place in March 2007. The
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Newbuilding database consists of 40 orders in March 2007. These are summarized in Table
2.6-6 along with the 4 resale transactions that took place that month.
No. Buyer Yard Yard Size Del P
Name Name Country Kdwt Mos ($m)
NEWBUILDING ORDERS
4 ANANGEL STX China 181 38.3 76
2 ANANGEL Daewoo Korea 180 31.5 81
4+4 ANANGEL Daewoo- Rum. 180 34 78
Mangalia
4 TRANSMED Hanjin Philipp. 180 - 78
1 KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA NACKS China 300 46 90
2 KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA Namura Japan 250 56.5 85
2 GOLDEN FLAME SHIPPING STX China 181 38 76
2 ZOSCO HANGZHOU SHPG Dalian China 180 43.5 69
1 - - Korea 170 36 80
1 - Dalian China 180 42 69
2 ORION BULKERS SWS China 177 50.5 -
8 HEBEI Quingdao China 180 - -
4 GOLDEN OCEAN SHIPPING Jinhaiwan China 176 31.5 -
2 PHOENIX ENERGY Sungdong - - - -
1 MEIJI SHIPPING Mitsui Japan 176.7 57 -
NEWBUILDING RESALES
1 DIANA SWS China 177 10 112
1 CHANG MYUNG Bohai China 174 8 112
1 - Bohai China 175 8 102
1 - - Korea 170 19 91
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Table 2.6-6: March Resales and March Section of the Newbuilding Database [raemar 2007b, Va as 20071
As analyzed previously, delivery time has a big impact on price. This can be seen
most clearly in the table by comparing the prices of the 4 resale deals with the 40
newbuilding orders. Size is another important factor particularly due to the high economies
of scale. This is highlighted by the price paid for the K-Line ore carriers (Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha), which is significantly higher than all other newbuildings.
Another important parameter is the specification of the vessel. Many yards have a
standard design, which they sell but this is often tailored to the needs of the particular
shipowner. People generally prefer to pay some extra money and make modifications
particularly when ordering a series of vessels. It is also very often the case that shipyards
learn by the modifications of their clients and then introduce them as standard in their
subsequent designs.
The price of a newbuilding can be high compared to one from another shipyard due to
modifications requested by a specific owner or because of the yard's standard specification.
Dalian for example offers a double hull design, which is generally less preferable since IMO
decided not to go forward with this requirement in 2005. The design specification offered by
STX therefore is preferred and that's why STX vessels are more expensive than Dalian
vessels by $7m as shown in Table 2.6-6. Following the previous analysis, it is clear that the
difference in price cannot be explained by the 4-5 months difference in delivery time. One
can also compare the two Bohai resales with the SWS resale, which is the same price as one
and more expensive than the other despite its later delivery time.
2.6.5 Shipbuilding Country Analysis
Beside the particular shipyard, a more general factor that is taken into account is the
country where the vessel was built. Ships from certain countries like Japan for example are
valued higher than those from other countries such as Rumania for example and Japan can
therefore charge higher prices.
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One can see in Table 2.6-6 that the Rumanian vessels ordered by Anangel were at a
lower price than those that were ordered in Korea even though Daewoo who is building the
ships in Rumania is actually a Korean yard. Similarly, the vessels ordered by Transmed in
the Philippines are also at a relatively low price compared to the typical Korean and Japanese
vessels.
The vast majority of capes today are built in Korea, Japan and China. An analysis was
carried out to investigate how the prices offered by these countries have varied over time.
Data from the newbuilding database was used along with data from [SSY 2006] to produce
the graph shown in Fig. 2.6-13, which shows historical newbuilding prices for these
countries.
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Fig. 2.6-13: Japanese. Korean and Chinese Newbuilding Prices - using data from
The Newbuilding Database and [SSY 2007a]
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Consider January 2003
Legend Meaning Value
Japan Average Japanese newbuilding prices in January 2003 $37.5m
S.Korea Average South-Korean newbuilding prices in January 2003 $37.Om
China Average Chinese newbuilding prices in January 2003 $35.5m
Table 2.6-7 How to read Fig. 2.6-13
It is clear that newbuilding prices in these countries are directly correlated and move
in parallel, meaning that they can be regarded as very close substitutes. Japan, which is the
oldest player, has been the most expensive on average, followed by Korea and then by China,
which is a relatively new and fast growing player. Newbuilding prices in all three countries
picked up together a few months after the market boom. Fig. 2.6-14 shows how the absolute
difference between Japanese and Korean prices, and between Japanese and Chinese prices
has varied over time.
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Fig. 2.6-14: Japan, Korea & China Newbuilding Price Difference - using data from
The Newbuilding Database and [SSY 2007al
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Consider January 2003
Legend Meaning Value
Japan-Korea Average Japanese - South Korean NB prices in January 2003 $0.5m
Japan-China Average Japanese - Chinese NB prices in January 2003 $2.Om
Table 2.6-8: How to read Fig. 2.6-14
It can be seen that Japan started off as being the most expensive but the difference
between Japanese and Korean prices gradually decreased until virtually zero where it has
remained over the past few years. There was an instance where the difference was actually
negative meaning that Korea was more expensive for a few months in 2001.
There are two possible reasons for this. First, the Korean ships could have been of
better specification than the Japanese orders at the time. One must note that Korean yards are
happy to allow design modifications by their clients. Japanese yards on the other hand have
relatively good standard designs but allow no changes or improvements. They don't want to
allow their clients to bring their own production schedule. Furthermore, they generally don't
even allow the owner's supervision during construction unless carried out by an approved
Japanese company on the owner's behalf. The other possible reason is that there may have
been many internal Japanese contracts at the time, which are conducted in Yen, while the
Yen - USD fluctuations may make them look cheaper.
China is relatively new to the market and growing fast. Though it has many yards
offering a wide range newbuilding prices, it only recently moved into capes so the majority is
mainly being built by experienced yards. SWS is considered the best with the most
experience in capesize vessels. Bohai also has experience with capes but offers a Double
Hull design, which is generally less preferred. NAKS, which is a Kawasaki - COSCO
venture, has high experience with Handymaxes and is now also building capes.
China has always been cheaper than Japan though the difference in prices appears to
be fluctuating over time between $lm and $6m. Since there is a wide range of prices
available and different yards may be taking the majority of the orders at different points in
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time, this may contribute to the fluctuations in the average price difference between Japan
and China. Quality in China is improving fast but Chinese vessels are still being discounted
against the Korean and Japanese vessels.
2.6.6 Conclusions
e Newbuilding Orders are strongly correlated to current earnings and newbuilding
prices even now that average delivery times are 38 months while it is a highly
cyclical market
e About a quarter of the $12.9bn that was invested in newbuilding capes between May
2003 and March 2007 was invested in March 2007
e There is a significant time lag between charter rates and newbuilding prices
e Delivery time is the most important factor determining newbuilding prices in today's
market. Price decreases with delivery time towards a plateau level at about 4 years
* Newbuilding orders between December and March showed that the value of delivery
time was increasing as well as prices for all delivery dates
e Other parameters affecting newbuilding prices include ship size, design specification,
country of built, shipyard etc.
e The main countries where capes are built today are Japan, Korea and China, which is
a relatively new and fast growing player
e China is most flexible regarding the design specification and monitoring during
construction while Japan is the least
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* Japanese prices used to be the highest but have been about the same as Korean since
January 2003
e China offers a big range of quality and prices but has always been cheaper than Korea
and Japan on average
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2.7 Information Cascades in the Cape Market
2.7.1 Intoduction
As of Dec 2009, there are currently 946 capes in the world fleet and 745 on order
[Clarksons 2009a]. Fig. 2.7-1 shows the orderbook as a percentage of the current fleet along
with the average daily earnings since the 1990s.
Orderbook/Fleet and Earnings 
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Fig. 2.7-1: Cape Orderbook in terms of Fleet Size, and Earnings - Based on data from [Clarksons 2009a]
Even though the market is cyclical and orders take a few years to be delivered, there
is a clear trend between orders relative to the current fleet and the current level of the market.
Intuitively this does not make sense for two reasons. First, orders are more expensive when
the market is high, and second, since the market is cyclical, an order on a crest will likely be
delivered during a trough.
What is worse is that the huge orderbook that builds up, itself brings the market
down. That is inevitable when the orderbook exceeds the current fleet size (as in 2008),
because the demand is very unlikely to double from already high levels and stay that high for
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25 years (a ship's typical lifetime). Furthermore, the yards that are constructed to build these
ships will have to keep building to pay off their CAPEX and stay in business.
The theory of reflexivity by George Soros may be helpful in understanding how this
process evolves. In brief, the theory states that the fundamentals used to determine market
prices are shaped by the biases of the market participants. The participant's views and the
actual market thereby enter into a process of dynamic disequilibrium. In The Alchemy of
Finance, he applies this concept in a wide variety of fields including exchange rates, lending,
stock prices etc. For example, capital outflows which determine exchange rates are affected
by market participants who are trying to predict exchange rates, while banks who decide
whether to lend based on debt ratios, and influence these ratios through their lending
activities [Soros 1987]. The cape market is a similar example whereby shipowners order
ships based on their expectation of what the market will look like in a few years time when
they are in effect shaping that market with their newbuilding orders. This leads to a constant
disequilibrium, giving rise to the high market cyclicality.
The Minsky Moment can also be used to explain the massive orderbook of 2008.
Minsky describes the instability of the financial system particularly during times of
prosperity. He talks about "hedge borrowers", "speculative borrowers" and also "Ponzi
borrowers" who are rewarded with higher profits by levering up in a booming market but
who also rely on selling assets or on refinancing based on asset appreciation to pay back
interest on their loans. He also describes how lenders are attracted by the performance of
borrowers during "good times", and keep lending them until a crisis is inevitable [Minsky
1992]. This closely resembles the "shipping good times" since 2003, after which a massive
number of shipowners levered up to place orders. Today, these banks are busy signing loan
covenant waivers to these borrowers whose assets' fair market value has decreased below the
outstanding debt, in order to avoid having to take in those ships and sell them at huge losses.
It seems obvious that it is wrong to order when the orderbook is higher than the size
of the current fleet, and when people keep ordering and are projected to continue doing so
like crazy. However, based on the number of people doing so, I suspect this behavior can
also be explained in part through information cascades, and I will attempt to demonstrate this
using the current orderbook of capes.
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2.7.2 Information Cascades
Baysian updating is the classical method through which one can calculate posterior
beliefs based on their prior beliefs and new information that arrives. Denote P(T) as the prior
probability that a hypothesis is true, then the posterior probability given information "I" is:
P(T I I)= P(T)PQ I T) (2.7-1)
P(I)
Alternatively, if we have two hypotheses (e.g. true and false), we can conveniently
rewrite Bayes' rule in terms of prior and posterior odds (ratio of probabilities) as:
P(T II) P(T)P(IIT)
P(F|I) P(F)P(I|F)
This has been used extensively in a variety of settings and one of the most useful
applications is the Black-Litterman model, developed by Goldman Sachs in 1990 to
determine optimal portfolio allocation. The model takes in as a prior the output of another
model, such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and updates it using the specific
views of the investor.
Information Cascades are a simple idea from game theory which explains how many
companies or individuals inevitably end up making the same choices (herding) even when
acting on rational grounds. Party A observes the actions of party B and presumes that Party B
is acting on their information. Then through Baysian updating, the beliefs of party B are
tilted towards making the same choice as party A. If party B follows the action of party A,
then party C, who sees the actions of both party A and party B has an even stronger influence
to act in the same way. This leads to an information cascade in which parties end up acting
based on the actions of others, which outweigh their own private information. No additional
information can therefore be inferred by the actions of a single party after a certain point in
the cascade.
242
The classical way of demonstrating information cascades is through a simple
experiment with two urns. Urn A contains 2 white balls and a black, while urn B contains
two black balls and a white. Each individual picks a ball and puts it back without anybody
else seeing it. Then they publicly announce their guess of whether it is urn A or B. If rational,
the first two individuals will guess the urn corresponding to the color which they picked.
From the third individual onwards however, everyone is influenced by the previous guesses
of others. This leads to interesting outcomes where everyone keeps guessing the same urn
regardless of what they picked. It is particularly interesting when the choice being made by
everyone is actually the wrong choice because of some initial unlikely event that triggers the
cascade in the wrong direction. Fig. 2.7-2 shows the probability of ending up in a correct or
an incorrect cascade based on the probability of the signal being correct.
In real life applications however, life is more complicated since this does not capture
the impact of our choices on the outcome itself, as discussed earlier under Soros' theory of
reflexivity.
Prob
1.0
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02 Incvrrect CasC&
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Signal Accuracy (p)
Fig. 2.7-2: Chances of a correct or incorrect cascade as a function of signal accuracy "p", where "p" is the
probability of the signal being correct [Bikhchandani et al 19921
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Information cascades appear frequently in economies especially since exchange of
information is possible between individual players of the market. Many terms have been used
in the past to express this process, such as bandwagon effect, herding, etc. The theory of
information cascades has been used in the past to explain different social phenomena where
information about others' choices plays a significant role for the aggregate outcome of a
process, such as selection of a movie or of social activities to participate in, purchase of a
product etc.
Several researchers have worked in this area proposing different models to capture
information cascades behavior. In [Bickhchandani et al 1992], information cascade is defined
as a compliance towards actions followed by others disregarding personal preferences.
[Anderson and Holt 1997] worked on inducing information cascades in a laboratory setting
using the model of [Bikhchandani et al 1992]. On a relevant paper, while working on an
optimal model to describe agents' influence on decision making, [Banerjee 19921 concluded
that information cascades lead to inefficient equilibriums. More specifically, he concluded
that speculations about information and decision making reasoning grow fast leading to
inefficient markets. The value of personal information is traded for the value of the decision
of others.
Another approach has been followed by [Scharfstein and Stein 1990] focusing on an
agency problem; where the agent gets rewards for convincing a principal for making a
decision. This approach increases the inefficiency of the final outcome. This derives partly
from lack of information about the reasoning of other agents' actions, leading subsequent
agents to disregard actual information and also due to lack of structure of information
exchange between agents. Another parameter that leads to inefficient results is the herd
externality's positive feedback that, i.e. after joining the herd you invite others to join in
order to better self-justify making a decision based on others' preferences.
Different fields have been analyzed using information cascades modes. More
specifically, [Keynes 1936] work suggested that investors' behavior in asset markets is
governed by information cascades. Other examples of applications of this theory include the
study by [Lee 1998] that examines information aggregation failures in a security market
under sequential trading causing high market volatility and inefficiency due to "informational
avalanches".
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Information cascades have also been introduced by [Ghashghale et al 1996] for the
modeling of Foreign Exchange market dynamics in comparison with hydrodynamic problems
in turbulence. Information exchange between different timescale traders causes information
cascades, i.e. forced behaviors in a similar way as energy is forced towards certain scales in
turbulence.
2.7.3 Information Cascades in Shipping
In shipping, there are many individuals of various sizes and influence. Each plays a
different role and has different sources of information. Charterers for example or cargo
owners may be better informed about future demand for transportation whereas groups
owning shipyards may be better informed about future supply. Furthermore, some companies
have closer ties to governments of key countries such as China, whereas others buy
information from special research companies such as Marsoft.
People talk to each other and their brokers and they also read shipping newspapers
which play a big role in shaping people's perceptions of the market. They try to infer what
type of information others have by their moves which are published through newspapers and
brokers reports. This clearly seems like an environment that would foster information
cascades.
There are at least two areas in shipping where one could directly examine the
presence of information cascades. One is in the futures market and the other one is in
newbuilding orders. Regarding futures, a big Taiwanese owner, Nobu Su, leader of TMT, is
known to have great influence, having cornered the market in 2006. Lloydslist wrote an
article about him having flown with a helicopter and seen the mines and stocks in Australia
and the empty stocks in China. He rushed to buy futures, inducing others to follow him and
also chartered in ships from the physical market, keeping them idle [Lewis 2007a]. These
two simultaneous moves caused the market to spike, allowing him and those who followed
him to cash in high profits. Articles have been written about his influence in the market and
information cascades among people who watch him are very probable [Lewis 2007a, Lewis
2007b].
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However, it is hard to demonstrate an information cascade in the futures market
because whenever someone takes a position, there is always a counterpart taking the exact
opposite position. All that we witness when there is a cascade of going long, is an increase in
trading volume and an increase in futures prices. But one could argue that in the meantime,
following that logic, there should be an information cascade going the other way (short)
which would net out the effects of the first cascade.
Information cascades can perhaps be demonstrated more effectively, with more
concrete support, in the case of newbuilding orders from shipyards. An outstanding example
where this may have been the case was with handymaxes in the early 1980s. In 1984, a big
Japanese company, Sanko acted on some information that they had which indicated that the
world economy would recover. They went and ordered 140 HMX (40-42kwt) vessels which
triggered several European companies to go and order another -140 (in total). This increased
supply dramatically in 1986 after the deliveries, outweighing any increase in demand
anticipated by Sanko. The resale value of these ships was then -$7m while the orders had
been placed two years earlier ~ $17m to $18m.
Current Orderbook Analysis
The database I will analyze consists of the full capesize orderbook as of Dec 2009. A
list of all the cape orders that have not been delivered yet has been provided by London
based Clarksons Brokers Ltd. The data includes 329 orders between Dec-10-2004 and 27-
Nov-2009. The average order size is 2.26 ships with a standard deviation of 1.83. The
database includes 672 capes from 138 companies, plus 73 from unknown owners (total
orderbook of 745 capes). Note that some orders may have been made in addition to those in
the database but are not included because the ships have been delivered. Fig. 2.7-3 shows the
number of orders under each order size, while Fig. 2.7-4 shows the orders on the dates that
they have been placed.
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Fig. 2.7-3: Number of orders for each Order Size - Based on data from [Clarksons 2009a]
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Fig. 2.7-4: Size and Timing of all orders of the Dec-2009 Orderbook - Based on data from [Clarksons 2009al
By examining Fig. 2.7-4, we notice that orders tend to be clustered and follow
patterns indicating the existence of information cascades. An information cascade for
example seems to have led the orders up until Oct 2008 where the cascade breaks down
following the market crash. A new information cascade then seems to initiate after 8 months
of no orders, with a 2 ship order in June 2009, followed by a 4 ship order the same month,
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and then several orders including an 18 ship order in July. Note that the information in this
case regards the state of the market a few years ahead, when the ships ordered today will be
delivered.
The interesting question is what sort of events triggers these information cascades. Based on
intuition, I will examine 3 types of events, namely the biggest one-time orders, orders by
companies with the biggest orderbooks, and orders by companies with the biggest cape
fleets. Big orders resemble big commitments, so they are likely to trigger a cascade because
people can more easily conclude that they contain reliable information. Companies with big
cape fleets are likely to trigger a cascade when ordering because, presumably, they are
players with more access to relevant information. Orders by companies with the large
orderbooks are likely to be based on additional information access, and they resemble big
commitments (adding to an already-big orderbook).
I devised a simple method to examine whether an order triggers other orders. This compares
the number of ships ordered during the month following the event with the those ordered
during the month preceding the event (the day of the event is excluded). If the events have no
influence, on average, the increase in orders should be zero. By using a large enough sample
size, if we consistently get positive increases following the events, we can infer that they
trigger other orders leading to an information cascade. The length of time for which the event
has an effect is unknown but a sensitivity analysis is carried out by repeating the analysis
using 2 months before and after the event.
Big Orders
The 10 largest orders include those that are equal to or greater than 8 capes. They are
analyzed under Table 2.7-1. We can see that on average, the 10 largest orders of the current
orderbook, stimulated an increase of 52% in the orders in the following month compared to
the preceding month before, and an increase of 29% in the following 2 months compared to
the two preceding months.
248
Date of Current Order 1Month 1Month 2 Mos2 Mos1Month 2Month
Order Owner Size Before After before after % inc. %inc.
28-Apr-06 Enterprises Shpg. 8 1 4 3 4 300% 33%
01-Oct-06 Unknown 9 14 5 18 23 -64% 28%
26-Mar-07 HOSCO 8 16 40 32 83 150% 159%
29-Jun-07 COSCO 8 19 38 57 76 100% 33%
22-Feb-08 Nordcapital 8 13 25 30 48 92% 60%
25-Apr-08 COSCO 8 24 28 48 42 17% -13%
01-Jul-08 COSCO 8 12 28 38 48 133% 26%
31-Jul-08 Vale 26 14. 38 31 -46%. -
01-Jul-09 .Grand China Logist. 18 6 -2 '-6, 101 .6% .67%
26-Aug-09 Vale 8 2 0 28 4 -100% -86%
Average 9.5 13.3 18.4 29.8 36.9 52% 29%
Exc. 4 Irrelevant 8 14.2 27.2 34.7 50.2 132% 50%
Table 2.7-1: Analysis of 10 Largest Orders of Database
There are, however, 4 orders which are irrelevant and distort the results. Grand China
Logistics acquired the shipyard and made an order of 18 capes that had recently been
cancelled by the previous owners in order to prevent the yard from closing. This actually
deters shipowners from investing as they rely on some shipyards shutting down in order to let
the market recover. Vale is the major exporter of iron ore from Brazil to China. It competes
with exporters from Australia who are a quarter of the distance away. Their recent bulk
orders of mammoth 400,000dwt iron ore carriers (not even classified as capes) was a
strategic move to keep its variable (transportation) costs down and restore its
competitiveness.
This again has the effect of deterring shipowners from investing as it has negative
implications for future demand. This is because Vale, a major charterer, will now rely on its
own ships to cover its transport needs. Finally, there is a 9 vessel order at Imabari shipyard
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by an unknown shipowner which could also be a combination of smaller owners by unknown
shipowners on the same day. The mere fact that it is by an unknown owner also means that it
was probably not reported at the time or that it could have been interpreted as a false signal,
so it could not have led to an information cascade. If we exclude these 4 data points, the
percentage increase becomes 132% and 50% using 1 month and two month periods
respectively.
Heavily Invested Owner's Orders
The current orderbook includes 627 orders from 338 known owners and another 73
orders from unknown owners. For this part of the analysis, we have to exclude orders by
unknown owners. Fig. 2.7-5 shows the companies ranked by orderbook size (smallest to
largest) and Fig. 2.7-6 shows the number of companies with each orderbook size.
Fig.2.7-5: Companies Ranked by Orderbook Size
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Fig. 2.7-6: Number of Companies with each Orderbook Size
Table 2.7-2 lists the 5 biggest companies in terms of orderbook size, while Table 2.7-3 shows
the analysis of all the orders made by these companies.
Company Capes on Order
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines 19
Korea Line 20
STX Pan Ocean 20
Vale 20
China Ocean (COSCO) 33
Table 2.7-2: The 5 Biggest Companies By Orderbook Size
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Date of Current Order1Month lMonth 2 Mos 2 Mos
Order Owner Size Before After Before After
01-Feb-06
05-Sep-06
30-Nov-06
01-Dec-06
05-Jan-07
01-Mar-07
04-May-07
11-May-07
25-May-07
31-May-07
29-Jun-07
01-Jul-07
20-Jul-07
14-Aug-07
01-Sep-07
23-Nov-07
01-Dec-07
07-Dec-07
07-Dec-07
31-Dec-07
01-Feb-08
01-Mar-08
01-Apr-08
04-Apr-08
04-Apr-08
25-Apr-08
01-Jul-08
Mitsui
Mitsui
Korea
Mitsui
O.S.K.
O.S.K.
Line
O.S.K.
Korea Line
Mitsui O.S.K.
STX Pan Ocean
COSCO
Korea Line
Korea Line
COSCO
COSCO
COSCO
STX Pan Ocean
Korea Line
STX Pan Ocean
Korea Line
Korea Line
Mitsui O.S.K.
Korea Line
Mitsui O.S.K.
Mitsui O.S.K.
STX Pan Ocean
Korea Line
Korea Line
COSCO
COSCO
1
1
2
2
3
2
1
2
2
2
8
4
3
14
10
14
7
17
24
43
36
42
11
29
42
25
47
9
15
33
33
33
17
22
25
23
23
24
12
2
10
14
7
4
39
50
33
19
29
24
39
45
33
21
35
40
36
36
17
26
23
44
30
30
28
28
7
21
22
26
25
26
63
78
82
87
57
75
75
81
85
44
45
55
55
50
71
39
47
49
49
48
79
252
5
15
22
15
24
63
70
64
75
67
76
82
71
64
53
73
57
55
55
39
49
59
58
52
52
42
48
08-Aug-08 Mitsui O.S.K. 2 27 18 53 30
03-Oct-08 Mitsui O.S.K. 4 10 0 30 0
01-Jul-09 Mitsui O.S.K. 1 6 2 6 10
13-Nov-09 STX Pan Ocean 8 4 1 13 1
Table 2.7-3: Analysis of Orders by the 5 Biggest Companies in terns of Current Orderbook Size
Table 2.7-4 shows a summary of the results from Table 2.7-3.
Current NumberMean 1Month1Month2 Mos2 Mos1Month2Month
Owner Orders Size Before After beforeafter % inc. %inc.
COSCO 6 5.2 26.8 32.8 68.7 63.8 48% -5%
Vale 2 10.0 27.0 7.0 46.0 17.5 -73% -69%
STX 4 4.8 15.5 29.8 50.3 52.0 89% -9%
Korea Line 10 2.0 26.9 24.0 54.9 49.6 5% -6%
Mitsui 10 1.8 16.3 16.3 33.4 30.1 -12% -1%
Top 5 (Avg.) 33 3.3 22.2 23.5 49.5 44.9 15% -80/
Top 4 31 2.9 21.9 24.6 49.8 46.6 21% -4%
Table 2.7-4: Summary of Results of Orders by the 5 Biggest Companies in terms of Current Orderbook Size
Here we see that the average increase is 15% and -8% using 1-month and 2-month
intervals respectively. Again the results are slightly distorted by the smallest of the top 5
owners, the big charterer Vale, who only has 2 orders. One of those was also preceded by the
18-ship order of Grand China Logistics further distorting the results. If we exclude Vale and
consider the top 4 owners in terms of orderbook, the average percentage increase increases to
21% and -4% for one month and two months respectively.
This analysis shows that these events have a significant positive impact on orders
during the next month but no impact in the second month.
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Big Owner's Orders
Current fleet consists of 946 ships owned by 217 owners. The top 50 fleets account
for 650 ships while 296 are owned under fleets of 5 or fewer ships. Fig. 2.7-7 shows the
distribution of current fleet sizes and Table 2.7-5 shows the 5 biggest fleets.
Cape Owners Distribution Nippon Yusen 
KaishaMisuiO K LinesKawasaki Kisen
19China Ocean (COSCO)
N Zodiac Maritime Agy.FWAngelicoussis GroupU Cardiff Marine Inc.
11n n Shpg Co.
t~ BW ttd. p oHOSCOGeneral Ore Corp.
Chang Myung Shipping
~Shoei Kisen KXK
SChina Steel Corp1CMB N.V.Vale
* Carras Hellas
Enterprises Shpg.
tKorea Line
Polembros Shpg.
6Hyundai M.M.
SU-Ming Marine Tran.
ISTal Chong Cheang
MNissan Kaiun K.K.
E Alpha Tankers & Frt.
UN Nippon Steel Shpg.
To Sangyo Co.Sincere Navigation
E General Maritime
EShinwa Kaiun Kaisha
*STX Pan Ocean
NESanko S.S.
WMarmaras Nav. Ltd.
Sinokor Merchant Mar
*Reederei H. Vogemann
U Excel Maritime Cerr.
E Diana Shipping Inc.
S Sen a u K.K.
*TMT Co. Ltd.
Chinese Mar. Trans.
EAsahi Shpg. Co.
ENeda Maritime Agency
E ZOSCO
* Navios Maritime
* Fredriksen Group
N Elcano
iOcean Longevity
E-Mizuho Sangyo Co.
Unique Shpg. (H.K.)Daiichi Chuo
Others (167 Other Owners)
Fig. 2.7-7: Distribution of Current Fleet Sizes
Company Capes
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 41
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines 41
Kawasaki Kisen 40
China Ocean (COSCO) 38
Zodiac Maritime Agy. 38
Table 2.7-5: Top 5 Current Fleets
Table 2.7-6 shows the analysis of the orders made by those 5 owners
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Date oCurrent Order 1Month 1Month 2 Mos 2 Mos
Order Owner Size Before After Before After
01-Nov-05 N.Y.K. 1 1 2 4 8
10-Nov-05 N.Y.K. 1 1 4 5 7
01-Jan-06 N.Y.K. 1 4 3 6 5
31-Mar-06 N.Y.K. 1 2 9 3 13
06-Oct-06 N.Y.K. 2 10 3 24 21
01-Dec-06 N.Y.K. 3 14 7 26 15
01-Jan-07 N.Y.K. 1 13 8 27 28
11-May-07 N.Y.K. 1 43 33 78 64
01-Dec-07 N.Y.K. 2 15 40 45 57
01-Dec-07 N.Y.K. 3 15 40 45 57
09-May-08 N.Y.K. 2 30 15 57 41
01-Feb-06 Mitsui 1 3 2 7 5
05-Sep-06 Mitsui 1 14 10 21 15
01-Dec-06 Mitsui 2 14 7 26 15
01-Mar-07 Mitsui 2 17 39 26 63
07-Dec-07 Mitsui 1 33 36 55 55
01-Feb-08 Mitsui 1 17 26 71 49
01-Mar-08 Mitsui 3 22 23 39 59
08-Aug-08 Mitsui 2 27 18 53 30
03-Oct-08 Mitsui 4 10 0 30 0
01-Jul-09 Mitsui 1 6 2 6 10
01-Jan-06 Kawasaki 2 4 1 6 3
01-Sep-06 Kawasaki 1 4 14 11 19
16-Mar-07 Kawasaki 3 7 36 28 78
01-Dec-07 Kawasaki 2 15 40 45 57
01-Jan-08 Kawasaki 2 54 23 71 43
_______________________________________________________ I
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04-Sep-08
20-Oct-09
11-May-07
29-Jun-07
01-Jul-07
20-Jul-07
25-Apr-08
01-Jul-08
21-Mar-08
09-May-08
30-May-08
7Kawasaki 2 20 12 48
Kawasaki
COSCO
COSCO
COSCO
COSCO
COSCO
COSCO
Zodiac
Zodiac
Zodiac
2
43
11
29
42
24
12
21
30
28
9
33
24
39
45
28
28
24
15
12
2
78
57
75
75
48
79
43
57
62
12
10
64
76
82
71
42
48
24
41
38
Table 2.7-6: Analysis of Orders by Owners with the 5 biggest Cape Fleets
The highlighted example of Kawasaki has no orders preceding it while 3 ships were
ordered in the following month and 21 in the following 2 months. This is the perfect example
of an information cascade initiation but it yields an infinite % increase so it is excluded from
the following results of Table 2.7-7.
Current Number Mean 1Month1Month2 Mos2 Mos 1Month2Month
Owner Orders Size Before After beforeAfter % inc. %inc.
NYK 11 1.6 13.5 14.9 29.1 28.7 75% 38%
Mitsui 10 1.8 16.3 16.3 33.4 30.1 -12% -1%
Kawasaki 8 1.9 13.3 17.3 26.4 30.4 144% 73%
COSCO 6 5.2 26.8 32.8 68.7 63.8 48% -5%
Zodiac 3 2.0 26.3 17.0 54.0 34.3 -31% -37%
All 38 2.3 17.3 18.8 37.9 35.4 52% 21%
Table 2.7-7: Summary of Results for Orders by the 5 Biggest Owners
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An average of 52% and 21% using 1 month and 2 month intervals is observed respectively. It
is also interesting to see how some owners, such as NYK seem to have more influence on the
market than others such as Zodiac on average.
2.7.4 Summary of Results and Conclusions
Table 2.7-8 provides a summary of the key results.
Type of Triggering Orders No. of Avg. Size Avg. %Increase Avg. %Increase
Orders of Order (1-Month) (2-Month)
Biggest Orders (Excl. 4 Irrelevant) 6 8.2 132% 50%
By Top 4 Order Book Owners 31 2.9 21% -4%
By Top 5 Owners (by fleet size) 38 2.3 52% 21%
Table 2.7-8: Summary of Key Results
Based on the results we can infer that indeed some events have a significant impact,
triggering more orders. This provides the basis for information cascades which are witnessed
by examining patterns in historical orders. Interestingly, big orders (irrespective of party)
have the biggest impact followed by orders by owners with big fleets. Presumably, that is
because big orders indicate a big commitment allowing observers to infer that the party is
acting on reliable data. Furthermore, players with big current fleets are perhaps believed to
have access to more information, and are therefore watched more carefully and imitated.
Finally, it is also interesting to see that consistently across the three types of cases, we get
weaker results using 2-month intervals compared to 1-month intervals. This shows how the
impact of the event gradually decays.
257
2.8 Freight Forward Agreements (FFAs)
2.8.1 Introduction
A futures contract is an agreement between two parties to buy or sell a certain
underlying instrument at a future date (the settlement date), at a pre-set price (the futures
price). The contract imposes an obligation on the holder to buy or sell at the settlement date.
Futures traders are either hedgers or speculators. Hedgers include producers and
consumers of a commodity who try to hedge out the risk of price changes. Producers can
thereby guarantee certain future revenue, while consumers can plan on fixed future costs.
Speculators try to make a profit by predicting the market and buying or selling the
commodity on paper accordingly. Futures markets thus serve to increase liquidity and
transfer the risk between traders such as hedgers and speculators who have different risk and
time preferences or a different perspective of the market.
In the capesize bulk carrier market, the most commonly traded futures are the time
charter Index (in $/day) and the freight rates (in $/ton) along the various trade routes. The t/c
Index is the average time charter rate of the four routes (front-haul, back-haul, transatlantic
and transpacific). It is common to trade these futures for a certain contract period that could
be a month, quarter or year. The last day of each month during the contract period is then a
settlement date and the payment day is the 7th day of the following month. A Baltic capesize
bulk carrier, meaning a 172,000dwt vessel up to 7 years old, is assumed for pricing.
An example of a future that might be traded today might be the T/C Index for 2008
(this will involve 12 settlement dates). The futures price is $45,000/day. A charterer who
knows they will need a capesize vessel in 2008 might therefore buy this contract, which will
effectively guarantee that price. If the physical market in 2008 is say $50,000/day then they
will have to pay that much to charter a vessel, but they will receive the $5,000/day difference
from the counterparty of the futures contract. On the other hand, if the market is say
$40,000/day, they will be paying less to charter a vessel but will have to pay the $5,000/day
difference to the counterparty of the futures contract. A shipowner who owns a cape might
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also hedge in a similar fashion, which would be equivalent to chartering out a vessel today
for the year 2008 at 45,000$/day.
A trader, who buys the future for 2008 today, may sell and buy back futures for that
contract period several times before they mature. A speculator can thus also hedge their bet
and make a profit or a loss on paper much earlier. This means that a profit can be made on a
correct forecast of the market fluctuation between the futures buying and selling date (or vice
versa), regardless of the physical market on the settlement date (2008).
On a note of caution, the traders must be aware that the solvency of their counterparts
is their own risk. There have been cases where counterparts have failed to fulfill their
obligation. The latest example is North American Steamship Limited (NASL) who declared
its inability to fulfill its obligation on a series of contracts in November 2006. Increasing
involvement of banks has been witnessed over the past few years. At a commission, banks
act as a counterpart on account of their approved client. The risk of the solvency of the
counterpart is thereby diminished. Furthermore, on a cross-trade with the bank, the
settlement is effected immediately. This means that when a profit (or loss) is made on paper
by buying and then selling a future with the bank, it goes directly into the trader's bank
account without having to wait for the settlement date.
2.8.2 Data
Futures prices are published every day for the capesize t/c index and for freight on
some trade routes. It is important to note that these are changing continuously even though
they are only quoted once a day. The Bid and Offer is published for each future period and
the mean value is taken as the price regardless of the number of transactions taking place. It
is not always necessary however that a transaction is made at the quoted price. Month to date
values, showing the average so far since the beginning of the month, and year to date values,
showing the average since the beginning of the year, are also published every day along with
the spot rates.
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Daily forms which denote the futures price of the t/c index and trade routes C4
(Richards Bay/Rotterdam) and C7 (Bolivar/Rotterdam), were collected for the last day of
each month since July 2004 from [FIS 2007]. These were then tabulated in a form that could
be used to carry out a comparative analysis and to present the results in graphical form. The
results are presented in the following sections.
Please note that the spot rates are the rates in the last day of each month, while actual
values for a period (month, quarter, two quarters or a year) refer to the average value over
that period.
2.8.3 Time Charter FFAs
Since hedging through the paper market is possible as discussed earlier, buying or
selling a futures contract can be seen as almost equivalent to chartering in or chartering out a
vessel for the futures contract period. Charterers will therefore look for the cheapest option
and shipowners will look for the highest paying option between the two substitutes. As a
result, when futures move up or down, this inevitably causes period charter rates to follow
and vice versa.
Ideally, futures prices and T/C rates at a given point in time and for a given contract
period should be identical. There are however some discrepancies owing to the fact that the
futures and the physical markets are separate. Fig. 2.8-1 shows a comparison between futures
prices and physical time charter rates over the same contract period.
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Fig. 2.8-1: Comparison of Futures Market and Physical Market - using data from
[Clarksons 2007a & FIS 20071
Consider July 2004
Legend Meaning Value
Spot t/c Index value on the last day of July 2004 $65,724/day
lyr FFA Futures price for 1 year t/c on the last day of July 2004 $55,000/day
0.5yr TC 6 month physical t/c rate in July 2004 $62,000/day
lyr TC 1 year physical t/c rate in July 2004 $51,500/day
Table 2.8-1: How to read Fig 116
As mentioned in the introduction, futures prices assume a vessel of 172,000dwt up to
7 years old. These are therefore compared with the physical market for similar vessels for 6
and 12-month period t/c. A close relation is evident between the futures and the physical
market. The small differences are mainly explained by the fact that futures values refer to the
end of each month whereas time charter values are an average for each month. Another
reason is that the time charter involves an optional period a the end.
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Fig. 2.8-2 shows the futures price for the t/c index for the next one to eighteen months
along with the spot rates since June 2004. Note that the number of months in this case is the
contract period. This means that for each point, trading the future is equivalent to chartering a
vessel at that time for the indicated number of months.
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Fig. 2.8-2: Futures Prices for the T/C Index along with the spot rates - using data from [FIS 20071
Consider September 2004
Legend Meaning Value
Spot t/c Index value on the last day of Sept. 2004 $59,846/day
(3mos) Futures price for Oct'04 - Dec'04 as of End Sept. 2004 $60,000/day
(12mos) Futures price for Oct'04 - Sept'05 as of End Sept. 2004 $53,500/day
(l8mos) Futures price for Oct'04 - Mar'06 as of End Sept. 2004 $47,500/day
Table 2.8-2: How to read Fig. 2.8-2
As shown, futures prices, particularly those for few months ahead, are closely aligned
with the spot market. This shows that even though the market is fluctuating between
$20K/day and $100K/day in the investigated period, traders consistently value futures close
to the present market. Furthermore, it can be seen that when the market is declining, the
futures prices are usually slightly lower than spot rates (points lie below the line).
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Conversely, when the market has a positive gradient, futures prices are often slightly above
the line. Futures values therefore also depend on the market direction.
The above conclusion can also be drawn by examining futures curves at various
points in time. Fig. 2.8-3 shows three futures curves along with the spot market to illustrate
this. The flat portion of each line shows the contract period.
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Fit. 2.8-3 Futures curves for the T/C Index alone with the sDot rates - usine data from [SSY 2007bl
Consider June 2007
Legend Meaning Value
FFA 31-Jan-07 Futures price for Q3-2007 as of January 31" 2007 $58,875/day
FFA 30-Jun-06 Futures price for H 1-2007 as of June 30"' 2006 $34,500/day
FFA 31-Dec-05 Futures price for 2007 as of December 31't 2005 $25,000/day
Table 2.8-3: How to read Fig. 2.8-3.
In 31-Dec-06, the market was at $34,973/day with a negative gradient. In 30-Jun-06,
the market was at $33,460/day with a positive gradient. As can be seen by the futures curves
on these two dates, the positive gradient of the market has a strong effect on futures prices.
Even though the market was slightly lower in 30-Jun-06, futures prices were significantly
higher due to the positive direction of the market. The FFA curve of 31-Jan-07, indicated in
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blue, was above both as the market was even higher and with a positive gradient. The blue
curve however declines more steeply than the other two showing that futures curves with
different origins tend to converge into the future. This is reasonable, as the influence of the
current market on futures values should theoretically be lower for contract periods that are
further ahead.
Fig. 2.8-4 shows the futures price of the t/c index for the following quarter or year
and those beyond since June 2004 along with the spot market. Note that the contract period
in this case is one quarter, two quarters, or one year.
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Fig. 2.8-4: Futures Prices for the T/C Index along with the spot rates using data from [FIS 20071
FConsider October 2004
Legend Meaning Value
Spot t/c Index value as of End October 2004 $76,792/day
(+1 Q) Futures price for Q1 -2005 as of End October 2004 $69,500/day
(+2 Q) Futures price for Q2-2005 as of End October 2004 $64,000/day
(+1&2 Q) Futures price for H1 -2005 as of End October 2004 $66,000/day
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(+1 yr) Futures price for 2005 as of End October 2004 $54,500/day
(+2 yr) Futures price for 2006 as of End October 2004 $34,500/day
(+3 yr) Futures price for 2007 as of End October 2004 $27,500/day
Table 2.8-4: How to read Fig. 2-8-4
It is evident again that the current market and its direction affects futures prices, and
more so for the closer contract periods. Looking at the prices for the following year (+1 yr)
and one or two years beyond that (+2 yr and +3 yr), the general opinion has continuously
been that the market will decline and keep declining in the long term. This is logical as the
market is at record high levels. It can also be seen that futures prices fluctuate less than the
spot market and they also fluctuate less the further ahead their maturity is. (+1 Q) for
example fluctuates the most after the spot market, while (+3 yr) fluctuates the least.
Fig. 2.8-5 and Fig. 2.8-6 show the futures prices for each quarter and each half-year
contract period respectively from Q4-2004 until Q1-2007. These are presented along with the
actual values in those periods and the spot market. Futures values and actual values referring
to the same quarter are shown in the same color for clarity.
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Fig. 2.8-5 Futures Prices for the T/C Index along with actual values - using data from [FIS 20071
Consider December 2006
Legend Meaning Value
Spot t/c Index value as of End December 2006 $65,870/day
Q1 07 Futures price for Q1-2007 as of End December 2006 $59,750/day
Act Q4 06 Average value of the t/c Index over Q4 2006 $63,148/day
Table 2.8-5: How to read Fig. 2.8-5
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Fig. 2.8-6 Futures Prices for T/C Index from HI-05 until H2-06 and actual values -
Using data from FIS 20071
266
Consider December 2006
Legend Meaning Value
Spot t/c Index value as of End December 2006 $65,870/day
Q1-2 07 Futures price for H1-2007 as of End December 2006 $56,750/day
Q3-4 07 Futures price for H2-2007 as of End December 2006 $48,125/day
Act Q3-4 06 Average value of the t/c Index over H2 2006 $57,415/day
Table 2.8-6: How to read Fig. 2.8-6
As can be seen, the fact that the futures prices are so closely aligned with a highly
cyclical market, leads to large discrepancies between futures and actual values. The futures
value for Q4 2006 in January 2006 ($24,875/day) for example (in pink), was off the actual
value ($63,148/day) by $38,273 per day, which amounts to more than $3.5m. The futures
value for H2-2006 in July 2005 was $23,500/day while the actual value was $57,415/day,
amounting to $6.24m. This obviously allows room for high profit that can be made if one
employs a more sophisticated forecasting approach than merely based on the current market.
Marsoft's predictions of the market, which are based on the estimated fleet utilization,
tend to be less "flat" than futures. Fig. 2.8-7 Shows Marsoft's predictions of the cape spot
market on January 2005 and January 2006 along with actual values.
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Fig. 2.8-7: Marsoft Forecasts for the Capesize Spot Earnings along with Actual Rates [Marsoft 2007b)
Estimating fleet utilization can be very difficult and sometimes inaccurate as
highlighted by the January 2006 estimates. This approach however is clearly more reliable
than using futures as a forecasting tool.
In general, futures tend to converge towards the actual value as the maturity date is
approached meaning that they are more accurate for closer contract periods. This is not
always true however as futures may undergo large cycles along with the spot market during
the last few months. The futures value for Q4 2005 in May 2005 ($40,500/day) for example
was a much closer than that of July 2005 ($23,750/day) even though both were lower than
the actual value of $43,939/day.
Fig. 2.8-8 shows the futures prices for years 2007 to 2009 and the actual values for
years 2004 to 2006.
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Fig. 2.8-8: Futures Prices for the T/C Index along with actual values using data from [FIS 20071
Consider December 2006
Legend Meaning Value
Spot t/c Index value as of End December 2006 $65,870/day
2007 Futures price for 2007 as of End December 2006 $52,875/day
2008 Futures price for 2008 as of End December 2006 $40,750/day
2009 Futures price for 2009 as of End December 2006 $35,750/day
Act 2006 Average value of the t/c Index over 2006 $44,867/day
Table 2.8-7: How to read Fig. 2.8-8
The right end of this diagram demonstrates most clearly how the current market
influences futures prices depending on the closeness of the contract period. After May 2006,
when futures prices for years 2007, 2008 and 2009 were approximately the same, the spot
rates began increasing and futures followed. They also diverged however as the price for
2007 was most affected and that for 2009 was affected the least. Again this shows how the
influence of the current market is lower for contract periods far ahead.
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The difference between futures prices and actual values for whole years (Fig. 2.8-8)
appear to be slightly smaller on average than those for half years (Fig. 2.8-6), which are in
turn slightly smaller than those for quarters (Fig. 2.8-5). This is a logical outcome as the
actual values for longer contract periods fluctuate less than those for shorter contract periods.
This is because the index is averaged over a longer period in each case. It should be noted
however that a given discrepancy for a longer contract period represents a greater potential
profit or loss than the same discrepancy over a shorter contract period. The actual value of
the index for 2006 for example was $44,867/day, so if one bought the future in July 2005 at
$23,500/day, this would yield a profit of $7.8m.
Fig. 2.8-9 shows a comparison between futures prices one month ahead (in red) and
actual values of the index (in black).
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Fig. 2.8-9: Futures Prices for the T/C Index along with actual values - using data from [FIS 20071
Consider July 2006
Legend Meaning Value
Act Month Average t/c Index value over July 2006 $40,828/day
1 Month Ahead Futures price for July 2006 as of End June 2006 $38,750/day
Table 2.8-8: How to read Fig. 2.8-9
As shown, futures prices are relatively accurate for the next month. The maximum
difference that can be observed between futures prices and actual values in Fig. 2.8-9 is
$9,579/day in June 2005. A comparative analysis was carried out in order to assess the effect
of time ahead on the similarity between futures prices and actual values for each quarter from
Q4 2004 until Q4 2006. The results are shown in Fig. 2.8-10.
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Fig. 2.8-10 Average difference between futures for T/C Index and actual values - using data from [FIS 20071
Consider 6 Months Ahead
Legend Meaning Value
Series1 Average difference between the actual t/c Index $17,571/day
value over a quarter and its futures price 6 months
earlier, for all quarters from Q4'04 to Q4'06.
Expon.(Series1) Exponential Regression Model $17,257/day
Table 2.8-9: How to read Fig. 2.8-10
As shown, the relationship between the time ahead and the average difference
between futures price and actual value can be characterized as exponential with reasonable
accuracy (R2= 0.964). This indicates that there is potential for much greater profit/loss in
contracts for a period far ahead. Perhaps a regression model of the form y = a + beA(cx)
would be even more accurate, where "a" resembles the average difference accrued during the
time until the middle of the contract period (in this case half a quarter), and would hence be
proportional to the length of contract period considered (month, quarter, two quarters or
year).
2.8.4 Freight Rate FFAs
A similar analysis to the above was carried out on futures for freight rates. Two trade
routes were considered in order to cross verify the results. These are the C4 route (Richards
Bay/Rotterdam) and C7 (Bolivar/Rotterdam). The graphs resulting from the analysis are very
similar for the two trade routes.
Fig. 2.8-11 shows futures prices for each month from Sept 2004 until June 2007
relative to the spot market. Fig. 2.8-12 shows the futures prices for a number of months
ahead along with the spot rates at the last day of each month since June 2004. Note that in
both cases, the contract period is one month.
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Fig. 2.8-1 1: The spot market and futures prices for C4 freight rates in various months -
Using data from [FIS 20071
Consider December 2006
Legend Meaning Value
Spot Freight rates on C4 as of End Dec. 2006 $21.21/ton
Jan-07 Futures price for January 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $19.50/ton
Feb-07 Futures price for February 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $18.88/ton
Mar-07 Futures price for March 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $18.25/ton
Apr-07 Futures price for April 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $17.88/ton
Jul-07 Futures price for July 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $16.75/ton
Table 2.8-10: How to read Fie. 2.8-11
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Fig. 2.8-11: The snot market
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Fig. 2.8-12: The spot market and futures for C4 freight rates 1-12 months ahead - using data from [FIS 20071
Con'sider December 2006
Legend Meaning Value
Spot Freight rates on C4 as of End Dec. 2006 $21.21/ton
(+1mos) Futures price for January 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $19.50/ton
(+2mos) Futures price for February 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $18.88/ton
(+3mos) Futures price for March 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $18.25/ton
(+4mos) Futures price for April 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $17.88/ton
(+7mos) Futures price for July 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $16.75/ton
Table 2.8-11: How to read Fig. 2.8-12
As with the futures for the t/c index, it is clear how futures prices, even for a number
of months ahead, are to a great extent dictated by current rates. This is particularly evident in
Fig. 2.8-11, where the futures lines appear to be going as a group following the spot market.
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The general pessimism over the past several months that was witnessed for t/c is also
apparent regarding freight rates. In both Fig. 2.8-11 and Fig. 2.8-12, the spot market (black
line) is most of the time above all futures lines. Furthermore, futures prices decrease with
time ahead as indicated for example by the futures prices in December 2006 shown in Table
2.8-10 and Table 2.8-11. This is also emphasized when the market is on a downturn as shown
in Fig. 2.8-12. The same conclusion can also be drawn from Fig. 2.8-13, which shows the
futures prices for a contract period of one year, one to four years ahead, along with the spot
rates since June 2004.
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Fig. 2.8-13: The spot market and futures prices for C4 freight rates 1-4 years ahead -
Using data from [FIS 20071
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Consider December 2006
Legend Meaning Value
Spot Freight rates on C4 as of End Dec. 2006 $21.21/ton
(+lyr) Futures price for 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $17.65/ton
(+2yr) Futures price for 2008 as of End Dec. 2006 $15.80/ton
(+3yr) Futures price for 2009 as of End Dec. 2006 $14.95/ton
(+4yr) Futures price for 2010 as of End Dec. 2006 $14.25/ton
Table 2.8-12: How to read Fig. 2.8-13
As for t/c it can also be seen that futures prices fluctuate less than the spot market and
are more stable the further ahead their maturity is.
Fig. 2.8-14 shows the futures prices for years 2005 to 2010 along with the spot
market and actual values for years 2004 to 2006. Note that the contract period is again one
year.
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Fig. 2.8-14: The spot market, C4 futures prices for years and average annual values -
Using data from [FIS 20071
Consider December 2006
Legend Meaning Value
Spot Freight rates on C4 as of End Dec. 2006 $21.21/ton
2007 Futures price for 2007 as of End Dec. 2006 $17.65/ton
2008 Futures price for 2008 as of End Dec. 2006 $15.80/ton
2009 Futures price for 2009 as of End Dec. 2006 $14.95/ton
2010 Futures price for 2010 as of End Dec. 2006 $14.25/ton
Act 2006 Average value of freight rates on C4 over 2006 $15.89/ton
Table. 2.8-13: How to read Fig. 2.8-14
Futures have consistently been lower the further the contract period showing the same
pessimism as futures for the time charter index. Again large differences from actual values
are observed.
277
Fig. 2.8-15 shows the spot rates at the end of each month, the average value of each
month, and the futures for that month one to twelve months earlier.
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Fig. 2.8-15 The spot market and futures prices for C4 freight rates 1-12 months ahead -
Using data from [FIS 20071
Consider November 2006
Legend Meaning Value
Actual Average freight rates on C4 over November 2006 $23.38/ton
Spot Freight rates on C4 as of End November 2006 $22.81/ton
(-imos) Futures price for Nov. 2006 as of End Oct. 2006 $22.75/ton
(-2mos) Futures price for Nov. 2006 as of End Sept. 2006 $19.38/ton
(-3mos) Futures price for Nov. 2006 as of End Aug. 2006 $19.00/ton
(-4mos) Futures price for Nov. 2006 as of End Jul. 2006 $17.38/ton
(-5mos) Futures price for Nov. 2006 as of End Jun. 2006 $13.88/ton
Table 2.8-14: How to read Fig. 2.8-15
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As shown in Fig. 2.8-15, the closer the month is, the smaller the difference between
the futures price and the actual value. It is sometimes the case, for example in October and
November 2006 that the further back the futures contract was made, the lower the futures
price relative to the actual value. In other months such as June and July 2005, the further
back the contract, the higher the futures price relative to the actual value.
Fig. 2.8-16 demonstrates the effect of time ahead on the similarity between futures
prices and actual values for each month from November 2004 until December 2006.
Fig. 2.8-16: Average difference between futures for freight rates and actual values -
Using data from [FIS 20071
Consider 10 Months Ahead
Legend Meaning Value
Series1 Average difference between the actual C4 freight $8.71/ton
rate over a month and its futures price 10 months
earlier, for all months from June-2004 to Dec-2006.
Expon.(Seriesl) Exponential Regression Model $8.88/ton
Table 2.8-15: How to read Fig. 2.8-16
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As for the t/c index, the relationship between time ahead and the average discrepancy
between futures prices and actual values is evidently of an exponential form with a high
grade of accuracy (R2 = 0.895). A similar result was also obtained in the combined analysis
of trade routes C4 and C7. As discussed earlier, the inclusion of a constant "a" in the
regression model to make it of the form y = a + beA(cx) would be less important than when
the contract period is a quarter as opposed to a month.
The corresponding results for trade route C7 are shown in Fig. 2.8-17 to 2.8-22.
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Fig. 2.8-17: The spot market and futures prices for C7 freight rates in various months -
Using data from [FIS 2007]
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Fig. 2.8-18: The spot market and futures for C7 freight rates 1-12 months ahead -
Ising data from [FIS 20071
Fig. 2.8-19: The spot market and futures prices for C7 freight rates 1-4 years ahead -
Using data from [FIS 20071
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Fig. 2.8-20: The spot market, C7 futures prices for years and average annual values -
Using data from [FIS 20071
C7 Actual Values and Futures 1-12 Months Earlier
* MTD
-Spot
- (-1mos)
- (-2mos)
(-3mos)
- (-4mos)
- (-5mos)
- (-6mos)
- (-7mos)
- (-8mos)
- (-9mos)
- (-IOmos)
- (-11mos)
(-12mos)
0 F
Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06 Jul-06 Jan-07
Date
Fig. 2.8-21: The snot market and futures nrices for C7 freight rates 1-12 months ahead -
Using data from [FIS 20071
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Fig. 2.8-22: Average difference between futures for freight rates and actual values -
Using data from [FIS 20071
2.8.5 Conclusions
After carrying out the above analysis on futures for capesize bulk carriers, the
conclusions that can be derived are identical regarding futures for the t/c index and for trade
routes C4 and C7. These can be summarized as follows:
* The futures and physical markets are separate but closely aligned and interrelated
" General opinion has consistently been that the market will gradually decline
* Futures prices are strongly affected by the current market and its direction
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* Futures curves with different origins tend to converge into the future, showing that
the influence of the current market is lower on futures prices for contract periods
further ahead
* Futures curves are relatively "flat" and therefore not a good forecasting tool. Large
discrepancies between futures prices and actual values are therefore common,
creating potential for high profits/losses
e Futures prices fluctuate less than the spot market
* Futures prices fluctuate less, the longer the contract period (e.g. futures for years are
on average more stable than futures for months). This leads to smaller absolute
discrepancies but those represent a higher potential profit/loss
e Futures prices fluctuate less, the further ahead the contract period
" The average discrepancy between futures prices and actual values increases
exponentially with time between the contract and the settlement date
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2.9 2006 Investment Opportunities
2.9.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous sections, the capesize bulk carrier market is highly
cyclical both in terms of charter rates and ship values. This creates big investment
opportunities with potential for high returns over relatively short periods of time. As shown
earlier, the past cycle created opportunities that would yield a return of over 1000% in just 3-
4 years.This section analyses the opportunities available in the current sale and purchase
market both from a seller's and a buyer's perspective. A buyer is faced with the choice of
asset to invest in and its employment. A seller is faced with the option of selling or chartering
a vessel. Some representative vessel and charter combinations are chosen, covering the wide
range that is available in the market. These are then evaluated and compared in order to
provide recommendations to potential buyers and sellers. The analysis is carried out in a way
so as to have long term significance and future reference value.
2.9.2 Deals Considered and Current Prices
Rather than considering actual ships that are for sale today, it is more appropriate for
the purpose for this project to assume hypothetical deals of typical vessels based on recent
transactions. This approach covers a wider range of ship ages and has greater long-term
value, as the deals considered are more representative of those available in the market at any
time.
The typical size of capes has increased significantly since the early 1970s when they
were first introduced. In order to produce results that are relevant to what is most widely
available; the typical size in the year that each cape was built is assumed. A few
representative deals are chosen to analyze as summarized in Table 2.9-1.
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Deals Considered
Transaction Year Built Age (years) Size (DWT)
Order 2010 0 180,000
Buy 2007 0 175,000
Buy 2002 5 175,000
Buy 1997 10 170,000
Buy 1992 15 150,000
Buy 1987 20 150,000
Sell 2007 0 175,000
Sell 2002 5 175,000
Sell 1997 10 170,000
Sell 1992 15 150,000
Sell 1987 20 150,000
Sell 1982 25 145,000
Table 2.9-1: S&P Deals Considered in the Current Project
Recent transactions have to be referenced for the current valuation of the vessels in
Table 2.9-1. Table 2.9-2 shows secondhand transactions from January 1st and Table 2.9-3
shows the orders and resales since March 14S. Only those with reported prices are included.
I D SI I1I i i I
Date Name Built Size Notes Price
02/Jan SPRING BRAVE 1995 151,066 Delivery in May 62.0
08/Jan MONTEGO II 1993 149,391 T/C: 30k/d - Dec'08 50.0
08/Jan CHS MOON 1990 151,227 - 45.0
10/Jan BRILLIANT CORNERS 1981 105,496 - 8.7
26/Jan LOWLANDS BEILUN 1999 170,162 T/C: 37.4k/d- Mar/Jun'10 72.5
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05/Feb YUE MAY 2007 175,000 - 99.0
14/Feb DYNASTY 1982 132,082 - 15.0
14/Feb PANTELIS SP 1999 169,883 T/C: 47.5k/d - Feb'08 83.0
22/Feb THIOS COSTAS 1982 145,229 Delivery in May 18.0
02/Mar CAPE PELICAN 2005 180,235 - 110.0
05/Mar JOHNNY K 1994 174,770 POLAND BLT 63.5
12/Mar ANANGEL WISDOM 2007 175,000 - 112.0
19/Mar CAPE KASSOS 2004 171,480 Delivery in Sept 100.0
20/Mar MARTHA VERITY 1995 157,991 - 62.0
Mar AMERICANA 1987 148,982 - 33.0
30/Mar IKARIA 1981 129,237 - 19.0
09/Apr NAUTICAL DREAM 1994 151,439 - 63.5
09/Apr Formosabulk CLEMENT 2001 170,085 Bareboat TC (10yrs) 95
09/Apr Formosabulk BRAVE 2001 170,085 Bboat TC: 25k/d (1Oyrs) 95
12/Apr ARIMATHIAN 1994 149,782 - 62.0
12/Apr Formosabulk ALLSTAR 1995 150,393 BboatTC: 22,7k/d (10yrs) 67.0
16/Apr GLOBAL PEACE 1982 132,049 - 19.5
16/Apr BOSS 1985 139,816 - 31.0
22/Apr WINNER 1985 174,004 - 37.5
04/May AUSTRALIAN FAME I 1982 145,500 - 21.5
Table 2.9-2: Capesize Deals from January 1s' to Ma T1 [Wafias 2007, Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 20071
Newb. u Or-er *nd -esle w 7 an
No of Delivery Size Yard Ps($m
Ships (Start/Average) (DWT) (Yard Country) each)
8 opt.4 2010/11 (start) 180,000 QINGDAO BEIHAI (China) 68.75
1 OCT 2008 170,000 KOREA 91
1 NOV 2007 175,000 SASEBO 102
1 NOV 2007 175,000 BOHAI 102
1 2010 170,000 KOREA 80
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1 JAN 2010 181,000 STX (China) 76
2 MAY 2010 (av.) 181,000 STX (China) 76
3 JUN 2010 (av.) 181,000 STX (China) 76
2 NOV 2010 (av.) 180,000 DALIAN (China) 69
4 JAN 2010 (av.) 180,000 DAEWOO-MA. (Rumania) 78
2 NOV 2010 (av.) 180,000 DAEWOO (Korea) 81
1 SEPT 2010 180,000 DALIAN (China) 69
1 JAN 2011 300,000 NANTONG COSCO KSE (China) 90
2 DEC 2011 (av.) 250,000 NAMURA (Japan) 85
1 NOV 2009 177,000 SWS (China) 88
1 OCT 2009 177,000 SWS (China) 88
2 opt.4 2009 (starting) 170,000 DAEHAN (China) 72.5
2 opt.2 2009 (starting) 176,000 ZHOUSHAN JINHAIWAN (China) 75.75
3 2010 (starting) 180,000 QINGDAO BEIHAI (China) 69
2 2009 (starting) 180,000 DALIAN (China) 70
4 2011 (starting) 230,000 LONGXUE 90
1 opt. 1 2010 (starting) 174,500 HANJIN SUBIC 80
2 2010/11 181,000 STX (China) 79.5
1 2007/10 177,000 SWS (China) 115.0
4 2010/11 176,000 NEW CENTURY (China) 69
4 2010 180,000 KOREA SHIPYARD CO. 77.7
2 opt.2 2010 170,000 DAEHAN 81
2 opt.4 2010 300,000 NANTONG COSCO (by COSCO) 80
Table 2.9-3: Capesize Newbuik ing Orders and Resales Between March 1" 2007 and May 1 1 2007
[Clarksons 2007c, Vafias 2007, Braemar 2007b, Tradewinds 20071
The actual prices summarized in Table 2.9-2 and 2.9-3 have to be adjusted to estimate
the prices of the hypothetical deals in Table 2.9-1. Parameters that have to be accounted for
include age, size, delivery time, attached charters and the shipyard. For each hypothetical
deal, the most similar ones from the recent transactions are chosen and adjusted.
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When discounting for age, it is important to remember that linear depreciation in the
current market is unrealistic as explained earlier. This is evident by comparing the "Cape
Pelican " (built 2005) that was sold for $1 10m with the "Anangel Wisdom" (built 2007) that
went for $112m in Table 2.9-2. Linear depreciation using a 25-year lifetime would result in a
depreciation rate of about $4.5m/year whereas these two deals indicate a rate of $lm/year
which is more realistic considering 20-year average capesize earnings.
The value of delivery time can be estimated by comparing deals that differ only in
this aspect, and by considering potential earnings during the waiting period. The value of a
time charter can be evaluated by comparing the charter rate to that of the current market for a
similar period. This can be either negative or positive. The charter-free value of a ship can
thereby be deduced by deducting the value of the charter from the ship's price.
Finally, it is evident from Table 2.9-3 that some shipbuilding yards and countries are
preferred and produce more expensive ships than others. Japan and Korea are on average
more expensive than Rumania, Poland and China, which has a wide range of prices. The
chosen deals assume Korean built, charter-free vessels with prompt delivery, except for the
newbuilding order that has a 3-year delivery time (current average). Using the deals in Table
2.9-2 and 2.9-3, and taking into account that rates have gone up by about 15% during April,
the valuations for the hypothetical vessels are as shown in Table 2.9-4.
Vautino Sp Cosidere
Year Built Country Built Age (Years) Size (DWT) Price ($M)
2010 KOREA 0 180,000 80
2007 KOREA 0 175,000 115
2002 KOREA 5 175,000 100
1997 KOREA 10 170,000 85
1992 KOREA 15 150,000 63
1987 KOREA 20 150,000 41
1982 KOREA 25 145,000 25
289
Table 2.9-4: Valuation of the Hypothetical Cape Deals Considered in the Current Market as of April 30' 2007
2.9.3 Financing and Payments
Shipowners have access to many sources of capital in today's market. These include
private reserves, partnerships, IPOs, leasing the ship, bonds etc. Very rarely however are any
of these options better than a bank loan.
A leading Bank in ship finance provided some illustrative finance scenarios for
capesize vessels in today's market. These are for a new building order, a newbuilding resale
(prompt delivery), a ten year old and a fifteen years old vessel. As most banks, they have a
policy of not financing vessels over 15 years old, though they consider them on a case by
case basis and relate them to current scrap prices less a margin. For our purposes, we shall
ignore the bank as a financer for vessels over 15 years old.
In order to minimize risk, the bank tries to keep the debt as low as possible compared
to the ships value until the loan expires. In today's market therefore, the bank does not use a
straight-line depreciation for the reasons discussed earlier. It typically finances 70% of the
ship value, uses a margin of 1% over LIBOR, and frontloads the repayments as a
requirement. It then relates the balloon payment with the last installment to the residual value
(e.g. the scrap value in the case of the 15 year old).
The bank tries to relate to historical average values in order to account for the fact
that we are currently at a very high peak in a cyclical market. 10-year average scrap values
are about $220/ldt, which is equivalent to about $5.5m for a 25,00Oldt cape. Table 2.9-5
summarizes the bank loan terms for the various deals considered while Table 2.9-6 provides
the definitions to the abbreviations used in Table 2.9-5.
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Order $78m -70% 1% 40(10) 8(1.41) 32 (0.865) 30.9
Resale $11Om -70% 1% 40(10) 12 (2.59) 28 (0.682) 19.82
10-yr $70m -70% 1% 32(8) 8(4.5) 24 (1.13) 6.91
15-yr $56m -70% 1% 20(5) 20 (3.05) - 8.64
Table 2.9-5: Typical Bank Loan Terms for Capes in the Current Market
Abbrev Definition
P Bank price based on Clarkson's valuations in March
L Loan (the rest is down payment by the shipowner)
M Margin over LIBOR
Qt Number of quarterly installments
Qr Number of frontloaded quarterly installments
Qr Remaining quarterly installments
B Balloon payment with the last installment
Table 2.9-6: Definitions for the Abbreviations used in Table 2.9-5 and Table 2.9-7
Payment front-loading is adjusted to bring the loan down to the 10-year average price,
while at the same time keeping the deal feasible from the shipowner's perspective based on
current time charter rates. Once that is achieved taking advantage of the current market,
payments assume linear depreciation until the balloon. Fig. 2.9-1 shows the 10-year average
values along with the outstanding debt for the newbuilding and the resale vessel.
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Fig. 2.9-1: Outstanding Loan Brought Down to 10-Year Average Prices through Frontloading Payments
[Marsoft 2006a, Levine 2006, Vafias 2007, Braemar 2007a, Tradewinds 20071
The financing terms assumed for the acquisition deals considered in Table 2.9-1 and Table
2.9-4 are based on the bank loan term indications of Table 2.9-5. Adjustments are made to
account for price differences but the payments as a percentage of the price are kept constant.
The loan terms for the 5-year old vessel are assumed to be the same as for the newbuilding
resale. The 20-year old vessel is assumed to be self-financed from private reserves or through
a partnership.
Table 2.9-7 summarizes the loan terms for the acquisition deals considered. The
delivery, legal and initial financial cost is also included in brackets as part of the down
payment. This is typically about $500,000 for a secondhand vessel and about $1,500,000 for
a newbuilding, which includes supervision during construction etc.
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Bank Frontloanding Payments
Order 24 (+1.5) 56 1% 40(10) 8 (1.128) 32 (0.692) 24.832
Resale 35 (+0.5) 80 1% 40(10) 12(2.978) 28(0.784) 22.312
5-yr 30 (+0.5) 70 1% 40 (10) 12 (2.590) 28 (0.680) 20.560
10-yr 25 (+0.5) 60 1% 32 (8) 8 (3.825) 24 (0.960) 6.360
15-yr 19 (+0.5) 44 1% 20(5) 20(1.922) - 5.560
20-yr 41(+0.5) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2.9-7: Financing Terms for the Acquisition Deals Considered
It is assumed that LIBOR is hedged for
which are shown in Table 2.9-8.
each payment at the current futures rates,
Period
2007
q2 q3 q4 q1
2008q2-
201391
201q2-
201491
2014q2-
201591 q2+
Price 5.35 5.34 5.3 j 5.25 4.9 4.97 5 5.02
Table 2.9-8: Current Futures Prices for LIBOR [Reuters 20071
When ordering a newbuilding, payments are made to the yard at various
stages before delivery. Typical payment terms are summarized in Table 2.9-9. It is assumed
that these payments are made using the shipowner's reserves and only a post delivery loan is
taken from the bank on the day of the delivery.
i . aymnt Terms
Stage Years from Now % NB Price Amount ($m)
Signing 0 25% 16
Steel Cutting 25% 20
Keel Laying 2.75 20% 16
Delivery 3 30% 24
Table 2.9-9: Typical Newbuilding Payments
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Futures Price for LIBOR
B ($mn)Ship PDown ($m) | L ($mn) M Qt (yrs) Qr (Smn) Q,. (Wm)
2.9.4 Cash Flow Analysis
Table 2.9-10 shows current period charter rates for a modem cape based on recent
fixtures reported by [Braemar 2007b]. Table 2.9-11 indicates the factors used to adjust these
rates for older vessels. These factors are only approximations based on fixtures that were
reported since the beginning of 2007.
It was found that vessel size is an important factor in determining rates. A 25-year old
180,000 DWT vessel for example may be chartered at a higher rate than a typical 15-year old
150,000 DWT vessel. Table 2.9-1 assumes vessels of typical size for their year of built as
shown in Table 2.9-4.
Charter Rate
Spot (Average of 4 TC roots) $106,366/day
1 year $90,000/day
2-years $80,000/day
3-years $70,000/day
5-years $58,000/day
10-years $40,000/day
10-years with delivery in 2010 $30,000/day
Table 2.9-10: Current Modem Capesize Rates for Prompt Delivery as of April 30' 2007 [Braemar 2007b1
294
Vessel Rate as a % of Modern Vessel Rate
Resale 100%
5-year old 95%
10-year old 90%
15-year old 80%
20-year old 70%
25-year old 50%
Table 2.9-11: Charter Rates for Capes of Various Ages as a Fraction of the Rates for a New Vessel
Some assumptions have to be made in order to get values for charter rates of the
newbuilding order with delivery in 2010. The market is not very fluid so some crude
approximations are needed based on the available data. These are summarized below:
1-year charter today is $90,000/day so the 1"t year is worth ~ $90,000/day
2-year charter today is $80,000/day so the 2 "d year is worth ~ $70,000/day
3-year charter today is $70,000/day so the 3 rd year is worth ~ $50,000/day
5-year charter today is $58,000/day so the 4 &5 tyear combined are worth ~$40,000/day
Based on an average ratio of 1 tyr: 2"dyr rates of ~1.1, the 4th year is worth -41,905/day
These estimates are very close to the current futures prices for similar contract
periods as of May 1st 2007. Table 2.9-12 shows a summary of both.
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, .~~.
6 . Si .Rat. E a . F i
Year Rate Estimate Contract Period Futures Price
1s' Year $90,000/day Remaining 2007 $91,000/day
2"n Year $70,000/day 2008 $69,000/day
3r Year $50,000/day 2009 $51 000/dav
4 Year $41,905/day 2010 $42,000/day
Table 2.9-12: Charter Rate Estimates and Futures Prices for Similar Periods as of May 1s 2007 [FIS 20071
So a 1-year time charter with delivery in 2010 (4th year) should be about $42,000/day.
It can also be hedged at this value from now by buying the future to guarantee that rate so
speculation is not required.
The rate for a 2-year charter with delivery in May 2010 (4 th and 5 th year combined)
should be -$40,000/day. From Table 2.9-10, a 10-year charter with delivery in 2010 is
$30,000/day. Interpolation based on current period rates can be used to get approximate
values for 3-year and 5-year rates for charters beginning in 2010 as follows:
Currently: 3 year rate = 2 year rate +%(2 year rate - 10 year rate)
For delivery in 2010: 3 year rate = 40,000 + %(40,000 - 30,000) = $37,500/day
Currently: 5 year rate = 2 year rate + 0.45(2 year rate - 10 year rate)
For delivery in 2010: 5 year rate = 40,000 + 0.45(40,000 - 30,000) = $34,500/day
The results for the deals considered are summarized in Table 2.9-13.
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Charter Period (years)Ship
A 2.5% commission on the time charter earnings is typical so it is deducted in the
calculation of quarterly earnings.
Since ships have to undergo repairs regularly, they are removed from service for a
number of days each year. Classification requirements become more stringent as ships age
and surveys become more regular and thorough. The number of days that a vessel is not
earning money each year therefore increases with age. Since the bank requires quarterly
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Order 1 42,000
Order 3 37,500
Order 5 34,500
Order 10 30,000
Resale 3 70,000
Resale 5 58,000
Resale 10 40,000
5yr Old 3 66,500
5yr Old 5 55,000
5yr Old 10 38,000
1Oyr Old 3 63,000
1Oyr Old 5 52,000
1Oyr Old 10 36,000
15yr Old 1 72,000
15yr Old 2 64,000
15yr Old 3 56,000
15yr Old 5 46,500
20yr Old 1 63,000
20yr Old 2 56,000
20yr Old 3 49,000
Table 2.9-13: Charter Rates for the Acquisition Deals Considered
Rate (5day)
payments, a quarterly analysis overall is most convenient. Table 2.9-14 summarizes the
earning days deducted from each quarter depending on the ship's age. These are approximate
values based on experience.
Earning Days Deducted due to Repairs and Surveys
Ship Age (years) Earning Days Deducted / Quarter Earning Days / Year
0 to 9 3 353
10 to 14 4 349
15+ 5 345
Table 2.9-14: Number of Days Deducted per Quarter Depending on Ship Age to Account for Repairs
Running costs on the other hand are applied for the full 365 days in each year. These
account for all operating and repair costs. As a ship gets older, maintenance becomes more
expensive and running costs increase. More importantly, running costs increase every year
due to inflation. Table 2.9-15 and 2.9-16 summarize running costs as a function of ship's age
and time.
Runn Cot as a Fucino hpAge anTm
Ship Age (years) I Running Costs Today Annual Increase in Running Costs
0 to 9 $5,000/day 2% per annum
10 to 14 $5,500/day 2% per annum
15 to 19 $6,000/day 2% per annum
20 to 30 $7,000/day 2% per annum
Table 2.9-15: Running Costs as a Function of Ship Age and Annual Increase due to Inflation
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0 $5,000 $5,000 $5,500 $6,000 $7,000 $7,000
1 $5,100 $5,100 $5,610 $6,120 $7,140 $7,140
2 $5,200 $5,200 $5,720 $6,240 $7,280 $7,280
3 $5,300 $5,300 $5,830 $6,360 $7,420 $7,420
4 $5,400 $5,400 $5,940 $6,480 $7,560 $7,560
5 $5,500 $6,050 $6,050 $7,700 $7,700 $7,700
6 $5,600 $6,160 $6,160 $7,840 $7,840 -
7 $5,700 $6,270 $6,270 $7,980 $7,980 -
8 $5,800 $6,380 $6,380 $8,120 $8,120 -
9 $5,900 $6,490 $6,490 $8,260 $8,260 -
10 $6,600 $7,200 $6,600 $8,400 $8,400 -
11 $6,710 $7,320 $6,710 $8,540 - -
12 $6,820 $7,440 $6,820 $8,680 - -
13 $6,930 $7,560 $6,930 $8,820 - -
14 $7,040 $7,680 $7,040 $8,960 - -
15 $7,800 $9,100 $7,150 $9,100 - -
16 $7,920 $9,240 $7,260 - - -
17 $8,040 $9,380 $7,370 - - -
18 $8,160 $9,520 $7,480 - - -
19 $8,280 $9,660 $7,590 - - -
20 $9,800 $9,800 $7,700 - - -
Table 2.9-16: Running Costs as a Function of Ship Age and Time
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Year \ Ship New 5-Year 10-Year 15-Year 20-Year 25-Year
2.9.5 Acquisition Deal Analysis
A quarterly analysis was carried out for each deal with each of the time charters
indicated in Table 2.9-13. Payments are made on time with an interest rate of 1% over
LIBOR, which is hedged at the prices indicated in Table 2.9-8. Quarterly revenues and
running costs are applied half way through each quarter and bank payments are made at the
end of each quarter. Fig. 2.9-2 shows the repayment of the loan from the day of the delivery
for each ship according to the financing terms shown in Table 2.9-7.
Loan Repayment Profile
90
80
70
60-
-Order
50 -- - Resale
-5-yr
40 - 10-yr
- 15-yr
30 -
20
10 -
0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44
Quarter
Fig 2.9-2: Loan Repayment Profile for the 5 Acquisition Deals using the Data from Table 2.9-7
Fig. 2.9-3 to 2.9-8 show the quarterly payments and profits of each ship for all the
charters considered. Profits vary each quarter because running costs increase with age and
time, earning days per quarter decrease with age, and because the number of days in each
quarter varies. The quarterly payments vary because of the frontloading requirement and
because interest is paid each time on the outstanding loan, which is reduced after each
payment. Furthermore, LIBOR is hedged at a different price for each payment as shown in
Table 2.9-8, so the interest rate also varies.
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Quarterly Payments and Profits for the NB Order
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Fig 2.9-3: Quarterly Payments and Profits for the Newbuilding Order with the Time Charters Considered
The negative payment in at the end of Quarter 12 in Fig. 2.9-3 is the bank loan upon
delivery of the vessel after a series of positive payments during construction.
Fig 2.9-4: Quarterly Payments and Profits for the Resale with the Time Charters Considered
As shown in Fig. 2.9-4, the profits of the 10-year charter are not sufficient to cover
the first bank installments for the Resale. This means that the vessel would be running at a
loss during the first few years. Clearly therefore, this charter option is not feasible.
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Fig 2.9-5: Quarterly Payments and Profits for the 5-Year Old with the Time Charters Considered
Again, as shown in Fig. 2.9-5, earnings from the 10-year charter do not cover the first
installments so this charter option is not feasible for the 5-year old vessel either.
Quarterly Payments and Profits for the 10-Year Old
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$6,000,000
$5,000,000
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Fig 2.9-6: Quarterly Payments and Profits for the 10-Year Old with the Time Charters Considered
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As shown in Fig. 2.9-6, earnings from the 3-year charter barely cover the first
installments while 5-year and 10-year charter earnings are inadequate. Only a 3-year charter
is therefore considered for the 10-year old vessel.
Quarterly Payments and Profits for the 15-Year Old
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.
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Fig 2.9-7: Quarterly Payments and Profits for the 15-Year Old with the Time Charters Considered
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Fig 2.9-8: Quarterly Payments and Profits for the 20-Year Old with the Time Charters Considered
Fig. 2.9-7 and 2.9-8 show that all charter options considered are possible for the 15
and 20-year old vessels. All charter options from the above analysis that do not cover the full
installment amount were eliminated before proceeding to the following comparisons.
The Net Present Value (NPV) and the vessel book value were calculated at the end of
the charter for each option. Both these can be used to compare between the various options.
The book value at the end of the loan is an indication of the equivalent amount one would
have to pay on that day to acquire the vessel. If one thinks that the market value will be
higher than the book value, then the deal is worth doing. The Net Present Value is an
indication of today's value of the ship after the time charter ends. In other words, it is
equivalent to what one would have to pay today for the charter-free ship with delivery when
the charter ends.
The NPV calculation assumes that the bank loan repayments will be carried out in full
meaning that the whole value of the loan (the benefit to the bank) is included. In reality, one
would have the option of repaying the loan before the payments are due and thereby save on
interest (the bank would normally request some kind of fee for this). The NPV of a deal at a
date before the loan is repaid is therefore higher than the present value of the ship's book
value at that point in time (when using the same discount rates). That is why the NPV of a
deal with no charter is slightly higher than the price of the vessel.
The book value is equal to the outstanding loan plus the current value of all previous
payments minus the current value of all previous profits (with interest). An interest rate of
5% is used for the book value as opposed to the discount rate of 10% used in the NPV
calculations. This is because the remaining profits after payments are made are likely to be
earning an interest of closer to around 5% in the bank.
As a check on the previous charter rate estimates, it was assumed that the resale is
traded for 5 years on the spot market. The first 3 years are hedged at the current futures rates
shown in Table 2.9-12. The rate for the following two years is then adjusted to bring the
book value after five years to the same level as when the vessel is chartered for 5 years. This
is provides an educated estimate based on the current market, of what the rates are going to
be for the last two years (2010 and 2011). The result was $42,680/day, which is very close to
our estimate of $42,000/day.
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Table 2.9-17 shows the book value of each vessel after the time charter, using an
interest rate of 5%, along with the vessel age and the time until the charter ends.
Book Value ($m) Years Until TC Ends
Vessel (charter) Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 13
NBOrder (Oyrs) 0 85.8
NBOrder (lyr) 1 80.9
NBOrder (3yrs) 3 68.6
NBOrder (5yrs) 5 60.1
NBOrder (10yrs) 10 51.1
Resale (Oyrs) 0 115.5
Resale (3yrs) 3 64.3
Resale (5yrs) 5 48.9
5yrOld (Oyrs) 5 100.5
5yrOld (3yrs) 8 50.5
5yrOld (5yrs) 10 35.2
10yrOld (Oyrs) 10 85.5
10yrOld (3yrs) 13 49.5
15yrOld (Oyrs) 15 63.5
15yrOld (lyr) 16 44.6
15yrOld (2yrs) 17 30.3
15yrOld (3yrs) 18 21.1
15yrOld (5yrs) 20 7.6
20yrOld (Oyrs) 20 41.5
20yrOld (lyr) 21 24.4
20yrOld (2yrs) 22 11.6
20yrOld (3yrs) 23 3.2
Table 2.9-17: Book Value for Each Deal After the Time Charter using an Interest Rate of 5%
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The book value can be viewed as the amount one would pay for a charter-free vessel
of that age in the indicated number of years. To compare amongst the deals in Table 2.9-17,
one has to look down a single column. Taking the column of 3 years until the charter ends for
example, there are 6 options to compare. Each option is equivalent to buying the vessel in 3
years at the indicated price while the age of the ship in 3 years is read from the column "age".
Hence the choice (in 3 years) is between a new vessel for $85.8m, a 3-year old vessel
$64.3m, an 8-year old vessel for $50.5m, a 13-year old vessel for $49.5m, an 18-year old
vessel for $21.1m and a 23-year old vessel for $3.2m. By making such comparisons, some
options can clearly be eliminated. The 8-year old vessel for $50.5m for example is clearly
better than a 13-year old vessel for $49.5m.
Based on historical average prices, the most reasonable deals in the current market
appear to be that of buying a 15-year old vessel and chartering it out for 5 years to write it off
at $7.6m, and buying a 20-year old vessel and chartering it out for 3 years to bring write it off
at $3.2m. 10-year average scrap prices are about $220/ldt, equivalent to about $5.5m for a
cape with a lightship of 25,000ldt. These two deals therefore involve the lowest risk and rely
the least on speculation of the market beyond 2010.
Table 2.9-18 shows the NPV for each ship after each time charter using a discount rate
of 10%. This can be viewed as the equivalent amount one would pay today to acquire the
charter-free vessel of the indicated age with delivery after so many years. With a discount
rate of 10%, no option appears reasonable. The best ones are the same as in Table 2.9-17.
NPV ($m) Years Until TC Ends
Vessel Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 13
NBOrder (Oyrs) 0 60.6
NBOrder (lyr) 1 51.7
NBOrder (3yrs) 3 39.6
NBOrder (5yrs) 5 32.2
NBOrder (1Oyrs) 10 24.7
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Resale (Oyrs) 0 104.7
Resale (3yrs) 3 46.6
Resale (5yrs) 5 33.0
5yrOld (Oyrs) 5 91.0
5yrOld (3yrs) 8 36.1
10yrOld (Oyrs) 10 89.8
1OyrOld (3yrs) 13 39.2
15yrOld (Oyrs) 15 59.6
15yrOld (lyr) 16 38.6
15yrOld (2yrs) 17 24.4
15yrOld (3yrs) 18 16.3
15yrOld (5yrs) 20 6.9
20yrOld (Oyrs) 20 41.5
20yrOld (lyr) 21 23.7
20yrOld (2yrs) 22 11.9
20yrOld (3yrs) 23 5.3
Table 2.9-18: Net Present Value for Each Deal After the Time Charter using a Discount Rate of 10
2.9.6 Sell or Charter Analysis
A similar analysis was carried out from the point of view of the seller who is faced
with the option of time chartering at current rates, or selling at current prices. The same
scenarios of ship age and time charter combination were considered with the addition of a
25-year old cape instead of the newbuilding order.
An annual analysis was carried out as opposed to a quarterly analysis for simplicity.
Charter rates for each case were based on Tables 12, 13 and 15. A commission of 2.5% was
applied again as in the previous analysis. Average running costs were taken for each charter
based on Table 2.9-15 and Table 2.9-16. The average number of earning days per year for
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each case was taken from Table 2.9-14. An end value was calculated for each scenario based
on the profits and current prices as follows:
End Val = (P - NPV,, 1+ I)"
NPVof = (Prof x aX+ 1) 12
(2.9-1)
(2.9-2)
1- [(1+ j) "
I
Where:
(2.9-3)
Prof: average annual profits
n: number of years of the time-charter
I: interest rate = 5%
If one believes that their vessel will be worth more than "End Value" after the charter,
then it is best to charter the vessel. Otherwise, it is better to sell at the current price. Table
2.9-19 provides a summary of the analysis for each scenario along with the resulting "End
Value".
Shlip (tc) K
($/day)
KC
($/day)
Days/Yr a INPVproft
($m)
Price
($m)
EndVal
($m)
0-yr (3) 70,000 5,100 353 2.723 62.0 115 $61.3
0-yr (5) 58,000 5,250 353 4.329 80.1 115 $44.6
0-yr (10) 40,000 5,450 353 7.722 93.2 115 $35.5
5-yr (3) 66,500 5,100 353 2.723 58.7 100 $47.8
5-yr (5) 55,000 5,342 353 4.329 75.3 100 $31.5
5-yr (10) 38,000 5,735 351 7.722 86.3 100 $22.3
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10-yr (3) 63,000 5,610 349 2.723 54.1 85 $35.8
10-yr (5) 52,000 5,775 349 4.329 69.1 85 $20.2
10-yr (10) 36,000 5,995 347 7.722 79.1 85 $9.7
15-yr (1) 72,000 6,000 345 0.952 21.5 63 $43.6
15-yr (2) 64,000 6,060 345 1.859 36.8 63 $28.9
15-yr (3) 56,000 6,120 345 2.723 46.3 63 $19.3
15-yr (5) 46,500 6,483 345 4.329 58.9 63 $5.2
20-yr (1) 63,000 7,000 345 0.952 18.2 41 $24.0
20-yr (2) 56,000 7,070 345 1.859 31.0 41 $11.1
20-yr (3) 49,000 7,140 345 2.723 38.7 41 $2.6
20-yr (5) 40,500 7,350 345 4.329 48.5 41 -$9.6
25-yr (1) 45,000 7,000 345 0.952 12.3 25 $13.4
25-yr (2) 40,000 7,070 345 1.859 20.7 25 $4.7
25-yr (3) 35,000 7,140 355 2.723 26.5 25 -$1.8
Table 2.9-19: Sell or Charter Comparison for the Various Scenarios Using an Interest Rate of 5%
The age of each vessel
left column) plus the length of
after the charter is equal to the initial vessel age (shown in the
the charter (shown in brackets). In the first row, the decision is
between selling the vessel today for $115m, or chartering it out for 3-years if the owner
expects that the value of a 3-year old vessel in 3 years will exceed $61.3m.
Some decisions are very clear. One for example should definitely choose to charter a
20-year old vessel for 5 years as opposed to selling it because the negative "End Value"
shows that it will make more money during the charter than it is now worth even of the
residual value of the vessel is ignored. Similarly, it is definitely worth chartering the 25-year
old vessel for 3 years as opposed to selling it.
It is important to note that these decisions rely on the fact that the charterer will
continue to pay the agreed rate if the market goes down. Since the risk varies depending on
the integrity of the charterer and the probability of the market declining, it is not quantifiable
and therefore not incorporated in the analysis. In real life, one may base their decision on
their interpretation of the risk involved in a given situation.
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Assuming low risk charters, the most sensible option for each ship was chosen from
Table 2.9-19. The choices are based on historical average values and personal opinion. They
are summarized along with a brief explanation in Table 2.9-20.
Ship Best Option Comments
Sell ort
5-yr charter
A 5-year old vessel in 2010 should be worth more than
$44.6m if orders are made at above $80m for delivery in 2010
5-yrs Sell High risk involved in all other options
1 0-yrs Sell 10-yr charter: A 20-yr old ship in 20 years may be worth
slightly more than $9.7m but it is not worthwhile
15-yrs 5-yr charter $5.2m is less that the 10-yr average scrap value of -$5.5m
20-yrs 5-yr charter Profit of $9.6m plus the residual value of a 25-yr old vessel
25-yrs 3-yr charter Profit of $1.8m plus the residual value of a 28-yr old vessel
Table 2.9-20: Best Chartering or Selling option for each Vessel Based on Current Rates and Prices
1-year and 10-year charters seem to be bad options compared to intermediate periods.
10-year charters allow very little room for significant profits, while 1-year charters rely
heavily on a strong market thereafter. If one wants to avoid relying on a strong market for
many years, the best option for vessels of age 15 years or older, is the longest time charter
available.
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2.9.7 Conclusions
" We are currently at a very high peak of a highly cyclical market. The following few
years are therefore valued significantly higher value than remaining ship's life
" Banks respond to this by frontloading loan repayments to bring a high loan down to
10-year average values. This makes some charter options unfeasible because the
earnings are inadequate to cover the first payments
e Out of the possible options from a buyer's point of view, only older vessels seem to
make sense as they involve lower risk and rely the least on speculation of the market
beyond 2010
" From a seller's point of view, 1-year and 10-year charters appear to be redundant
options in general while 3-year and 5-year charters or selling are chosen for all vessel
ages
" If one does not want to rely on the market staying strong, it is generally worth selling
newer vessels and chartering old vessels (15+ years) for as long as possible
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2.10 Overall Comments and Conclusion
Since the development of capes in the late 1960s, their market has been closely
correlated with that of the dry bulk fleet. China's recent economic expansion and huge
increase in demand for iron ore, has created a boom for capes that account for the great
majority of iron ore transportation.
China's steel production industry is expanding rapidly and this drives the demand for
iron ore imports. Furthermore, China has gradually become a net coal importer, causing its
previous importers to go to Australia. This has led to a heavy increase in tonne-miles and to
record-high delays and queue lengths in Australian ports, driving freight rates extremely
high. Demand is also affected by the high oil prices, which not only boost the economies of
oil producing countries, but also cause many factories and power plants around the world to
convert to steam coal, creating more employment for capes.
The global supply of capes is inelastic in the short run due to the limited capacity of
yards and ports and the length of delivery times. The high increase in demand, combined
with the inelasticity of supply has led to exceedingly high spot and t/c rates. Record-breaking
newbuilding, second hand and demolition prices have followed. The weak US S has also
helped boost trade and the freight market.
Most people do not expect the market to last at the current levels for long so the next
few years are valued much higher than the remaining ship's life. This has made the second-
hand more expensive than the newbuilding that has an average delivery time of 3 years. A
modem resale today with prompt delivery is worth about 150% the price of a newbuilding
order. This has also narrowed the gap in prices between older and newer vessels. Spot rates
are also significantly higher than t/c rates and the difference increases with t/c period length.
Since the crisis of 1986 when a 9-year-old cape was of scrap value, the market has moved to
the opposite extreme with a 13-year old cape today worth as much as a newbuilding order.
Supply will increase by about 30% by 2011 on the basis of the current newbuilding
orderbook. However, China's imports/exports are expected to keep increasing and there is a
corresponding optimism on the demand side. Hence there may be a tight balance between
supply and demand until then and this will determine the outcome of the market.
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There has been minimal scrapping over the past few years leading to an increasing
scrapping pool. A decline in rates will force old ships out of the market, thereby
counteracting the decline. The resolution of the congestion problem will effectively increase
supply and will have an imminent impact on the freight market. If China's demand drops
significantly, the increase in supply over the coming years will lead to a shipping crisis. This
could make the next decade one of the worst in the history of shipping. Even if that happens
however, ship values are unlikely to drop for a relatively long time because of cash reserves
and optimism that has been built up during the current boom.
The market is cyclical and very volatile both in terms of ship earnings and ship values,
particularly for capes. This cyclicality leads to huge losses but also provides big investment
opportunities particularly with older vessels. The latest cycle has created opportunities,
which in instances yield return on investment of over 1000% in just 3-4 years. Today we are
probably near the peak of the market with average daily earnings of about $115K/day and a
modern resale worth in excess of $115m. Such high returns are therefore unlikely to be
repeated in the near future. The less risky investments today are in older ships and rely the
least on speculation of the market beyond 2010. From a seller's point of view, it is generally
worth selling newer vessels and chartering out older ones for as long as possible.
The futures (FFA) market provides good investment opportunities to those that wish to
hedge or speculate. The FFA market and the physical market are not identical but one affects
the other and they are closely aligned. Large discrepancies between actual values and futures
prices are very common creating opportunities for high profits. The average difference
between futures prices and physical values in fact increases exponentially with the time
between the contract and the settlement date. Future prices are strongly affected by the
current market and its direction and they are relatively flat. They are therefore a relatively
bad forecasting tool and create a risk for big losses. One therefore has to adopt a more
scientific approach to forecasting the market and to hedge accordingly.
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3.1 Bulk Carrier Losses
About 10 ships and 50 lives are lost every year from bulk carrier losses alone since
the beginning of the 1980s [Intercargo 2004, O'Mahony 2004a, Terry Macalister 2004,
Intercargo 2002, MER 2002c, Naval Architect 1996, Byrne et al 1998, Mortensen 1998]. A
recent study of total losses between 1997 and 2006, by the International Union of Marine
Insurance IUMI, found that hull damage is one of the leading causes for total loss [Wang et
al 2009].
Human error has consistently been a dominant factor accounting for about 90% of all
maritime accidents [Lloyd's 2003]. Approximately half are directly initiated by human error
while about a third result from the failure of human performance to avoid or mitigate the
consequences [Baker et al 2004}. Fig. 3.1-1 shows the trend in bulk carrier losses and the
resulting losses of life between 1995 and 2004.
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Fig. 3.1-1: Ships and Lives Lost due to Bulk Carrier Losses since 1995 [Intercargo 2004]
In an analysis of bulk carrier losses, ABS suggests that they seem to follow the
fluctuations of the freight market [ABS 1997]. A contributing factor is that during a high
freight market, repairs are more likely to be postponed. This emphasizes the influence of
repairs and structural integrity on ship casualties.
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According to the chairman of Intercargo, Frederick Tsao, "Structural failure remains
a consistent and significant cause of loss, while the presence of heavy cargos features in
many of the losses" [MER 2002a]. The 11 largest out of the 12 capes which were lost due to
known or suspected structural failures between 1990 and 1997 were carrying iron ore.
Furthermore, while capes comprised only about 9 percent of the bulker fleet, they accounted
for 48% of the casualties [Mortensen 1998]
[Thayamballi et al 1996] suggest that the loss rate from all cape causes is
approximately 3 times greater than that of Panamaxes. Fig. 3.1-2 compares the normalized
casualty rates due to side shell failure, which is a common failure cause, and due to collision,
between the various bulk carrier size groups.
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Fig. 3.1-2: Casualties per ship year for the various bulk carrier size groups [Vassalos et al 20041
The prevalence of iron ore cargos in bulk carrier losses is demonstrated in Fig. 3.1-3.
The reasons for this are mainly associated with the cargo's high density. The implications of
loading iron ore on the hull stresses are analyzed in greater depth in Section 3.9.2.
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Fia. 3.1-3: Bulk Carrier Casualties (>2000dwt), where Hull Failure may have been a Factor [DNV 19971
Even though bulk carrier losses have stemmed from a variety of causes, fatigue
cracking is a recurring one. Significant research was carried out on the effect of fatigue in
tankers [Bea 1994, Rolfe et al 1993, ABS 19921, but bulk carriers suffer more because of the
larger number of discontinuities in their structure. Fig. 3.1-4 shows the trend in the total and
hull related casualties between the periods of 1980 and 1994.
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Fig. 3.1-4: Total and Hull-Related Casualties [LR 1996]
Both corrosion and fatigue cracking, particularly on the side shell, appear to be a
prime cause of failure [Intercargo 2002, Plaza 1998, IACS 1992, LR 1995, Robinson 1991,
Anon 1991]. According to a study of the IMO, cracked or damaged side shell is the leading
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cause of bulk carrier losses, while flooding of the first cargo hold accounts for -40% of bulk
carrier casualties [ABS 2002c]. For capes, side shell failure accounts for 58.3% of the total
losses, while hatch cover failures account for 13.3% [ABS 2002c]. Typically, fatigue cracks
on shell frame connections propagate towards the shell as a result of cyclic loading. This
causes leakage and ultimately flooding of a cargo hold. Excessive loads consequently lead to
the progressive collapse of bulkheads, which may also have fatigue cracks and corrosion.
Progressive flooding of an iron ore loaded ship, which is usually only designed for the
flooding of one cargo hold, ultimately leads to rapid sinking.
This is a typical way by which many capes are lost [Braidwood et al 1998, Kim et al
1996a, Naval Architect 1996, Liu et al 1995, Ferguson et al 1993, Richardson 1986, IMO
1993, Adam et al 1991, Foy 1983]. About 20 ships disappeared as such without warning in
the 1980s and early 1990s [Paik et al 1998c]. These include the two major cape incidences
"Giga 2" (140,000dwt built in 1981) and "Pos Challenger" (149,000 built in 1992). Other
examples include the ore bulk oil carrier (OBO) MV Derbyshire in 1980, the Capes
Alexandre P., Pasithea and Algarrobo all of which disappeared virtually without trace in
1990 while loaded with iron ore [LR, Peckham, Ferguson 1991a], the Mineral Diamond in
1991 again loaded with iron ore [NK 1992] the OBO and the capes MV Christopher in 2001
and Alexandros T in 2006. Naturally, this has attracted public attention and it has caused
great concern about fractures particularly in capes. Studies have shown that ships with
alternately loaded holds are more susceptible to failure this way [Hibbert 1997, Somerville
1996].
Fig. 3.1-5 shows the number of capesize bulk carrier losses per year and the fleet size
since 1980. There are also a few cases where Capes were saved just in time following quick
and decisive action by an alert crew after discovering dangerous cracks while at sea.
Examples include the 170,000 dwt Cape Setsuyo Star in 2006 [Corbett 2006b] and Hebei
Wisdom in 2008 [Corbett 2008].
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Fig. 3.1-5: Cape Losses Since 1980 [Intercargo 2007, Clarksons 2007a]
The average loss rate has been on average 1 cape per year or approximately 0.3% of
the world fleet. Many of these failures have given rise to the commonly used term of
"disappearing capes". The failure sequence described above is most common in capes
because of their frequent transportation iron ore, which has a density of 2600kg/m3. At
175,000tons, only 67,308m 3, or a third of the cargo hold space of a typical 175,000dwt cape
is occupied. If the rest becomes filled with sea water, the weight in the cargo holds increases
to approximately 310,000 tones or 177% of the dwt capacity, making it sink like a rock.
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3.2 Maritime Organizations
3.2.1 Overview
The maritime industry includes a large number of parties who have a vested interest
in the ship at any point in time. Fig. 3.2-1 provides a summary of some of the most important
constituents.
Fig. 3.2-1: Parties Involved in the Shipping Industry
Maritime societies which are directly concerned with the safety of ships include
Classification Societies, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and the Flag
Administrations. They try to ensure safety through the introduction of rules/ regulations and
minimum requirements. Additional inspections may also be carried out by other parties who
may be concerned with the safety of ships, such as the Port State Control when a ship enters
or leaves from a port.
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3.2.2 The IMO
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) was established in 1959. Its main
purposes are "to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting
shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of
the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of
navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships". The IMO is also
authorized to deal with administrative and legal matters related to these purposes [IMO
2009a].
The most important of the Conventions adopted by the IMO are the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from ships (MARPOL 73/78). Others include the International
Convention on Standards of Training Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarer (STCW),
Load Lines (LL), Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea (COLREG) and International Labour Organization Convention No. 147 Merchant
Shipping (Minimum Standards) (ILO 147).
The first version of SOLAS was adopted in 1914 in response to the Titanic disaster
and successive versions followed in 1929, 1948, 1960 and 1974. The 1974 version has been
updated and amended several times and today it is referred to as SOLAS 1974, as amended
[IMO 2009b]. This is now generally regarded as the most important international treaty
concerning the safety of merchant ships.
In the 1994 SOLAS amendments, the International Safety Management (ISM) code
was introduced, which was enforced to all bulk carriers from 1 July 1998. The ISM code
requires every company to implement a safety management system in compliance with the
mandatory rules and regulations.
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3.2.3 IACS and Classification Societies
Classification Societies are the certification agents which provide their classification
and statutory services for the operation of the maritime community. They are independent,
self regulated organizations which have no commercial interests related to ship design,
construction or operation. Their purpose is to establish and apply technical standards relating
to the design, construction and survey of marine structures.
Primary clients of classification societies include ship-owners, flag states, designers,
shipyards and manufacturers but there are also others who do not relate directly but depend
upon the quality of services provided by classification societies. These include port states,
underwriters, financiers, charterers, cargo interests etc.
Classification societies are responsible for the design approval and inspections
throughout a ship's life. As such, they publish rules and regulations that are principally
concerned with the strength and reliability of the ship structure, its machinery and all systems
which are required to maintain essential services on board. The rules and standards are
developed by the Bureau staff and passed upon by committees made of naval architects,
marine engineers, shipbuilders, engine builders, steel makers and other technical operating
and scientific personnel associated with the maritime industry. Theoretical research and
development, established engineering disciplines and service experience are all used in their
development. A certificate of classification may be issued for a ship which meets the
requirements upon application after the completion of the relevant surveys. This certifies that
the class requirements are met by the ship but does not guarantee sea worthiness or safety.
There are over 50 classification societies worldwide but the ten major ones cooperate
through the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) and, therefore, have
many common requirements. It is estimated that IACS, including the additional societies that
have been accorded associate status, collectively classifies about 94 percent of all
commercial tonnage involved in international trade worldwide [IACS 2006] and over 95% of
the bulker fleet [IACS 1998].
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IACS adopts Common Structural Rules and ensures minimum standards between its
members but there are often significant differences between them as a result of the
differences in experience or policy. This can have a great impact on the ship's quality. An
example is with GL which has a great experience particularly with containerships and whose
philosophy is to extend the minimum IACS requirements by introducing all the relative
developments from the strength analysis and experience of containerships, to the design and
classification of bulk carriers. This is why GL-classed bulk carriers are generally known to
experience fewer structural problems.
The classification society carries out regular surveys throughout the ship's life to
check her conformity and ascertain that she remains up to standard. Inspections are scheduled
so as to ensure safe operation between surveys subject to proper maintenance. The
classification society, however, is not responsible for maintenance. The Flag Administration
is responsible for overseeing that the safety requirements are maintained. The ship owner is
required to inform the society without delay if any defects affecting class become apparent,
or if damages are sustained between surveys.
The surveyor may give a recommendation (condition of class) for any minor details
which are observed. Under more serious circumstances, class may be suspended temporarily
or withdrawn permanently. After a ship is assigned and registered under a classification, it is
maintained in class as long as it meets the requirements and surveys are carried out in
accordance with the class rules.
3.2.4 Flag States & Statutory Certification
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is an umbrella
convention concerned with several maritime aspects, including the granting of registration of
a ship by a State. Among the duties of the Flag State laid out in UNCLOS is to take enough
measures for all ships flying its flag in order to ensure safety.
Uniform standards have been established through international conventions in order
to allow ships registered in one port to travel to waters of other countries. These are known as
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"statutory requirements" and cover aspects of design, safety, accident prevention and the
situation after an accident.
There are approximately 100 administrations that are parties to SOLAS. According to
SOLAS Ch II-1, Reg 3-1, a ship must comply by the standards of a classification society
which is recognised by the administration according to regulation XI/l, or with standards of
the Administration which ensure an equivalent level of safety [IACS 2006]. All ships are
obliged to meet both statutory and class requirements. If a ship is suspended or withdrawn
from class, IACS publishes this information on its website and notifies the flag
administration which then usually invalidates the statutory certificates.
3.2.5 Recognised Organisations (RO)
ROs carry out inspections and surveys on behalf of the flag administration in order to
ensure that a ship is in compliance with the applicable requirements. They are thus
responsible to the flag administration and are authorised to require repairs and invalidate the
ship's certificates if the necessary actions are not taken. The details of inspections and
surveys regarding safety and pollution are established by international conventions and the
Government is a signatory. Minimum standards for ROs are set by the IMO Resolution A
739(18) [IACS 2006].
3.2.6 Port State Control (PSC)
Port state control (PSC) is the inspection of ships when they enter ports in order to
ensure that IMO requirements are met. Although this is strictly the responsibility of the Flag
States, Port State control is complementary to Flag State Control and is used as a safety net to
catch substandard ships as they enter ports.
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The Port State is thus entitled to inspect vessels as soon as they enter the port. It
usually takes action when ship owners, classification societies and Flag Administrations fail
to enforce IMO requirements. In such circumstances, it usually requests an occasional survey
to be carried out by the society and withholds permission to sail until any deficiencies are
rectified.
The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (MOU on PSC) has been
in effect since July 1982 [Isbester 1991]. Organizing inspections on a regional basis is very
effective as it allows for cooperation of port state authorities in consecutive ports of call.
Inspections are closely coordinated to enforce effective control while mitigating unnecessary
inspections. IMO has encouraged the establishment of regional PSC organizations and
agreements (MOUs) have been signed covering all oceans [IMO 2009a].
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3.3 History of Fractures and Fracture Mechanics
Introduction
The problem of fractures is as old as structures themselves. An 1982 study estimated
the cost of fractures in 1978 in the US alone at $119bn in 1982 $ (4% of GNP) and that this
could be reduced by $35bn with current technology and a further 28bn with further fracture
mechanics research [Anderson 1995, Eischen 2008, Roylance 2001]. Substantial progress
has been made in fracture mechanics over time, particularly during the 2 0t century but it
will never be known exactly how many lives were saved and how much damage has been
avoided.
One of the most famous brittle fracture problems was that of the Liberty ships during
WW2. Those were among the first to have an all-welded hull allowing for much faster
construction than riveted ships. The fracture problem of these ships, and particularly that of
the T2 Tanker Schenectady was arguably the birth of the field of fracture mechanics. Today,
virtually all steel ships are welded as opposed to riveted and this is possible partly due to
knowledge gained from the Liberty ships. What follows is a brief history of the discoveries
in fracture mechanics and their application in the maritime industry along with some of the
major fracture disasters.
Ancient times (B.C.)
In ancient times, designing against fractures was done by trial and error.
Understanding of fracture mechanics was very vague and structures often failed below the
predicted loads. Therefore, safety factors greater than 10 were common. It can be seen that
the Romans soon discovered that compressive stresses are safer than tensile stresses by the
way they built their bridges. They actually tested them by requiring the design engineer to
stand underneath while chariots drove over it. This put the right incentives in place and
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resulted in a Darwinian natural selection whereby only the best engineers survived
[Anderson 1995]. Similarly today, the highest ranked officials are required to go in the first
dive of a submarine which is done to stress relieve the welds.
1th15 1hCentury
Leonardo da Vinci performed experiments on iron wire and found that longer wires
failed at lower loads than shorter wires. He showed that the strength of iron wires was
inversely proportional to their length thus drawing a connection between flaws and strength
for the first time (longer wires had a higher probability of containing a larger flaw).
1 7 th Century
In 1638, Galileo investigated the strength of a column under tension and referred to it
as resistance to fracture [Eischen 2008].
1h th
18 t and 19t Century
In 1843, Rankin first talked about fatigue in railroad axles [Eischen 20081. The
increase in heavy industry during the Industrial Revolution resulted in many accidents
related to brittle fracture. This stimulated a lot of interest in understanding fracture
mechanics and a number of papers were published before the 2 0 th century [Kobayashi and
Onoue 1943].
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1910s
In 1912, Charpy clarified the ductile to brittle transition and developed the Charpy
Impact Test to evaluate it by measuring the absorption energy and ductile to brittle transition
temperature [Kobayashi and Onoue 1943]. The study of crack-like defects began by
professor of Naval Architecture, C E Inglis who in 1913 formulated the stress analysis
equations of a crack-like elliptical hole in a stressed infinite elastic plate [Inglis, 1913].
In 1912, the Titanic sank with 1,523 passengers and crew after hitting an iceberg on
its maiden voyage to the U.S. [Deitz 1998]. The steel had very large grains and high sulfur
content and the temperature was -2degC. The ductile to brittle transition temperature was
found to be 20degC on one direction and 30degC on the other compared to -15degC for a
reference sample of modem A 36 steel [Baumgartner 2006]. It is believed that tougher steel
could have delayed the sinking allowing more passengers to board the life boats.
Fig. 3.3-1: The Titanic [Deitz 19981
Another famous examples is the tragic rupture of a molasses tank in 1919 in Boston
which resulted in 12 deaths and 40 injuries [Shank 1953, Love 1944, NHML 2004]. Half a
century later, it was determined that as with the Titanic and the Liberty Ships, the steel was
below the ductile/brittle transition temperature [NHML 2004].
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1920s
In 1920, Griffith modified the equations of Inglis and applied the first law of
Thermodynamics to formulate a theory based on an energy balance [Griffith, 19201. Fracture
occurs when the strain energy change due to an increment of crack growth exceeds the
material surface energy. The theory correctly predicted fracture in glass specimens but was
only valid for "ideally brittle materials".
1930s
Dislocation theory which explained how metals deform at the crack tip started in the
early 1930s and was a hot topic in the 1950s [NHML 2004]. They are the primary reason
why materials fail at stresses much lower than those predicted using inter-atomic force
arguments - something which troubled engineers for centuries. In 1938, Westergaard
developed a technique for analyzing stresses and strains at the crack tip [Westergaard 1939].
1940s
The Liberty ships were the reason why fracture mechanics became an engineering
discipline. They were supplied by the U.S. to Britain during WW2 under the Lend-Lease
Act. The Nazis were sinking British cargo ships at three times the replacement rate so the
famous construction engineer, Henry Kaiser developed a revolutionary procedure to increase
the fabrication speed. 37 shipyards produced 5,777 ships (2708 Liberty ships) totaling
56million DWT between 1939 and 1946 [Kobayashi and Onoue 1943]. Under another
account, the Kaiser program produced 2580 liberty ships, 414 Victory Ships and 530 T2
Tankers [TWI 2000].
T2 tankers were being produced at an average time of about 70 days [Wright 2005].
In November 1942, the Liberty ship Robert E Peary was launched only 4 days and 15 hours
after keel laying as a propaganda effort to show that ships could be built faster than they
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were destroyed [Thompson 2001]. Fig. 3.3-2 shows a plot of the days from keel laying to
delivery for keel-laying dates of Liberty ships between Jan-41 and Nov-44.
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Fig. 3.3-2: Liberty Ship Construction Time of Shipyards [Thompson 20011
They were considered a great success until they started breaking in two. One of the
most tragic failures was the T2 tanker Schenectady in Jan 1943 in Portland, Oregon. This
was one of at least 9 T-2 tankers that broke in two between 1942 and 1952 [Barsom & Rolfe
1987]. The failure was due to poor weld quality combined with stress concentration at a
water temperature of 4degC and air temperature of -3 degC [Hayes 1996]. The ship was only
24 hours old and even though 8 Liberty ships had fractured earlier, this attracted the most
attention because it was in full view of the population of a major city [Thompson 2001]. This
showed the importance of fracture toughness which marked the birth of fracture mechanics
[Kobayashi and Onoue 1943].
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Fig. 3.3-3: Schenectady T2 Tanker Failure [TWI 20001
1031 damages or accidents due to brittle fracture on Liberty ships were reported by
April 1st 1946 and more than 200 Liberty ships were sank or damaged beyond repair
[Kobayashi and Onoue 1943]. Under another account, of the 2751 liberty ships built during
WWII, about 400 had brittle fractures of which 145 were catastrophic failures [Banks-Sills
2003]. 19 ships broke completely in two but fractures often occurred luckily before the ships
were floated [NHML 2004]. Reasons were the ~600,000 feet of welded joints [Statistics and
Reports Unit 1944] on each ship which were made by semi-skilled workers, stress
concentrations at hatch corners and the low toughness steel that was being used. Welded
construction did not provide crack arrest sites where a fracture would terminate. Steel,
however, was not a problem in the riveted Canadian Liberty ships.
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Fig. 3.3-4: Liberty Failure [Cambridge. 20001
Fig. 3.3-5: Liberty John P Gaines [Wright 20051
[Thompson 2001] showed that the quality of Liberty ships (in terms of fracture occurrences)
declines with labor productivity and production speed. This is an important lesson we learnt
from these ships.
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Fig. 3.3-6: Fracture rate (100-ship averagel vs. Average Date of Keel Laying [Thompson 20011
Following these failures, square cut-outs in the sheer strake were removed and the
ships were retrofitted with rounded and strengthened hatch corners and high toughness
riveted crack arrester plates at strategic locations on the deck. The date when these design
changes were made is shown in Fig. 3.3-6. According to the Griffith theory, crack arrest
occurs when a crack runs~ into an area in which the energy required for an incremental crack
extension exceeds that released. This may be due to an increase in the material toughness or
a decrease in the applied stress (e.g. if a tensile stress becomes compressive). Alternatively,
crack arrest can occur when the crack reaches the end of a plate (hence the riveted arrester
plates). As a result of the design modifications, many of the ships, which were initially
designed to last for a single voyage (until they were sunk by the Nazis), were in service up
until the 1970s. Two of those ships were still afloat in 2000 [TWI 2000, Wright 2005]
Fracture mechanics, as we know it today was born from studies associated with the
Liberty ships over the next few years after WW II. Constance Tipper investigated the Liberty
ship failures and demonstrated the temperature below which the steel turns brittle. She wrote
a book titled "The Brittle Fracture Story" published in 1962 and developed the "Tipper Test"
for determining brittleness in steel [Cambridge, 2000]. She laid the foundation for studying
the effect of low temperatures on steel.
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All the WW2 ship failures occurred at temperatures below 15degC(60F) and steel was
improved by adjusting the C-Mn ratio to decrease the Nil Ductility Temperature (NDT) by
about 20degC(30F) [Pellini 1986]. A lot of work has been done in the area since then and the
toughness of steels has improved a lot. The NDT+At procedure for fracture arrest design
(using fracture arrest properties at At above the NDT) was first applied to naval structures in
1955 and there are no cases of brittle fracture in structures that were conservatively designed
on this basis [Pellini 1986]. Crack arrestability is still an important topic that is being
researched for application in ships [Inoue et al 2007]. Even today however, there are
occasionally brittle fractures due to low temperatures. An example is the 21.5foot crack on
the side shell of the "Lake Carling" which occurred in the Gulf at St Lawrence in 2002 at a
water temperature of 0 degC and air temperature of 06degC [Drouin 2006].
Fig. 3.3-7: Stress Fracture on the bulker Lake Carling [Professional Mariner 20041
Another famous fracture of the 1940s was that of the Cleveland LNG storage tank
which destroyed 79 houses, 2 factories and 217 cars while heavily damaging a further 35
houses and 13 factories totaling $6m to $7m in 1944. The failure was from a crack starting at
a weld defect, which grew due to the vibration of passing trains [Eischen 2008]
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Following the war, [Irwin 1948] and [Orowan 1948] independently extended the
work of Griffith and Inglis to metals by including the energy dissipated by local plastic flow
while [Mott 1948] extended the theory to rapidly propagating cracks. The electron
microscope also came from RCA in 1948 allowing us to see what was happening [NHML
2004].
1950s - LEFM
After the Liberty ship disaster, at least 4 ships split in two between 1945 and 1956
[Hodgson et al 1958] including two young cargo ships and a tanker between 1951 and 1953
[Barsom & Rolfe 1987] and the tanker World Concord in 1954. The first jet powered
pressurized passenger plane, the 1952 DeHavilland Comet airplane, was also a fracture
disaster of the 1950s (due to fatigue). Three aircraft suffered in-flight breakup due to fatigue
cracks near stress risers at window openings [Eischen 2008, Bishop 1955]
In 1956, [Irwin 1956] developed the strain energy release rate concept stemming
from Griffith's theory. He then used Westergaard's technique from the 1930s, to describe the
stress-strain field at the crack tip by the stress intensity factor, which is related to the strain
energy release rate via the Young's modulus and Poison's ratio [Irwin 1957]. This was the
beginning of Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM). At around the same time,
[Williams 1957] also arrived at the same crack tip solutions and stress intensity factor via a
different approach.
Energy Criterion
_allI
1 Jd (3.3-2)
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For an crack of length 2a in an infinite plate:
;TC 2
GC =- E (3.3-3)
CE
Fracture occurs when: G = Gc. Rearranging, we can see that:
1
cc (3.3-4)
Where: G: strain energy release rate (change in potential energy with crack area)
II: Potential Energy
a: Crack Length (of half crack length for a center crack)
W: Strain Energy Density
V: Volume
T: Traction
u: displacement vector
S: Surface
7: Applied Stress
E: Young's Modulus
Gc : Critical energy release rate of the material
Stress Intensity Approach
Even though the stress range, mean stress, stress ratio and amount of damage are the
main parameters contributing to crack growth [Schijve 2001, Blake 1996, Broek 1986, Chell
1979], as Irwin concluded, all the stress components around the crack tip are proportional to
the stress intensity factor K. At the crack tip K is given by:
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K =Fo-ra (3.3-5)
Where F is a correction factor and a is the crack opening stress. Fracture occurs when K is
equal to the fracture toughness of the material K = Kc . The correction factor F can be
decomposed into particular factors as follows [Zettlemoyer and Fisher 1978]:
F=F*F*F *F *Fe sg t
Where: Fe:
Fg:
F,:
Fg:
Ft:
(3.3-6)
Joint Geometry Factor
Front Free Surface Correction (accounts for the load distribution on the crack
surface where stress is zero on the free boundary)
Back Free Correction (accounts for the free surface ahead of the crack)
Stress Gradient (accounts for non-uniform applied stress e.g. in bending)
Finite Thickness Factor (applies to surface cracks) [Albrecht & Yamada
1977]
Another form of the equation which makes explicit differentiation between
membrane and bending stresses is:
K=&(O-YM,, +aYM,,) (3.3-7)
Where the Y's are geometry factors and the Mk's are correction factors for the stress
concentration due to the weld profile [Shine and Nair 2008]. For Simple crack geometries, K
is given by the expressions presented in Fig. 3.3-8.
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Type of Crack Stress Intensity Factor, K
Center crack,
length 2a, in an oV T
infinite plate
Edge crack,
length a, in a 1.12 o/ W
semi-infinite plate
Central penny-shaped
crack, radius a, in 2 ao
in infinite body
Center crack,
length 2a in o VW tan (W)
plate of width W
2 symmetrical edge
cracks, each length a, in a, /W [tan (g) + 0.1 sin (v)]
plate of total width W
Fig. 3.3-8: Stress Intensity Factors for Common Geometries [Roylance 20011
Factors that can lower the fracture toughness of the material include intergranular
fractures, quench-age embrittlement, blue brittleness, temper embrittlement, intermetallic
compound embrittlement, hydrogen embrittlement and order-disorder reactions [NHML
2004].
A ductile fracture can be distinguished from a brittle fracture by examining the
cracked surfaces. Ductile fracture is slow and stable and involves extensive plastic
deformation whereas brittle fracture is characterized by very rapid, unstable crack growth
with almost no plastic deformation.
There are 3 modes of fracture as shown in Fig. 3.3-9. The mode is usually noted by K
subscript I, II or III. Mode I is the crack opening mode, mode II is the shearing mode and
mode III is the out of plane shear or tearing mode. We are primarily concerned with mode I
fracture as it is the most severe.
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Y 4!
Fig. 3.3-9: The Three Fracture Modes [Kozak 20021
For a center crack of length 2a in an infinite plate under mode 1, the parameter Y is
equal to 1, yielding:
K2  K 2G = and Gc - (3.3-8)
E anE
In other words, the strain energy and stress intensity approaches are equivalent. The
corresponding equation under plane strain is
K 2
E(1-v2) . (3.3-9)
Paris-Erdogan Law
The late 1950s was a difficult time period as research in fracture mechanics was
openly discouraged and design engineers were not ready to replace their cumulative damage
approach. Paris and his co-workers found it difficult to publish their work at first in 1959
[Paris et al 1961, Paris and Sih 1965]. The Paris-Erdogan law is as follows:
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aa = AAK"
aN [Paris and Erdogan 1963]
Where N is the number of stress cycles and A and n are material constants (which may vary
with medium (e.g. salt water) and with time.
This can be integrated from the initial crack length to give the final crack length or
the number of cycles to failure:
Nf da
Nf = AAK n ,(3.3-11)
where the critical crack length is obtained from the fracture toughness:
ac _ K 
2
;r Yo-
(3.3-12)
There is a threshold AKth below which cracks will not propagate, and fast fracture
will occur at Kc. So aa must approach zero as AK approaches AKth and must shoot to
aN
infinity when AK = (1-R) Kc where R is the stress ratio. The Paris-Erdogan law can be
written as:
aa
8N
n AK -A
(1-R)K
Kth
- AK [Liu 1998]. (3.3-12)
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(3.3-10)
1960s - EPFM
Linear elastic fracture mechanics is not valid when significant plastic yielding
precedes fracture. It assumes that the plastic zone occurring at the crack tip is too small to
significantly affect the stress distribution. Research was carried out to account for plasticity
at the crack tip by [Irwin 1961] who proposed a simple extension of LEFM introducing the
effective stress intensity factor (including the plastic zone) Kerr, by [Dugdale 1962] and
[Barenblatt 1962] with new models and by Wells who developed the Crack Tip Opening
Displacement approach (CTOD) to account for significant plasticity. Fracture occurs when
9 = t5 where 6 is the opening of crack surfaces where they are intersected by 450 lines from
the tip, and 5c is the critical crack tip opening displacement.
In 1968, [Rice 1968] developed the J Integral which expresses the non-linear (plastic)
energy release rate evaluated along an arbitrary contour around the crack tip. Eshelby had
already published conservation integrals including one equivalent to the J Integral but did not
apply them to cracks. Soon after, Hutchinson, Rice and Rosengren related the J integral to
the crack tip stress fields in nonlinear materials allowing J to be used both as a nonlinear
stress intensity parameter as well as an energy release rate [Hutchinson 1968, Rice and
Rosengren 1968]. Since then, the M integral has also been developed for mixed modes and
interface cracks. The J integral is given by:
J= Wdy+T auI.ds
ax (3.3-13)
F: a path independent contour enclosing the crack tip
s: the distance along F
Once J is evaluated, K can easily be determined from its elastic component and is
then usually quoted as Knc. Under pure mode I loading:
Ksc= eE' (3.3-14)
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In 1962, the Kings Bridge in Melbourne failed at brittle fracture at 40F and in
December 15h 1967, the Pleasant Bridge at Point Pleasant, West Virginia fractured
unexpectedly claiming 46 lives [Barsom & Rolfe 1987]. A series of other brittle fractures of
steel bridges have occurred since then [Fisher 1984]. [Boyd 1969] describes 10 brittle ship
failures that occurred between 1960 and 1965.
Fig. 3.3-10: The 29,000 Liberian Tanker SS Bridgewater broke in two in early 1962 [Wright 20051
1970s
In January 1972, the 584ft tank barge I.O.S. 3301 and the 1-year old ship Martha R
Ingram involved broke almost completely in half while in port at calm seas [MCR 1974]. In
1979, the six year old tanker Kurdistan broke in two while sailing in the North Atlantic, full
details of which can be found in [HMSO 1982, Corlett et al 1987]. The warm oil inside and
cold water outside resulted in high thermal stresses and the crack initiated from a stress
concentration at an improperly welded bilge keel. In the same year in Chicago, there was an
AA DC-10 crash with 271 deaths after an engine pylon fracture [Eischen 2008].
Design analysis based on J integrals became possible after the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) published a fracture design handbook based on a methodology of
Hutchinson and Shih developed in 1976 [Shih and Hutchinson 1976, Kumar et al 1981]. Shih
related the US J integral to the UK CTOD, showing that both are equally valid [Shih 1981].
Both are used today. Research using finite elements also took off in the 1970s with the
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advent of computers. Special crack tip elements were developed. Examples of quarter point
elements include quadrilateral elements by Henshell and Shaw in 1975 and triangular
elements by Barsoum in 1974 and 1976. Others include the eight noded isoparametric
element and the square root singular element developed by Banks-Sills and Bortman in 1984
[Banks-Sills 2003].
1980s and Onwards
One of the most notable fractures of the century was the Aloha Airline stress fracture
in April 2 8th 1988 where one third of the roof was lost at 24,000 feet altitude. Failure was
caused by fatigue under a corrosive environment after 19 years in service [Bastawros 2006,
Banks-Sills 2003, Roylance 2001].
Fig. 3.3-11: Aloha Airline Stress Fracture [airdisaster.com 20091
Other 1980s aircraft fracture disasters include the 1989 United Sioux city crash (due
to a hard phase inclusion) [Bastawros 20061 and the 1985 JAL B-747 crash in Japan with
over 500 fatalities due to aft pressure bulkhead fatigue [Eischen 2008].
Most work since the 1980s has been incremental. There has been focus on
composites and ceramics, dynamic fracture, fracture of thin films and interfaces, molecular
simulations etc. Sophisticated models have been developed for material behavior,
incorporating time dependent nonlinear behavior, such as viscoelasticity and viscoplasticity,
and others to relate local and global fracture material behavior. Along these lines, influence
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functions are promising in predicting fatigue life. This may solve many problems if proven
to be reliable. The concept is:
oL =AO- +BoB (3.3-15)
Where: UL = a local stress in a critical area which is to be determined
aA, cYB = stresses or other measurements at two convenient locations
A, B = Influence Functions
Similarly to stress concentration factors, Influence Functions can be used to obtain
the effect of Global actions such as longitudinal stresses on the deck, on a critical area which
may not be accessible for measurements. [Braidwood et al 1998, Braidwood et al 1997] have
carried out research showing how well influence functions can predict fatigue life of typical
components using response amplitude operators from finite element modeling along with
fatigue analysis programs.
Today, interest in fracture mechanics for ships is low because brittle fractures have
become rare, following steady design and steel improvements since the Liberties. Brittle
fracture casualty rates have decreased from one in ten ship-years in the 1940s to about one in
ten thousand ship-years [Sumpter and Kent 2006]. This trend is directly linked to the
increase in toughness of the basic (grade A) shipbuilding steel [Sumpter and Kent 2004].
Some notable recent examples of ships splitting in two include the Corazon in 1990 [NK
1992], Mineral Diamond in 1991, Karadeniz S in 1992 Flare in 1998, Lassia in 1999 and
Selendang Ayu on December 2004.
Fig. 3.3-12: OBO Lassia during discharge in Italy
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Fig. 3.3-13: Sinking after Brittle Fracture [ABS 19991
Fig. 3.3-14: The PMX SelendangAvu on Dec 9 th 2004, by United States Coast Guard (USCG)
[ENS 20091
Most classification societies prefer cumulative damage methods in designing their
rules. Their fracture control strategy relies on Charpy energy indices. They require repair of
all identified cracks immediately, which is often too conservative and expensive. A more
rigorous analysis could show that the repair of some cracks can safely be delayed until the
next scheduled dry dock. Progress towards developing a crack management approach has
been made by [Kent and Sumpter 2006]. Major shortcomings of the linear damage
accumulation approach include the neglect of loading sequence and crack blunting, the effect
of the surrounding structure and stress redistribution, and the lack of distinct qualitative
differences on the basis of damage ratio. A notable exception of fracture mechanics in ships
is the Leak Before Break criterion of LNG Carrier tanks [Kokarakis and Taylor 20091
Research is carried out for future marine fracture mechanics application. The Paris-
Erdogan law is widely used to predict crack growth in a wide range of structures. Studies
based on lab tests are carried out on ship building steel specimens for the purpose of
calibrating the constants of the Paris-Erdogan law in order to be used in the design of ship
structures [Shine and Nair 2008]. Some, however, have found it to be conservative in
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complicated structures like ships. Forman, Newman and de Konig developed the FNK (or
ESACRACK) equation which is applied by [Shehu et al 2006] on shipbuilding steel:
(IA thda _C1f AK
dN L1-R ) Km j (3.3-16)
1- 'ax
Kc
Where: f: Crack opening function: f = AO + AIR + A2R 2 + A3R3  (3.3-17)
Ao, A 1, A2, A3: functions of material properties and the peak stress
Kmax: Maximum stress Intensity Factor
C, p, q, n: Empirical Constants
Some materials exhibit a very small stress ratio effect and the effect of crack closure can be
neglected. The equation can then be reduced to the following expression:
1_ Ath
dN K q (3.3-18)d1- '"ax
Kc
From this form, it can be seen that setting the parameters p and q to zero, we get the
Paris-Erdogan Law. The modified Forman crack growth Eq. 3.3-19 [Forman 1986], , has
been applied by [Kokarakis and Taylor 2009] in Bureau Veritas (BV) to structural details for
developing a fracture mechanics based ship design method.
da n (AK. -(1- 2R / 3) AKh )
dN ((1 - R ) Kc -AK )
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Some have also tried to combine the S-N curve approach with fracture mechanics to
carry out fatigue assessment of cracked ships [Xu & Bea 1998]
Summary
Fracture mechanics has been of great interest to engineers foi many centuries.
Research in the field had been carried out as early as the 1 5th century by Leonardo da Vinci
but we only had a quantified understanding after the works of Charpy, Inglis and Griffith at
the beginning of the 2 0th century. It really became an engineering discipline after the Liberty
ship failures. in WW2. The particular ship which signaled its birth was the T2 Tanker
Schenectady. We have learnt a lot since then but ships have continued to break in two in
some rare circumstances. Today, fracture mechanics has limited application in ships as
engineers tend to favor a more conservative approach and the use of the simpler cumulative
damage rules. Fracture mechanics can potentially be much more accurate than these
cumulative damage models and research is currently being carried out for increased
application in ships.
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3.4 Recent Research in Aircraft Fatigue
A significant amount of research has been carried out on fatigue and fracture in
aircraft. Recent research has primarily been focused on predicting and improving fatigue
strength and fatigue life; predicting crack initiation, propagation (trajectories and growth
rates) and effects on structural integrity; developing new designs and materials; performance
of adhesives; and non-destructive testing (NDT).
Fatigue life prediction is carried out primarily using cumulative damage models, such
as Palmgren-Miner Damage Summation [Wu et al 2008] and Wohler Curves (S-N curves)
with Miner's rule [Braccesi et al 2008]. [Aruajo et al 2008] predict fatigue strength using the
theory of critical distances, the hot spot approach and Modified Wohler Curves (MWC).
Methods have also been developed for estimating the cumulative fatigue damage based on
surface deformation near the stress concentration [Karuskevich et al 2008] and using the
inverse power law [Allegri & Zhang 2008]. A new damage parameter has also recently been
introduced, based on the maximum strain on the critical plane [Sun et al 2008].
Besides damage accumulation models, crack growth models, based on stress
concentrations and energy criteria [Fomichev 2008], are also widely used. Paris Law is often
applied and experiments are carried out to determine the required material properties "A",
"n" and fracture toughness Kc of various alloys [Farahmand & Nikbin 2008]. Stress intensity
factors are calculated using Boundary Element Methods (BEM) [Yang & Mall 2008] or 3-D
finite elements [Srikant & Arakere 2008] while [Ren & Lu 2008] uses FEA to calculate
stress intensity factors for the case of three-dimensional cracks.
Crack growth rates and trajectories have also been studied using FEA and
experimental methods. Finite element modeling is used to predict crack growth rates and
direction [Srikant &Arakere 2008] and to examine crack closure due to repeated overloads
[Singh et al 2008]. Experimental methods have been applied to measure crack growth rates
under different stress concentrations [Huynh et al 2008], while crack trajectories have been
examined with respect to material orientation and loading mode [Hosseini-Toudeshky et al
2008].
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Crack initiation has been studied experimentally by [Rashed et al 2008], with regards
to the stress-strain state by [Hurley et al 2008] or by assuming that it follows a Weibull or
Log-Normal distribution by [He et al 2008], who also consider the effects of corrosion.
Other common approaches to determining fatigue life include the application of
Coffin-Manson Law for thermal cyclic fatigue, Basquin's equation t - (Ao-)" and the
Ramberg-Osgood relation:
+ k j [Begum et al 2008] (3.4-1)E E)n
New ways of evaluating the Manson-Coffin-Basquin and Ramberg-Osgood equations
have also been developed [Niesloni et al 2008]. Finally, some employ a probabilistic
approach on life distribution, based on the Monte-Carlo technique [Liao et al 2008a].
Understanding and quantifying the effects of several parameters on the fatigue
strength and fatigue life has been the focus of several recent papers for various materials,
alloys and composites. Examined parameters include temperature [Harbour et al 2008] (also
specifically on titanium alloys [Majidi 2008] and on composites [Shimokawa et al 2008]),
corrosion [Bian et al 20081, environmental effects [Ruggles-Wrenn et al 2008], grain size
[Tsushida et al 2008], loading frequency [Ruggles-Wrenn et al 2008], load sequence
[Matikas et al 2008], fiber properties, component shape and size, crack orientation, coating,
geometric effects such as weld toe radius [Nykanen et al 2009] etc. The effect of interacting
surface cracks has been studied experimentally and using FEA [Kamaya 2008a, Kamaya
2008b]. Analysis has also been done under various loading conditions including oblique,
dynamic, random and static loads, high and low cycle fatigue, repeated overloads and creep
fatigue.
Various methods have been examined for increasing fatigue resistance and extending
fatigue life. These include heat treatments [Deodati et al 2009], bake hardening [Robertson et
al 2008], pre-straining [Robertson et al 2008, Park et al 2009, Froustey and Lataillade 2008],
shot peening [Oguri et al 2008], ultrasonic impact treatment [Liao et al 2008b], improved
adhesive bonding and replacing mechanical fasteners with adhesives [Kwakernaak &
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Hofstede 2008]. To aid these attempts, studies have also focused specifically on the crack
resistance of adhesives [Levesque & Arakere 2008] and the impact resistance of adhesives
[Silberschmidt et al 2008] and coatings [Bouzakis et al 2008].
The effect of crack propagation on the structure has been studied with regard to shaft
deflections [Bachschmid et al 2008] and structural stiffness [Gaidai et al 2008], while work
on NDT and fatigue monitoring has been carried out [Safizadeh et al 2008, Aubele & Keown
2008]. A new NDT technique based on linear acoustics has also recently been developed
[Matikas et al 2008].
A significant portion of the work is focused on material developments and
understanding. This includes the development of stronger and lighter composites [Zwaban
2008] as well as research on fatigue and crack propagation in various alloys [Xu et al 2008,
Fadag et al 2008, Underhill & Duquesnay 2008]. Research has been carried out to optimize
the number of experiments required for alloy characterization [Farahmand & Nikbin 2008].
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3.5 Crack Growth Mechanisms
3.5.1 Overview
Cracks in ships develop and propagate mainly due to corrosion or fatigue. Corrosion
cracks manifest by the mechanism of stress corrosion cracking, while the structure is fatigued
by alternate loading due to sea waves and cargo operations with rates of up to 18,000t/hr.
Overstressing of the hull during loading and damage often caused during discharging may
further intensify the problem.
Cracks may initiate in gas cut notches, at geometrical discontinuities, in defects, or in
other high stress concentration sites which often arise due to poor design. Defects are very
common in welds, of which there are several miles on a cape. Cracks also often occur during
repairs, when steel plates are welded at a 90 degree angle to the direction is which they have
been hardened. This typically occurs in regions of large surface area, such as deck plates, the
tank top, the shell plate, hoppers, sloping plates, bulk heads etc.
Cracks can also occur through careless handling, for example by the impact of
excavators during discharge or as iron ore strikes the tank top plate during loading. These and
other factors may result in denting and the formation of high stress concentration sites which
give rise to cracks.
Cracks tend to propagate along preferred paths such as along the grooves parallel to
the weld seams because of the lower thickness of the material. This is because contraction on
cooling locks in high residual tensile stresses along the weld line. The preferred crack path
generally depends on the material, geometrical considerations such as the thickness and the
mode of loading i.e. the direction of stresses relative to the crack.
A number of criteria have been developed to predict the crack path when subjected to
mixed mode loading. Some of the most common ones include the stress based criterion
which predicts crack propagation in the direction of the maximum hoop stress, the critical
shear stress criterion (propagation in the direction of maximum shear stress), the Griffith
criterion in which the crack propagates in the direction of maximum energy release rate, and
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the kr1 = 0 criterion which predicts crack growth in the direction of local zero mode II
loading.
The hoop stress field ahead of the crack tip is given by:
Ki cos3 + K11 3 sin~- Cos 
2 (E2)](3.5-1)
Where: K1 = mode I (crack opening mode) stress intensity factor
K1 = mode II (shearing mode) stress intensity factor
ao = hoop stress distance r and angle 0
r = distance from crack tip
o = angle measured anticlockwise from the crack plane.
By employing the maximum hoop stress criterion and setting " = 0, the crack
branching angle 0 satisfies:
For KH 0, this results in:
sin9 K 1
1-3cos9 K1
tan i= K (7 +8]
Using this result, the crack branching angle of an inclined crack in a plate under
tension loading is given by:
A i tan p - tan 2 Y +80 = 2 tan- 14 (3.5-4)
Fig. 3.5-1 shows the crack branching angle 0 as a function of applied load angle p
(both measured from the crack centerline).
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(3.5-2)
(3.5-3)
Angle of Deflection 0 as a function of Crack Angle p
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Fig. 3.5-1: Crack branching angle vs. applied load direction using the maximum go criterion
Though curved crack paths are predicted during mixed mode loading and are also
observed in bi-axially loaded welded structures, fatigue life predictions in ships are based on
a one dimensional crack path. A finite element model has been established in order to
investigate fatigue crack growth under mixed loading conditions [Pedersen et al 1996].
3.5.2 Vulnerable Areas
The areas most vulnerable to cracks are known to be the side shell, bulk heads,
longitudinal frames, hatch coamings' connections to main deck, hatch covers, welds and
other stress concentration sites. Fractures tend to initiate at the beginning or the end of a weld
354
or a stiffener, at corners, intersections with other welds, at undercuts, or at the abrupt edges
of bad quality welds. Fig. 3.5-2 shows some typical defects which occur within the cargo
hold region.
Fractures on web of
cortugation initiating at
Intersection of adjacent
shedder plates Fractures initiating at
the corners of the shedder
plate connections to the shelf
plate and corrugations
Fractures initiating
at connections to
ide shell
at connections of
stool/hopper
sloping plating
Fig. 3.5-2: Typical defects within the cargo hold region [The Motor Ship 19941
The main frames and end brackets are also very vulnerable to cracking. A few
examples are illustrated in Fig. 3.5-3.
Topside teak
Side
shell
Topsde takLI Faetare
Happer tak
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Fig. 3.5-3: Potential Problem Areas in Main Frames [The Motor Ship 19941
It is important to realize that cracks in some locations are more dangerous than in
others. This may either be because some cracks can more readily cause serious failure or
because the critical stress for brittle fracture is more likely to be exceeded in certain cracks
due to their location and size.
The side shell is arguably the most critical part of a bulk carrier when it comes to
cracks. Apart from the static loads, it is also fatigued by the continuously changing pressure
loads from the sea. Its failure may lead to immediate flooding of the hull and total loss. Fig.
3.5-4 summarizes a few of the factors which Lloyd's Register cites as contributory to bulk
carrier structural failure and losses.
Cracking of hatch corners Buckling of cross deck strips
Localised cracking
and buckling o0
web frames
Corrosion and
buckling of
watertight
Corrosion and cracking-, y bulkeads
Cracking of connect ons
Corrosion and
cracking at bulkhead
connection to stool
Fig. 3.5-4: Structural Failure and Loss Contributory Causes for Bulk Carriers as cited by LR [MER 19971
3.5.3 Fatigue and Brittle Fracture
Creep is generally not a major concern in ships, so there are essentially two types of
fractures, fatigue and brittle fractures.
Fatigue is a process by which cracks propagate through a structure when it is
subjected under cyclic stresses that are below the yielding point. The stress cycles may be of
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relatively high frequency, such as those induced by the engine or propeller vibrations,
moderate frequency due to waves, or low frequency due to loading and discharging in
consecutive ports.
Crack propagation can be affected by several parameters including the initial crack
size and geometry, mode of loading, applied stress range, stress concentration at the crack
tip, sequence of the applied stresses, history of local nominal stresses, crack retardation,
crack closure, crack growth threshold etc. Crack initiation and propagation in a steel structure
due to fatigue, is illustrated in Fig. 3.5-5. This is shown in conjunction with the critical crack
size for fast fracture, which also varies with time. Failure occurs when the two lines intersect.
a(T) 1: Crack initiation stage a(T): Crack size (length)
II: Crack propagation stage ak(T): Critical crack size
-.H1: Failure stage
a,(T) Fracture
(Failure)
a(T)
0 T, T TF Time T
Fig. 3.5-5: Variation of crack size and crack critical size with time [Paik et al 2003b]
Brittle fracture is a failure mechanism in which a crack suddenly becomes unstable.
When critical combinations of crack size a and stress a are exceeded, fast fracture occurs,
resulting in sudden catastrophic failure. This happens when the toughness of the material is
exceeded.
Parameters used to quantify the toughness of the steel include the elastic-plastic
crack tip parameter J = JC, the strain energy release rate G = Ge, the crack tip opening
displacement 15 = S and the elastic stress intensity factorK = Kc. These are defined as
follows:
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6 = opening of crack surfaces where they are intersected by 450 lines from the tip
OBu.
J = Wdy +t ' ds (3.5-5)
1 &UI auG=-- (3.5-6)
B Ba
K = YomJ (3.5-7)
Where: F = path independent contour enclosing the crack tip
W = Strain energy density
t = traction vector (normal to the contour)
u= displacement
s = distance along F
U = potential energy
B = Specimen breadth
a = Crack size (assumed elliptical)
Y = Tabulated geometry factor (for centre crack ~-, edge crack -1.12)
a= Applied stress
E = Material Young's Modulus
These parameters are interrelated as follows:
Under the HRR field (J-dominance zone), S = d, (3.5-8)
o-y
K 2 2 K 2For a Linear Elastic Material, J = G = ' " + "' (3.5-9)
E' 2G'(3 )
Where dj ~ 1 for plane stress, d - 0.5 for plain strain
E'= E for plane stress, E'= E for plane strain
(1- v2)
G'= Material Shear Modulus
Subscripts I, II & III refer to Mode I, II & III respectively.
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J can be evaluated by several methods e.g. the 11 approach or the GE-EPRI scheme. In
both cases, J is composed by elastic and a plastic component. Using the ri approach for
example, J is defined as follows:
J=JA _ __ __A= A + + "7 A
* = Be+ W' - - = o B(W' -a) B(W' -a) e B(W' -a) A E' B(W' -a) p
(3.5-10)
Where: K = elastically calculated stress intensity factor (defined as above)
i= Tabulated geometry factor (For tension ~ 0.5, bending ~ 1)
W' = Specimen width (along direction of crack)
P = Load
A = displacement
A = area under stress/strain curve
Subscript e = elastic component
Subscript p = plastic component
The Y factor, used in the evaluation of the elastic stress intensity factor K, comprises
of a crack shape factor, a crack surface factor, a finite width factor and a non-uniform stress
factor [Dexter et al 2004]. The stress intensity factor K has also been tabulated for various
geometry configurations and loadings [Tada 1985, Rooke et al 1976] and can also be
evaluated by FEA.
The K approach is the easiest method to apply but K is only valid if plasticity is
localized to the crack tip. The K dominance zone is lost near or far away from the crack tip.
The near tip fields are better characterized by the HRR field (J-dominance zone) as the zone
of plastic strains becomes significant. Furthermore, the HRR field will always be
conservative if J-dominance is lost. Therefore, Kc is often estimated from Jc in order to
account for the plasticity at the crack tip of ductile metals. Once J is evaluated, K can easily
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be determined from its elastic component and is then usually quoted as Kjc. Under pure
mode I loading:
KJC = JE' (3.5-11)
For ship steels, fracture toughness is controlled using "Charpy" impact tests and its
value varies significantly between steels from grade A to E used in ship construction.
Factors affecting brittle fracture include the toughness of the material, the applied
elastic stress intensity K loading rates, weld metal and quality, welding sequence and
technique, plate thickness and microstructure etc. The toughness of the material can in turn
be affected by environmental factors including temperature and the presence of hydrogen.
The elastic stress intensity applied depends on the defects present, the applied stress
levels, residual stresses and stress concentrations. Residual tensile stresses in welds can be of
yield stress magnitude. These are superimposed with global stresses and increase the chances
of fracture in weld defects. Stress relief of welds occurs due to "shake out" during operation.
It can also be applied thermally or mechanically during repairs. Heating blankets may be
used for thermal stress relief. However, hammer peening (mechanical stress relief) is not so
common these days. Experimental data [Torii et al 1989, Galambos 1988, Bjorhovde 1972,
Tall et al 1969] suggests that the initial residual stresses in welds and rolled sections, are
highly dependent on the fabrication process and can vary significantly.
Mild steel is very sensitive to strain rate. During normal operation, significant strain
rates can be generated by slam impact or wave loads. The freezing point of sea water is -
2degC, while the air temperature above sea level can be as low as -15degC without the sea
freezing. However, operating temperatures will always be higher due to insulation from the
sea on the submerged hull, and icing on the exposed hull.
The use of thicker plates in repairs to reduce stress levels may introduce less uniform
properties and larger grains which promote brittle fracture. Furthermore, brittle fracture is
favored by plain strain conditions (thick components). It is less likely in thinner plates for a
given microstructure. Therefore, increasing thickness is not always a good practice.
Bearing these factors in mind and considering the typical conditions during normal
ship operation, brittle fracture is generally not a favorable mode of failure. A storm, however,
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may occasionally be encountered in which wave slamming, typically at low temperatures,
results in significantly high loading rates of the hull. If in such a case large defects are
present, and if the steel is of poor quality, brittle fracture may be around the corner.
Brittle fracture can either be post-yield, or true (classical). Post-yield brittle fracture is
more common and results from local overloading. True brittle fracture develops from
existing defects at relatively low stresses and low temperatures. In today's ships, crack arrest
is probable, as a crack enters an area of low stress or residual compression, particularly
during post-yield brittle fracture [Faulkner 1999].
Crack arrest occurs when the crack arrest toughness of the material Kea exceeds the
stress intensity generated at the tip of the propagating crack. Fig. 3.5-6 shows the static and
dynamic stress intensity analysis for the Robertson test at an applied stress of 200MPa for
various crack velocities as obtained by Curr and Turner.
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Fig. 3.5-6: Static and dynamic Stress intensity solutions for the Robertson Crack Arrest Specimen at an
applied stress of 200MPa [ Curr et al 19871
Fatigue cracking is more common in ships but it is also far less dangerous than brittle
fracture,) which has been the cause of some of the most disastrous accidents in the history of
shipping. Brittle fracture can result in propagation rates so high that a crack may propagate
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across the ship beam in less than a tenth of a second [Faulkner 1999]. This has resulted in a
number of ships splitting in two, including several Liberty and T2 ships around WW2,
another 4 ships between 1945 and 1956 [Hodgson et al 1958] including the tanker World
Concord in 1954, the six year old tanker Kurdistan in 1979 full details of which are
contained in [HMSO 1982, Corlett et al 1987], the cement loaded bulker Corazon in 1990
[NK 1992, 2], the capes Mineral Diamond in 1991 and Karadeniz S in 1992 [2], the bulker
Flare in 1998 or the panamax Selendang Ayu on December 2004.
Fatigue cracks occasionally also have the potential of ultimately leading to serious
damage. An example is when a crack propagates from a frame to the outer shell and affects
the watertight integrity of the hull, which can then lead to flooding and ultimately sinking, in
extreme weather conditions. This, however, is rare and fatigue cracking is generally viewed
as being much safer than brittle fracture. According to [Dexter et al 2000}, fatigue cracks
may propagate to lengths as great as 8m before the ship's structural integrity is compromised.
An example where this has been demonstrated was the 15m crack which propagated across
the deck of the Ro-Ro Great Land during a storm without brittle fracture of the section
[MDTN 1998]. Fatigue cracks in some cases can even prove to be beneficial as they may
serve to transfer the crack tip away from a dangerous area such as the heat affected zone, to
an area less prone to brittle fracture [Nibbering et al 1970].
There are significant differences in the factors influencing the two mechanisms.
Fatigue cracks, for example, usually initiate at the surface while brittle fracture can often
initiate at a subsurface defect. Time is an important factor in fatigue cracks since a large
number of stress cycles are required before a fatigue crack initiates, while temperature is
more important in brittle fracture as it affects the ductility of the steel. The quality of steel on
the other hand plays a minor role in fatigue cracking but is critical in brittle fractures
[Antoniou 1977, Hollister et al 1948].
A lot of work has been carried out to investigate the effect of residual stresses, which
can be of critical importance in brittle fracture, on ductile fracture and fatigue crack growth
rates [Almer et al 1997, Torii et al 1989, Torii et al 1988, Bucci 1981, Formby et al 1977].
The effect of residual stresses on ship hulls has been investigated by [Osgood 1954]. The
effective stress range and hence AK (the range of applied stress intensity factor), which
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controls the crack propagation rate may be affected by residual stresses but the influence is
minor compared to that over brittle fracture.
The effect of salt water on crack growth rates has also been examined [Dexter et al
1990]. It has been concluded that saltwater increases growth rate at high AK ranges and
reduces it at low AK. An explanation for this could be that corrosion, which accumulates at
the crack tip at low AK, retards crack growth. Corrosion at high AK weakens the structure
without being able to accumulate corrosion because of the high flexing. Such environmental
effects can be incorporated into the Paris-Erdogan law by adjusting the material coefficients
"A" and n
Significant improvements in fracture resistant steels were made following the losses
of the Liberty ships during and after WW2 [Barltrop et al 1992]. A lot of experience was
gained from research in warship steels. The British Admiralty, whose work continued into
the 1960s, played a leading role in the investigations of brittle fracture [Sumpeter et al 1988].
There has also been an increased use of crack arrest plates made from tougher steels in ship
structures. Catastrophic brittle failures have become extremely rare. Therefore, we are
primarily concerned with fatigue cracks.
3.5.4 Stress Corrosion Cracking
3.5.4.1 Outline of Mechanism
Stress corrosion cracking is a very common phenomenon in ships. Corrosion results
in degradation and loss of structural strength locally and globally. This leads to fatigue and
the development of cracks throughout the hull. Corrosion is known to bring down the fatigue
threshold stress intensity Kth, bellow which, there is no crack growth. This means that fatigue
occurs under lower stresses than those required in the absence of corrosion. The mechanism
is known as corrosion fatigue. Corrosion can also affect material properties such as fracture
toughness, making the material more susceptible to fast fracture after a crack reaches a
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certain length. An example of this is through hydrogen embrittlement, a form of corrosion
that leads to hydrogen cracking.
Corrosion can progress by several millimeters per year. Fig. 3.5-7 shows typical
stress corrosion cracks at the repair of a capesize bulk carrier, while Fig. 3.5-8 presents a
schematic diagram of the crack growth rate with respect to crack length.
Fin. 3.5-7: Stress Corrosion Cracks at Web Frame in Top Side Tank of Cave Cosmos - 2006
Fig. 3.5-8: Crack Growth Rate of a Stress Corrosion Crack [Fontana 19861
While loss of material and large diameter holes are common, corrosion in the past has
also resulted in deck cracks across almost the entire ship width [ABS 2001]. This has been a
major contributing factor to the loss of structural integrity of bulk carriers [Tong, 1995, IACS
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1984]. Statistics have shown that it is the leading cause for casualties in older ships [Harada
et al 2001].
In his famous book on Corrosion Engineering in 1967, Mars G. Fontana talks about
eight types of corrosion. These are "uniform attack", "crevice corrosion", "pitting",
"intergranular corrosion", "selective leaching", "erosion corrosion", "stress corrosion",
"hydrogen damage" [Fontana 1986]. There is significant overlap between those and they
have been described under different names by various authors ever since. However, it has
become a convention to describe corrosion under eight types.
Pitting corrosion, which can progress by up to 3 or 4 millimeters per year, can be
resisted by high-grade alloy steels, but their use is economically unfeasible [Burton, 2004].
Careful coating, used in combination with strategically placed sacrificial anodes, is the best
alternative which is generally adopted.
The process begins from coating breakdown. Corrosion starts as the metal is exposed
to the atmosphere, leading to material wear and a reduction in cross section. Holes in the
material may result and the structural component becomes more prone to fractures. Cracks
begin to form due to the stresses acting on the corroded component.
Both corrosion and the mechanisms of coating breakdown are electrochemical in
nature. Large flat sites are usually the cathodes that drive the anodic sites including welds,
edges and/or sacrificial anodes. Corrosion current is focused on weak areas of non-
uniformity. These areas are therefore more prone to stress-corrosion cracks.
Ballast tanks are the most vulnerable area regarding stress corrosion cracking and
they are generally protected by anodes. They are vulnerable because of the harsh conditions
resulting from the frequent sea water ballasting operations and because of the difficulty
associated with inspection in that area.
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3.5.4.2 Coating Lifetime
Unlike corrosion, there is only limited research, available in the open literature, on the
modeling of coating deterioration [Murakami et al 2007]. Coating life follows a normal
distribution and usually has a mean value of 5 to 10 years, with a Coefficient of Variation
(CoV) of about 0.4 [Paik et al 1998c]. Fig. 3.5-9 provides an outline of the various phases
during the coating lifetime in ballast tanks.
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Figz. 3.5-9: Ballast Tank Coatingz Breakdown vs. Service Life [Callow 2004}
The coating barrier properties increase during the initiation stage which lasts between
half to two and a half years. Then, they slowly decline over a number of years, during the
stabilization stage, until failure. A great increase in the electrochemical loading of the ballast
tank then follows and corrosion sets in.
Coating lifetime depends on several factors, including the type of coating system, the
environment, damage during operation, but also very importantly, the details of its
application. Humidity and salinity control during painting, the number of stripes, the film
thickness and pre-surface preparation can have a significant effect. Taking an extreme case,
coating over a corroded surface is no use at all, as there is nothing to stop corrosion from
continuing beneath the new layer. Improper removal of the previous layer before painting is
also ineffective as it leads to an abrupt surface, which is very prone to coating breakdown.
Entrapment of air in the coating layer also must be prevented as much as possible. Another
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determining factor in the coating lifetime is the film thickness. A film too thin may give
insufficient protection but excessive thickness can also result in sagging and cracking of the
coating.
Inventories made by the TNO Institute of Industrial Technology (the Netherlands),
have shown that the majority of coating breakdown is caused by human error. Both repair
and maintenance costs can be saved if more attention is paid during the design of painting
specifications and by more rigorous inspection during coating application [Shipping World &
Shipbuilder 1997c].
Fig. 3.5-10 shows the connection of a the sloping plate with the bulk head in a
capesize bulk carrier. This is near the top of the cargo hold, where flexing is more
pronounced, and doesn't allow a film of corrosion to accumulate and protect the base metal.
Fig. 3.5-10: Connection of Top Side Tank Sloping Plate with Bulkhead in Cape Cosmos - 2006
Coating breakdown is evident, along with pitting corrosion, and leaks of ballast water
into the cargo hold. The main cause was improper coating application in the previous repair.
After sand blasting, the weld seams should be stripe coated before spray painting the cargo
hold. This ensures that no parts of the weld seams are left unprotected.
A new green and efficient coating removal method has been developed by ice
blasting. Small dry ice pellets are blasted with air at a speed of 300m/s onto the hull, and then
sublimate upon impact. This provides good surface preparation and cleaning of both the
surface and the surroundings. Dust accumulation can be reduced by as much as 70% [Reuss
2001].
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The color of the coating plays a role in the operating temperatures of the structure.
This affects both the rate of corrosion and also thermal fatigue. An all-white color scheme
above the water line, as chosen by Hellespont in their Korean built 2001-2 series of VLCCs
and ULCCs, may reduce peak deck temperatures by 20-25"C in warm countries [Van Dyck
2002b, Ryle 2000]. A pale color may also ease the work of painters and inspectors in dark,
restricted spaces such as the ballast tanks [The Motor Ship 1993]. Another reason why
Hellespont chose a white color is for marketing purposes, since it takes a lot of confidence in
one's ability to maintain it clean of corrosion and dirt.
3.5.4.3 Basics of Ship Corrosion
Various types of corrosion are identified in ships, namely general corrosion, pitting,
grooving, weld metal and microbial corrosion. Other mechanisms include galvanic corrosion
and erosion corrosion, while cracks arise from stress corrosion cracking and corrosion fatigue
etc. (Boon et al 1997)
Metals are thermodynamically unstable and have a tendency to revert to their natural
ore. This is the driving force of corrosion which consists of an anodic and a cathodic
reaction. The electrolyte provides the medium for these electrochemical reactions. Three
important factors are the temperature, oxygen supply and humidity. These vary significantly
in bulkers depending on a number of factors. Corrosion protection is mainly through coating
and sacrificial anodes in the ballast tanks and the outer immersed hull. However, sacrificial
anodes in ballast tanks are only effective when the ship is ballasted so they only provide
protection for about half of the time.
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3.5.4.4 Factors Affecting Corrosion
The rate of corrosion varies with time [Melchers 1995] and one important cause of
this is the variation of surface exposure with time. Several factors have been found to
influence the rate of corrosion and these can be summarized under a few categories. They
include the type of corrosion; the quality and damage of the protection such as the coating
and anodes; the age and type of ship as well as the quality of steel used in its construction;
the ship operation including handling procedures and the amount and frequency of repair; the
ship location being considered and whether it is immersed in sea water; trading factors
including the type of cargo, the loading and ballasting condition and the trading route
followed; environmental conditions such as humidity or temperature and salinity of the water
and atmosphere. Moisture is the primary factor affecting corrosion rates of steel covered by
coal and iron ore, with the critical moisture level being between 60 and 80% of the
theoretical Maximum Water Holding Capacity (MWHC) [Gardiner and Melchers 2001].
Corrosion is often not uniform throughout the ship because it is affected by different
factors in different parts of the hull. Corrosion of areas immersed in sea water, for example,
depends mostly on sea water salinity, temperature, oxygen content and the velocity of the
ship (for the outer hull) [Melchers 1997c]. The corrosion rate is governed by accessibility of
oxygen to the surface. Corrosion rates of areas exposed to the atmosphere depend on the
relative humidity, air temperature, time of wetness, chloride deposition and sulphur dioxide
pollution [Evans et al 1972]. In the cargo holds and deck, mechanical damage and wear
increase the likelihood of corrosion. In ballast tanks, the time and duration of ballasting
dictates when (and for how long) the anodes are effective. It thereby affects the time over
which corrosion take place. Furthermore, different temperatures are attained at the various
sections of the hull during operation. As a rule of thumb, corrosion rate doubles for every
10"C increase in temperature [DNV 2002]
The trading pattern is one of the most important parameters because it controls a
variety of factors which affect corrosion. Environmental factors, including atmospheric and
sea water conditions, depend on the trade route. The weather encountered is also determined
by the trading route. It affects temperature and atmospheric composition as well as water and
humidity exposure of the hull. It also dictates whether the ship will be sailing on light or
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heavy ballast (with an additional hold ballasted) and the number of storms, large waves and
rains that are encountered.
The trading pattern also determines the frequency of loading and ballasting. The
frequency of loading has a major effect on coating breakdown, and also dictates the
frequency of washing. The frequency of ballasting operations determines the supply of new
oxygenated water to the tank surfaces. Exposure to moisture is also affected by the loading
condition, since this determines the number of holds that require washing after discharge.
The cargo is also a determining factor, particularly in capes, which mainly carry coal
and iron ore. The type and origin of coal is important because some coals are more corrosive
than others and because it affects the amount of moisture in the cargo holds. Sulphate
concentrations can vary vastly between the coals while corrosion has been shown to be a
linear function of sulphate concentration [Johansson et al 1995]. This is one of the reasons
why corrosion rates vary significantly between bulk carriers. Iron ore is not corrosive but it is
very abrasive so it accelerates coating breakdown. The usual practice of carrying coal and
iron ore alternatively in capes, therefore, is one of the worst trading patterns in terms of
corrosion.
3.5.4.5 Critical Areas for Corrosion
The ballast tanks are the most vulnerable area and the most difficult to inspect. When
ballast tanks are empty, anodes are not effective, so protection is provided by the coating
alone. Therefore, extra care is given to the type and application of ballast tank coatings, both
in ship building and during repairs. Coating usually breaks down at the edges and around
corners but also randomly due to the impacts from grabs in the holds during discharge.
Therefore, coating flexibility is critical. The rate of corrosion when the ballast tanks are
empty depends on the previous ballasting water temperature [Melchers 1997d] and salinity.
Fig. 3.5-11 shows corroded longitudinals under the tank top in the double bottom of a
25 year old cape (a ballast area).
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Fig. 3.5-11: Tank Top Longitudinals in Double Bottom of Cape Cosmos - 2006
These are flat bars by design, which weigh approximately 100kg/m. The double
bottom is a very inaccessible area in which repairs are difficult. In old ships, therefore, it is
common to convert them into an unequal angle-bar by adding a flange. This gives it a shape
with a higher modulus to weight ratio, thereby maintaining the section modulus while
compensating for the wear due to corrosion. A lot of time and money is thereby saved during
repairs since the heavy corroded flat bars do not have to be replaced. The exact same
situation applies in longitudinals in other ballast areas. Fig. 3.5-12 shows the modified under-
deck-longitudinals of the same ship in the top side tank, just before welding, and after the
first coating.
Fig. 3.5-12: Under-Deck Longitudinals in Top Side Tank of Cape Cosmos - 2006
Since sand blasting is also difficult and expensive in ballast tanks, it is more practical
to burn the surface with an oxygen flame in order to prepare the surface for the two filet
welds (one on each side of the flange connection). The prepared surface is shown on the left
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picture of Fig. 3.5-12. The right picture shows the area after the repair with the first layer of
coating, which is grey in order to distinguish it from the final, red coating that will be applied
on top.
Corrosion is also very common in cargo hold bulk heads, which until a few years ago,
were usually left uncoated. [Yamamoto et al 1996] developed a probabilistic model for the
corrosion of transverse bulkheads in bulk carriers.
Corrosion rates in cargo hold tend to increase with depth, partly because protection
also decreases the lower you go. There is full coating on the upper stools and frames, just a
corrosion product layer on the hoppers, and no protection at all on the tank top. Another
reason is that the likeliness of damage or coating breakdown also increases with depth. This
is due to the impact of iron ore on the hoppers and particularly the tank top during loading,
the likelihood of mechanical damage in the lower regions during discharge, and the increased
exposure to cargo when holds are partly loaded. Finally, moisture levels also increase with
depth within the cargo holds. This is due to the temperature difference across the sea
immersed hull being greater and also because moisture accumulates in the lower regions due
to gravity.
3.5.4.6 Corrosion Models
Having realized the consequences of corrosion, it is very important to understand its
mechanisms and most importantly to accurately predict it. This is critical during initial
design, during maintenance and also when planning for inspections and setting the corrosion
allowances. Though our understanding of corrosion mechanisms is generally improving,
prediction is a very difficult task due to all the determining factors which vary dramatically
between different ships.
Therefore, there has been an effort to develop probabilistic models to describe
corrosion and predict corrosion rates [Guo et al 2008, Garbatov and Soares 2007, Wang et al
2007, Moatsos et al 2005, Gao et al 2005, Melchers 1997a, Melchers 1995, White et al
1991], and some are focused specifically on bulk carriers [Paik et al 1998a, Yamamoto et al
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1996]. Statistical means have also been used to estimate the rates of corrosion on ship
structural members from observational data [Loseth et al 1994, Yamamoto et al 1994,
Okamoto et al 1993].
As our understanding of corrosion mechanisms improves, there are incentives to
move from a statistical approach to a physically based probabilistic model, in which all the
contributing factors can be incorporated. Physical models have been developed in the past for
predicting corrosion [Gardiner et al 2001, Melchers 2001]. The problem, however, is that
they are often limited to defined conditions and thereby render themselves inappropriate for
application is ships which are exposed to great variety of conditions.
Several studies on corrosion wastage have been carried out over the past few years
based on thickness measurements. Such studies are difficult to perform as there is only
limited corrosion wastage measurement data reported to the public. Furthermore, the size of
the database is important to ensure an accurate representation of the ships in service. Some of
the available literature conducted so far and the databases used are summarized in Table 3.5-
1.
DIRECT MEASUREMENT BASED CORROSION LITERATURE
Author Ships/Type Measurements
Wang et al 2003b,a 140 Tankers 110,082
Paik et al 2003b,a >100 Tankers 33,820
Harada et al 2001 197 Tankers + 98 Bulk Carriers >250,000
Yamamoto et al 1998 50 Bulk Carriers ?
Paik et al 1998a 44 Bulk Carriers ?
Paik et al 1997a 40 Tankers ?
TSFC 1992 52 Tankers ?
Table 3.5-1: Corrosion Wastage Surveys
Probabilistic representations, corrosion models and measurement databases are often
combined to evaluate corrosion.
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The most frequently used distributions for corrosion wastage i.e. to calculate the
probability that a plate thickness will meet the requirements at a given ship's age, are the
Weibull, Normal, truncated normal and log-normal distributions. According to [Ivanov et al
2004b], the Normal and truncated normal distributions produce slightly more optimistic
results than the Weibull distribution by about 2-3%.
In addition to wastage, other types of corrosion exist such as pitting,
grooving/necking etc. but unfortunately no such data is being collected, so no quantitative
analysis can be performed. Three general models for corrosion progress are published so far
as shown in Fig. 3.5-13.
All assume that there is no corrosion during the first stage, during which the coating
is still intact. Corrosion initiates at some point as a result of coating breakdown. As shown in
Fig. 3.5-8, the corrosion rate may (a) remain constant, (c) gradually decrease until corrosion
stabilizes due to corroded material which accumulates over the plate providing a protective
layer, or (b) increase if this film is removed due to impacts or as the structure flexes due to
waves [Saidarasamoot et al 2003, TSFC 1992].
b
x o0
age
Fig. 3.5-13: Corrosion models [Wang et al 2003al
[Wang et al 2003a] and [Vassalos et al 2004] assume 5 years for the first stage and
they conclude that corrosion rates can be described by a Weibull distribution function. [Paik
et al 2003b] adopt a model of type (a) which appears to be the most common. They suggest
374
the inclusion of a transition period after coating breakdown and before corrosion initiates
over a large enough area to be measurable. Their findings suggest that the relative frequency
of corrosion depth tends to follow a Gaussian distribution for younger ships and a log-normal
or Weibull distribution for older ships. They also assume that the coating life of a cape lasts
7.5 years except for the tank-top and the hopper plates where 5 years are assumed instead. As
they suggest, however, a more realistic structural assessment should account for both general
and pitting (localized) corrosion, which is more likely to occur in bottom plates.
A three stage model, which seems to be more accurate and flexible has also often
been adopted as shown in Fig. 3.5-14. Coating breakdown initiates at the end of the first
phase. The corrosion rate is assumed to increase linearly during the second phase as the
coating gradually breaks down exposing new material. This continues until a maximum rate
is reached when the coating is completely broken down at the end of the second phase. The
corrosion rate may then stabilize at this value as assumed by [Ivanov et al 2004a, Ivanov et al
2003], or it may decrease to zero again as a result of the accumulated protective corrosion
layer [Soares et al 1999].
Assumed phases of corrosion wear
r Phase IIIPhase I I I
0 T1 T2  Ship's age
Fig. 3.5-14: The Three Assumed Phases of Corrosion [Ivanov et al 2003, pp. 3321
Whichever assumption is made, the total corrosion wastage accumulated over time
can be obtained from
W = r(t)dt (3.5-12)
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Where: W = Corrosion wastage in millimeters at time T
r(t) = Corrosion rate in millimeters per year
T = Time in years
[Ivanov et al 2003] assume three years for the coating lifetime (first phase) and three
years for the second phase. Their findings suggest that the effect of the 2 "d phase is slightly
greater than that of the 1 t phase in the probability of meeting renewal criteria at a given time.
[Vassalos et al 2004] adopt a model of the form:
tr = CTc2 (3.5-13)
Where tr = corrosion wastage (mm)
Te= time in years (after corrosion starts)
C 1 = coefficient defining the corrosion rate
C 2= coefficient determining the corrosion progress
The use of thickness measurements by [Paik et al 2003a] to estimate C1 and C2
revealed that C1 is a random Weibull distributed variable while C 2 is equal to unity [Vassalos
et al 2004]. [Paik et al 2006] and [Paik and Thayamballi 2002] use the same approach but
break down the time in various components, as shown in Fig. 3.5-15.
Transition
of Progress of corrosion
Type A (Convex)
Tyrpe B (Concave)
Type C (Lmear)
Tc TC+T,
Exposure tnn
Fig. 3.5-15: Corrosion Depth with Respect to Time [Paik et al 20061
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The equation is t, = C, (T - T - T)c2 (3.5-14)
Where Tc = Life of coating in years
T= Transition time
Many methods of estimating corrosion have been proposed but the most important
aspect to be analyzed is the effect on ship. [Andreassen et al 1998] present a probabilistic
analysis method to assess the strength of the hull girder as corrosion progresses. The
influence of adopting the various corrosion models on the predicted reliability of ship
structures has also been investigated [Ivanov et al 2003].
3.5.5 Fatigue Life Estimation
Fatigue life is defined as the time required in service for a structure to experience
enough stress cycles for a fatigue crack to initiate. Ship hulls were known to be subject to
localized fatigue since the 19 th century [Bishop et al 1985]. Fatigue assessment as part of a
ship's design, however, was not required until about 10 years ago [Wang et al 2004]. As it
has become of increasing importance, several methods have been developed and documented
in the literature [Bea et al 1995, DNV 1995, ABS 1992, Wirsching et al 1987, Munse et al
1983, Thayamballi 1983, Wirsching 1983]. Examples include the "Simplified" method which
is most common, or the "Spectral" and "Deterministic" methods [ABS 2003].
Depending on which stress is used in the calculations, the analysis can be categorized
as a "nominal", "hot spot" or "notch" stress approach. The hot spot stress approach is the
most commonly used in complicated ship details where a hot spot stress is defined as a local
stress at a hot spot such as the toe of a weld which is prone to crack initiation [Wang et al
2004]. The hot spot stress concentration factor is defined as the ratio of the hot spot stress to
the nominal stress applied. This can be established by several methods but FEA is most
commonly used [ABS 2004, ABS 2003]. Linear elastic quadrilateral plate or shell elements
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are typically used while triangular elements are avoided, particularly in the hot sipot region
[Wang et al 20041. A "structural stress method" which uses an "equivalent structural stress"
has also been introduced by Dong and is said to be mesh size and type insensitive [Dong
2003]. Case studies by [Wang et al 2004], however, have established that this is not always
the case and that both the hot spot and the structural stress methods are mesh sensitive and
they both tend to under-predict fatigue life compared to experimental test results.
The "Simplified" method of estimating ship fatigue life involves the combination of
Palmgren-Miners's rule of cumulative damage with S-N curves where a Weibull probability
distribution parameter is used to characterize the long-term stress ranges on a detail [Wang et
al 2003c]. Miner's law of Cumulative Damage [Miner 1945} predicts failure when the
damage ratio "D" reaches 1. The damage ratio is given by D = , where ni are the
N,
number of stress cycles of stress amplitude si, and Ni are the number of cycles to failure at
stress amplitude si.
The use of S-N curves and the cumulative damage approach is far more common in
assessing ship fatigue life as opposed to the application of fracture mechanics. Different S-N
curves are proposed by various sources because there are numerous ways which can be used
to incorporate the effects of corrosion, plate thickness, welding procedures and other relevant
factors. Differences in results when using the various S-N curves are illustrated by [Wang et
al 2003c]. [Wang et al 2006] also use Miner's rule and derive an S-N curve for predicting
cyclic plasticity (low cycle fatigue) of welded joints.
The procedure of using S-N curves with Palmgren-Miner's rule to predict cracking is
relatively simple. The rule is as follows [Mansour and Liu 2008]:
log(N) = log(K) - m log(S)
or (3.5-15)
N = K(S~')
Where: log(K) = log(K1) - 20
S = Stress range
N = Number of cycles to failure under stress range S
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K1 = Constant relating to the mean S-N curve
a= standard deviation of log(N)
m = inverse slope of S-N curve
The histogram of cyclic stresses is first defined, and then the cumulative damage is
calculated from the chosen S-N curves to predict crack initiation. This can be applied to all
structural members of a ship for which the loads have been pre-estimated. Ship fatigue life
estimations can thus be obtained.
However, estimation of the loads to which a ship will be subjected throughout its
service life is not a simple task. These include wave induced dynamic, vertical, and
horizontal bending moments; hydrostatic loads and still water bending moments; external
wave pressure and internal tank pressure etc.
Therefore, a probabilistic approach has often been adopted to carry out fatigue life
assessments for various types of applications including ships [Lambrigger 1997, Soares et al
1996b, Columbi et al 1995,]. The wave-induced loads throughout a ship's service life and the
ocean surface are often modeled using Gaussian random variables. However, waves of
extreme height have been witnessed, on a number of occasions, which could not occur if the
wave statistics followed Gaussian assumptions [Doneal 1991, Bascom 1980]. Such waves
have been the cause of many ship losses in the past [Faulkner 2001, Corlett et al 1992] and
there have been many studies to explain the phenomenon [Smith et al 2002, Kim et al 2001,
Clauss 1999, Chaplin 1996, Zou et al 1995]. It is important to consider these extreme waves
in the design and fatigue analysis of ships.
The proper combination of the various stress components is critical in order to derive
the total stress values to be used in the calculations. Various methods have been developed
for this [Shin et al 2004, Baarholm et al 2002, Chen et al 1997, Mansour 1995].
[Shin et al 2004] propose a method where the total stress or at a structural location is
expressed as a linear summation of the component stresses ci multiplied with the
corresponding stress combination factors Ci as follows:
aT = J C, x o- (3.5-16)
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The combination factors strongly depend on structural location, cargo loading
condition, wave heading angle and the period under each sea state. A load transfer function is
obtained from the ship motion prediction program. This is a function of the wave heading
angle and frequency. By multiplying this with the stress combination factors Ci, the
corresponding component stress (ai) distribution factors are obtained. These can then be
summed to give the total stress transfer function. The total stress (aT) can thereby be
translated to any location in the hull.
Since the long term environment is characterized by a wave scatter diagram, which
gives the different sea states that might be experienced over a ship's service life, this analysis
has to be carried out for all the sea states. The long term distribution of dynamic stresses is
then obtained by summing the distributions for the various sea states. [Shin et al 2004]
The influence function method also shows a promise in predicting fatigue life and
may solve many problems if it proves to be reliable. The basic theory is summarized as
follows:
UL =AA +B-B (3.5-17)
Where: UL = a local stress in a critical area which is to be determined
CYA, aB = stresses or other measurements at two convenient locations
A, B = Influence Functions
Similarly to stress concentration factors, Influence Functions can be used to obtain
the effect of Global actions such as longitudinal stresses on the deck or at a critical area
which may not be accessible for measurements. As such they can be combined with the stress
history of the convenient locations using FEA, to predict fatigue life at critical inaccessible
areas. Influence Functions combined with FEA, stress predictions (anticipated voyages), and
fatigue analysis (Palmgren-Miner's rule), at the design stage can be used to estimate fatigue
life at those critical locations.
[Braidwood et al 1998, Braidwood et al 1997] have carried out research in showing
how well influence functions can predict fatigue life of typical components using response
amplitude operators from finite element modeling along with fatigue analysis programs.
They evaluate their results by taking full scale measurements with strain gauges and
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accelerometers on a cape on homogeneous loading and heavy ballasting conditions. Some of
their experiments were successful, showing accurate results on a long term basis.
As with corrosion predictions, due to the difficulty associated with predicting
stresses, there is a trend in moving towards probabilistic methods in performing strength
analysis in ships. Our understanding of structural failure modes has improved over the past
few years and probabilistic presentations of loads and stresses have been developed. This has
led to improvement of the reliability approach and its application in the shipping industry
[Melchers 1997b, Mansour 1997, Wang et al 1996, Soares et al 1989]. Further progress has
led to the development and use of the Time Variant Reliability (TVR) approach which
incorporates structural deterioration with age and is much more accurate with reference to
ships [Ivanov et al 2003, Paik et al 2003b, Qin et al 2002, Sun et al 2001, Wirsching et al
1997, Soares et al 1996a].
A statistical approach is common in evaluating the uncertainty of a ship's strength
over time, based on the probability of experiencing excessive bending moments. [Ivanov et al
2004] have extended this by incorporating the corrosion wastage over time and the
consequent change in section modulus. Hence, by using the still water and wave induced
bending loads and geometric properties, the bending stress is expressed in the form of time
dependent distribution laws. The probability of exceeding the classification society's
permissible value at different ship ages can thus be calculated. Their analysis shows that
there is no change in the permissible bending stresses as a ship ages, provided that all
parameters determining the ship's strength are calculated in probabilistic terms as for a new
design.
It is common practice in the shipping industry to perform fatigue life calculations
using S-N curves and Palmgren-Miner's rule of cumulative damage without the application
of fracture mechanics. According to [Nibbering et al 1973], one of the reasons for this is that
the influence of crack length on fracture strength is less important than temperature and
speed of loading.
According to [Rizzo 2007], a fracture mechanics approach is required for the proper
assessment of the remaining life of a cracked member. Recent developments have been
made, enabling the rapid calculation of stress intensity factors for complex structural details,
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thereby, making LEFM more applicable [Chahardehi and Brennan 2008, Brennan and Love
2006, Brennan and Teh 2004].
[Kinoshita et al 1973] demonstrated the applicability of Paris's Law in ship structural
plates. One of the few examples where fracture mechanics is currently used in shipping is in
the analysis of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers membrane tanks where the concept of
"leak before break" is applied. This refers to the thickness of the membrane being smaller
than the critical crack size for fast fracture so that in the event of a crack, the tank leaks
instead of suddenly breaking. The reason for this is that the membrane tanks carry liquefied
gas at high pressures and at temperatures around 160degC. An explosion of a membrane tank
would thus have very serious consequences extending far beyond the ship structure if it is
near a port at the time.
Research based on fracture mechanics in ships has been carried out extensively since
WWII. Using the fracture toughness of the given steel, and by estimating the loads applied
throughout the hull, the critical crack lengths for brittle fracture in each location can be
determined. This provides very useful information regarding the danger of particular cracks.
Furthermore, fracture mechanics can be used to calculate the remaining time until a particular
crack grows to critical length. The time when a crack needs to be repaired can then be
determined. However, classification societies are currently too conservative to allow the
existence of any cracks at any location in the hull.
The Paris-Erdogan Law is integrated over a period of time to give the final crack
length after a number of stress cycles. It is roughly considered that the period of wave load
cycles in ships is about 6-10s [Paik et al 2003b]. Consequently, the number of cycles can by
estimated over a period of time giving the crack length. This method, however, is based on
the assumption that the local stress levels don't change as the crack propagates. It therefore
underestimates fatigue life. Stress concentration factors for typical joints in ships can be
found at [ABS 2002a}. Fig. 3.5-16 shows the predicted values of stress ranges at some
critical points in a cape, and the associated crack growth rates after initiation at the age of 5
years.
382
[:n g s a the cier
AswinFig. 3.5-17, [Bed~ndn ul idrsren a eciia onsi an Deeu 2008]) densrated owc inspetio
results can be used to infer remaining crack sizes, and thereby refine fatigue life predictions.
The ship's life prediction depends on the size of the largest defect which is unknown. The
probability distribution of this value defines the range of possible values for the life
prediction. By considering the detected cracks of a repair and assuming a typical POS
90/95% inspection, one can narrow down the range of possible values for the size of the
largest remaining crack. This yields a more precise prediction of the fatigue life. The
maximum size crack that can escape a POS 90/95% inspection, ag9o/95 has a 90% probability
of detection at a 95% confidence level.
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Fig. 3.5-17: Reduction in Life Prediction Scatter Using Latest Inspection Results
[Brennan and DeLeeuw 2008. Wand et al 20091
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The conventionally used Miner's cumulative damage rule has several disadvantages
to fracture mechanics approaches. The first is related to the effect of local yielding, which
makes the loading sequence important. The loading sequence is not accounted for in Miner's
rule. If a cracked component is subjected to a relatively large load, "crack blunting" often
results, whereby a plastic region with compressive residual stresses is generated at the crack
tip, making it less sharp. This diminishes the effect of subsequent loads. Therefore, small
loads followed by a large load may be far more damaging than vice versa.
Another disadvantage of the cumulative damage approach is that it does not account
for the mean stress, which may be significant depending on the level of residual stresses.
Alternatively, therefore, the cyclic strain approach has been proposed for some regions such
as web intersections [Fricke et al 1987]. A comparative study between the S-N and the cyclic
strain approach has been carried out using data of cracks from a bulk carrier [Pedersen 1996].
Results showed that the S-N approach is more conservative while the cyclic strain approach
is more sensitive to the applied loading.
The cumulative damage approach is also very sensitive to input parameters that are
inaccurate to start with. The damage ratio is proportional to the applied stress raised to the
power of the gradient of the S-N curve of a structure. This is generally equal to around 3.
That means that the cumulative damage calculated by Miner's rule is approximately
proportional to the applied stress raised to the cube. Consequently, any inaccuracy in
predicting applied stresses is amplified in the calculation of fatigue life. Damage is caused by
the stress fluctuations so the percentage error in the calculated damage is approximately three
times the percentage error of the wave/weather induced stresses. Predicting wave induced
stresses over a 30 year lifespan is very difficult because of significant effects such as global
warming and climate changes that designers often neglect. Therefore, errors resulting from
the conventional approach can be dramatic. Namely, if we take the typical value of 3 for the
gradient of the S-N curve, a 20% error in the stress amplitude due to waves would result in
an error of -60% in the cumulative damage! Significant improvement is therefore needed in
estimating fatigue life of ships.
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3.6 Crack Monitoring
3.6.1 Inspection Planning
Inspections are carried out throughout the service life of ships by various maritime
organizations including classification societies, the flag authority and the port state control
when ships enter or leave ports. Fig. 3.6-1 shows a summary of the type of bulk carrier
inspections.
Organization Regulation, rule, Survey Inspection area & item
guidance
International Safety, pollution and load line
IMO onntnsad Initial, Annual, IMconventions and Itreieism, ISPS
Clasifiatio clss rlesIntermediate,Classification class rides Periodical/Renewal Hull and machinery
societies (mandatory)
Memorandum of On purpose
Understanding (targeting of ships) Hull and machinery
National Initial, occasional, Safety, pollution, load line
Flag s regulations periodical
Insurance
company Insurance / P&I Insurance CAS / ESP (mandatory)(including P&I requirements inspections
Clubs)
Local regulations Safety & pollution Cargo handling and equipment,
Terminal operators and procedures prevention survey procedures, loading master
Cargo owners Charterer/vetting CAP, cargo operation and
Ship owners/ Commea (oil majors, CDI, management, survey on purpose,
managers equirements OCIMF/SIRE, etc.) risk-based analyses
Fig. 3.6-1: Bulk carrier Inspections by the various Maritime Organizations [Wang et al 20091
Regular inspections are scheduled throughout the ship service life by classification
societies. Their frequency and the items which are viewed each time vary with the type of
survey and the ship's age. IACS Classification societies carry out the following hull surveys.
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Special Survey: Carried out every 5 years and every time there is a change of
classification society
Intermediate Survey: Carried out during the 2 "d or 3 rd year after each Special Survey
Annual Survey: Carried out every year and may coincide with an Intermediate or a
Special Survey
Occasional: Carried out randomly if there is a particular reason such as a damage
or a request by the port state control
The scheduling of inspections is based on the accumulated experience of maritime
organizations over time, primarily regarding the plate thickness diminution. It has been
shown in the past that the geometric properties of the hull girder and its structural
components follow a Gaussian distribution [Ivanov 2002, Ivanov 2001].
The hull girder strength is maintained through control of its section modulus for
vertical bending while the strength of structural components and plates is controlled through
plate and flange thickness. [Ivanov et al 2003] present both the hull girder's section modulus
and plate and flange thickness as probabilistic functions at any ship's age in order to assess
the probability that a ship hull will meet the renewal criteria over a given time period.
Classification societies and IMO have developed criteria for the strength of the ship
hull girder and its structural components based on data from ship's operation [ABS 2002b,
IMO 2000]. The requirement by IACS is that the longitudinal strength of a ship should
remain above 90% of when it was built. In practice, this means that the minimum permissible
section modulus of a ship in service is about 90% of that for a new construction [Caridis
2001]. Generally, plates are required to be renewed when the thickness drops by 20-30%,
depending on the location. This applies to both mild and high tensile steel plates.
According to [Paik et al 2003b], it would be better to schedule steel renewals based
on a structural strength criterion rather than on plate thickness, in order to account for the
effect of dents and cracks on strength. Consequently, if strength falls below a critical value,
such as 90% of the original strength as required by IACS, repairs can be carried out.
[Paik et al 2003b] carried out extensive theoretical, numerical and experimental
studies to investigate the effect of general corrosion, pit corrosion, fatigue cracks and local
denting damage on ultimate tensile strength of ship structures including time-dependent risk
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assessments. "Knock-down factors" (factors of reduction) of the ultimate axial and shear
strength are deduced for each parameter which can be multiplied to give a combined factor of
reduction. The current ultimate axial and shear strength of a damaged plate can then be
obtained by multiplying this factor by the original strength. The knock-down factor for the
effect of fatigue cracking damage on Plate ultimate strength is given by:
xCU AO-AC (3.6-1)
where: Rxc = Factor or reduction due to crack damage
ax, = Ultimate axial strength of cracked plating
axuo = Ultimate axial strength of un-cracked plating
A( = Cross sectional area of plating
Ac = Cross sectional area involved by cracking damage
This can be applied for both tensile, compressive and shear loading. Even though the
approach ignores crack orientation, it reasonably predicts the plate ultimate strength at a
somewhat pessimistic side. Fig. 3.6-2 shows the time dependent characteristic for the
ultimate hull girder strength of a cape with and without repairs for sagging including pitting
corrosion and a crack by [Paik et al 2003b].
387
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Ship age (years)
Fig. 3.6-2: Time-Dependent hull girder strength of a 170,000dwt bulk carrier [Paik et al 2003b]
As indicated by their analysis, repairs could be scheduled by considering a variety of
factors that affect hull strength rather than just merely corrosion wastage.
Recently, there has been an effort towards a risk-based inspection approach [Truchon
et al 2007]. This involves the identification and assessment of structural failures and their
consequences, and planning inspections based on the level of risk. The newly proposed ABS
Hull Inspection and Maintenance Program (HIMP) is a vessel-specific inspection program
that employs risk-based techniques and includes a scoring system (using simple traffic light
colors) for identified inspection criteria and a list of target inspection areas [Kalghati et al
2009].
3.6.2 During Inspections
Hull inspections are generally focused on coating breakdown; corrosion or
diminution; and damages such as buckling or cracks. The identification of all these factors is
critical as they all ultimately lead to cracking.
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Coating breakdown is particularly important in ballast tanks as it is the only means of
protection when they are empty. Classification societies record the quality of ballast tank
coatings under three categories; "Good" which refers to minor spot rusting; "fair" which
includes local breakdown at edges of stiffeners or weld connections and/or light rusting over
20%; and "poor" with coating breakdown of over 20% or hard scale of 10% of the areas
under consideration [IACS 2004].
Assessment can either be visual or instrumented. Percentage area charts are
traditionally used for comparison in order to determine the percentage area of coating
breakdown by visual inspection. Instrumented methods, however, involving the use of
electrochemical patch robes, which measure coating barrier properties, provide a more
reliable and consistent quantitative measure of the coating quality.
The most important point of the survey is to identify if the coating failure has
occurred. Coating failure first shows up in instrumented measurements, then in sacrificial
anode rates, where it shows up as pitting, and finally in visual observations of coating
breakdown at welds and edges.
Corrosion is assessed by plate thickness measurements taken by ultrasonic gauge
readings. The areas most vulnerable to corrosion are discussed under Section 3.5.4. A good
understanding of these is essential in order to inspect the critical areas in more detail and to
take measurements at the correct locations in large surfaces.
Regarding cracking, inspections should be based on experience of where cracks
occur. Some of these cracking-prone areas are discussed under Section 3.5.2. Cracks are also
likely to be found at the locations where coating breakdown or corrosion has been identified.
Often, cracks may not be evident during inspection due to dirt, poor lighting, difficulty of
access, or compression of the two surfaces. Even in close-up inspections, cracks can be
almost undetectable when they are closed by the loading condition [Holzman 1992, Ferguson
1991b]. Rust scale adhering to the surface also often presents a smooth and regular surface
making it difficult to detect any cracks. Therefore, it is important to first clean and then
carefully inspect the critical areas. In some cases, the crack origin or tip may not be visible,
so the other side of the plate has to be examined. A similar example is in the cracks of hatch
coamings which can only be seen by looking over the hatch opening if they have not yet
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propagated out to the deck. Fig. 3.6-3 shows an average estimate of the probability of
detection as a function of crack size.
Fig. 3.6-3: Probability of detection as a function of crack size [Barltrop 19921
It is consequently vital for an inspector to have a good understanding of the areas
being inspected and also of the importance of cracks depending on both size location and
origin. The chance of identifying cracks is then increased and dangerous cracks can be
distinguished from other less critical defects.
.When cracks are detected in the hull., the normal procedure is to replace the cracked
plate with a new one. If this is not possible, a hole is sometimes drilled at the crack tip, as a
temporary solution. This reduces the stress concentration and prevents further propagation.
At locations, such as cast iron engine components, where small cracks cannot be welded,
they are often tied together using the "metal lock" method. There are several methods used to
detect cracks. These include:
" Visual - Easiest and most basic /. surface cracks only
e Ultrasonic - Access to difficult regions / subsurface cracks / size and shape
eMagnetic Particle Inspection -- Very easy / surface cracks only
" Dye Penetrant - Only large surface cracks on plane surfaces
" Radiographic (X-Ray) - Subsurface cracks / only size (a shadow)
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The use of cameras to aid inspections is also very promising [Roy 2000, Armitt and
Henning 2000, De Petris and Macro 2000], as it allows for inspection from a distance
without disrupting operation and without the need for a cherry picker to gain access.
Acoustic Emission Technology (AET) for crack detection has also been known to the
marine industry for a number of years. It has been applied in many industries to detect
cracks, corrosion and leaking [Athanasios et al 2008]. Only recently, however, has it
developed to a stage where it can be used reliably to monitor propagating fatigue cracks in
ships. It was initially developed to locate earthquakes but it is currently used on large
structures and probably in ships in the near future.
A typical system, such as the BALRUE, would comprise of a 24 acoustic emission
and 212 non-acoustic channel data acquisition unit, a laptop PC and a human command
interface [MER 2002b]. An array of sensors is strategically distributed on the structure.
Filtering, grouping and location algorithms are then used to detect propagating cracks. The
diagrams in Fig. 3.6-4 show a typical acoustic map (right) used to locate propagating fatigue
cracks in steel (left).
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Fig. 3.6-4: A monograph of a crack in steel (left), and a typical acoustic emission map (right) used to locate
propagating fatigue cracks [MER 2002b]
Some of the most important benefits include the detection and monitoring of cracks
without prior knowledge of their existence or location, and also monitoring on a continuous
basis or depending on the weather as suggested by LR [MER 2002b]. It also provides the
information required to permit operation under certain circumstances and to delay repair until
an opportune economic moment.
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The decrease in time spent at ports has increased the need for automated inspections.
This has resulted in several recent developments. An example is the the autonomous, wall-
climbing robot for nondestructive inspection of storage tanks [Kalra and Gu 2007], the
Automated Ultrasonic Testing Technique (Dijkstra and De Raad 2006), and the ROV
stereovision system for ship hull inspection [Negahdaripour and Firoozfam 2006].
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3.7 Design
3.7.1 Fit for Purpose Design
Besides designing for maximum strength and survivability of a vessel, there are a
series of other design considerations which must be taken into account for a successful
design. First, there must be a clear understanding about the way a vessel is intended to be
used in order to make the correct design decisions.
While all new ships should be safe in the most hostile wave environments, some
designs are known to age better than others. Owners often intend to sell ships at the age of
about ten years, while others plan for a longer use. The commercial advantages offered by
High Tensile Steel (HTS) and the associated problems as a ship ages are now well
understood. When designing for the short term, therefore, it is common to use more HTS.
When designing for a typical 30 year fatigue life, it is important to have a good
understanding of the "correct" locations, in which HTS will not cause problems. A much
smaller percentage is then normally used.
Another example is the design for alternate hold loading. This provides several
advantages such as the ability to moderate the ship rolling motion by increasing the height of
the centre of mass, or the fact that fewer holds require cleaning. Most important, however, is
the time saved during cargo operations. This is achieved because fewer holds are unloaded
each time while the bottom part of the holds is most time consuming. Alternate hold loading
is preferable when loading high density cargos such as iron ore but this increases the hull
stresses. As a result, special design and strengthening of the required structural members is
necessary, to allow this type of loading. Fig. 3.7-1 shows a finite element model of a hull
section during alternate loading with the associated stresses.
Regarding correct design for the intended use, there are often problems associated
with the required cost. Some ships were built to low standards but then used in a wide range
of trades, for which they were not suited. This is overcome by a introducing a common
minimum standard that addresses the needs for all common cargos and a common design life.
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According to Mr Bowring, most yards will always supply the bare minimum, since most
faults will not show within the 12 month guarantee period, and there is almost no collection
of data by the industry that would identify yards routinely building ships with faults [MER
2002a]
Greater topside
distortion of Increased stress in
Increased stress at hatch topside tank cross deck strip
corners and coamings
Increased stress in Increased stress in
main frames and double bottom
brackets structure
Fig. 3.7-1: Hull Stresses under Alternate Loading condition
[MER 19971
There is no doubt that the ship design plays a major role in the problems developed
by a ship throughout its service life. This is evident in sister ships that often have the same
problems even when owned and run by different operators in different trades. A good design
does not eliminate cracks but it reduces the rate of development after they have initiated. If
good manufacturing standards are used in a high quality yard, then crack initiation is delayed,
since there are presumably fewer and smaller defects to start with. Therefore, a good
shipyard, combined with a good ship design lead to higher quality ships that last longer.
An important aspect of design is its influence over other critical parameters. It is
important when designing to ensure conditions that promote easy, safe and effective
operation, maintenance and inspection. A typical example of a design for easy and effective
operation is the use of large hatch openings. This facilitates cargo operations but also has
significant implications on the hull's torsional resistance [Plaza 1998]. Compromises like this
are important and frequent in the design stage.
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Designing for a cheap construction is important, but also for cheap maintenance.
Compromising between those two is very frequent. For example, full penetration welds in
cargo bulkheads increase fabrication costs relative to fillet welds, but make these critical
components less vulnerable to corrosion and fatigue.
Finally, design for ease of inspection is also very important. An example of failing to
do so is the construction of joint bottom and top-side ballast tanks. This, not only eliminates
the option of ballasting the topside tanks when a leak develops in the double bottom tank, but
it also makes inspection of the bottom tank impossible when the ship is in ballast. Another
example where design makes inspection difficult is in the double hull construction. The
following chapter provides a detailed analysis of the double hull design for its use in bulk
carriers.
3.7.2 The Double Hull Bulk Carrier Debate
The first double hull ship was built by William Petty in 1662 [Wheater 2000]. Double
hulls became mandatory for tankers over 5000dwt by the MARPOL Convention since the
early 1990s in response to the Exxon Valdez disaster and phase out dates for the different
types range until the later 2010s [Naval Architect 2003a, Naval Architect 2003b, GMOPIG
(a), DF Dickins Associates Ltd. 1995]. In 2002, K-line (Wawasaki Kisen Kaisha) ordered the
first ever double-hull capesize ships. The two 205,000dwt bulk carriers were ordered from
Imabari Shipbuilding in Japan for delivery in 2005 [Flynn 2002].
The issue of double hull bulk carriers hit the headlines in the shipping industry a few
years ago after the proposals of the IMO for its enforcement to newbuildings. Any
modification as such, would have a great impact on ship construction and maintenance,
which inevitably will reflect on the cost of freight. Consequently, an enormous amount of
mental energy, as well as time and money, has been spent by both government and industry
experts regarding this matter [De Bievre 2004a]. Fig. 3.7-2 shows the modification in the
cargo hold region in going from single to double hull.
The main reason which triggered research in this direction was the aspect of safety
and protection of the environment [Lloyd's List 2004a]. IACS has also been considering the
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implementation of the double hull to other types such as containerships for the future
[Landon 2004].
One of the strongest supporters of the double hull configuration was the ITF general
secretary who characteristically accused the opposition of "favouring short term cost saving
over sea farers lives". He also raised the question why the double hull was made compulsory
for tankers and not bulk carriers claiming that "an oil spill costs an owner more than a dead
crew" [O'Mahony 2004a].
Fig. 3.7-2: Single hull (left) compared to Double hull (right)
[Graig Shipping plc. & Carl Bro A/S1
Prevention of pollution is clearly not the case in bulk carriers. Bearing in mind that
tankers are of different construction and operate under different conditions, it would be very
unwise to make assumptions and directly compare the two. Capesize Bulk carriers carry non-
polluting cargos such as coal and iron ore, so the only risk of pollution would be from
bunkers. If this was the objective however, the double hull could simply be confined just to
the fuel tanks as is now being considered independently [Lloyd's List 2005a]. It should be
noted that even for tankers, the effectiveness of the double hull configuration has been
disputed and is not clearly the ideal solution regarding safety and pollution prevention
[Langdon 2004, Langdon, 2003, The Motor Ship 1991].
The concept behind the double hull configuration is that during a collision, the cargo
holds remain isolated from seawater and flooding is thus confined to the void space which
separates the two shells. However, this only applies to low energy collisions (rarely the case
of total loss) where the inner shell remains unaffected [Efthymiou 2004].
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An advantage is that reduced hold width and the consequent reduction in free surface
area of the holds would make the ship less prone to instability due to free surface effects in
the case of partial flooding. Furthermore, the increased steel cross sectional area due to the
secondary shell with longitudinal framing results in increased shearing strength. This reduces
the probability of shear failure in the vertical direction.
However, twice the number of hulls does not necessarily mean twice the strength and
the double hull is also faced with several disadvantages in the case of inner shell failure.
Under that scenario for example, water is isolated from the void space at the other end of the
hold, resulting in asymmetrical flooding and subsequent heeling of the ship to the side of the
collision. Double hulls are also exempt from many regulations imposed to s-hulls by
SOLAS-X1 1 [Corbett et al 2004a] including flood testing. As a consequence of this, some
yards have found the overall cost of the double hull to be even lower than the s-hull and have
been accused of providing ship owners with a cheap solution! [Corbett et al 2004a,
Tradewinds (a)].
The small number of double hulls and the fact that they are all relatively new severely
limits the validity of statistical data (comparing accidents) and makes the assessment of the
proposed configuration a true challenge. It should also be noted that the double hull
recommendation came from a study, which only considered pre-1998 bulk carriers [Bowring
2003]. Standards have greatly improved since then and continue to do so for newbuilding s-
hulls which not only have to comply with tougher regulations [Corbett 2004], but they are
also scrutinized by surveyors in ports.
Instead, one can consider accidents of the past and assess whether a double hull
would make a real difference. There are two very famous, tragic examples which suggest the
opposite. These are the s-hull cape MV Christopher (Dec.2001) [Lloyd's List 2004a], and the
double hull OBO MV Derbyshire (Sept.1980). Both have been thoroughly investigated, they
were both about 165,000dwt and both failed due to progressive flooding. In the case of MV
Christopher, flooding started through the first hatch cover (forward) so obviously, a double
hull would not have made a difference as it also didn't do so in the Derbyshire 21 years
earlier [Woinin 2002, SSC]. Today, ships are designed using the principle of inherent
redundancy to prevent this domino effect and all ships have to comply with the according
regulations [Tradewinds (a), De Bievre 2004b].
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Fig. 3.7-3: Double Hull Ore Bulk Oil Carrier MV "Derbyshire " [SSC1
Fig. 3.7-4: Capesize Bulk Carrier MV Christonher TCorbett 20021
Key factors on the double hull design are maintenance and inspection. Since the
width of the space separating the two shells in double hulls is approximately im [Naval
Architect 2003a], both are extremely difficult. Entry is via the top side ballast tanks and
access is consequently prohibited when the ship is ballasted. This also provides a very good
excuse to prevent inspection in general for prominent reasons. Potential corrosion in the
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double hull space due to the local break-down of coating is immense because of the frequent
impact from grabs during discharge. As a result, existing double hull type vessels are
typically scrapped 2 to 3 years earlier than comparable s-hulls [O'Mahony 2004b, Vassalos
et al 2004]. Bearing in mind that new bulk carriers are designed for a 30 year fatigue life
[Lloyd's List 2004b], the inability to properly maintain the double hull space may increase
the chances of structural failure. Statistics also exist which show a far higher incidence of
fatigue problems in double hulls [Vassalos et al 2004]. An example is shown in Fig. 3.7-5.
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Fig. 3.7-5: Fraction of ships affected between 1990-1999 by side structure fatigue
Comparing s-hulls (SSS) with double hulls (DSS) [Vassalos et al 20041
There are also fears that the limited number of older double hulls to confirm their
durability and the limited experience in their operation may also prove unsafe.
Having discussed the safety issue concerning the double hull, it should be noted that
there are other more effective and efficient ways of improvement. Examples include the
forecastle and wave breaker which became compulsory for capes after the MV Christopher
incident, stronger hatch covers, improved scantling design, enhanced surveys and stronger
bulkheads etc. As BV committees commented, "Single skin design bulk carriers could
become much safer if the additional steel requirements for the double-side skin design were
to be strategically distributed in the scantling" [Corbett et al 2004b].
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Besides safety issues however, there are many operational advantages of the double
hull design. Chris Williams, director at Graig comments "We designed the Diamond double
hull bulker from the shipowner's point of view. We came up with the design before the
whole double-hull thing became a debate" [Corbett et al 2004a]. Contrary to the s-hull,
frames are placed on the outer shell, which leaves the cargo hold with a smooth surface free
of discontinuities. This allows quicker dispatch at ports, less stevedore damage., effective
cleaning of holds without the obstacles presented by frames, and easier maintenance and
inspection [Lloyd's List 2004a, Jones 2002, Fricke et al 1998, Jang et al 1998].
Terminal time is of major importance to ships and shippers and is probably the
greatest advantage of the double hull. This is achieved due to less obstruction to bulldozers
during discharge; avoidance of cargo getting lodged between frames; easier cleaning without
the need for entry of shore workers to holds to remove residual cargo (also a great health and
safety issue); and easier inspection without the need of a cherry picker which can be a major
problem to find and load on large gearless ships. Terminal operators claim that double hulls
have a 10% faster discharge rate for coal and that the mechanical damages per ton discharged
is 6 times lower than in s-hulls [Naval Architect 2003a]. [Vassalos et al 2004] suggests a
6.5% reduced time in port overall for a cape by employing a double hull.
Maintenance within the hold is also made easier. Welded frames are difficult to
maintain and are very vulnerable to grooving corrosion especially when exposed to corrosive
cargos such as Australian coal. Sand blasting is much easier on the double hull whose design
also provides large areas of smooth surfaces for the rust-bust machine to work on. In the case
of damage to the side of the hold however, repair works are very difficult since both sides
need to be accessed.
A big concern in double hulls is the use of the space between the two shells. The
double side spaces could be used for ballasting as in the handymax type "Diamond" [Lloyd's
List 2005b]. The gain in ballast volume could possibly allow the elimination of the topside
tanks, which will regain part of the lost cargo volume. The same may apply to hopper tanks
though hoppers are also convenient to guide the cargo towards the centre of the hold. On the
other hand, ballast is very corrosive and as discussed earlier, ballast tanks are the most
corrosion prone region of the ship's hull. According to Alan Gavin, principal surveyor for
Lloyd's Register, "...Because of the narrow width of the wing space and the cellular
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construction, atmospheric corrosion within the upper spaces will be more significant," [The
Motor Ship 1993].
Noting the difficulty of maintenance and inspection discussed earlier, it would seem
much safer for the area to be used as void space which would provide much higher corrosion
resistance. Additionally, some yards are also very concerned that ballast would give rise to
excessive bending moments in the flooded condition [Naval Architect 2003a].
A disadvantage of the double hull design is the additional steel as part of the hull.
Several yards and classification societies suggest that the lightship of a double hull will be in
the region of 3-5% higher than of an equivalent s-hull [O'Mahony 2004b, DNV 1997]. This
makes the ship more expensive to built, increases consumption (due to deeper draughts) and
leads to loss of deadweight. ABS has calculated the additional steel cost in the double hull
capesize bulk carrier to be about $484,000 while savings due to reduced maintenance and
cleaning amount to approximately $9,700 per year [ABS]. More detailed calculations by
[Vassalos et al 2004] which include steel, coating and construction costs as well as running
costs such as increased fuel consumption, increased maintenance and repair costs and loss of
earnings due to reduced deadweight and volumetric capacity, add up to $4,869,264 for a
cape. The benefits to the ship owner, port and stevedores due to reduced time in port as well
as increased scrapping value in the same analysis add up to $556,414. There are experts,
however, who suggest that the structural weight could be reduced reasonably in comparison
to the existing double hull designs" [Jang et. al 2002].
More important than the loss of deadweight is the loss of grain capacity (cubic meters
of cargo hold space). This may not be such a great issue for high-density cargos like iron ore
but will be of major importance in the trade of lower density cargos such as coal. Ways,
which have been considered to reduce the loss in freight earning capacity (both weight and
volume), include the use of high tensile steel and the reduced double bottom depth
respectively, but this may have a negative effect on the strength of the hull girder [Naval
Architect 2003a]. There is extensive research going on to perfect a steel/concrete sandwich
double skin using a special lightweight 900 kg/m3 concrete aggregate as shown in Fig. 3.7-6.
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Fig. 3.7-6: Steel Concrete Sandwich double hull structure [Naval Architect 2003b1
This will be stiffer and hence will allow narrower double hull and d-bottom spaces to
be occupied saving more cargo space. There are fears, however, that it will be more
uneconomic if regulations are imposed on the minimum width of the double hull space
[Naval Architect 2003b}.
As a conclusion, excluding safety issues, it should be left to the market and owners'
discretion to judge which is the most competitive design and this is not the purpose of
legislation. As Arthur Bowring states "Commercial considerations should be left to market
forces, not to regulation" [Bowring 2003]. Therefore, it is natural that the proposal was voted
against by 32:22 [O'Mahony 2004a, Corbett et al 2004b]. Nevertheless, there have been
proponents of the double hull who have been pushing for it to be mandatory, mainly for
commercial reasons. An example includes Luis Dreyfus, an owner of double hull bulk
carriers who a year later issued a plea for the adoption of double hulls as the standard for
large bulk carriers. He was arguing that this would get rid of the 15%-20% of the world fleet
which are substandard and whose owners would have difficulty finding the resources to
convert them to double hulls [Spurrier 2005].
There are several owners who seem to prefer the double hull design, for example
Transmed [Lloyd's List 2004a], Angelicoussis [Lloyd's List 2004b], K-Line and Dreyfus
[Corbett et al 2004a]. Many including Transmed seem unaffected by the IMO decision to
reverse its previous decision for compulsory double hull design as they have continued to
order double hull capesize bulk carriers [Lloyd's List 2004a, Corbett et al 2004a].
Both the s-hull and the double hull designs have advantages and disadvantages and it
will be interesting to see which is going to be most widely adopted in the future.
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3.7.3 Designing against Cracks
Cracking is generally associated with corrosion, rough treatment in a rough
environment, and with the neglect of fatigue and stress concentrations in the design and
fabrication. According to Lloyd's Register, one of the main factors which can contribute to
structural failure and loss of bulk carriers is the design of details such as the main frame
bracket toes [MER 1997].
Individual fatigue analysis for such details has been carried out in the past in order to
improve design [Andersen et al 1995, Hansen et al 1995, Sorensen 1995] and fatigue design
criteria have been established [Capanoglou 1993]. Design has a strong influence on the
cracks that a ship will develop during its service life. An example where this is evident is in
European ships whose construction is significantly more stiff and heavy than Asian ones,
resulting in more cracks.
One of the most important precautions required in the design stage is to avoid high
stress concentrations. These can result from geometrical discontinuities, corners, sharp edges,
holes, connections, welds, changes in thickness, hard spots etc. A hard spot is defined as a
point of high rigidity in a more flexible structure i.e. when there is an abrupt change in
rigidity [LR 2004a]. According to Lloyd's register, a hard spot occurs when the distance
between the end of a bracket and the next supporting floor or stiffener exceeds 80cm [LR
2004b].
Another way to reduce the probability of cracks is by enhancement of critical
locations. A remarkable difference in the applied stress range can be achieved by the
attachment of transverse frames in topside tanks. Cracks can also occur due to the
misalignment of connected units. This is because of the resulting bending moment and high
stress concentration. A typical example is the misalignment of two brackets that are attached
on either side of a plate. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.7-7.
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Fig. 3.7-7: Resulting moments and stress concentrations due to the misalignment of connections across
a plate
Besides preventing cracks, it is also important to consider the implications and to
ensure an acceptable outcome after they develop. Crack arrest sites are frequently used to
stop cracks from propagating to large lengths. However, they are sometimes avoided because
they are expensive, and do not allow for large continuous sections that are convenient in
construction. Another example where fatigue prone design is tolerated is in the use of
scallops. These are a recognized high stress concentration site but are essential for the
assembly of blocks during fabrication.
3.7.4 Design Methods
Classification societies' rules for ship scantlings are generally derived from
experience-based criteria that include many semi-empirical formulae. However, these
formulae-based rules are a significant development from the pure deterministic table rules of
the 1950s [BMT CORTEC LTD 1993]. Ship designs in the past were solely based on static
principles which were modified by empirical factors to account for actual dynamic conditions
[MER 1993].
A good understanding of the possible loads to which a hull may be subjected, is
critical in design. As put by [Saunders 1965], "It is necessary to coordinate what seas look
like to seafarers with what naval architects imagine them to be". Waves of significant heights
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"Hs" in the range 13 to 15 meters can be expected in severe storms of Beaufort 10+, and
consequently waves of up to 26 to 30m may be encountered [Faulkner et al 1996]. The
resulting hull stresses and bending moments may depend on numerous parameters and are by
no means straight forward.
In general, loads from the sea are transmitted from the shell plate to the secondary
members (stiffeners), from there to the primary members (large webs), and finally to the hull
girder. Loads are transmitted along this path by shear and bending via welded connections.
These connections form the topic of detail design. The type of detail and design at these
locations is critical to structural safety, because small cracks can propagate from these welds
and cause significant damage.
Our understanding of the loads acting on the hull has improved significantly over the
past few years and this has impacted the design of ships. It was assumed that the major hull
loads were carried by the main deck on the two sides of ship. Consequently, the cross deck
plates between hatch openings were made thinner. After several studies, we came to realize
that higher stresses act on cross decks. This may be due to torsional effects that are imposed
by twisting and compression as a result of heavy cargos in adjacent holds [The Motor Ship
1994]. Furthermore, the cross deck structure may be subjected to side loads during bad
weather conditions. As a result, thickness requirements of cross deck plates have increased
significantly.
The increasing use of Finite Element Analysis FEA over the past 30 years has also
enhanced our understanding of the stresses to which the various structural components are
subjected during different situations. Fig. 3.7-8 shows a typical 3-D finite element model of a
cargo hold of a double hull cape.
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Fig. 3.7-8: 3-D F.E. Model of a Double-Hull Cape [Vassalos et al 20041
The detailed stress results obtained from the F.E.A. can be evaluated to assess the
fatigue strength at specific locations with greater accuracy. This allows for a more efficient
allocation of scantlings while avoiding excessive conservativeness in the areas that are less
understood.
The methods currently used for estimating fatigue life are quite inaccurate while there
is limited use of fracture mechanics. A better understanding of the stresses acting throughout
the hull, however, will lead to better designs of higher fatigue strength and a reduction in
fatigue related problems.
3.7.5 Hull Strength and Flooding Survivability
IACS requires the structural strength of ships to remain above 90% of their original
value. This is controlled through several parameters including the section modulus and
moment of inertia of the hull girder and the thickness of plates. There are also section
modulus requirements for stiffeners that are contributing and that are not contributing to
longitudinal strength. According to the rules of ABS, LR, and BV, the minimum hull girder
section modulus at the mid-ship section for ships between 90 and 300 meters in length is
given by:
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Zmin =0.0lx 10.75- 300 - L)" x L2 x B x (C, +0.70) (3.7-1)
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Where: Znin= Minimum Hull Girder Section Modulus (cm 2 m)
L = Scantling length (in)
B = Ship Beam (in)
Cb = Block coefficient at summer load
Besides a minimum standard regarding hull diminution, there are additional rules that
ensure safety and the ability to survive harsh weather conditions. One of the most important
ones concerns flooding survivability. "... bulk carriers over 150m in length, designed to
carry solid bulk cargos with a density of 1,000kg/m3 and above, shall have sufficient strength
to withstand the flooding of any one cargo hold..." [Mortensen 1998]. According to the IMO
1997 SOLAS Conference, all new single skin bulk carriers built on or after 1" July 1999 are
required to have sufficient strength to withstand flooding of any one cargo hold, also taking
dynamic effects of the water in the hold into account [IACS 2004, IACS 2002, Plaza 1998].
The rules for older vessels require that the ship can withstand the flooding of cargo hold
number 1 in all approved loading conditions [Mathiesen 1998].
High danger is associated with the flooding of a cargo hold because of the consequent
progressive collapse of bulk heads. This was the cause of the two major cape incidences
"Giga 2" (140,000dwt built in 1981) and "Pos Challenger" (149,000 built in 1992). The
crucial point is the bulkhead between cargo hold 1 and 2, since about 40% of casualties
involve water ingress into cargo hold 1 [Plaza 1998]. Work on the collapsing of bulkheads
has been carried out since a long time ago [Caldwell 1955, Paik et al 1998c], and more
recently using non-linear FEA modelling [Paik et al 1997b, Grundy 1997].
The numbers of cycles to failure (N) in a bulkhead can be approximated as follows:
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Typical hot-rolled 0.2%C steel under large cyclic strains: N = [Fuchs et al 1980]
Ae
(3.7-2)
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1000For a butt weld: N = [Guerney 1979]Ae
400For a fillet weld: N = [Guerney 1979]
A~c
(3.7-3)
(3.7-4)
By simple calculation, therefore, one can observe that for a small cyclic strain of 1%,
and a loading period of 1Os, the fatigue life is about 2.8 hours for a butt welded bulkhead and
1.1 hours for a fillet weld. Evidently, the strength of a bulkhead is highly dependent on the
welds. Lloyd's Register requires the upgrading of the bulkhead lower end weld connections
to a deep penetration standard as shown in Fig. 3.7-9 [Tustin 1998].
lower shelf
plate
original fillet
-weld
deep penetration
weld
Fig. 3.7-9: Fillet weld upgrading [Tustin 19981
The residual strength of the hull girder is often decreased substantially due to fatigue
cracking and corrosion. Therefore, progressive flooding may also lead to total hull girder
collapse [Paik 1994]. Another important consequence of progressive flooding is that it can
eventually lead to the loss of stability and capsizing in rough seas [Turan et al 1994].
It is possible for accidental flooding to occur in any hold but there is a view that it
occurs most often in cargo hold 1. More than 40% of all water ingress incidents have
occurred in Hold No 1, while in 90% of the cases, water ingress was through the side shell
[Mathiesen 1998]. Water ingress through the side shell is usually due to a combination of
wave slam and hull girder bending or twisting, after a reduction in residual strength due to
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fatigue cracking, mechanical damage or corrosion. Flooding is then followed by collapse of
the bulk head separating the first 2 holds since, unlike the collision bulk head, it is not
designed to withstand the hydrostatic pressures that are further amplified by the ship motion
[Grundy et al 1998].
The other common way of flooding is after the collapse of hatch covers under heavy
sea loads on the deck. This forms a vital design aspect. Side shell failure accounts for half of
bulk carrier casualties while water ingress through hatches accounts for 20% [Jones 2003].
Research in hatch cover design and failure with respect to water induced loads, maintenance
and operation, has been carried out with reference to case studies and using FEA [Faulkner
2001, Faulkner et al 1996, Byrne et al 1998, Byrne 1995, Hansen 1982].
In response to several hatch related casualties, a fore castle is required in new ships,
old ships are retrofitted with a wave break barrier, and requirements on the ability of hatch
covers to withstand severe weather conditions have increased. The total cost of upgrading a
bulk carrier to URS21 standards is approximately 4% of the total cost of 9 covers and this
would increase the weight of the hatch covers by about 33% [Langdon et al 2002]. The cost
of replacing covers on existing ships is approximately six times higher, although in some
cases, reinforcements may be possible at a lower cost [Langdon et al 2002].
This example demonstrates that it is not always cheaper in the long term to design to
the currently minimum required standard. Another example is oil tankers that were
constructed with a small double hull before the legislation was enforced, and were given a
significantly extended phase-out date.
3.7.6 Grounding and Collisions
Besides designing to prevent damage, it is equally important to design with respect to
ship performance after damage has occurred. There has been an increasing interest in
accurately predicting the consequences of collision or grounding accidents, in order to
account for them during the design stage.
409
One of the most famous early studies on collisions was carried out by [Minorsky
1959]. Based on 26 ship collisions, he developed a simple empirical equation to relate the
absorbed energy E (tons-knots2) with the destroyed material volume RT (ft2 -in). The equation
is E = 414.5RT+121,900. Since then others have proposed various modifications based on
this equation [Zhang 2002, Wang and Ohtsubo 1999].
Rigid wedge cutting of thin metal plates has been studied extensively since the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, on March 24, 1989. This research affected
tanker safety regulations drastically, leading to the adoption of the double-hull. The process
has been modeled differently by various research groups. Far-field plastic deformation and
near-tip fracture are considered the main direct mechanisms, while friction is also
occasionally considered as an indirect mechanism.
Experimental methods have been used to determine the governing parameters. [Lu &
Calladine 1990} proposed a single-term formula to describe the required work, incorporating
the effects of far-field plastic deformations and near tip fracture. [Atkins 1990 and Atkins
1991] on the contrary, supported the idea that two independent parameters must be used, one
for each region.
[Wierzbicki & Thomas 1993] propose a closed-form solution, based on a simple
kinematic model, using a single parameter to describe both near-tip and far-field areas. The
quasi-static equilibrium of cutting is expressed using the principle of virtual work, and the
membrane work near the crack tip is calculated using CTOD theory. This approach combines
plasticity, fracture mechanics and friction in a simple formula. It supports prior one-
parameter experimental results by [Lu & Calladine 1990], while also considering the
contribution of friction. It also demonstrates the interdependence of far-field and near-tip
deformations, thereby mitigating the need for two independent parameters to describe the
required work.
The steady-state case of wedge cutting of metal membranes was also studied by
[Zheng & Wierzbicki 1995]. A plastic zone at the wedge tip, a transient bent flap zone, and a
transient zone were identified. Each was modeled using geometric analysis, while the wedge
force and rolling radius were calculated using membrane theory. A frictional force term was
added and a closed-form solution was derived, using a kinematic admissible velocity and
displacement, defined such that the actual cutting pattern was consistent. The wedge force
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solution was found to be dependent to the friction force and to the flow stress. A parametric
study was then carried out and results were validated with experimental data from [Lu &
Calladine 1990], [Yahiaoui 1994] and [Astrup 1994]. This technology provided a reliable
analytical tool for the prediction of steady-state wedge cutting of metal membranes.
Theoretical and experimental results were compared and empirical results were established.
Analytical methods for studying collision and grounding have been developed and
used extensively since these earlier studies [Simonsen and Tornqvist 2004, Wang et al 2002a,
Wang et al 2002c, Pedersen 2002, Brown et al 2001, Brown 2001, Suzuki et al 2000b, Wang
et al 2000a, Paik et al 1999, Wang and Ohtsubo 1999, Simonsen 1997, Ohtsubo et al 1997,
Wang et al 1997, Wierzbicki et al 1993]. With the rapid development of computer
technology however, FEA simulations are becoming more efficient and provide much more
detail than other methods. Their reliability has been demonstrated and they have been used
for the simulation of both collision and grounding accidents [Ozguc et al 2005, Kajaste-
Rudnitski et al 2005, Yamade et al 2005, Wu et al 2004, Lehmann and Biehl 2004, Wu 2004,
Jiang and Gu 2004, Tornqvist 2003, Endo 2001, Lehmann et al 2001, Glykas et al 2001,
Kitamura 2001, Kitamura et al 2001, Kitamura et al 1998, Kuroiwa 1996]. It is often helpful
to combine these two approaches and use an analytical method in order to decide on the FEA
parameters such as mesh size.
One of the main challenges in non-linear FEM is analyzing problems like the
simulation of cracking [Wang et al 2002c]. The most common assumption is that fracture
initiates when the "equivalent strain" reaches a critical value [Wu 2004]. Efforts have been
made to calculate this value of critical rupture strain from large scale tests and real life
observations [Wang et al 2002a, Kitamura 2001]. The element size is perhaps the most
critical parameter for its assessment [Simonsen et al 2000].
Though this assumption regarding crack initiation is convenient for numerical and
analytical solutions, it is not theoretically proven. More sophisticated models which consider
material behavior around the crack tip are also being developed [Simonsen et al 2004].
Another difficulty is that very fine meshes are required due to the high complexity involved.
This increases calculation time. Simulation of one second of an accident, for example,
requires about a week of CPU time, whereas a linear model for a design purpose lasts about
ten minutes [Wang et al 2002c].
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It is important to assess the risk of collision and grounding accident scenarios, based
on the probability of occurrence and on the consequences. Parameters which should be
considered include the residual strength and reserve stability after the accident, as well as the
environmental impact. One of the main challenges is to predict the energy released during the
impact, and the ability of the hull to absorb it. A significant amount of research has gone into
this [Lehman et al 2001, Suzuki et al 2000a, Paik et al 1999, Pedersen et al 1998]. Studies
have also been performed to investigate the response during accidents with respect to design
[Tikka et al 2000, Paik et al 1999, Kitamura et al 1998, Kitamura 1996]. These provide a
good guidance in designing against collision.
Some classification societies have introduced requirements related to collisions and
groundings. ABS provides a method to check the residual strength of ships after grounding or
collision [ABS 1995]. GL also uses a notation to rank the resistance of a vessel against a pre-
defined set of scenarios. Standards against collision, however, have not yet been set and this
is probably due to the lack of knowledge so far.
Research has been carried out on the residual strength of ship hulls after collision or
grounding [Wang et at 2002b, Paik et al 1998b, Wang et al 2000b}. [Wang et al 2002b]
provide simple equations for the quick calculation of hull strength during an emergency
situation. These are of the form:
-1- a ( )-a22  - a3 C (3.7-5)
Z B B B)
Where: Z'/Z = Ratio of final to original section modulus of deck or bottom
b/B = Ratio of damaged to total length (vertically or horizontally)
al,2,3 = Tabulated constants depending on the ship type and dimensions
Their findings show that the residual strength after accidents depends on the ship type
and that it is irrespective of dimensions. The reserve of residual strength during collision in
bulk carriers ranks between that of tankers which are 1st and containers which rank 3rd [Wang
et al 2002b].
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Expanding knowledge of the dynamic behavior of structures under impact loads has
presented researchers and naval architects with the challenge of creating a collision-resistant
ship. An important step towards this achievement was the development of a Y-shaped
support web that was patented by Hans Ludolphy, R&D coordinator at Royal Schelde Naval
Shipbuilding in the Netherlands [Van Dyck 2002a].
Fig. 3.7-10: Construction of Y-Shaped Web [Van Dyck 2002a]
During a collision, the structure deformation absorbs the force by a combination of
bending buckling and stretching. This has also been verified by successful collision tests, as
shown in Fig. 3.7-11.
8tru~VpAmaUu
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Colliding ship Nedloyd 34
Fig. 3.7-11: Collision tests of the Libra Dynamics Collision Resistant Ship Structure in Holland
[Van Dyck 2002a]
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The structure can easily be fitted to a single or double hull ship and only slightly
increases newbuilding costs while significantly improving structural safety [Van Dyck
2002a].
Japan has been collecting data on collisions since 1991 in an endeavor to design a
"crash-worthy ship structure". Full-scale tests were performed on grounding in 1994 and
collision in 1997, as well as dynamic and quasi-static impact tests in MHI's Nagasaki
shipyard. A computerized model of the effects of these tests was then created. This led to the
development of a more collision/grounding-resistant hull structure but also to the
development of a commercially viable type of steel that is said to yield but not fracture [MER
1998].
A significant amount of research has led to major developments towards creating a
hull that can withstand grounding and collision. Fracture mechanics, however, has a long
way to go until it can be used to calculate the effects of the impacts on the hull. FEA
methods, similarly, are still not advanced enough to accurately predict the dynamics and
resulting damage of ship collisions within a reasonable CPU time. Consequently, it will take
some time before such designs can become standardized in capes.
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3.8 Steels
3.8.1 High Tensile Steel
Various grades of ship building steels exist, comprising of both mild and HTS. The
introduction of HTS in shipbuilding is generally regarded as one of the most significant
developments over the past 30 years. The yield stress of HTS 36 (grades A, D & E) is
355MPa compared to 235MPa of mild steel (grades A, B, D & E). These are the most
common grades used in ships, but intermediate yield stresses of 265MPa and 315MPa are
also available, as well as higher grades like HTS 40 (A-D &E) with a yield stress of 390MPa
[IACS 1996].
At first, HTS was only confined to the upper flange of the hull girder and
occasionally the lower flanges. The upper flange refers to the main deck plating and
longitudinals, the sheer strake, and the top strake of the longitudinal bulkheads. The bottom
flange includes the bottom and bilge platting with their longitudinals, the double bottom
girders, and the tank top plating. Gradually, as more experience was gained, HTS was
extended to all longitudinals and transverse material. It has been used extensively since the
early 1980s.
The use of HTS allows for thinner plates that can still cope with the applied loads.
This decreases the lightship, thereby reducing construction and fuel costs, and increasing
deadweight capacity. This improves the specification, making a ship more attractive to
buyers. The shipyard also finds it more attractive since less steel is handled during
construction, thereby reducing the costs of production.
The yield stress for HTS 36 is almost 50% higher than that of mild steel. Weight
savings of 25-30% were thus common with the use of HTS during the 70s and early 80s
[Mortensen 1998]. However, weight savings through the use of HTS were then reduced to
approximately 15% [ABS 1991]. Today, this value varies significantly across ships. It is
interesting to note the increase in percentage of HTS with bulk carrier size, as shown in Fig.
3.8-1.
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Fig. 3.8-1: Percentage of HTS against bulk carrier size [DNV 19971
The use of thinner plates through the application of HTS has several commercial
advantages to offer. However, the structure is subjected to higher stresses because the loads
are applied over reduced cross sectional areas. Since fatigue strength is not increased, this
dramatically impacts crack growth rates, which vary approximately with the cube of the
applied stress (Section 3.5.6). Unless appropriate measures are taken, HTS will endure a
shorter fatigue life [Ferguson et al 1991].
In addition, thinner plates are associated with higher bending displacements (flexing)
throughout the hull girder and with a phenomenon known as "springing" (vibration of the
hull with short sea waves), which is very common among HTS-built vessels. This further
aggravates fatigue and results in coating breakdown, which accelerates corrosion. This is
particularly important because corrosion allowances (quoted as a percentage of the initial
thickness) are already reduced to start with (in absolute terms) due to the use of thinner
plates. Therefore, HTS uses up the corrosion margin earlier than mild steel [LR 1991].
Another problem associated with high tensile steels is that they are more difficult to
weld and more prone to cracking because they are less tolerant to deviations from optimally
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established welding parameters. Since fatigue strength is not increased when introducing
HTS, the effect of defects in welding and alignment problems is magnified. Consequently,
details which gave satisfactory service life in a mild steel vessel may not do so in a
comparable HTS vessel. Therefore, higher quality control and a highly skilled workforce are
required. This increases maintenance cost.
Areas in which many failures have been noted on HTS vessels include scallops of
transverse webs and bracket connections of longitudinals. Extra care is necessary in
alleviating stress concentrations in HTS vessels.
Due to these problems, there is a tendency of avoiding HTS in primary structural
members over the past few years. However, this is not always true, since in some cases, the
savings in cost, consumption and capacity may outweigh the disadvantages over a certain
period of time. Typically, Japanese owners prefer the use of HTS as they often build ships to
operate for about 10 years before selling them. Corrosion and fatigue cracking problems
begin to play a major role during the later years of a ship's life. Therefore, HTS is a more
attractive solution in this case. Table 3.8-1 summarizes the main advantages and
disadvantages of HTS over mild steel.
HTS ADVANTAGES HTS ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
Reduced Capital Cost: Structural problems:
Reduced Lightship (-15%). Higher Stress Concentrations, nominal
working stresses and strains (flexing),
while fatigue strength is not increased.
Profitable: Increased maintenance Costs:
Increased Deadweight and reduced fuel Higher Corrosion rates and reduced
consumption. corrosion margins.
Higher skill labor and less standard repair
materials required
Table 3.8-1: Advantages and Disadvantages of using HTS as opposed to mild steel
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3.8.2 Anticorrosive Steel
Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC) developed an anticorrosive steels that claims to slow
down the progress of pitting corrosion to about a fifth of that in regular steel, irrespective of
maintenance or environmental conditions [Burton, R. 2004]. Its cost is acceptable and its
performance is verified experimentally as shown in Fig. 3.8-2. It might have a positive
environmental impact by displacing paint coatings, particularly in ballast tanks.
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Fig. 3.8-2: Fatigue Performance of a butt-welded joint confirmed by NSC and MI [Burton 20041
3.8.3 Steel Products for Shipbuilding
There has been a recent trend towards higher performance, exclusive-use ships, and
improved construction productivity. This has resulted in the need for new steel products and
technologies. JE has developed 6 products to address those needs including four plate
products, one pipe product and one TMCP technology for shapes for shipbuilding. These are
discussed in detail by [Suzuki et al 2004]
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The size of containerships has increased rapidly over the past few years, requiring
plates of higher strength and thickness. This, however, poses problems in weldability and
toughness. High thickness requires high heat input during welding which coarsens the
microstructure in the Heat Affected Zone (HAZ). Adding alloying elements and increasing
the carbon equivalent to improve strength also limit weldability and toughness. In the
"EWEL" high heat input, Thermo-Mechanical Control Process (TMCP) plate, excellent
properties and weldability are achieved by using Super-OLAC (online accelerated cooling
technology) to get a yield strength of 390 N/mm2 at low carbon equivalent and upper bainite
levels (detrimental to toughness), optimum TiN to refine grain size in the HAZ, and
microalloying technologies to control microstructure in the HAZ. These steels have been
adopted to large containerships and LPGs and have received excellent evaluations so far.
Longitudinally Profiled (LP) Plates, or taper plates, have a continuously changing
thickness which is achieved by continuously changing the roll gap during rolling. They can
be applied to bulkheads, the deck, bottom plates etc. and offer significant reductions in
welding and material requirements. For example, 2500t LP plates were used in a 170,000t
bulk carrier reducing weld length by 700m and steel weight by 218t. Adoption has increased
dramatically since 1993 and bi-directional LP plates recently developed.
Clad Steel Plates consists of a base material (a carbon steel or low alloy steel plate)
and stainless steel (or other material) plates bonded on one or both sides. The base plate
offers the required strength while the other plates offer protection and other properties
required on the outside. This results in a composite plate with properties that are not possible
using a single material. They are particularly useful in chemical tankers which need to
withstand severe loading conditions while they also require high corrosion resistance as they
are exposed to a variety of chemicals. Application of Stainless clad plates in tankers,
therefore, has increased substantially since the beginning of the 1990s. There are various
manufacturing processes but JFE Steel uses the rolling cladding process. Accelerated
corrosion tests, tensile tests and Charpy impact tests were carried out on JFE clad steel plates
with satisfactory results showing sufficient properties for hull construction.
Crude oil tankers are subjected to "vapor space corrosion" in the area just under the
decks. The average corrosion rate in vapor space is about 1mm/year so the long service life
of tankers often requires expensive replacements. The New Anti-Corrosion No 5 (NAC5)
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plate promises to extend the service life of deck plates by approximately 5 years. TMCP
technology is applied to reduce the carbon equivalent to the level of conventional steels thus
achieving equivalent weldability. Cyclic corrosion tests simulating the environment under the
deck were carried out on conventional steel and NAC5 plates without primer. The corrosion
rate of both the base metal and the weld metal was about 10% lower in the NAC5 plates.
The pipes of oil tankers are exposed to oil and seawater and oil on both sides so they
are required to have high sea water corrosion resistance and corrosion wear resistance. JFE-
MARINE-COP offers the corrosion resistance and corrosion wear resistance of cast iron with
an equivalent weldability to 400MPa steel. JFE-MARINE-COP with 1/1 Cr has
approximately half the corrosion rate of conventional 400MPa steel. No corrosion was
observed in the base or weld metal of JFE-MARINE-COP cargo oil pipes on the vessel
Benetia after 3 years of service. It can be manufactured in outer diamterers ranging from
76.3mm to 10 16mm and JFE Steel currently produces -5000t/yr.
JFE was the first in Japan to manufacture shipbuilding steel shapes and has been a
leader in the field ever since. It has a long production line of shapes and is certified to
produce for a wide range of standards and applications. Shapes for shipbuilding are
asymmetrical both in the vertical and longitudinal direction so material properties and
manufacturing design in the hot rolling process are important. JFE has introduced equipment
such as an exclusive-use shot blasting device for shapes and the first water cooling type
TMCP technology for shapes (originally used for plates), thus enabling it to meet low Ceq,
high toughness requirements and achieve weldability equal to that of plates. High accuracy
rolling is achieved 2-hi rolls by applying FEM analysis.
JFE has developed and commercialized several advanced shipbuilding steel products
in the past several years. They include plates TMCP for reduced welding time in
containerships, LP plates that save on material and weld length, NAC5 anticorrosive plates
for crude oil tankers, clad plates for chemical tankers, the JFE-MARINE-COP reduced
corrosion wear cargo pipes for tankers and a wide range of shape steels using TMCP
technologies and achieving weldability equal to that of plates. Increased adoption of those is
expected in the future while JFE Steel group will continue to introduce new products.
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3.9 Stress Analysis
3.9.1 Overview of the Hull Stresses
Capes are subjected to various loads throughout their life. These are very difficult to
predict because of uncertainty in weather predictions, the random nature of wave-induced
and cargo-loading-induced bending stresses etc. Loads can be divided under static or
dynamic. Static loads are those which remain relatively constant with time. Examples include
cargo weight, hydrostatic pressure and ballast weight. Dynamic loads are fluctuating and are
responsible for fatigue. Examples include wave induced loads, cargo induced loads during
cargo operations, internal slamming during ballast passage, and tank sloshing, which is
particularly damaging in low filled tanks.
Bending moments are generally divided into still water and wave or weather induced.
Each classification society has its own prediction method, based on empirically derived rules.
Still water bending moments result from the cargo and ballast loading condition. They
effectively impose a mean value about which weather induced bending moments fluctuate.
Wave induced loads are generally transmitted from the shell plate to the secondary members
(stiffeners), from there to the primary members (large webs), and finally to the hull girder.
Loads are transmitted along this path by shear and bending in the welded connections.
Even though fatigue is caused by the wave induced dynamic loads, the still water
bending moments are also crucial. This is because fluctuations about a higher mean value is
much more likely to exceed an allowable stress limit, resulting in a fracture or a permanent
deformation (yielding).
Besides global bending moments, there are a series of other factors that may cause
cracks. Examples include shear forces, weather induced stresses and slamming, corrosion and
wear, damage or overstressing during cargo operations, collision or grounding, sloshing in
ballast tanks etc.
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3.9.2 Iron Ore Loading and its Implications
There is a prevalence of iron ore cargos in bulk carrier losses. Most of the reasons for
this are associated with its high density. Dedicated iron ore carriers are designed so that cargo
holds are full when loaded but they are very rare. In capes, iron ore is either loaded in
alternate holds, leaving four holds empty, or homogeneously, in which case all holds are
partially loaded. Note that even in alternate loading of iron ore, bulker holds are only about
two-fifths full [NK 1992].
Partly loaded holds allow for a large floodable volume and provide no counterforce to
the hydrostatic sea pressure loads against the shell plate. This combined with transverse
bending of the double bottom due to cargo weight, cause flexing and fatigue of the side shell
and frames. Furthermore, the dense slurry that forms during flooding often causes bulkheads
to collapse.
During loading, iron ore is dropped from into the holds from high above. This results
in impact damages and dents which then form stress concentration sites. Due to its
abrasiveness, iron ore also leads to wear and coating breakdown. Corrosion is exacerbated by
the typical sequential loading of abrasive iron ore and corrosive coal. The high density of
iron ore also permits high loading rates which increase the chances of deviating from loading
plans. This is discussed in Section 3.9.3.
Free surface effects are not a -great danger with iron ore. However, inadequate cargo
trimming in partly loaded holds can lead to non-uniform loading. This increases local stresses
on the double bottom. Furthermore, the vessel's stiff and rapid rolling motion, due to heavy
ore, increases the dynamic loads from the cargo, water and hull mass, exacerbating the
loading situation [NK 1992, Ferguson 1991a]. This is more intense if cargo is loaded
homogeneously because the centre of gravity is lower. In alternate loading, the ship's centre
of gravity is higher and the rolling period is about 10% higher than in the homogeneous
loading condition [Plaza 1998].
A significant advantage of alternate loading is the time saved in terminals. Only five
cargo holds have to be discharged instead of nine, while the bottom part is the most time
consuming. Furthermore, fewer holds require cleaning and inspection. During loading, time
is saved because cranes need to move less frequently from one hold to another.
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Alternate loading is used with high density cargos like iron ore, which accounts for
more than half of the capesize trading volume. Cargos in capes often come in 2 bunches
(some times of a different grade of iron ore), that have to be unloaded in two consecutive
ports. In this case, the only option is a homogeneous loading condition on the first trip,
followed by alternate loading on the second. This is because cargo redistribution after
unloading the first bunch is usually impossible since loading and discharging facilities are
not both available in the same port. Even when they are, it is very difficult, expensive and
time consuming.
Alternate loading is fast, cheap, convenient and effective but it also amplifies hull
stresses. The maximum shear force, bending moment and tank top pressure, all approach the
maximum permissible levels, leaving only little reserve strength for the case of accidents.
Alternate loading involves higher loads on the inner bottom plates of laden holds. It also
involves high shear stresses on the longitudinal girders that support the cargo weight in one
hold, along with the up-thrust acting on the empty adjacent holds. This is demonstrated in
Fig. 3.9-1 and Fig. 3.9-2, which shows a finite element model of a cargo hold under alternate
loading.
Fig. 3.9-1: Alternate Loading Still Water Shearing Action of the Hull Girder of a Cape FIACS 19971
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Fig. 3.9-2: F.E. model of a D.Hull BC. Cargo Hold under Alternate Loading
(deformations magnified) [Shipping World & Shipbuilder 1997a]
Besides the double bottom, other locations that are highly stressed during alternate
loading include the main frames and brackets, the top side tanks, the deck (particularly at the
hatch corners), the hatch coamings and the cross decks. Special design is required, with
strengthened structural members, in order to allow alternate loading. Regulation XII/14 of the
2004 SOLAS Amendments, states that single hull bulk carriers over ten years old will not be
allowed to carry cargo of a density exceeding 1780kg/m3 (mainly iron ore) with any hold
loaded to less than 90% of the maximum allowable cargo weight. The only exemptions are
vessels which comply with the Reg. XII/5 structural strength requirements and the Res. MSC
168(79) s-hull side structure criteria [IMO 2004]. Most capes are strengthened and are
permitted by classification to perform alternate loading, but many owners avoid it as a safety
precaution, particularly in older vessels.
424
3.9.3 Damage during Cargo Operations
The dramatic increase in the transportation of iron ore over the late years has resulted
in heavy congestion at terminals. This increases pressure to speed up cargo operations to
unprecedented rates.
Heavy weight grabs weighing up to 36 tons [Plaza 1998] are used to unload capes.
Therefore, careless handling can result in serious structural damage, setting the stage for
corrosion and cracks. When unloading a large cape, 8,000 to 12,000 grab movements are
required at approximately 1 minute intervals [Ferguson et al 1993]. Therefore, mistakes and
subsequent damage are inevitable.
The use of pneumatic rams, bulldozers and pneumatic or hydraulic hammers to
dislodge cargo that is stuck between frames, also contributes to failure of the shell plating.
Catastrophic failure of the shell plating is suspected of being the cause of a number of vessels
disappearing without trace over the past several years [IACS 1998, Shipping World &
Shipbuilder 1997b]. Bulldozers or even grabs are used to vibrate the bulk heads by banging
them to remove sticky cargo which may adhere on them.
It is generally understood that the rate of loading and discharging has a great effect on
ship fatigue. This has been a great issue in regions like Brazilian iron ore terminals which
have capacities for loading rates up to 16,000 tonnes/hr. Such loading rates are achieved by
means of conveyor belts that may be several kilometers long.
It has been suggested that dynamic effects of high loading rates may directly affect
the ship's structure. However, this is unrealistic as the rate required to induce dynamic hull
flexing is of the order of a thousand tonnes per second [Corlett et al 1992]. Even at the
highest loading rates, therefore, the ship is quasi-static, in structural terms.
Though fatigue effects have not been scientifically explained in terms of fracture
mechanics, "...damage over time caused by high speed loading have been suggested by
experts as the possible causes of initial structural damage" [Corbett 2006a]. One reason why
damage may occur at high loading rates is the increased likelihood of deviating from the
loading/unloading sequence plan. Exceeding the permissible shear forces and bending
moments or overstressing the local structure is very likely when deviating from a
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loading/unloading sequence plan. Dramatic proof of what can go wrong came about in 1994
when a bulk carrier broke in half during loading at a port in South America [Oceansatlas].
Loading and discharging plans consist of a sequence of cargo and ballast operations
that are carefully calculated to avoid locally exceeding permissible stresses throughout the
process. A high number of passes (cargo pours) minimizes hull stresses, but is also very time
consuming and inconvenient. Fig. 3.9-3 shows a loading plan from a cape in Brazil,
involving loading rates of 16,000 tonnes/hr.
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Fig. 3.9-3: Typical Loading Sequence of a Cape Loading Iron Ore in Tubarao-Brazil at Rate of 16,000 t/hr
The impact forces which are generated when loading at 16,000 t/hr from a height of
18.3m are around 9 tons. Furthermore, some terminals aim to increase loading rates up to
32,000t/hr in the future [Ferguson et al 1993].
Even with a good intention and effort by the crew and stevedores to accurately follow
the plan, this may be difficult due to delays in communication between the ship and terminal,
or because terminal instrumentation does not give accurate loading rate information [IACS,
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1998, Williams 1998, Isbester 1991]. Surveys in the past have revealed discrepancies of up to
8000 tons between shore scales and draught readings [Grey 1991]. According to Lloyd's
Register, one of the contributory causes of structural failure and loss of bulk carriers is the
lack of precise information regarding the weight of cargo in individual holds [MER 1997]. A
5% or 10% overload in one hold, could increase the still water bending moment by up to
15% or 40% of allowable values in sea going condition respectively [DNV 1998, DNV
1997]. Bearing in mind that stopping requires careful planning and may take several minutes
[Oceansatlas], such overload conditions can easily occur at high loading rates.
According to IACS the main problems associated with overloading are the
synchronization of loading and ballasting operations, the sensitivity of the hull girder shear
forces and bending moments to overloading, and local structure overloading. Other reasons
include inaccurate terminal weighing equipment providing incorrect data, limited time
available to check the draught, and excessively loading cargo in a hold to compensate for
partial bunkers [IACS 1998, IACS 1997].
It is shocking to note that, besides language and communication issues, the loading
plan is often not followed, while some ships do not even have one, or have plans that don't
work [Doughty, 1997]. Sometimes it is very inconvenient or impossible to stop loading in
one hold and move to another according to plan. This is particularly difficult in some
terminals that are unable to move the loading system along the dock. That requires the ship to
move backwards and forwards in order to comply with the loading plan [Shipping World &
Shipbuilder 1997b]. As a result, ships have been kept on anchorage until further notice,
because their loading plans deviated from the terminal's standard procedures, which other
waiting ships were ready to accept [Mortensen 1998]. This puts a terrible pressure on the
master, since any delays may cost tens of thousand dollars to the owning company.
The main problem leading to overstressing is the coordination of loading and
deballasting or vice versa. Loading must not exceed pump deballasting rates, but this may be
difficult due to lack of capacity or information. Furthermore, ships may be tempted to
continue loading, even if pumps cannot keep up, in order to remain on hire. This problem
increases with age since, the deballasting rate tends to get slower as the ship gets older, while
the loading rates of terminals tend to be upgraded [Isbester 1998, Corlett et al 1992]. As a
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result, still water bending moment design values have been reportedly exceeded by 10-30%
during loading operations [Soares 1990].
Bulk carrier losses in recent years have been well documented and in many cases
have been the result of excessive stresses, induced by non-adherence to the loading plan, due
to lack of information during loading or because minor attention was paid to the mandatory
loading manual and diagram with regard to the loading procedure [Shipping World &
Shipbuilder 1997b, Intercargo 1998a, MER 1997].
The officer in charge is responsible of ensuring that the loading sequence and agreed
upon loading rates are followed, that stevedores are closely monitored and all damages
reported, and that effective communication with the terminal is maintained. They also have
to be in a position to stop all operations immediately if any deviations are observed [IACS
1998, IACS 1997].
3.9.4 Still Water Bending Stresses
The still water bending and shear stress distributions throughout the hull depend on
the loading condition. Capes in general sail under 4 standard loading conditions, except in
rare circumstances. These are "homogeneous loading" whereby all cargo holds are similarly
loaded, "alternate loading" where every second hold is loaded, "light ballast" where only the
ballast tanks are ballasted, and "heavy ballast" where usually one or in some cases two cargo
holds are also ballasted.
The worst loading condition in terms of stresses is the alternate loading condition.
Usually, only the odd numbered cargo holds are loaded but in some cases, the cargo in the
front three holds may be evenly distributed as shown in Fig. 3.9-4. This allows the cargo in
hold 2 to support the bulkhead in the case of flooding of hold 1 [Mortensen 1998], but is not
very convenient so it is rarely adopted.
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Fig. 3.9-4: "Traditional" Alternative Loading Condition [Mortensen 19981
Homogeneous loading is the most common and safe loading method. Heavy ballast is
the conventional way of ballasting as opposed to light ballasting. This usually involves the
additional ballasting of cargo hold 6 in order to increase the draught and thereby avoid
slamming which can lead to high stresses. Light ballasting is some times performed for small
trips if allowed by the weather and usually during repairs or idle time before loading in order
to clean the cargo hold.
Today, each ship has a software program that calculates the shear forces and bending
moments along the ship depending on the loading conditions. These are referred to as the still
water loads. Fig. 3.9-5 to 3.9-9 show typical examples under the four standard loading
conditions and block loading, which is a much rarer partly loaded configuration that also
required reinforcement as alternate loading.
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Fig. 3.9-5: Typical "ANCO" - Shear Stress and Bending Moment Distribution under Homogeneous Loading
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Fig. 3.9-6: Typical "ANCO" - Shear Stress and Bending Moment Distribution under Alternate Loading
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Fig. 3.9-9: Typical "ANCO" - Shear Stress and Bending Moment Distribution under Block Hold Loading
Besides this procedure, cargo mass calculations are also carried out to check whether
the maximum or minimum permissible loads are exceeded in any hold, location or structural
member. Each ship has a loading manual (booklet) for these calculations that is often
complemented by a loading instrument, usually incorporated in the ship's loading software.
This is always approved by the classification society. The loading instrument enables
effective planning and control of cargo and ballasting operations, rapid calculations of shear
forces and bending moments, and the identification of imposed structural limits [IACS 1998].
Fig. 3.9-10 shows the cargo mass results of a ship's software for the alternate loading
condition.
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Fig. 3.9-10: Cargo Mass Analysis for the Alternate Loading Condition
Among other rules, the ISM code also requires the installation of a loading
instrument, which is capable of providing information on hull girder shear stresses and
bending moments for all ships in excess of 150m [IACS 2005].
Having examined the stresses distributions during each loading condition in relation
to the maximum allowable, it would be interesting to note the implications if these values are
exceeded. Fig. 3.9-11 shows the progressive collapse behavior of a cape for different levels
of initial imperfections (such as cracks) in hogging if the allowable bending moments are
exceeded.
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Fig. 3.9-11: Progressive collapse behavior of a 170.OO0dwt single sided bulk carrier under vertical moment
varing the level of initial imperfections [Paik et al 2002]
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The stress distribution in the hull at the point of collapse is also depicted in Fig. 3.9-
12 and 3.9-13.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.9-12: Variation of the longitudinal stress distribution during progressive collapse under hogging moment
(a) pre-ultimate limit regime, (b) ultimate limit state [Paik et al 20021
I Y
(a) Sagging ib) Hogging
Fig. 3.9-13: Longitudinal Stress Distribution Over the Ship's Cross Section at the Overall Collapse State
[Paik et al 19951
3.9.5 Wave Induced Loads
Weather induced loads are a determining factor in a ship's life and can cause
significant damage over years through continuous fatigue cycles or within a few hours in a
strong storm. A simulation of the bending moment and shear force evolution, roughly
corresponding to that in which the Onomichi-Maru lost her fore peak and sank, is shown in
Fig. 3.9-14. Studies by [Bishop et al 1990] have concluded that the ratio of bending moment
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to shearing forces in the hull are proportional to the distance along the hull for about 20% of
the hull length.
Fig. 3.9-14: A Random iuain depicting the Bending Moment and Shear Force alona the hull of Onomichi-
Maru against time [Bishop et al 19851
Capes are particularly vulnerable to sea loads due to their large size. The design wave
load is different for every ship and varies between 5 and 6 tonnes/m 2 for large bulk carriers
[Langdon et al 2002]. During 20 years of operation, a cape experiences approximately 10^8
wave load cycles [Vassalos et al 2004].
The worst condition in terms of total bending stresses is when a ship loaded in
sagging encounters a sagging wave. This maximizes the tension on the bottom plate, while
the compression is taken by the topside tanks. Alternatively, [Thayamballi et al 1996] have
carried out simulations on a cape loaded in hogging (with CH 4 empty) as it encounters a
hogging wave, thus maximizing the tensile stresses on the deck. Their results showed an
applicable load BM value of 773,200tm (of which the still water BM was 253,540tm) for the
intact condition compared to 31 0,000tm which is the maximum allowable; and 1,011 ,600tm
(of which the still water BM was 491,900) when CH1 is flooded with 611 Ot. These results
demonstrate the effect of flooding, showing how allowable stresses may be exceeded while
the still water stresses are within acceptable limits even in the intact condition.
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Fig. 3.9-14: A Random simulation
[Paik et al 2003bJ calculate the mean bending moments on a cape during a 3hr storm
to be 4.673 GNm in hogging and - 4.210 GNm in sagging, and the still mean water bending
moments to be 5.93GNm. The wave induced bending moment is also presented as a function
of wave height in Fig. 3.9-15.
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Fig. 3.9-15: Variation of Wave-Induced Bending Moment of a 170,000dwt bulk carrier as a function of
significant wave height [Paik et al 2003b}
One of the most critical factors in severe weather conditions is maneuverability. A
ship with good maneuverability can be more easily guided to reduce the loads acting on it in
a storm. Consequently, it is less likely to suffer damages. A 150,000dwt cape is typically
fitted with a 11-12MW engine compared to 18-19MW in the early 1980s. While this has
reduced daily fuel consumption from 65t to 45t, it has also reduced the maneuverability of
the vessels [Langdon et al 2002].
An important factor in the induced bending moments is the size and frequency of the
waves encountered. Since wave scatter is a determining factor, there has been a lot of
statistical research into the field [Hogben 1990, Hogben et al 1986]. The MIT sea keeping
books by [Loukakis & Chryssostomidis 1975] are also often used for predicting the short
term bending moments experienced by ships. Fig. 3.9-16 shows the distribution of wave
heights worldwide.
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Fig. 3.9-16: Distribution of Waveheights Worldwide [Byrne et al 19981
Each society has its own empirical formulas for calculating the wave induced bending
moments on a ship's hull but they all recommend the use of the ship's loading manual for
still water bending moment calculations. All methods used for calculating the mean value of
wave-induced bending moments, consist of calculating the bending moment amidships, and
then using a distribution factor to translate this value at any location along the hull.
According to [Paik et al 2003b], the method given by IACS is that used by Bureau Veritas as
shown below. Examples from some of the major classification societies are presented below.
The mean value of extreme wave-induced bending moments, that a ship is likely to encounter
during its life for worldwide service, is given by:
Lloyd's Register:
American Bureau of S
Bureau Veritas:
MW =f xM. =f xo.1xCxL 2 x B x (C, +0.7)
hipping: MW = C2 xL 2 xBxHxK
For Hogging: M =190 x 10-3 x C x L2 xBxCb
For Sagging: M = -110 x10- 3 xCxL 2 xBx(Cb +0.7)
Germanischer Lloyd: For Hogging: M, = 0.19 xL2 x B x C0 x CL XCb
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(3.9-1)
(3.9-2)
(3.9-3)
(3.9-4)
(3.9-5)
For Sagging: M, = -0.11 x L2 x B x CO x CL X(Cb + 0.7)X C
(3.9-6)
Where: Mw = Wave induced bending moment amid ship in kNm
f = Ship service factor = 1 for unrestricted sea going service
C = 10.75 - 3 0 L) for ship length between 90 and 300m(100
Cb = block coefficient at summer load waterline
L = Scantling Length
B = Ship Beam
C2 = 0.0234Cb +0.002
H = wave parameter depending only on ship length L
Kb= 1.4 - 0.5Cb
Cm = GL Distribution Factor, equal to cv amidships for the sagging condition
(instead of 1) where cv is an influence factor depending on ship speed
Co, CL: See GL rules Section 4 A.2.2
In all the formulas, except GL's sagging condition, the wave induced bending
moment amidships is only a function of the ship length L, beam B and the block coefficient
Cb. The value obtained is then multiplied by the longitudinal distribution factor of each
classification society in order to obtain the wave induced bending moment anywhere along
the ship length. Plots of the tabulated values from the different rules are presented in Fig. 3.9-
17 to 3.9-19 along with GL's prediction in Fig. 3.9-20.
438
L R Longitudinal Distribution Factor of Wave Beuding Moment
lioo
8
0,2
0
AP 0Oat an o.mL O44 0OOL oM0L O.L OAt oML FP
Fig. 3.9-17: Plot of LR Longitudinal Distribution Factor of Wave Bending Moment
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Fig. 3.9-19: Plot of ABS Longitudinal Distribution Factor of Wave Bending Moment
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Where: cr= 3 4I
1.4 x JL
vo = Ship Speed
The shape of the wave induced bending moment distribution may influence the
distribution of cracks throughout the hull. This will be examined in the following chapters.
The distribution is approximately the same for the classification societies considered. The
bending moment peaks amidships and decreases more or less symmetrically towards the
stem and bow.
Besides wave induced bending moments, significant fatigue damage may also be
caused directly by the water pressure on the side shell. [Hansen and Winterstein 1995]
propose a model to analyze the sea loads on the side shell of a tanker and compare it with
1,990 reported fatigue cracks in 4 single hull 165,000dwt vessels by [Schulte-Strathaus
1991]. In their wave model, they account for the Froude-Kryloff pressure (from the incident
wave potential T1, in absence of ship) and for changes in hydrostatic pressure due to vessel
oscillations in calm water, and they neglect diffracted and radiated waves (wave potential PD
and PR due to presence and oscillations of vessel in calm water). They get their wave
parameters using a weighted average of the available statistics in the different Marsden
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zones, based on the specified trades of the vessels. Their results show that the water pressure
is of paramount importance as it accounts for the majority of the expected fatigue damage.
3.9.6 Real Time Stress Monitoring
Significant improvements in safety are achieved by controlling still water and wave
bending stresses by appropriate loading and by the use of real-time stress monitoring
systems. In new ships, sensors are placed on the deck and bulk heads allowing for continuous
display of real time information. This enables close monitoring of stresses during
loading/unloading and ballasting/deballasting procedures. Thereby, it can be ensured that the
vessel works within its design limits, greatly reducing the risk of hull damage by cargo
overloading.
Fig. 3.9-21: Typical Cargo Load and Hull stress monitoring system [MER 19941
By monitoring stresses during ship operations, loading can be stopped if the
stevedoring company fails to follow the ship's loading instructions. The stevedore is obliged
to sign an agreement to this before the commencement of loading. Data collected during
loading operations and voyages can also be used to monitor fatigue.
In addition to all these measures, improvements are made by choosing speed, course
and route in order to avoid excessive loads. Integrated hull condition monitoring systems
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have been developed, which, in addition to continuous display of stresses, also provide a
choice of route (using a radar), and guidance during severe weather conditions. This is
achieved by combining measurements of the wave parameters, the ship motions and the hull
stresses [Steen et al., MER 1994]. Fig. 3.9-22 shows the display of a hard weather avoidance
system.
Fig. 3.9-22: Display of the Hard Weather Avoidance System (MARINETEK 1990)
[Karlsen, 1990]
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CHAPTER 4
Structural Reliability Analysis
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4.1 Stress Survey
4.1.1 Overview
It is generally believed that cracking is caused primarily by the bending stresses
although other factors, including shear stresses, impact and damage, may also have an
influence. The permissible total bending stress given by the ABS classification rules is 1784
kg/cm2 [Ivanov et al 2004a].
The ship can be modeled as a beam and the bending stress at any location in the hull
is related to the vertical bending moment at the corresponding ship length by beam theory as
follows.
My M (4.1-1)
I Z
Where: a = bending stress
M = vertical bending moment
I= second moment of area
y = vertical distance from the neutral axis
Z = section modulus
The bending stress is thus maximized on the deck and bottom plate of the ship at any
location along the length. Its magnitude depends on the section modulus and the bending
moment at the corresponding location along the length. Each ship has a deck section modulus
and a bottom section modulus (which is slightly larger). These values are relatively constant
throughout the cargo hold region, since there are no major geometric changes. Though the
limit is on the bending stress, it is equivalent to quote the bending moment as a percentage of
the maximum allowable. Consequently, we are mainly concerned with the distribution of the
bending moments along the hull.
The total bending moment acting on the hull is determined by superimposing the
fluctuating wave induced bending moments and the still water bending moments. The wave
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induced bending moments will be distributed throughout the hull as shown in Fig 3.9-17 to
Fig. 3.9-20 of Section 3.9.5. The still water bending moments that are experienced by a ship
throughout its life depend on the ship type, its trade and its loading patterns. Statistical
analysis that was carried out extensively in the 1970s has shown that still water bending
moments obey a Gaussian distribution [Mano et al 1977, Ivanov et al 1975, Lewis et al 1973,
Ivanov 1973, Soares et al 1982].
Capes are quite unique in their structure with specific trading and loading patterns
that are very different to those of smaller bulkers and other ship types. A focused analysis is,
therefore, presented in the following section in order to determine the distribution of the
average still water bending moments imposed on a typical cape throughout its operating life.
4.1.2 Still Water Bending Moment Analysis
4.1.2.1 Average Time under each Loading Condition
The record books of fifty capes were used to evaluate the average percentage of time
spent under each of the four common loading conditions, denoted by the letter "K". Four
consecutive voyages were considered at a time, in order to account for round trip averages.
These were chosen from different years in order to account for the changes in loading
patterns over time. It was noticed that, on average, the use of alternate loading has decreased
slightly over time. The cracks which have been recorded in capes so far also depend on the
loading procedures of the past. Since we will later examine the correlation of crack initiation
and growth rates with stresses, the results were left unmodified in order to reflect historical
usage patterns.
Idle time, repair time (in the water) and cleaning time were all included and account
for the majority of light ballast time. Dry docking only accounts for a small percentage of the
time and this was neglected. Only the 4 standard loading conditions were accounted for since
other types are quite rare. Consecutive voyages were chosen so as not to coincide with dry
docks or any rare loading conditions.
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It was considered reasonably accurate to distribute the loading and discharging time
(which accounted for less than 10%) evenly between the 4 loading conditions. This was done
under the assumption that during loading homogeneously (which is most common), the
various stages of the process can be approximated by a change from a combination of
alternate loading and heavy ballast to combinations more closely resembled by homogeneous
loading and light ballast. Correspondingly, when a ship unloads from the homogeneous
loading condition, the transient states of the ship tend to move from combinations of
homogeneous loading and light ballast to those resembled better by alternate loading and
heavy ballast. After making the above assumptions, the results of the survey were compiled
and are summarized in Table 4.1-1.
50 CAPE AVERAGE LOADING CONDITION TIME DISTRIBUTION
LOADING CONDITION AVERAGE % TIME
HOMOGENEOUS LOADING (K-1) 39.5
ALTERNATE LOADING (ic=2) 16.3
HEAVY BALLAST (K=3) 36.4
LIGHT BALLAST (K=4) 7.8
Table 4.1-1: Average time sailing under each loading condition
4.1.2.2 Average Still Water Bending Moment Distribution in the Ship
Hull
The loading program "ANCO" of twenty capes was used to calculate the still water
bending moments at 20 locations "i " along the ship length under each loading condition.
The program allows the input of any amount of cargo or ballast in each hold or tank
respectively and calculates the shear stresses and bending moments at every point " t " along
the hull. It then outputs the result as a percentage of the maximum allowable still water
bending moment (%BM). Average values of the twenty ships were calculated for each
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location under each of the 4 loading conditions. The results are presented in Fig. 4.1-1 to 4.1-
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Fig. 4.1-1: Average Bending Moment Distribution as a Percentage of the Maximum Allowable for the
Homogeneous Loading Condition
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Fig. 4.1-2: Average Bending Moment Distribution as a Percentage of the Maximum Allowable for the Alternate
Loading Condition
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Fig. 4.1-3: Average Bending Moment Distribution as a Percentage of the Maximum Allowable for the
Light Ballast Condition
Fig. 4.1-4: Average Bending Moment Distribution as a Percentage of the Maximum Allowable for the Heavy
Ballast Condition
The results shown in Fig. 4.1-1 to 4.1-4 were combined with the average percentage
time spent under each of the four loading conditions from Table 4.1-1, to evaluate an average
percentage of the allowable still water bending moment along the ship length. This was
evaluated as follows.
(=4
%BMf =I (%t,) (%BMKC, (4.1-2)
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Where: %BMt = Average % of allowable bending moment at location " t "
%tK= Average time under each loading condition "K" (Table 4.1-1)
%BMK = Average % of allowable bending moment at location " t " under
each loading condition "K" (Fig. 4.1-1 to Fig. 4.1-4)
Note that the average percentage of allowable bending moment, %BMe, is equivalent
to the average percentage of allowable bending stress. The value was evaluated along the
ship and plotted as a function of" e ", as shown in Fig. 4.1-5.
AVERAGE BENDING MONVENT MAGNITUDE
Fig. 4.1-5: Average Percentage of Allowable Still Water Bending Moment along the Ship Hull
It should be noted that this graph only gives an indication of the average magnitude of
still water bending stresses to which a capesize bulk carrier is subjected throughout its life.
The actual bending moment distributions experienced at any time will be given by
superimpositions of still water bending moments (Fig. 4.1-1 to 4.1-4) and wave induced
bending moments (Fig 2.9-17 to 2.9-20 of Section 3.9.5).
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4.2 Crack Distribution
4.2.1 Previous Work on Cracks
Theoretical, analytical and numerical methods have been developed to assess the
problem of cracks in many ways. Modeling of the marine environment, however, and
accurately predicting the actual conditions and stresses are practically impossible. Therefore,
it is essential to take direct measurements from ships and any conclusions derived as such
will be much more reliable for the time being.
Extensive research of this sort has been carried out to cover the aspect of corrosion in
great detail. As outlined in Section 3.5, several databases of direct ultrasonic gauge readings
have been collected and statistical studies have been performed. Similar studies on cracking,
however, are very limited and most are quite old as can be seen in Table 4.2-1, which
summarizes all such studies reported over the past 50 years.
DIRECT MEASUREMENT BASED SHIP CRACK LITERATURE 1958 - 2005
Author Classification Number of Type of Data
Society Ships/Type
[LR, ABS and DNV LR, ABS & 224 Double Hull 1,949 Defects (1,323
2006] DNV Tankers Cracks Included)
[JBP 20051 BV, CCS, NK, 76 Single Hull Fatigue Damages
KR, RINA & VLCC Tankers built
RS after 1985
[GL 2005b Private GL (72 of 145) 145 Bulk Carriers 783 Damages
Correspondence]
[GL 2005b Private GL 193 Tankers 1,201 Damages
Correspondence]
[NK (b) Private NK 124 (Tank, Ore C. & 643 Cracks
452
Correspondence] Bulkers)
[DNV 2002 Private DNV - 221 Cracks / 304
Correspondence] Damages
[LR 1999 Private LR 1,405 Bulkers 19,115 Damage
Correspondence] Defects
[Bea et. Al 1995] - 10 Tankers 3600 cracks
[Yoneya et al 1993] NK 18 VLCC -180 cracks
[Ferguson et al 1993] LR Bulk + OBO Damages
[Schulte-Strathaus - 4 S-Hull 165kdwt + 1990 + 1660 Fatigue
1991] 5 D-Bottom or D- Cracks
Hull 35-188kdwt
[Exxon 1983 Private - >40 Exxon Tankers Cracking/ Corrosion
Correspondence]
[SSC 1980] - 36 3,555
Cracking/Buckling
[Jordan et al 1978] - -50 (various) 6,856 damages
[Antoniou 1977] - 233 Tankers 25,652 Cracks
[ABS 1976] ABS 535 Bulk Carriers 104 Damages
[ABS 1976] ABS 411 Tankers 413 Damages
[LR 1976] LR Cracks
[NK 1976] NK 176 (Tank / Ore C./ Cracks
Bulkers)
[LR 1975] LR - Defects
[ISSC 1973] 73 Cut-out Damages
[Yamaguchi 1968] NK 97 Damages
[Vedeler, 1958] DNV - Cracks
[NK (a)] NK Damages
Table 4.2-1: Crack and Damage Surveys
This is mainly due to the high confidentiality and difficulty of access to raw data
which is never available to the public. Most of the work has been carried out by classification
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societies who have access to the data of ships in the fleet under their classification. Many of
them do not report details of their findings but only use them to develop their rules.
Consequently, many of the surveys are not published and the number of ships and defects of
the surveys are usually not made available.
Classification societies are so careful in protecting the confidentiality of the data, that
they sometimes even withhold anonymous statistical results. In their survey of defects of
double hull tankers (including cracks), [LR, ABS and DNV 2006] simply state "Because of
the small number of ULCC's (i.e. they can easily be identified) this data has been withheld".
Some of the surveys only focus on a certain age group of vessels or only examine a
particular area such as the After Peak [LR 1976]. Furthermore, very few surveys have been
performed specifically on cracks. Most cover a wide range of damages or failures including
dents, buckling, corrosion etc.
The work most closely aligned with the current project's objectives was that of Prof.
Antoniou who performed an 8 year crack survey on Tankers of all sizes, coming for repairs
at the shipyard of Skaramangas in Greece during the 1970s [Antoniou 1977]. The work of
Schulte-Strathaus at U.C. Berkeley in the early 1990s, also appears to cover the whole range
of fatigue cracks but is only limited to 9 vessels. Surprisingly, no survey has been performed
on capesize bulk carriers in particular where the problem is most crucial.
4.2.2 Objective
The aim of this section is to examine the whole spectrum of cracks developed
throughout the life of capesize bulk carriers which are known to be most vulnerable to the
problem. Important statistics are presented regarding the location, size and frequency of
cracks with respect to the ship's age. It should be noted that since only a particular size group
of bulk carriers is considered, an investigation of the above parameters with respect to ship
length or deadweight is not feasible. Finally, the aim is also to examine the methods of repair
for the various cracks with respect to crack origin, location and size.
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It is also important to note that there are numerous factors affecting cracking
behavior. Examples include the shipyard where the ship was built; the operator, crew and
maintenance; the location, frequency and quality of repairs throughout the ship's life; the
trading route, cargo and the weather encountered by the ship; the classification society, the
surveyor and the port of inspection etc. Information may only be available on some of these
factors and it is very hard to quantify. As with all research, some parameters have to be
neglected. This, however, can be accounted for by working with a large sample of data.
4.2.3 Database
In order to perform the required analysis a large sample size is required in terms of
ships, cracks and total crack length. It is also very important to have a good age distribution
of the ships in the database. An adequate number of ships is required for each age in order to
get a representative average crack distribution throughout the ship's life. The data required
consists of ship age at the time of the survey; number, size and location of cracks; and the
types of repairs carried out.
Data regarding cracks in its raw state is highly confidential and thus access to it was
of great difficulty. As [Adam et al 1991] quotes about defects information in the Lloyd's
Register database, "No identifiable information is released to third parties without the
owner's consent. In most cases we can present the data statistically to preserve its
anonymity ". Furthermore, the size of the database in such statistical surveys is crucial to the
validity of the results. Therefore, all possible sources were exploited.
The data came from IACS classification societies, ship owning companies and
shipyards. Access in most cases was provided under the condition that the data sources and
ship names would remain confidential. Classification societies only then have the legal right
to release any data unless they have direct permission from the shipowner. In its raw state,
the data is in the form of survey reports, some of which are well over 150 pages long.
Classification society records included an average of about 30 surveys per ship, of which
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about half were hull related and relevant. These were searched in detail and all cracks,
locations, crack sizes and repair procedures were recorded.
Unfortunately, when compared to data from owners and shipyards, some of the data
from classification societies seemed inaccurate and incomplete. Reasons for this include the
fact that only specified locations are inspected in each survey. Ballast tanks for example are
not usually inspected in annual surveys. One of the measures taken to deal with this was the
use of only one data entry per year for a given ship which includes all the surveys within that
year.
Classification societies don't all have the same procedures in terms of reporting and
these may also vary between surveyors. The detail of the survey and hence the likelihood of
recording cracks depends on many factors including the survey type, the surveyor, the port of
inspection, the ship age etc. In addition to this, cracks are often repaired without being
reported and repairs are often reported without indicating whether cracks were present
beforehand. This is often the case when a large plate has to be replaced due to corrosion
wastage, in which case the surveyor may not bother to find all the cracks on the plate and
report them. This leads to information which is usually very vague and inaccurate.
It is also often the case that the owners find cracks and repair them without reporting
them to the classification society. Consequently, additional records from the ship owning
companies had to be referenced in order to complete the data before it could be used. By
combining the records of classification societies, shipowners and shipyards for each repair, a
more complete set of data was obtained. Table 4.2-2 gives the number of ships from each
source and the Venn Diagram in Fig. 4.2-1 illustrates the overlap in the data sources.
Table 4.2-2: Number of Ships from each Source
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Fig. 4.2-1: Venn Diagram with Number of Ships from each Source
One entry of data was used for each ship every year. This means that cracks reported
in several surveys on a ship within one year were all combined into one set (one data entry),
and that a ship was reported as two separate entries if data from two different years was used.
This resulted in a database size of 240 ships (data entries) with the age distribution shown in
Fig. 4.2-2.
Distribution of Ships by Age
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Fig. 4.2-2: Distribution Crack-Database Ships by Age
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As can be seen, the data sample is well distributed and covers a wide range of ages.
Sharp decreases in the number of ships, however, appear after the age of 5, 10, 15 and 20
years. The main reason for this is that major repairs or surveys are rarely required during the
year immediately after a special survey which is normally passed during these ages.
Excluding those peaks, the distribution seems to roughly follow a normal distribution and
looks relatively symmetric about a mean of approximately fifteen years.
TOTAL DATA SAMPLE
Total Number of Ships (entries) 240
Total Number of Cracks 29,567
Total Crack Length (km) 7.82
Mean Crack Size (mm) 264
Mean Number of Cracks per Ship 123
Mean Total Crack Length per Ship (mm) 32,582
Table 4.2-3: Final Data Sample
4.2.4 Location Coding System
In order to perform the analysis and present the results, a system of coding was
devised, whereby each location is asserted a particular code. The following system was
finalized after several modifications that had to be made throughout the analysis. Bearing in
mind that any such modifications led to a huge amount of subsequent work in regrouping the
data, particularly during the later stages, such a system has to be very detailed and accurate
from the beginning. Therefore, the coding system devised here is recommended for future
projects. With minor modifications, it could be applied to other types of ships, such as
tankers, or used in research assessing different damages such as dents, buckling, corrosion, or
coating failure etc.
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The ship was divided into 3 zones along the height going upwards as shown in Fig.
4.2-3.
-- - -- -
DERMTtO.. OF AI;MA
Fig. 4.2-3: BV Definition of Areas [Loukakis. 2009]
The ship was similarly divided into 11 compartments along the length going forward
as follows:
Compartment 1: After Peak and Engine Room
Compartments 2-10: Cargo Holds (9)
Compartment 11: Fore Peak
2)' 3 (71
Fig. 4.2-4: The 11 Compartments along the ship Length
Each compartment includes only its stem bulkhead. This leads to an even distribution
of 1 large Bulkhead allocated to each compartment. Each compartment along the ship length
was further divided to subsections as summarized below:
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Fig. 4.2-5: Structural Configuration of a Typical Capesize Bulk Carrier
[MER 2002a]
1 DECK AND UPPER WING TANK
a Transverse Web Frame + Transverse bulk heads + Stiffeners i=1
b Shell plate and shell longitudinals i=2
c Slopping plates and longitudinals i=3
d Longitudinal Girder (Longitudinal bulkhead) i=4
e Hatch coamings and stays (brackets) + Transverse Hatch End Beam i=5
f Deck plate and Longitudinals i=6
2 CARGO HOLD
a Shell Plate and Cargo Hold Frames (upper part) i=7
b Shell Plate and Cargo Hold Frames (mid part) i=8
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c Shell Plate and Cargo Hold Frames (lower part) i=9
3 LOWER WING TANK
a Bilge Web Frames (transverse web) + Stiffeners i=10
b Bilge plate + Bilge Longitudinals + Bilge Keel i= 1I
c Hopper plate and Longitudinals i=12
d Longitudinal girder and Stiffeners i=13
4 DOUBLE BOTTOM
a Inner bottom plate and Longitudinals i=14
b Transverse floors and stiffeners i=15
c Bottom shell plate and Longitudinals i=16
d Longitudinal Girder and Stiffeners i=17
5 TRANSVERSE CARGO HOLD BULKHEADS
a Upper Stool i=18
b Corrugated Bulk Head Plate - upper part (-30%) i=19
c Corrugated Bulk Head Plate - mid part (-55%) i=20
d Corrugated Bulk Head Plate - lower part (-15%) i=21
e Lower Stool i=22
f Side Trunk (usually in alternate bulk heads) i=23
6 OTHER
a Stringers i=24
b Girders i=25
c Pillars / Struts i=26
Even with a carefully devised system as above, one always needs to make certain
adjustments or decisions on how to deal with peculiar data samples. Some examples are
given in Table 4.2-4.
461
abe4 .24: iv1Uu1ioLs in unexMeced aata
The cracks of the database ranged from 50mm to 8000mm and the vast majority were
reported to the nearest 50mm irrespective of their location. Therefore, the database consists
of 16 different crack sizes. Under the coding system each crack can be recorded by its size,
compartment number (1 to 11) and region (la to 6c). We can describe this using in a 3D
matrix where the "i" index is the region ranging from 1 to 26, the compartment is the "j"
index ranging from 1 to 11 and the size is the k index ranging from 1 to 16. Though not very
common, a 3-D matrix can simply be implemented in a code as a 2-D matrix of pointers to
arrays.
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ADJUSTMENTS
CASE SOLUTION
Ships with 8 cargo holds Cracks found in CH8 repeated in CH9
Ships with over 9 cargo holds Excluded
Double hull ships Excluded
Ore Bulk Ore carriers Excluded
Romanian Ships: Cracks in horizontal Quoted as cracks in vertical frames (2a &
tripping brackets of CHI & CH9 2c)
New Ships: Tripping brackets (slant Quoted as cargo hold frames (2a & 2c)
plates) included between frames (in old
ships, this was done only in CHI).
Rudder Cracks Quoted as Longitudinal bulkhead (Id)
Engine Room: Cracks in engine or Not considered as they do not form part
auxiliary components of the hull structure
Engine Room: Cracks in the bulkheads of Quoted as la (transverse) or Id
small tanks (longitudinal)
CH9 aft bulkhead has no upper or lower Cracks in that region quoted as upper or
stool (5a & 5e) lower corrugation (5b & 5d)
T-
A 3D matrix called Cs is set up for each ship "s" which includes all its cracks. After
all the data has been inserted, the matrix component [Os]jk gives us the number of cracks
of the description given by "i", "j" and "k". For example, [Os 122,6,4 = 2 means that ship "s"
has two cracks of 200mm (k=4) in the lower stool (i=22) of cargo hold 5 0=6).
By summing over the k dimension, we compress the matrix into a 2D matrix, Ns
which gives us the total number of cracks (irrespective of size) in each location described by
region "i" and compartment "j". The elements of the resulting matrix are given by:
Rs = [s (4.2-1)
k
To get the total crack length in each location, we start by creating a size matrix S
which is again 3D but varies only in the k dimension. The elements of the matrix S are given
by: IS k= 50k for k=l to k=16.
[5]ij, =50, [5]i,2 = 100 ....... [S]ij,16 = 8000 (4.2-2)
Now we need to use the two 3-D matrices, Cs and S, to develop a 2D matrix Ls
which gives the total crack length in each location ij. The type of operations which take you
from 3-D to 2-D are referred to as "Open Matrix Multiplications" in contrast to "Closed
Matrix Multiplications " where the degrees of freedom are held constant. To get Ls we need
to develop a new "Open Matrix Multiplication" product. To do that, we start from the
Hadamard Product (a sub-matrix of the Kronecker Product) which is used for 2-D matrices.
For 2-D matrices, the Hadamard Product , also known as Entrywise Product and
Schur Product, is defined as: [ A -B ],[ = B . (4.2-3)
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This is unrelated to ordinary matrix multiplication (inner product) which is defined as:
[AB]91 = 5 lir L r . In the Hadamard Product, each component ij in the resulting
r=1
matrix is the product of the respective components ij in the individual matrices.
First, we extend the Hadamard Product to 3-D matrices and we sum over the k-
dimension in order to compress from 3-D to 2-D. As a result, we develop a 2-D L-Matrix
matrix in which the elements are given by:
(4.2-4)is Q k
The matrix Ls , therefore, gives the total crack length in each location and
compartment of ship s
Summary
For each ship "s":
1. We input the data according to crack location and size into Cs (3-D)
2. We compress to Ns (2-D), which gives the number of cracks in each location ij.
3. We "combine" with Ss using the above defined modified-Hadamard open matrix
multiplication product to get Ls, which gives the total crack length in each location ij.
Now for each data sample (ship) "s" we have the ship's age at the time of the repair
and the matrices Cs, Ns and Ls. We can then sum these matrices across all the ships of the
database to create combined matrices for the whole data sample C, N and L. The elements
of these matrices are given by:
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D ij,k = e i,j,k
5 $s (4.2-5)
S
We can also sum matrices Cs, Ns and Ls across all the ships of a particular age
group "A" to create combined matrices for each age ranging from 0 to 28 years. Denote these
as C , and i. The elements of these matrices are given by:
A
[ A ] ijk Z (S= i~
S
[ [SEA]I, (4.2-6)
ASe
After processing all the data, we have developed matrices CS , Ns and Ls for each of
the 240 ships, matrices CA, NA and iA for each ship age from 0 to 28, and matrices a, N
and L for the whole data sample.
Having developed theses matrices, we can then sum over the relevant compartments
"j", locations "i" or ages "A" in each matrix, to obtain the distribution of cracks or crack
lengths along the ship length, height or within each location for each ship, ship age group or
for the whole data sample. Many results can easily be derived once the above matrices are
developed and can be presented in a graphical form. A selection of those is summarized in
Section 4.2.5.
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4.2.5 Result Presentation and Analysis
4.2.5.1 The Hull Distribution of Cracks
4.2.5.1.1 Distribution along Ship Length
By summing over the i-components of the N matrix, we compress the 2-D N matrix
into a 1-D matrix which gives the total number of cracks from the whole database in each
compartment "j". This gives us the average distribution of the cracks (by number) along the
ship length. The results are summarized in Fig. 4.2-6.
Fig. 4.2-6: Crack Distribution along Ship Length
This result is very close to what would be expected if the ship hull is modeled as a
beam in bending where the bending stresses are maximized at the centre. The aft end 0=1),
cargo area 0=2 to 10) and fore peak 0=11) account for 0.73%, 95.5% and 6.6% of cracks. A
similar analysis on defects (67.9% cracks) in double-hull tankers by [LR, ABS and DNV
2005] showed 6.4%, 82.8% and 10.3% respectively across all ship sizes. Their results for
suezmaxes (closest size to a cape), were 4.8%, 89.7% and 5.4% respectively. The results
obtained by Lloyd's Register in a damage survey (including cracks) on Bulk Carriers and
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OBOs of 65'000dwt and larger, were 9.0%, 77.8% and 13.2% respectively [Ferguson et al
1993].
However, they are in slight contrast with those of Fig. 4.2-6, because the Lloyd's
register results are slightly negatively skewed, showing a maximum of hull damages in the
forward mid-section of the ship, as shown in Table 4.2-5.
Hull Damages Distribution in Bulk & OBO Carriers of 65 000 DWT +
Region AP+ER MID-AFT MID FWD-MID FP
% Damages 9.01 17.11 27.93 32.74 13.21
Table 4.2-5: Lloyd's Register Hull Damage Survey Results for PMX + size ships [Ferguson et al 19931
The crack distribution along the hull has a similar shape to the distribution of wave
induced bending moments as shown in Fig 2.9-17 - 2.9-20 of Section 3.9.5. A link is thereby
demonstrated between the highly stressed areas and those which are prone to cracking. It
should be noted that cracks may appear for numerous reasons as discussed earlier and also
that the ship structure is strengthened accordingly in the relevant locations to accommodate
the high stresses. As a result, this counterbalances the effect and hence weakens the link
between the two.
The compartment with the most cracks is j=5, which corresponds to cargo hold 6,
with 5,288 cracks (17.88% of the total). This is the cargo hold which is ballasted during the
heavy ballast condition in approximately 80% of capes. According to the analysis in Section
4.1, the heavy ballast condition accounts for approximately 3 6.4% of the time. As shown in
Fig. 3.9-5 to Fig. 3.9-9 in Section 3.9.4, heavy ballasting is the worst of the loading
conditions. The bending moment peaks at the ballasted hold and the shear force peaks at its
adjacent bulkheads with values often exceeding 90% of the allowable stress.
In some ships, cargo hold 4 corresponding to compartment j=7 is used during the
heavy ballast condition. Compartment j=7 also shows a relatively large number of cracks.
Approximately 5% of the ships, particularly the larger ones, use two cargo holds for heavy
ballasting, usually cargo holds 4 and 6. Additional cargo holds (e.g. all even numbered holds)
are also often used for port ballast. Heavy ballasting holds are always enhanced. However, as
shown in Fig. 4.2-6, an increased crack frequency is still evident in CH6.
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In the fore peak region (compartment 11), most of the 1,109 cracks are associated
with heavy weather. Dynamic loads arise from the impact of waves at the bow and also due
to free surface effects in the fore peak tank when it is partly ballasted. The area is significant
enhanced to account for this but sometimes, over-enhancement, again leads to the same
problem. Cracks often develop from the inner side of the fore peak if it is over-enhanced, and
consequently too stiff, even though there is significantly less flexing in this part of the ship
compared to the centre.
According to [Janzen et al 1973}, severe damages can also occur in the bottom of the
forward vessel when traveling on light ballast if not reinforced appropriately. The cracks
which develop at scallops or brackets, depending on the fore peak design, are the most
common cracks in this compartment. They are a consequence of wear, design and stress.
Most other cracks in the fore peak were only due to corrosion.
The after peak and engine room (j = 1) contained a total of 215 cracks. Overall,
cracks towards the stem or bow of the ship are relatively few in number. This is in agreement
with the results obtained by [Antoniou 1977]. 82% of crack and buckling failures were also
found to occur in the mid-ship portion of the ship in a survey carried out by [SSC 1978].
The reduced number of cracks at the two ends of the ship in the database is mainly
accounted for by the lower wing tanks and double bottoms (regions 3 and 4). Bending
moments are lower at the ship ends, but more importantly, the geometry is different. The ship
"closes up" going backwards or forwards, leading to a higher density of frames and to a
smoother curvature of the side shell and bilge web frames with no abrupt corners. The
hoppers are also larger than those in compartments closer to mid-ship.
Cargo hold 9 (Compartment j=2) accounts for 1,345 cracks (4.55% of the total) and
cargo hold 1 (Compartment j=10) accounts for 1.942 cracks (6.57% of the total). In the
survey conducted by [NK 1976], the corresponding locations in 22 Handy/PMX size bulk
carriers had 7% and 11% of the cracks respectively while the fore peak tank had the least.
Compartment j=1 which comprises of the after peak and the engine room includes the
least number of cracks (215 in total). Very few ships were found to have cracks in the after
peak. Stresses in this area are very low compared to those in the rest of the hull. Cracks in
this area develop mostly due to wear and corrosion or vibrations from the engine, shaft,
propeller or steering gear. Cracks in the rudder trunk were very few and they were located
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under the longitudinal bulkhead. They are due to sudden rudder shaft vibration being
transmitted from the steering gear.
Very few cracks were also reported in the engine room, again in a small number of
ships. These are mostly due to vibration or local stresses and include mainly cracks in bracket
or stiffener ends, at the connections of struts with pillars (mostly on struts) (6c), on transverse
web frames (la), and in the small transverse bulkheads (la) or longitudinal bulkheads (id) of
fuel oil and diesel oil tanks. A few cracks were reported on the main engine but these were
not recorded as they are not part of the hull structure. Very few cracks were also reported in
the void space of the double bottom region under the engine (4b & 4d). These are very rare
and develop due to vibration or as a consequence of low quality welds and small defects.
Finally, it should also be noted that after peak and engine room cracks were more
common in newer ships.
4.2.5.1.2 Distribution along Ship Height
By summing over the j-components of the N matrix, we compress the 2-D N matrix
into a 1-D matrix which gives the total number of cracks from the whole database in each
location "i". This is a (1x26) matrix. Then we can group locations "i" into those which
correspond to the bottom, middle and upper part of the ship. This reduces the size of the
matrix to (1x3). The cracks in region 6 (Stringers, Pillars, Girders and struts) were distributed
to height areas 1, 2 and 3 by a ratio of 4:3:3 respectively which is approximately the ratio by
which these structures are allocated along the height. This only has a small influence since
region 6 only accounts for 1.6% of the total number of cracks.
The bottom part (height 1) includes regions 3 and 4, 5d, 5e and 40% of 6. The middle
(height 2) includes regions 2, 5c, 5f, and 30% of 6. The upper part (height 3) includes regions
1, 5a, 5b and 30% of 6. The results are shown in Fig. 4.2-7.
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Fig. 4.2-7: Number of Cracks along Ship Height
Evidently, the tension that prevails in the lower height results in the a higher crack
frequency. Higher bending stresses are expected near the top and bottom edge of the ship
simply by modeling the ship as a beam in bending:
Y -My -M
I Z
Fig. 4.2-8: Stress distribution w.r.t. Ship Height
where Z is the section modulus and has two values, one for the region below and one for the
region above the centre line. Hence, by looking at the crack distribution along the height,
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Crack Distribution along Ship Height
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there seems again to be an association between the highly stressed regions and those prone to
cracking.
However, the difference between the number of cracks in the upper (3) and lower (1)
zones compared with the neutral axis zone (2) is not very large. The number of cracks near
the neutral axis zone (height 2) is largely due to the numerous small components such as
brackets which are very susceptible to small cracks. The analysis was thus further extended
to provide a distribution of the total crack length in the same regions as shown in Fig. 4.2-9a.
This is done by repeating the exact procedure but starting with matrix L as opposed to N.
Fig. 4.2-9a: Total Crack Length distribution along ship Height
This clearly shows a more defined increase in the upper and lower regions in
comparison to the middle. The higher total crack length in the lower part of the ship is also
consistent with the fact that the neutral axis is lower than the middle of the ship.
Similar results were observed by the in a survey of 76 single hull VLCC tankers by
the Joint Bulker Project group. These are shown in Fig. 4.2-9b.
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Fig. 4.2-9b: Fatigue Damage Frequency in COT and WBT [JBP 20051
4.2.5.1.3 Crack Distribution by Location and Repairs
By summing over the j-components of the N matrix, we compressed the 2-D N
matrix into a 1-D matrix of size (1x26) which gives the total number of cracks from the
whole database in each location "i". Previously, we grouped locations "i" into "height"
categories and reduced the size of the matrix to (1x3). Now instead of doing that, we can
simply plot this (1x26) matrix in a chart to show the total number of cracks in each location
"' across all compartments. That is shown in Fig. 4.2-10.
Fig. 4.2-10: Total Crack Distribution in the various Locations
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The 2-D N matrix is of size (26x11). We can also break this down into 11 l-D
matrixes of size (1x26). Each 1-D matrix corresponds to a compartment "j" and its elements
give the number of cracks in each of the 26 locations "i" within that compartment. The
results are summarized in Fig. 4.2-11 to 4.1-21.
Fig. 4.2-11: Crack Distribution in Compartment 1
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Fig. 4.2-12: Crack Distribution in Compartment 2
Fig. 4.2- 13: Crack Distribution in Compartment 3
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Fig. 4.2-14: Crack Distribution in Compartment 4
Fig. 4.2-15: Crack Distribution in Compartment 5
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Fig. 4.2-16: Crack Distribution in Compartment 6
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Fig. 4.2-17: Crack Distribution in Compartment 7
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Fig. 4.2-18: Crack Distribution in Compartment 8
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Fig. 4.2-19: Crack Distribution in Compartment 9
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Fig. 4.2-20: Crack Distribution in Compartment 10
Fig. 4.2-21: Crack Distribution in Compartment 11
As shown in Fig. 4.2-10, the region with the highest crack frequency was the lower
wing tank area (3) with a total of 9,290 cracks followed by 8,931 cracks in the Deck and
upper wing tanks (1). Ballast tanks, combined, account for approximately 60% of all cracks.
The crack distribution, however, varies significantly along the length of the ship as can be
seen in the subsequent graphs (Fig. 4.2-11 to 4.1-21). The lower wing tank area shows a
much higher number of cracks in the mid ship region (cargo holds 4-7) compared to the ship
ends. The cargo hold region (shell and frames) also shows a relatively high number of cracks
and appears to be the most vulnerable region in cargo hold 1 with 703 cracks out of the
1,942.
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4.2.5.1.3.1 Region 1 - Deck & Upper Wing Tank (i =1 to 6)
The deck and upper wing tank is the region with the most cracks in compartments 2,
3, 8 and 9 and ranks second in the remaining except for compartment 11. It is also second
overall with a total of 8,931 cracks (30.2% of the total).
Cracks in region 1 develop mainly due to high local stresses but the whole region is
also very vulnerable to corrosion. This is because the upper wing tanks undergo cycles of sea
water and air exposure more than any other region in the ship (lower tanks must usually be
full in order to ballast upper wing tanks). Therefore, many of the cracks develop by the
mechanism of stress corrosion cracking.
The most vulnerable location appears to be that of the transverse web frames and
stiffeners (la), where a total of 3,312 cracks were recorded. Most of these were dealt with by
increasing the plate thickness from say 12mm to 14mm. Initiation usually takes place at the 3
"corners" of the o-ring, most common being the lower and the inner (to the ship) corners.
Fig. 4.2-22 shows the typical repairs which are carried out.
insert plate with increased
thickness
Fig. 4.2-22: Enhancement of Top Side Tank Web Frame with Brackets and Inserts [IACS 20041
Cracks in this area develop both due to high stresses and stress corrosion cracking.
The same applies to all scallops, small openings and man-holes on web frames which are
vulnerable due to local corrosion at their edges.
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The majority of scallop cracks were found on scallops of the deck and side shell
rather than the slopping plate. Cracks at scallops on the slopping plate were mostly
concentrated on the inner and upper region where thicker plating is often used. The most
common solution was again increasing the thickness or adding a collar plate or doubler for
strengthening. An area particularly vulnerable on the slopping plate is at the corners of the
scallops where the web frame connects to the slopping plate. The solution to these cracks was
usually either replacing the cracked piece or gouging/grinding and then welding it back.
Cracking also initiates due to local stress at side shell longitudinals connecting with the
tripping brackets of web frames. The face plate thickness in this case is usually increased.
The most common cracks on the deck are those at the corners of hatches. Cracks
initiate due to stress concentration at the corners of hatch coamings from the inside and
propagate outwards towards the deck. They are thus not visible from the side of the deck
until they have propagated far enough. This can be seen in the right diagram of Fig. 4.2-23
where the crack is not visible from outside the hatch opening until it has propagated beyond
the dotted line at the hatch corner. The particular problem has been long recognized and the
plate thickness is increased at the corners by about 15% to account for this.
S a eUpper dck plati ng
tH
Wedding sequenceI
propagate outwards towards the shell. Another critical area on the deck is that of the cross
deck (between the hdevels) n the platchring is about 11mm compared to 25mm of the
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remaining deck. The reason for this is that the side loads and torsional stresses carried taken
by the cross deck were underestimated in early designs. Many cracks were also found on the
stays around the hatch openings. Cracks usually initiate at the toes of hatch coaming brackets
and the design is often modified to include a smoother bracket which weakens the hot spot
(Fig. 4.2-24).
Hatch
ooming
cacet
[FAeru o et l 1993]
Besides cracking, the deck is also prone to mechanical damage from accidents during
operation.
Many cracks were also reported on transverse hatch end beams (le). These often arise
from the high stress concentration at the connection with the longitudinal girder and are
particularly dangerous for ballast water ingress from the wing tanks into the cargo hold. The
thickness was usually increased locally in these cases during crack repairs.
No major modifications were reported in the repairs of cracks in 1d, le and if.
4.2.5.1.3.2 Region 2 - Cargo Hold Frames & Shell Plate (i = 7, 8 & 9)
A total of 6,353 were reported in the cargo hold frames and shell plate area which
appears to be the most problematic region in cargo hold 1 (j = 10) and ranks second in
compartments j = 2, 3 and 9.
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Stresses increase with the distance from the neutral axis and they are consequently
higher near the ends of the frames. Therefore, brackets are made thicker than the rest of the
frame. Despite the increased thickness, the higher stresses combined with the high stress
concentration factor and associated "hard spots" causes the majority of cracks to initiate at
the toes (mostly the upper toes). They propagate along the welds towards the side shell.
Even though the lower region is more prone to corrosion and mechanical damage, the
lower frames are larger and flexing is less severe. This, in combination with the increased
fatigue in the topside tanks due to inertial effects, partly explains the increased occurrence of
cracks in the upper toes. The overall frequency of these cracks along the ship length appears
to be closely related to the stress distribution predicted by the wave induced and still water
bending moments. When cracking was suspected to be caused by high stresses, the thickness
was increased during repairs. When cracking was also found in locations of lower stresses,
and was thus a consequence of poor design, a common approach was to modify the tips of
bracket toes to make them smoother and rounder (sometimes also increasing thickness). Fig.
4.2-25 shows a lower bracket toe modification recommended by Lloyd's Register.
a,'N
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Fig. 4.2-25: Additional Stiffener and Bracket Extension [LR 2005al
In agreement with past experience, cracks at brackets of an integral design, or in the
absence of corrosion, were found to be contained in a localized area around the bracket toe.
When corrosion was also reported, however, and in the case of a two-part bracket design (as
depicted in Fig. 4.2-25), relatively larger crack lengths were recorded.
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Most other cracks were found to be due to stress corrosion, inherent material and
weld defects or mechanical damage. These were usually repaired by replacing the cracked
plate with a new one of similar thickness. Examples include cracks in the middle region of
frames, all of which without exception were found to propagate towards the shell plate. The
shell plate on its own was very rarely found to crack away from connections. Cracks often
initiate at weld defects in hopper tank transverse brackets and propagate along the shell due
to fatigue. Some cracks were also reported along the edges of frames with the shell which
was the result of wear and not stress.
Region 2 accounts for 306 cracks in cargo hold 9 6 = 2) and 703 in cargo hold 1 6 =
10), whereas the mean across the remaining cargo holds 6j= 3 to 9) is 763. It should be noted
that cargo holds 1 and 9 are different in design as the ship changes section towards the stem
and bow. Frames are thus smaller in length and more curved so they are less vulnerable to
cracking. Most of the stresses here are also taken by the bulkhead as opposed to the frames.
Even though still water bending moments are relatively low in this region, the frames
in cargo hold 1 ( = 10) are subjected to weather induced dynamic loads and are enhanced
accordingly. The side shell and frames, however, still appear to be the most vulnerable area
of cargo hold 1. Some cracks in this region were found on the side shell near and on the
connection to the collision bulk head. This design detail is expensive for shipyards to correct
and is thus usually ignored, knowing that a few cracks will develop. Some large vertical
cracks in the range of 1 to 2 meters have also been reported on the side shell in the region of
the transverse bulk head between cargo holds 1 and 2.
It should be noted that the fore peak 6=11) is connected to the rest of the ship at about
10-15cm behind the collision bulk head and that this is the location where often ships split in
two. The crack may initiate on the outer shell in the groove as a result of sea wave loading.
Dynamic loads due to free surface effects within the fore peak also often translate to the shell
via the bulk head and further propagate the crack. This phenomenon may also occur at the
welding around the ship on the shell near the bulkhead between cargo hold 9 (=2) and the
Engine room (=1). In this region, cracks often initiate on the main deck at the comers of the
accommodation and propagate sideways towards side shell.
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4.2.5.1.3.3 Region 3 - Lower Wing Tank (i =10 to 13)
As shown in Fig. 4.2-10, the lower wing tank appears to be the most vulnerable area
with a total of 9,290 reported cracks. The subsequent graphs (Fig. 4.2-11 to 4.1-21) show that
the frequency of cracks in this region is much higher near the centre of the ship and decreases
substantially towards the stem and the bow. Most cracks in the first double bottom (covering
j = 2 and 3), result from wear and very rarely due to stress.
The most vulnerable location in the whole ship appears to be the bilge plate with its
longitudinals (3b or i = 11) where a total of 3,785 cracks have been recorded. Most of these
cracks initiate at the tripping bracket connections with the face plates and propagate down
and through the frames towards the shell. About 80% of these were found to initiate at the
inner corner of the tripping bracket and the rest initiated at the outer corner (the toe). The
face plate thickness was usually increased during the repairs of these cracks. Another
modification which was occasionally reported was to replace the bracket toe with a softer one
and thus reduce the stress on the face plate at the corner as shown in Fig. 4.2-26.
Crop ard extend toe of br acke t
w ath softer n tdin
in ~Pa fitte totf~ scallop
Fig. 4.2-26: Modification of Bracket Toe to Reduce the Stress on the Face Plate [Ferguson et al 19931
The types of modifications which have been reported in this region are analyzed in
greater depth in Section 4.2.5.1.4.
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Cracks were occasionally reported on discontinuous bilge plates (3b, i = 11) at the
corners where the sections end (on the outer side of the shell). The bilge keel sections were
then replaced by one long bilge keel running throughout the length of the ship.
The location with the second largest number of reported cracks was bilge web frames
(3a, or i = 10) with a total of 3,372. Unlike the top side tanks however, very few were
reported at the o-ring "corners". Most were found to initiate at the corners of scallops and
were relatively concentrated on the side shell compared to the hopper and bottom. After
replacing, collar plates or doublers were often added for strengthening.
Only 386 cracks were found on the hopper plate and longitudinals (3c or i = 12).
Stresses in this region are more uniformly distributed and cracks are usually only due to
wear. Cracks were recorded at the connection with the tank top (inner bottom plate) from the
side of the cargo hold. The plating thickness was often increased or additional intermediate
brackets were added joining the hopper with the longitudinal girder. Very few cracks,
however, were reported on the connection to the side shell. It appears more common for the
frame brackets (toes) to fail instead.
A total of 1,747 cracks were recorded in the longitudinal girder and stiffeners (3d, i =
13). Many of these were on the longitudinal girder at manholes, air-holes and drain-holes as a
result of stresses or wear at the edges. Cracks in manholes were often dealt with by replacing
the plating with one of the original thickness and often adding a collar plate (doubler with a
hole) as shown in Fig. 4.2-27. The face plate which is also recommended by IACS is
probably less practical and was not reported in any of the repairs.
Doubling plate SeHOuA.A
Fig. 4.2-27: Modification of Manholes with Collar plate (left) or (not reported) face plate (right)
[IACS 20041
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During the repairs of cracks in drain holes or air holes, the plating thickness was
usually increased. Cracks were also reported at the ends of stiffeners which are connected on
the longitudinal girder. These are the result of poor design and thus the connection was
usually modified to join more smoothly, or the length of the stiffener was increased so it ends
at the floor. The thickness was generally increased when cracks appeared on the girder.
4.2.5.1.3.4 Region 4 -Double Bottom (i =14 to 17)
A total of 2,411 cracks were reported in the double bottom region which is
substantially lower than those in the lower wing tanks. This is partly explained by the fact
that stresses are higher at the sides of the ship than close to centre-line. Again as with the
lower wing tanks, the majority of cracks appear towards the centre of the ship and the
frequency decreases towards the stem and bow. The static loads and buoyancy forces acting
in this region vary significantly between loading conditions and the area is also very
vulnerable to damages during cargo operations.
Most of the cracks recorded in the tank top (inner bottom plate) and longitudinals (4a,
i = 14) were either due to mechanical damage or corrosion. These were just replaced with
plating of the original thickness. Some cracks, however, were reported along the connection
with the lower stool as a result of high stresses. In this case, the plating thickness was locally
increased. Eventually, such cracks may propagate downwards across the girders 'and
ultimately out to the shell but they are easy to detect due to the resulting ballast water
ingresses into the hold.
The majority of cracks were reported on the transverse floors and stiffeners (4b, i =
15). Most of these were at the edges of manholes, scallops or drain holes as a result of stress
and/or corrosion. The cracked plating was usually just replaced in most cases and a collar
plate was often also added to cracked manholes as shown in Fig. 4.2-27. Cracks were also
found at the connections of floors to girders due to the resulting stress concentration.
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Relatively few cracks were reported in the bottom shell plate and longitudinals. Only
a small number of bottom longitudinals was reported cracked. In these cases initiation took
place at the corner of stiffeners which join the bottom longitudinals, the tank top
longitudinals and the floors. These cracks propagate towards bottom shell. The thickness of
the face plate was usually increased. Very few cracks were reported in the bottom shell.
These were at the scallops of floors due to undercutting or at drain holes. The keel which is
of thicker plating seems to be a crack-free region. Corrosion, however, may develop since
this is where the ship rests when on dry dock.
A relatively high number of cracks were reported on the longitudinal girders and
stiffeners (4d, i = 17). As with the side girder (3d, i = 13), cracks were found at the ends of
stiffeners due to high stresses and stress corrosion cracking was found in drain and air holes.
These were dealt with in the same way as in the side girder.
4.2.5.1.3.5 Region 5 - Transverse Cargo Hold Bulkheads (i = 18 to 23)
As can be seen in Fig. 4.2-11 to 4.1-21, the majority of cracks in bulkheads occurred
in compartments j = 2, 5 and 6. These are the bulkhead between the engine room and cargo
hold 9 and the two adjacent bulkheads of cargo hold 6 which is typically the heavy ballast
hold. Cracking occurs even though the bulkheads adjacent to the heavy ballast hold are
enhanced and often have a varying plate thickness to accommodate the hydrostatic loads.
1,989 cracks were reported in total and most are at the connections of bulkheads with
surrounding structures, particularly hopper tanks and top side tanks.
The collision bulkhead suffers the greatest impact loads out of all bulkheads from the
weather and due to slamming as a result of free surface effects from the partly ballasted fore
peak tank. It is, however, enhanced with stiffeners, girders and stringers from the side of the
fore peak tank in order to withstand these loads. There is also a gradual increase in its
thickness from about 10mm at the top to 16 mm at the bottom in order to account for the
hydrostatic forces imposed by about 20m of water from inside the fore peak. As a
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consequence, fewer cracks are observed in the collision bulkhead and most are due to wear or
corrosion rather than purely stress.
Besides the collision bulkhead, the aft bulkhead of cargo hold 2 6 = 9) has also been
enhanced over the past several years as a result of reassessment and research. Similar
problems thus often arise due to stiffness. A total of 107 cracks were reported on the collision
bulkhead (j = 11) and similarly, 125 cracks were found in the cargo hold 2 bulkhead ( = 10).
A large number of cracks (319 and 291 cracks respectively) were reported in the bulkheads
of compartments j = 5 and 6 which are the two adjacent bulkheads of Cargo hold 6 (the
typical heavy ballast hold). This is mainly due to the heavy ballast condition as discussed
earlier.
288 cracks were also reported in the bulkhead of cargo hold 9 6 = 2). This is partly
accounted for by the increased shear stresses which are witnessed at this location from the
ANCO diagrams (Fig 3.9-5 to 3.9-9 in Section 3.9.4). Fatigue is also significant in this region
since the engine room imposes a constant weight on the aft side of the bulk head while cargo
hold 9 undergoes consecutive loading and discharging operations. High cycle fatigue due to
vibration from the engine room also contributes to some extent.
Even though no cracks were found in the engine room bulkhead, it should be noted
that this is a particularly critical area which is closely monitored. Since it separates the after
peak tank with the engine room, any damage may lead to engine room flooding and have
serious consequences. Furthermore, the bulkhead is subjected to thermal fatigue as a result of
the heating from the side of the engine room and the alternate cooling from the continuous
ballasting operations with cold sea water from the other. Cracks were reported, however,
along the stiffener on the bulk head as a result of corrosion, flexing and due to the increased
stiffness at the nodes.
About a quarter (24.8%) of the cracks in bulkheads were reported on the upper stool
(5a, i = 18). Most of these were at the connection to the corrugated bulkhead or to the
slopping plate particularly in the hold used for ballasting where stresses tend to be higher.
These cracks are relatively easy to notice, however, particularly in the ballast hold due to the
consequent water ingress to the adjacent holds. The solution for these cracks was usually
gouging and then welding again. In some cases, intermediate tripping brackets were added
inside the upper stool.
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658 out of 1989 cracks in the bulkheads occurred in the upper corrugation (5b, i =
19). These were often the result of stress cracking at the connection of the corrugation to the
slopping plates. Most of these cracks were reported to be gouged and welded. In some cases,
tripping brackets are included between the corrugation and the upper stool for enhancement.
Stress cracking was also witnessed in these and most cracks were found to initiate at the
bottom of the tripping plate and propagate towards the stool. Repairs usually just included
the replacement with thicker brackets.
The middle part of the corrugation was found to be much less vulnerable with almost
no cracks except in cases with very much corrosion leading to stress corrosion cracks. Mostly
other types of damages were reported in this region such as deformation, buckling, twisting
etc.
The lower part of the corrugation showed crack distribution similar to that of the
upper part. Cracks were reported at the connection with the lower stool and also at the
connection with gusset plates and shedding plates. Most of these were stress cracks at the
corners and bases but there were also some due to wear. Stress cracks were usually gouged
and welded and in some cases, intermediate tripping brackets were included inside the lower
stool for enhancement. Cracks due to corrosion were just replaced with plating of a similar
thickness.
Most cracks in the corrugation overall were the result of high stresses. The best
design to prevent this is that of curved shaped edges but it is far more expensive so the usual
design consists of corners. In some cases it is of a square shape which is even worse in terms
of stresses. The square design is less strong but it is cheaper and also cheaper and easier to
repair when damaged. In addition to this, the corners rarely cracked, since they are welded
from both sides and are, therefore, very strong. Some times, a totally flat sandwich structure
(2 bulk heads with stiffeners in between) is used without a corrugation. This results in less
cracking at the connections with the lower and upper stool. It is, however, more expensive
and requires more steel.
In the lower stool (5e, i = 22), stress cracking was witnessed at the connection with
the corrugation and with the tank top. Again gouging and welding was most common and
intermediate brackets were occasionally added inside the stool. Other cracks due to corrosion
were very few comparatively.
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The ballast side trunk (5f, i = 23) is sometimes included in all cargo holds but is
usually only present in every two. Cracks were usually recorded at the connection to the shell
plate or at corner pointing inside the hold and most were near the mid region. These were
usually gouged and welded and in some cases, carlings (web with rings) were included inside
the trunk. Very few cracks were reported at the connection to the top side tank and hopper
plates.
4.2.5.1.3.6 Region 6 - Other (i = 24 to 26)
The forepeak usually has two or three stringers (i = 24) but occasionally even six or
more. These are platforms in the fore peak with scallops through which frames, stiffeners and
sometimes girders (i = 25) pass. 227 out of the 1,109 cracks reported in the fore peak region
were located at those girders. The fore peak design depends on whether it is constructed as
one or two separate blocks. In the second case, one of the blocks ends at a stringer so the web
frames, girders and vertical stiffeners within the fore peak are discontinuous and hence
welded to the top and bottom of the stringer with brackets. In ships of this design, many
cracks were located in the corners of these brackets at the connection with the stringer. If a
single block design is adopted, this effectively introduces more scallops which are also prone
to cracking as shown in Fig. 4.2-28.
Buckling andior
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Fig. 4.2-28: Typical Cracks observed at Scallops FIACS 20041
Cracks originating at scallops, often propagate to the shell and then appear from the
other side as a bird spreading its wings, as shown in Fig. 4.2-29 and Fig. 4.2-30. That is how
oil leaks often occur in tankers [Okumoto et al 2009].
See B- B
Fig. 4.2-29: "Fly bird" Crack on Side Shell, Originating at Scallop [Okumoto et al 20091
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Fig. 4.2-30: Crack in Longitudinal at Connection to Transverse Web Frame
[Hansen and Winterstein 19951
Stringers (6a, i = 24) and girders (6b, i = 25) accounted for 275 and 216 cracks
respectively. Most of the cracks were at scallops and the corners of brackets. Cracks at
scallops were replaced and a collar or doubler was sometimes added. Cracks at the corners
and along the edges of brackets were usually replaced with no modification but in some
cases, the thickness was increased by say 2mm. Special attention was also paid to the
welding and particularly at the bracket corners. Typically a specification includes the new
bracket to be welded on both sides and also around the tip which is often neglected but is
very important to avoid crack initiation.
17 cracks were reported in pillars and struts (6c, i = 26). Most of these were at pillar
connections with brackets at the ends of the pillars. This involved cracking of brackets rather
than the pillars so the brackets were just replaced.
4.2.5.1.4 Design Conclusions
As can be observed in the previous sections, there is a particular trend in the way in
which repairs and design changes are carried out depending on the origin of the crack. The
general solutions adopted are summarised in Table 4.2-6.
It is common to simply replace a stress-cracked plate with one of increased thickness
while not carrying out any further modification. This is for example typical on the deck at the
corners of the accommodation or the hatch coamings.
If cracks are due to wear or corrosion, an insert is the correct and final method but in
situations where this may not be possible, a temporary doubler is added.
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GENERAL REPAIR SOLUTIONS
CRACK TYPE SOLUTION
STRESS INCREASE PLATE THICKNESS
CORROSION AND WEAR DOUBLER - TEMPORARY
INSERT - PERMANENT
POOR DESIGN MODIFY PART ACCORDINGLY
CYCLIC GLOBAL DEFLECTION ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENT OF
STRUCTURE
VIBRATION (Usually in AP + ER) DAMPING / SUPPORT WITH
STIFFENER/BRACKET(S)
SMALL CRACKS (10-22mm) GRIND & WELD
Table 4.2-6: General trend in repairs and modifications depending on crack origin
Design changes are also often required depending on the situation and there may be a
range of possible solutions. A typical example includes tripping brackets which connect web
frames to the longitudinals. The great majority of cracks were found to initiate at their
corners due to the associated "hard spots" and propagation was through the face plate of the
longitudinal towards the outer shell. Approximately 80% of the cracks were reported to
initiate at the inner corner. The most immediate solution in this case was to increase the
radius of curvature at this location where cracks tend to initiate. If this proved inadequate, or
if cracks initiated at the outer corner (about 20% of cracks), the most common solution was
to increase the face plate thickness. In cases where this did not eliminate cracks initiating at
the outer corner (the toe), a common solution was to replace the bracket with a more curved
one, which weakens the "hard spot" and provides a more even distribution of the stresses
along it. Ultimately, if cracks anywhere on the bracket persisted, a secondary tripping bracket
was provided on the other side of the web frame as shown in Fig. 4.2-31.
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Fig. 4.2-31: Tripping bracket modifications along with the principal dimensions FIACS 20041
If cracks develop due to large global deflections such as the whole double bottom,
then reinforcement of the whole structure is required in addition to renewal and possible
design changes of the fractured part. Fig. 4.2-32 shows frames without tripping brackets that
have deformed under large global deflection and Fig. 4.2-33 shows tripping brackets between
frames which counteract the problem.
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Fig. 4.2-32: Deformation of Side Shell Frames Under Global Deflection [IACS 20041
Fig. 4.2-33: Tripping brackets between side Shell frames [LR 2005a]
In some cases, cracks develop due to design flaws which are known already from the
design stage. Construction costs, however, very often outweigh the benefits and a sacrifice is
made. As a result, design changes have to be made once cracking appears in order to solve
the problem permanently. One of the most typical examples is that of the scallops. These are
there for no other reason other than the fact that they are needed for the assembly of the
blocks in construction. The associated problems regarding cracking in scallops as shown in
Fig. 4.2-34 and 4.2-35 are well understood.
Fig. 4.2-34: Associated cracking problems with scallops [Pedersen et al 19961
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Fig. 4.2-35: Associated cracking problems with scallops
Scallops can be enhanced by a doubler or a collar plate which helps reduce cracking.
Including this to all the scallops at the construction stage, however, is too expensive and thus
they are designed knowing that the area will develop say 50 cracks over a course of 30 years.
Consequently, these solutions serve as modifications after the problem starts off. Fig. 4.2-36
shows typical scallop modifications as proposed by IACS.
Repair A LugReirB;
Repa -rqB
Full collar plate
New plating of
enhanced thickness
Fig. 4.2-36: Scallop Modifications [IACS 2004]
Design consequently plays a major role in the number and locations of cracks which
appear throughout a ship's life. The effects of design are witnessed during the very early
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stages where cracks due to design faults may appear but also during the later life as some
designs age better than others.
During the survey, great similarities were witnessed between sister ships.
Furthermore, ships from particular building shipyards or countries also often share the same
problems and weaknesses. For example, 5 Taiwanese sister ships in the database showed
almost consistently the same distribution of cracks. Romanian ships on average showed a
much higher number of cracks which shows partly why they are viewed as inferior and are
valued significantly lower in the market. Japanese ships are considered to be of the highest
quality and are generally the most expensive. These develop many cracks, however, which
are associated with the extensive use of high tensile steel particularly as ships age. There is a
great number of Korean ships and these are generally of good quality but they are being
overtaken in number as shipbuilding capacity in China is increasing radically. The quality of
Chinese ships seems to vary significantly between the numerous shipyards and there is great
development going on.
4.2.5.1.5 Comparisons with Previous Research
A similar analysis has been carried out by GL in their 2005 damage survey on Bulk
Carriers [GL 2005b Private Correspondence]. This included 145 ships, out of which 72 were
classed by GL. The 783 damages were found to be distributed as shown in Fig. 4.2-37.
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Fig. 4.2-37: GL Bulk Carrier Damage Survey Results [GL 2005b Private Correspondence]
Cracks were mostly reported at the connections of bulk heads to other members such
as wing tanks or at the connections between shelf plates and shedder plates with the stool.
They were mainly focused in the lower region of the bulk heads. Many cracks were also
found at side frames and in the upper regions mainly at stays, face plates and hatch side
coamings. Cracked girders were also common and this was believed to be the result of bad
workmanship and overstressing loading to high local or global stresses.
Though cracks were found to develop in similar regions to our survey, the distribution
of these is significantly different. Surprisingly, only a few similarities such as the relatively
low number of cracks at the fore ship (fore peak) can be observed in the distribution of
cracks as shown in Fig. 4.2-37 compared to Fig 4.2-6.
Slightly more similar results were obtained in the distribution of cracks when
focusing in the bottom and upper ship areas. The crack distribution by the GL bulk carrier
damage survey at these locations is given by Fig. 4.2-38.
Affected units bottom area
Cracks
Fig. 4.2-38: GL Bulk Carrier Damage Survey Results in Bottom Area [GL 2005b Private Correspondence]
As in the current survey, many cracks have been reported in the hopper transverse
frames (web frames) which corresponds to location i = 10 (3a). The second most popular
region is the bottom plating corresponding to location i = 16 (4c) which in the current project
has relatively few cracks. It should be noted, however, that the bilge plate may also be
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included here since it is not quoted elsewhere. This corresponds to location i = 11 (3b) where
more cracks than any other region have been reported (3,785).
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Fig. 4.2-39: GL Bulk Carrier Damage Survey Results in Upper Area [GL 2005b Private Correspondencel
As can be seen, most cracks in the upper area have been reported in the hatch
coamings and also in the deck plating. These correspond to locations i = 5 and 6 (le and If)
respectively, but it should be noted that our location 1 also includes the upper wing tank
which has a high density of cracks. This explains why our locations i = 5 and 6 (le and If)
account for a smaller fraction of the total number of cracks.
A similar damage survey by GL was also carried out on 193 tankers where a total of
1,201 damages were reported. The main results regarding cracking are shown in Fig. 4.2-40.
497
Affected units
inition buckling
:>.plating o trans.bulkheadi
tructure
Fig. 4.2-40: GL Bulk Carrier Damage Survey Results [GL 2005b Private Correspondence}
A similarity with these results was that many side frames were found cracked,
particularly at connections with lower brackets. As can be seen by comparing to Fig. 4.2-10
however, there are significant differences in the crack distribution. The major example is the
inner bottom plating which appears to be the most critical area while hardly any cracks were
reported at that location in the current survey.
A damage survey was carried out in by DNV in 2002 and the results regarding the
distribution of damages in capes are illustrated in Fig. 4.2-41. These include 221 cracks out
of 304 damages.
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Fig. 4.2-41: Damage Distribution in Capes where 221 out of the 304 Damages are Cracks from the DNV
Database [DNV 2002 Private Correspondencel
Even though many damages other than cracking are included, these results seem
somewhat more similar to those of the present survey. Table 4.2-7 summarizes the results of
various surveys compared to those of the current project.
Table 4.2-7: Crack distribution in current survey compared to damage defect distribution from the DN R
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LOCATION CODES CURRENT DNV LR ABS
(Capes - (Capes - (Bulkers (Bulkers -
%Cracks) %Damages) %Damages) %Damages)
DECK 1(e-f) 7 16 21 36.5
D.BOTTOM 3(a-d) & 40 19 16 33.7
& HOPPER 4(a-d)
TOP SIDE l(a-d) 23 13 36 -
TANK
SIDE 2(a-c) 21 15 27 29.8
BULKHEAD 5(a-f) 7 12 - -
OTHER 6(a-c) 2 25
and ABS surveys [DNV 2002 Private Correspondence, LR 1999 Private Correspondence, ABS 19761
As shown in the Table 4.2-7, cracks have a significantly different distribution
compared to other types of damages and also the ship type plays a major role. This
emphasizes the importance of projects which are specific on a certain type of damage and
vessel. It is also important to keep in mind the way each location is defined when comparing
results across different surveys. [Schulte-Stratause 1991], for example, reports 42% of all
fatigue cracks on the side shell and its longitudinals. This percentage exceeds the
corresponding value in all the other databases considered. His definition of side shell,
however, may also include areas which are classified under the double bottom or topside
tanks in other surveys.
4.2.5.2 Crack Sizes
Starting with the 3-D matrix C, we sum across "i" and "j" and reduce it to a 1-D
matrix which gives us the number of cracks under each size (50 to 8000mm in increments of
50mm) irrespective of their location on the ship. By dividing each element in the matrix by
the total number of cracks in the database, the Probability Density Function (PDF) of crack
size was constructed and is presented in Fig. 4.2-42. This shows the probability of a crack
lying within every given size range irrespective of its location.
Fig. 4.2-42: Probability Density Function of Crack Size
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From this, the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of crack size was plotted
which shows the probability of a crack being up to a given size (Fig. 4.2-43).
Fig. 4.2-43: Cumulative Probability Function of Crack Size
While the crack size range is very wide, the inter-quartile range of the cumulative
distribution function shows that 50% of all cracks observed were between 158mm and
292mm long (using linear interpolation). The c.d.f. at a crack length of im is equal to 99.8%
so larger cracks are very rare (51 in our database). Occasionally cracks of over 2 meters were
recorded. Examples of these include vertical cracks on the side shell in way of the cargo bulk
head between cargo holds 1 and 2 ( = 10). The shape of the graph in Fig. 4.2-42 seems to be
somewhat irregular showing a significantly higher number of cracks at sizes which are
multiples of 100 compared to intermediate values. This is because surveyors often have a
tendency to record crack sizes in round numbers. Very similar graphs were produced by
[Antoniou, 1977] based on his survey of cracks in oil tankers under repairs. These are shown
in Fig. 4.2-44.
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Fig. 4.2-44: Marginal Distribution Density and Marginal Distribution of Crack Size Irrespective of Age
[Antoniou, 19771
Evidently as [Antoniou, 19771 also predicted, the majority of cracks (approximately
60%) are up to 300mm which appears to be the size limit considered important to be reported
by classification society surveyors. In our database, c.d.f. at 300mm is approximately 78%
(as opposed to 60%) and c.d.f. is equal to 60% for approximately 254mm cracks (using linear
interpolation). This suggests that surveyors are on average reporting a slightly larger fraction
of smaller cracks today in capesize bulk carriers compared to what was reported in tankers in
the 1970s.
4.2.5.3 The Effect of Age
The average number of cracks per ship from the current survey was found to be 123.
This may sound shocking for people outside the marine community but it proves the fact that
ships can travel perfectly safe with a large number of cracks. Similar Japanese investigations
in 1973 have suggested an average of about 200 cut out damages per vessel [ISSC 19731
while the findings of the latter survey carried out by the Ship Structural Committee suggests
a rate well in excess of 100 failures per vessel [SSC 1980]. The findings of Exxon
Corporation from the surveys carried in tankers of its fleet in the early 1980s also suggest the
number of fractures being of the order of hundreds in a typical vessel [Exxon 1983 - Private
Correspondence]. The survey carried out by Prof. Antoniou in 1977 showed an average of
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110 cracks per tanker [Antoniou 1977]. This proves the earlier point made that only a small
percentage of cracks are reported by surveyors if they are considered dangerous and warrant
further investigation. It is also evident from the frequency and size of cracks in similar
surveys carried out by classification societies, that only large damages and cracks were
considered.
The variation of the number of cracks per ship with ship age and its cumulative total
have been computed and are presented in Fig. 4.2-45 and 4.2-46. The first graph is created by
compressing the 29 2-D N matrices into one number (each) by summing across the "i" and
"j" components, and then plotting the resulting numbers against "A". The second graph is
just the cumulative of the first.
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Fig. 4.2-45: Average Number of Cracks per Ship with respect to Age
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Fig. 4.2-46: Cumulative Average Number of Cracks per Ship with Age
By considering the inter-quartile range in Fig. 4.2-46, it can be seen that 50% of all
the cracks that develop throughout the ship's life, occur between the age of approximately
12.8 and 19.6 years old (using linear interpolation).
An interesting pattern is observed in the number of cracks per ship as a function of
ship age. It can be seen that the average number of cracks generally increases until the age of
about 20 years after which they start declining again. Periodic cycles can also be observed in
relation to this trend. The number of cracks show high peaks at the ages of 10, 15 and 20
which are the years when special surveys are normally passed. Additional peaks are observed
at the ages of 12, 13, 17 and 22 which are common years for passing intermediate surveys.
During the subsequent years following major surveys such as year 11, the number of cracks
reported is significantly reduced since it takes a while again for the ship condition to
deteriorate. A similar analysis was also performed by [Yamaguchi, I. 1968] on NKK ships in
1968. Fig. 4.2-47 shows the crack frequency with respect to age for 97 NK class built vessels
between 1950 and 1962.
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Fig. 4.2-47: Rate of Crack Occurrence with respect to Ship Age
[Yamaguchi, I. 19681
This graph shows that damages peak at the age of about 2 to 4 years old. It only
covers, however, a very small fraction of the ships' service life. [LR, ABS and DNV 2006]
provide some results on defects found in 224 double hull bulk carriers, that can be analyzed
to produce similar results. They provide the results shown in Table 4.2-8. Using their total
number of defects (1,323) and total number of ships (224), the results shown in Table 4.2-9
can be inferred.
Age Cracks Defects (including Cracks) Ships
<5 18.98% 23.60% 51%
5 to 9 29.04% 36.84% 29%
10 to 14 11.39% 21.65% 13%
15 to 19 3.23% 11.75% 4%
20 to 24 0.41% 0.41% 1%
25+ 4.82% 5.75% 2%
Total (%) 67.88% 100.00% 100%
Table 4.2-8 Results of rLR, ABS and DNV 20061
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Defects Cracks Ships Cracks/Ship
460 370 114 3.245614
718 566 65 8.707692
422 222 29 7.655172
229 63 9 7
8 8 2 4
112 94 5 18.8
1949 1323 224
Table 4.2-9 Inferred Results of [LR, ABS and DNV 2006 1
Fig. 4.1-48 shows a plot of Cracks per ship against age group, using the results of
Table 4.2-9 and Fig. 4.2-49 shows the same chart using the results of the current database.
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Fig. 4.2-49: Average Number of Cracks per Ship with respect to Age
There is a clear difference between the trend of our results and that of [LR, ABS and
DNV 2006]. However, the most striking part is the scale on the ordinate axis. The average
number of cracks is 123.2 in our database and only 5.9 in [LR, ABS and DNV 2006]. This
indicates that there is a clear difference in scope between the two surveys besides the
difference in ship type and size.
It is interesting to note that Prof Antoniou concludes from his data on tankers that
with an average of 110 cracks per ship (compared to 123 in the current survey) "the average
number of probable cracks during a ship's life time of say 22 years is about 2000". An
estimated cost of repairing these cracks with today's prices would be around $lm. It should
be noted, however, that this is a very vague estimate as a crack may only cost about $50 to
repair in a shipyard in China during repairs whereas it may cost hundreds of thousands if for
example it requires dry docking or delays a ship.
The final result is the relation of crack size with ship age. We compress the 2-D
matrices LA and NA into one number by summing across their "i" and "j" components. For
each ship age "A", this gives us the total crack length and total number of cracks
respectively. Dividing to total crack length by the total number of cracks gives us the mean
crack size for each ship age.
The computation of the median is significantly more complex. Starting with the 3-D
matrices CA, we compress it into a 1-D matrix by summing over the "i" and "j" components.
The result is 29 (1x 16) matrices (one for each age) which gives the total number of cracks for
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each size. By plotting the c.d.f. and determining the crack size for which c.d.f. = 50%, we
determine the median crack size for that respective ship age.
The mean and median crack sizes have been computed for each age and are presented
in Fig. 4.2-48. The Weibull distribution is often used to describe phenomena which result
from two independent mechanisms, typically one short term and one long term cause as is the
case with wear or fatigue in bearings. In this case, early design problems result in short term
high crack growth rates while fatigue and corrosion is the cause of long term cracks of lower
growth rates and consequently smaller crack sizes by the time of the inspection. It is
reasonable, therefore, to assume that both the mean and median crack size may be
characterized by a Weibull distribution.
The PDF f(t), and the CDF F(t) of the two parameter Weibull distribution are given
by:
f(T) =e (4.2-7)
F(T)=1- e (4.2-8)
The c.d.f. was linearized by taking natural logarithms (twice):
e =1-F(T)
- = -ln[1-F(T)]
(4.2-9)
,8 In = In [-In [1- F(T)]]
Then, the least squares method was used to evaluate the distribution parameters p and
il. This can be done by setting the derivative of the sum of the errors with respect to P and il
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simultaneously to zero and then examining the second derivatives to verify that it is a
minimum. The Weibull distribution parameters are shown in Table 4.2-10 and the two
Weibull functions, (one through the mean values and one through the median values), are
shown along with the data points in Fig. 4.2-50.
WEIBULL DIDTRIBUTION PARAMETERS
MEAN CRACK SIZE MEDIAN CRACK SIZE
B 1.41 1.40
H 15.8 14.6
Table 4.2-10: Weibull Distribution Parameters
Fie. 4.2-50: Mean and Median Crack Size with respect to Ship Age
Both the mean and median crack size increase during the early life and peak at the
age of about 5 years which is when the first special survey is passed. They then continuously
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decrease with age. Similar Japanese investigations in 1973 have also suggested that the
occurrence of cracking peaks at about 3 to 4 years [ISSC 1973].
It is also interesting to note that the mean is above the median throughout the ship's
lifetime. This implies a negative skew of the data (in a plot of crack frequency against size)
which is also evident in Fig. 4.2-42. The Weibull parameterization function seems to be a
fairly accurate representation of the data for both the mean and median, but it predicts a
slightly high value for the age at which the mean crack size peaks.
The same analysis was carried out by [Antoniou, 1977] where a similar trend has
been obtained excluding the initial increase during the early years. The graph is presented in
Fig. 4.2-51.
j '0
Fit. 4.2-51: Mean and Median of Crack Size versus Age of Ship [Antoniou, 19771
The first year of a ship's life is not predictable in terms of cracking and it is covered
by the shipyard's guarantee. There are consequently frequent inspections by the owners who
make an effort to discover any problems for the shipyard to fix without charge. After the end
of the guarantee period when the ship is one year old and up until the age of about five, there
are no major repairs and the surveys are generally less stringent. This allows cracks to grow
to a large size before they are discovered.
The early years of a ship's life are characterized by design related cracks. Any defects
or faults from design which result in high stress concentrations or overstressed areas, lead to
the initiation of cracks which propagate at a relatively high rate. This, combined with the less
frequent and stringent inspections, leads to the mean and median crack size being relatively
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large when cracks are recorded. Typical cracks during the early life include the classic cracks
at hatch corners.
[Barltrop et al. 1992] show the predicted distribution of crack sizes with time during
the first few years in Fig. 4.2-52 based on fracture mechanics. These are approximately an
order of magnitude below our results, presumably because real world effects such as
unexpected impacts and bending moments or stress concentrations due to design and
manufacturing imperfections have not been considered in the theoretical predictions.
Nevertheless, it clearly illustrates how the distribution of crack sizes may evolve over time.
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Fig. 4.2-52: Changes in Distribution of Crack Sizes with Time
Following the first special survey at the age of about 5 years, most design problems
are corrected as cracks emerge and the design continuously improves during the subsequent
repairs throughout the ship's life. As a consequence, more and more of the cracks appearing
as the ship ages are due to fatigue which are generally much smaller when reported as they
propagate at a much lower rate. Along with the design improvements, surveys become more
regular and extensive as ships age and consequently there is a greater chance of detecting
cracks. This explains the decrease in the mean and median crack size with age after the peak
at about 5 years old.
The survey carried out by NK in 1976 showed that cracks due to structural
discontinuities were relatively small (nearly half were less than 100mm) whereas cracks due
to faults in fabrication and/or material were much larger (some greater than 500mm).
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Furthermore, almost all such cracks which were greater than 500mm initiated within the first
8 years of operation [NK 19761.
It should be noted that the ship condition, and consequently the frequency and size of
cracks at any given age, is highly dependent on the design and ship builders, but also on the
owners. For example, some owners (typically Japanese and Norwegians until a few years
ago), operate ships until the age of about 10 years and then plan on selling them. These ships
are not only built accordingly, with a higher percentage of high tensile steel, but they are also
repaired less extensively as they approach the age of 10 years. Both these parameters play a
great role in the future cracking behavior of the ship.
4.2.5.4 Database Validation and Revision
The analysis that will follow in the next chapters requires significantly more detailed
data in terms of the exactness of crack locations and individual sizes for all cracks. Though
this has not been an impediment so far, a significant amount of the data, particularly that
which was not verified with data from owners, will have to be discarded for the remaining
analysis. The analysis so far was repeated for the revised database in order to check the
consistency between the data. The results are summarized in Fig. 4.2-53 to 4.1-72.
Fig. 4.2-53: Distribution Crack-Database Ships by Age
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Fig. 4.2-54: Crack Distribution along Ship Length
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Fig. 4.2-55: Number of Cracks along Ship Height
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Fig. 4.2-56: Total Crack Length distribution along ship Height
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Fig. 4.2-57: Total Crack Distribution in the various Locations
Fig. 4.2-58: Crack Distribution in Compartment 1
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Fig. 4.2-59: Crack Distribution in Compartment 2
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Fig. 4.2-60: Crack Distribution in Compartment 3
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Fig. 4.2-61: Crack Distribution in Compartment 4
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Fig. 4.2-63: Crack Distribution in Compartment 6
Fig. 4.2-64: Crack Distribution in Compartment 7
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Fig. 4.2-65: Crack Distribution in Compartment 8
Fig. 4.2-66: Crack Distribution in Compartment 9
Fig. 4.2-67: Crack Distribution in Compartment 10
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Fig. 4.2-68: Crack Distribution in Compartment 11
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Fig. 4.2-69: Probability Density Function of Crack Size
Cummulative Distribution Function
1
0.8
0.6
L- 0.4
0.2
0
400 600 800 1000
Crack Size
Fig. 4.2-70: Cumulative Probability Function of Crack Size
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Fig. 4.2-71: Average Number of Cracks per Ship with respect to Age
Fig. 4.2-72: Cumulative Average Number of Cracks per Ship with Age
Table 4.2-11 summarizes the main statistics.
The similarity between the two databases, particularly in terms of number of cracks
and total crack length per ship, shows that the data is sufficiently consistent within itself. The
same conclusion can be reached by comparing the graphs of the two databases. This result,
and the large size of the database relative to the world fleet give confidence that the database
is a representative sample.
519
DATABASE STATISTICS AND COMPARISON
Database INITIAL REVISED
Total Number of Ships (entries) 240 140
Total Number of Cracks 29,567 17,435
Total Crack Length (km) 7.82 4.32
Mean Crack Size (mm) 264 248
Mean Number of Cracks per Ship 123 125
Mean Total Crack Length per Ship (mm) 32,582 30,875
Table 4.2-11: Revised Data Sample
4.2.5.5 Comments and Conclusions
Cracks were shown to generally appear at the highly stressed regions as predicted
from the wave induced bending moments. However, many other causes of cracking have
been identified. These, in combination with the enhancement of highly stressed areas, tend to
weaken the link. Examples of other cracking causes include corrosion or damages induced
during cargo discharge. An arbitrary location may also be overstressed during cargo
operations at high rates due to a deviation from the plan, which is very likely to occur. These
and other factors result in additional cracks in regions where the still water or wave induced
bending moments are relatively low.
An important observation is that even though a great amount of research has been
directed towards improving ship design against cracking in the critical areas, evidently,
cracks are still generally observed in the highly stressed regions exactly where they are
expected. This to some extent resembles the aircraft industry where continuous research is
focused in minimizing stress concentrations and improving design, but cracks still initiate at
highly stressed points which go unnoticed. One of the main reasons for this outcome in ships,
is that sacrifices are purposely made regarding cracking, in order to keep manufacturing costs
within acceptable limits.
Due to the numerous factors involved, and the differing views and interests of the
various parties, it is difficult to predict the future with respect to cracks in capes. Ship owners
take the view that the unified rules (common rules) should be stricter regarding ship design
and construction of vessels, in order to minimize cracking and subsequent repair and
maintenance costs. Furthermore, they favor lower loading rates for easier monitoring and
adherence to the loading sequence in order to avoid overstressing of the hull. Terminals on
the other hand strive to maximize loading rates in order to minimize congestion and facilitate
the higher export and import of cargo.
Shipyards are generally focused on introducing new designs to create a new market
and increase business for the shipbuilding industry. They also have an interest in delaying the
initiation of any problems including cracking beyond the twelve month guarantee period.
Classification societies recognize the need for stronger ships and they introduced the
unified rules in order to avoid pressure from shipyards and unfair competition amongst
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themselves. Port State Control has also shown a greater interest and has introduced the "Bulk
Carrier Inspection " which entails the internal inspection of the bulk carrier hull condition
and survey for cracks.
Cargo owners and charterers who are most concerned about damages and delays, are
dependent on cargo terminal operators and are trying to tackle the issue by imposing an age
limitation. For this purpose, they introduced a 25 year age limit for ships which are allowed
to transport iron ore. Similarly, underwriters who understand the potential risks of cracking,
have responded by quoting higher premium rates for older vessels.
The IMO is mostly concerned with safety aspects of both the crew and the
environment. They turned down the double-hull legislation attempt of shipyards for a new
design, in favor of stronger single-hull bulk carriers. However, they have not yet taken any
effective measurements regarding the high loading and discharging rates.
This is the largest ship cracking survey in terms of the number of cracks considered,
out of those identified in a comprehensive literature research. It is also the only one focusing
particularly on capes which lie at the core of the problem. The number of ships considered
account for a substantial portion of the world fleet.
Though cracks in the current investigation stem from a variety of causes, ship design
seems to have a major influence. There was a case of 5 Taiwanese sister ships within the data
sample, which all showed similar crack patterns. Furthermore, crack sizes were found to
continuously decrease after approximately the first special survey while a number of cracks
per ship was observed to rapidly decline after around the fifth survey. These results suggest
that, contrary to popular belief, the design of a vessel and the way in which it is maintained
and repaired can be of much greater importance than the age regarding the frequency of
cracking.
Design related cracks with high growth rates occur during the early years of a ship's
life at highly stressed locations. Those are gradually eliminated by design modifications and
appropriate reinforcement during repairs. Fatigue cracks generally appear more randomly
during the later stages of a ship's life. Factors contributing to fatigue include dynamic loads
and overstressing due to high loading rates or bad weather including storms; wave induced
cyclic loads; slamming loads during ballasting; low cycle stressing due to consecutive
loading, discharging, ballasting and de-ballasting operations; high cycle fatigue due to
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vibrations e.g. from the engine, shaft, propeller, bulkheads or rudder; thermal fatigue due to
ballasting operations (particularly in the after peak which is adjacent to the engine room); and
other random loads during operation that are difficult to quantify.
Due to the complexity of the bulk carrier structure, it is impossible to guarantee that
no cracking will occur. Cracks up to a few meters long are common, and develop due to
many reasons including fatigue, wear, bad design, damage etc. The results suggest that a
typical cape may have hundreds of cracks at any one time, while the number developed
throughout its lifetime is approximately two thousand. Many of these are not recorded by
classification societies during regular surveys.
The mean number of 123 cracks recorded per ship, and the scatter of the data,
demonstrate that ships can operate safely with hundreds of cracks. Though there is little
evidence to suggest that fatigue cracks pose a significant threat to the overall structural
integrity of a ship, they are repaired whenever possible. Many cracks cannot be identified
during routine hull maintenance so focused surveys after cleaning and preparation are carried
out during dry-dock. It is also important, for inspections to be carried out during operation,
particularly after a high stress situation such as a fast cargo operation or after a storm.
Cracks, which have grown to a large size, can then be easily identified and repaired before
they impose a danger.
Though information regarding the design and shipyard in which the vessels were built
was only available for a limited portion of the data, it is observed that some yards build ships
that are more crack resistant than others. Romanian ships, for example, consistently had more
cracks that those from the Far East. The shipyard, and consequently the construction quality
and manufacturing methods adopted, seem to have a major influence on the stage at which
cracks initiate during the ship's lifetime. This is generally due to the smaller defects that are
present to start with, the lower residual stresses after the effective stress relief of welds, lower
stress concentrations after careful finishing etc. Design on the other hand seems to influence
the rate at which deterioration progresses after initiation. This is partly due to the avoidance
of "hard spots" and other measures which can be taken at the design stage to reduce the local
stress range. A more comprehensive and focused study would be required to derive
substantiated conclusions regarding this matter.
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4.3 Crack Growth Rates
4.3.1 Introduction - Purpose
In Chapter 4.2, the final result showed the mean and median crack size as a function
of ship age. After the age of about 5 years, crack size was found to steadily decrease with
age. Two factors causing this outcome were discussed. One is that as a ship ages, fast
growing stress cracks are repaired with design changes that eliminate their recurrence, while
slow growing fatigue cracks become more prominent. The other reason is that as ships age,
inspections become more frequent and stringent, thereby not giving enough time to the
cracks to grow to a large length.
In order to separate the impact of those two effects on the final result, growth rates
need to be examined as a function of ship age. Average crack growth rates for each location
and ship age are also required to assess the safety implications of the various cracks.
4.3.2 Paris Law
Paris Law is the most common procedure used to determine crack growth rates in
structures such as ships. Some of the most advanced research on ship structural reliability to
date, carried out jointly by the Pusan National University (PNU), the American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) and Chevron, apply Paris Law to determine crack growth rates throughout
the hull and its implications on longitudinal strength [Paik et al 2003a, Paik et al 2003b].
Our analysis of crack growth rates, therefore, begins by applying the Paris Law and
checking its consistency with the data. The Paris Law, which expresses the crack growth rate
in a differential equation, can be integrated to give the final crack size in terms of the initial
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crack size ao, the number of stress cycles N, material parameters A and m and geometric
parameter Y as follows:
da
da =A(AK)" =A(YAacr.4 Tha)
a m N
f a 2 da =A (AcYVr)mf dN
ao 0
2 2-m2- a 2 =NA (AcYV) (4.3-1)
2-m 
a
2
2-m 2 -m m 2-nm
a ao 2 + (2m NA(A aY )I
Because of the way Paris Law is designed, ao has to be small (of the order of a
millimeter) in order to get meaningful results. After ongoing research in the field, the method
of applying Paris Law to ship components is standard and tabulated results exist for the
parameters required (such as geometric factors).
The effective stress amplitude of location "i" Ao , is obtained by
A, = 2 My * SCFj * k, (4.3-2)
MW is the global bending moment which can be obtained from MIT Sea-keeping
tables USAS-L program for the trade routes in which capes typically sail and from loading
manuals for cargo operations. I is the second moment of area of the cross section which may
vary slightly between compartments (particularly at the ends) but not so much between ships.
SCFi are stress concentration factors for locations "i" and have been tabulated by ABS. yj is
the vertical distance of the crack from the neutral axis. kf is a knockdown factor (0.25) to
account for dynamic stress cycles.
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The number of stress cycles "N" per year can be approximated assuming an average
wave period of 8 seconds which is commonly used and corresponds to a wavelength of 100m
according to the deep water dispersion relation (Eq. 4.3-4). The analysis was repeated with a
wavelength of 12 seconds (corresponding to a 225m wavelength) and this had no impact on
the conclusions. The wave encounter frequency is given by:
o, = o+kV cos p (4.3-3)
2fr
where the ship velocity is V, the wave number is k = - the wave frequency is
2rc(0 = , the wave period is T=8s, and p is the angle of wave propagation using a body-
fixed coordinate system. One can use the dispersion relation to solve for the encounter
frequency using a typical ship travel speed of 14 knots.
(o2 = gk tanh(kh) Deep Water k (4.3-4)
On average, however, traveling in both directions relative to the waves, the encounter
frequency will average out to be approximately equal to the wave frequency. Therefore, we
can simply use o. In practice, the ship makes short stops for loading operations which
involve a lower loading frequency and higher loading amplitude but this effect is not
considered in the analysis. If anything, however, this assumption should make the results of
Paris Law less conservative (because of the damage during cargo operations).
4.3.3 Over-Conservative Results
Using tabulated values and data available in the open literature, the above procedure
was applied to various locations in order to compare to the data. In agreement with some of
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the more recent research, the results were found to be over-conservative over a wide range of
locations. The shell frame brackets are chosen as an example to demonstrate this because of
the large number of cracks over a wide range of ship ages. Aco for upper (i = 7) and lower (i
= 9) shell frame brackets amidships correspond to 125 MPa and 32 MPa respectively. Table
4.3-1 summarizes the numbers that go into Paris law for lower shell frame brackets
amidships:
Table 4.3-1: Paris Law Data for Lower Shell Frame Brackets [Paik et al 2004, ABS 2002a}
Paris law was applied numerically for 63,990,486 stress cycles (16.233 years) and the results
of crack size over time is shown in Fig. 4.3-1.
Crack Growth at Shell Frames (mid-ship)
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Fig. 4.3-1: Paris Law Crack Growth for Shell Frame Brackets
According to the results, Paris Law suggests that it would take approximately 15.6
years for a 1mm shell frame bracket crack to grow to a detectable size (~40mm) for a
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Shell Frame Parameters
LO= 1 mm Y = 1.33
A = 6.94E-12 m= 3.07
&a = 32 MPa = 3,942,000 Cycles/yr
standard inspection. After it reaches 40mm, however, the growth rate increases rapidly. Table
4.3-2 shows some tabulated values derived from Fig. 4.3-1 with time measured from the
point when the crack is 40mm.
Crack Length (m) Time (Months)
0.04 0.0
0.5 5.9
1 6.5
5 7.3
10 7.5
25 7.6
175 7.8
Table 4.3-2: Paris Law Growth for Lower Shell Frame Brackets
The perimeter of a capesize bulk carrier is approximately 140m. Paris law predicts
that a barely detectable bracket crack (at 40mm) grows all the way around the ship in less
than 8 months, which is less than the shortest scheduled inspection interval (annual surveys).
If that were the case, each time an inspector missed a 40mm crack, the ship would be
expected to break in two before the next inspection.
Evidently, Paris Law is extremely over-conservative. This has also been observed in
some of the most recent fracture mechanics research on ships. In fact, ABS is currently
working on a project where they examine the progress of cracks on small tankers between
voyages without repairing them. They are finding much slower crack growth than that
predicted by Paris Law and in some cases, cracks are found to stop growing after they reach a
certain size.
The reason why Paris Law is conservative is that as a crack grows, the structure
becomes more flexible. A lot of the stress is then transferred to the surrounding members and
the stress that is driving the crack growth decreases.
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4.3.4 Proposed Paris Law Modifications
Three modifications of the Paris Law were proposed and tested. The constant stress
amplitude term is replaced by one that is a function of crack length, and thereby decreases
with time. This will cause the predicted crack size at any point in time to be smaller and
thereby less conservative.
1). The first modification is to replace Ao-with Ao- a where af is a "final" crack
a,
length. In this case af is chosen to be the size of the bracket. This means that when a = af,
the bracket is cut and the crack has reached the side shell.
Modified Paris Law 1 becomes:
da = a1_a 
.8~a (4.3-5)dN a,
As before, integrating from the initial to the current crack length gives a function that relates
the crack size "a" and the number of stress cycles "N":
- "a
[47(A a N125af3 -15a 3 -8 a- +15arctanh a- (a -2afa 3 + a')
4a (a, -a) . aa a
A YA-OJ N
a(
(4.3-6)
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22). The second modification is to replace A a-with A -f 1 -a where again af is chosen to
a,
be the size of the bracket.
Modified Paris Law 2 becomes:
2 -3
- =A YA - a adN a,
(4.3-7)
Integrating in this case yields:
5 2 3
+af 6(a a ) 2  af af4a)4+ +f f (a - a) f (af -a)
21[ln a -In (a - af 6 1
a,8 a 7 a 6a,6 a2aff f
= (YA.fl N
af 2
(4.3-8)
3). The third modification involves the replacement of Ac-with Aa where "K" is a
1I+Ka)
geometric constant that can be adjusted to produce a good fit with the experimental data. This
constant accounts for the fact that the cracked component becomes more flexible with crack
growth and stresses are transferred to the surrounding members, so its value depends on the
surrounding geometry. Note that the constant "K" is defined for the crack length "a" in
meters (to be consistent with S.I. units).
Modified Paris Law 3 is becomes:
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da A1 c (4.3-9)
dN [ 1+Ka) (
Integrating this time gives:
2 3 s 3 1 1 -a
2K a2 + 2K 2 a2 + 6Ka2 -2a2 = A(YAoW. ) N (4.3-10)
-~ -a0
It is clear from Eq.4.3-6, 4.3-8 and 4.3-10 that even small modifications to the
original Paris Law complicate results to the point where it is impossible to solve for the crack
length as a function of the number of stress cycles and the initial crack length. Again, we
have to resort to numerical integration of the above equations to overcome this problem.
In order to compare the original Paris Law, the three modified laws and the
experimental data (from the database), we have to plot them all with the abscissa beginning
at the same point. That point is chosen to be when the crack length is equal to the detectable
size (40mm). Crack length is, therefore, plotted against the time since the crack was 40mm
(t'). The independent variable, therefore, becomes:
t =tta=40mm (4.3-11)
In order to obtain comparable points from the data, we have to consider the size of
cracks in the given location and the inspection intervals. Shell frame brackets amidships are
inspected every 2.5 years (at dry docks) until the age of 20, after which they are usually
inspected once a year. No frame cracks were identified in ships under 5 years of age.
We assume that cracks reach 40mm evenly throughout the inspection interval. It
follows that on average they grow from 40mm until the inspection over half the inspection
interval. The value of t' for cracks observed is set to half the inspection interval. We can then
deduce three data points from the data as follows:
530
For t'=O:
For t' = 0.5years:
For t' = 1.25 years:
t'= = 40mm
at'=0.5 
-
at'=1.25
7
A>20 j=5
7
Z LN i=7,jA>20 j=5
7
A 20 j=5
7 ~
Y LN i=7,j
A520 j=5
The original Paris Law is plotted along with the three modifications and the data
points on a graph of Crack Size against t'. The constant "K in the third modification is
adjusted to K= 4.7 in order to fit the data.
Paris Law - Data Comparisons for Frame Brackets
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Fig. 4.3-2: Paris Law, Modifications and Data comparisons of Crack Growth in Frame Brackets
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(4.3-12)
(4.3-13)
Over the range considered, we can see that the original Paris Law is extremely
conservative, the first modification is less but still too conservative, the second modification
underestimates the crack growth rate and the third modification is adjusted to fit the data.
If we were to adopt this approach, the only viable option would be the third
modification. This, however, would require calibrating the constant "K" for all locations on
the ship. The amount of effort required to accomplish this would be analogous to that of ABS
and other organizations who produced tabulated results of the stress intensity factors
throughout the ship hull over decades.
Over the range of crack sizes that we are considering, we can see that the crack
growth is approximately linear. Considering the example of shell frame brackets in Fig. 4.3-
2, the error of approximation by assuming linear growth is only 0.146%. Therefore, it is more
appropriate for our purposes to approximate crack growth as described in Section 4.3.5 that
follows.
4.3.5 Crack Growth Rate Approximation
The crack growth rate has to be approximated for each location and each ship age.
The mean crack size for each location and each age can be deduced from the data. A two
dimensional matrix aA is defined for each age A as the Hadamard division of matrix L by
matrix NA:
LA
aA- NA (4.3-14)
In other words, using the Hadamard division, its elements are calculated as follows:
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i ['A ] (
Similarly, matrix as is defined for each ship and matrix a for the whole database
using the relevant matrices.
The inspection interval for each location, for every ship age is available in rules of
IACS member classification societies. Some assumptions and approximations have to be
made to account for differences in rules and for cases where freedom of choice is given to
surveyors. The values are summarized in Table 4.3-3.
"i" Location ar (mm) T' (years) T' (years) T' (years)
Letter (AGE<5) (AGE<20) (AGE>20)
1 la 40 AGE 2.5 1
2 lb 40 AGE 2.5 1
3 lc 40 AGE 2.5 1
42 id 40 j =5,10: 1 j = 5,10: 1 1
j #5,10: AGE jA 5,10: 2.5
5 le 40 j =5,10: 1 j =5,10: 1 1
j # 5,10: AGE j #5,10: 2.5
6 if 30 j =5,10: 1 j =5,10: 1 1
j # 5,10: AGE j # 5,10: 2.5
7 2a 40 j =5,10: 1 j =5,10: 1 1
j # 5,10: AGE j # 5,10: 2.5
8* 2b 40 j= 5,10: 1 j= 5,10: 1 1
j # 5,10: AGE j # 5,10: 2.5
2 The minimum requirement for annual surveys is the inspection of Cargo Hold 1 (j=10) and an additional cargo
hold chosen by the surveyor, usually Cargo Hold 6 (j=5), which is the ballast hold amidships. The values in the
table are only typical. In practice, when the previous annual survey of a ship was available, it was used to
identify the inspection interval of a particular crack/location
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(4.3-15)
9' 2c 40 j =5,10: 1 j =5,10: 1 1
j# 5,10: AGE j# 5,10: 2.5
10 3a 60 AGE 2.5 1
11 3b 60 AGE 2.5 1
12 3c 60 AGE 2.5 1
13 3d 60 AGE 2.5 1
14 4a 60 AGE 2.5 2.5
15 4b 60 AGE 2.5 2.5
16 4c 60 AGE 2.5 2.5
17 4d 60 AGE 2.5 2.5
18' 5a 80 j =5,10: 1 j =5,10: 1 1
j #5,10: AGE j# 5,10: 2 .5
19* 5b 80 j =5,10: 1 j =5,10: 1 1
j 5,10: AGE j 5,10: 2.5
20 5c 80 j =5,10: 1 j =5,10: 1 1
j #5,10: AGE j #5,10: 2.5
21* 5d 80 j =5,10: 1 j 5,10: 1 1
j #5,10: AGE j #5,10: 2.5
22* 5e 80 j =5,10: 1 j =5,10: 1 1
j # 5,10: AGE j #5,10: 2.5
23* 5f 80 j = 5,10: 1 j =5,10: 1 1
j # 5,10: AGE j #5,10: 2.5
24 6a 40 AGE 2.5 1
25 6b 40 AGE 2.5 1
26 6c 40 AGE 2.5 1
Table 4.3-3: Detectable crack sizes and Insection Time Intervals
A two dimensional matrix is constructed for each ship age "A" with elements
[ giving the inspection interval of location "i" in compartment "j".
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The detectable crack size for each location can be estimated from the cracks reported
in the database, previous research on the probability of crack detection with respect to size
and other parameters, and by consulting with experienced surveyors and engineer
superintendents. The values can be found in Table 4.3-3 and range is between 30mm and
80mm. Arguments could be made why the measurement resolution should increase with age,
but there are also counter arguments. An older ship is inspected in more detail and often by
more surveyors so one could argue for a higher resolution. On the other hand, an older ship
has more to be reported including more wastage, damages and possibly more cracks, so
arguably, there is less time to inspect per crack, indicating a lower resolution. Therefore, this
~r
variable was neglected for simplicity. A single 2-D matrix a was constructed with
elements [' ]i giving the crack measurement resolution for location ij irrespective of
ship age.
Using the above matrices, a matrix of crack growth rates can then be constructed. A
2-D matrix RA is constructed for each ship age "A" with elements [RA giving the crack
growth rate that corresponds to the location "i" in compartment "j" for ship age "A". Using
Hadamard division:
a -ar
R _AA 1 (4.3-16)
-T
2
Its elements are calculated as follows:
2[ ]i,- [ ]..lrj'1 (4.3-17)
1 LA 1'j
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Similarly, matrix Rs is defined for each ship and matrix R for the whole database
using the relevant matrices.
This approximation of the crack growth rate follows the same method used in
comparing the Paris Law and its proposed modifications with growth rates implied by the
data. Cracks are assumed to grow, on average, from the resolution length to their final length
(at which they are reported), over half the inspection interval. This is illustrated graphically
in Fig. 4.3-3, where " a " is the crack size and "t" is the time elapsed from the previous
inspection.
1. Data Points 2. Mean Crack
3. Crack Growth Projectio y
Projection
Crack
Growth
5 - -
- -i. -
2 ,
Fig. 4.3-3: Crack Growth Rate Approximation
The elements of matrix IA give the crack growth rates corresponding to each
location, compartment and ship age. These values will be used extensively in the remaining
analysis.
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4.3.6 Crack Growth Rate vs. Age - "Bathtub Curve"
To answer the initial question of isolating the effect of design modifications and
inspection frequency on the crack size vs. age relationship, we need a single value for each
ship age. In other words, we need to determine an average crack growth rate RA for each
ship age irrespective of location. A quick preliminary result can be obtained by plotting the
average crack growth rate of each ship against ship age. That is obtained as follows:
Ns (4.3-18)
iii
Plotting Rs against age "A" gives the result shown in Fig. 4.3-4, where each red dot
corresponds to a data sample (one ship).
AVERAGE CRACK GROWTH RATE ON EACH SHIP
1000
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0 5 10 15 20 25
SHIP's AGE
Fig. 4.3-4: Averagze Crack Growth Rate Rs " against Ship Age "A" for all Ships
This result gives us a rough idea but it is inaccurate as it ignores the number of cracks
per ship. In other words, the average crack growth rate on a ship with 10 cracks has the same
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weighting (one data point) as the average crack growth rate on a ship with 200 cracks. In
order to correct for this and produce a more meaningful result, we can take a weighted
average (by the number of cracks) of crack growth rates as follows:
RA=
[ZLRA] [N' A iJ
iij
(4.3-19)
By calculating RA for each ship age, and by plotting it against age, we can isolate the
effect of inspection frequency on the inspected crack sizes. This will allow us to draw some
conclusions that help answer the above question. The result is shown in Fig. 4.3-5.
WBGHTED AVERAGE CRACK GROWTH RATE
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Fig 4.3-5: Plot of Average Crack Growth Rate " R A" against Ship Age "A"
The values of RA corresponding to each age are indicated by the red dots. A simple
modeling of the situation is to break it down into three linear regions as shown by the fit.
These involve the first decade of a ship's life during which average growth rates decrease
with time, the second decade during which they are constant, and the third decade during
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which they increase again. This result actually resembles a "bathtub curve" which is common
in many engineering applications but has not been identified before regarding cracks in ships.
A typical example where the bathtub curve is observed is in machinery or electronic
components which show a high failure rate at a young age, then reach a steady as the initial
design problems are sorted out, and then begin to fail again at an older age due to ageing
related problems such as wear and tear. Bathtub curves also apply in people. Fig. 4.3-6 shows
a bathtub curve in pilot accidents with respect to hours of experience, while Fig. 4.3-7 shows
it in driver fatality rates with respect to driver's age.
Accident Rates by Hours of Experience
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Fig. 4.3-6: Bathtub Curve in Pilot Accident Trends for 2005 [Nail Renort 2006]
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Fig. 4.5-7: Bathtub Curve in Driver fatality Rates based on 1996 figures from the National Bureau of
Transportation; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [Boston Sunday Globe 20041
In our case, design modifications eliminate stress concentrations during repairs,
causing crack growth rates to decrease in the early years. Corrosion causes crack growth
rates to increase again in later life. The following analysis attempts to construct the Bathtub
Curve describing the data, and decompose it into its constituent parts.
The Bathtub Curve results from the effects of design modifications and corrosion on
the crack growth rates. The resulting crack growth rate can be resembled by a superposition
of an initial value, the effect of design and the effect of corrosion:
Rtotal = Rorigina + RCorrosionEffect + RDesignEffect (4.3-20)
The original value is simply a constant equal to what the crack growth rate would
have been in absence of the two other opposing effects. We can simply replace the first term
by a constant:
Roriginal = ao (4.3-21)
The effect of corrosion has been examined in great detail by many researchers in the
past. Table 4.3-4 shows a sample of this work.
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DIRECT MEASUREMENT BASED ON CORROSION
Author No. of Ships/Type Measurements
[Wang et al 2007] 211 S-Hull Tankers 2195 sections
[Wang et al 2003a,b] 140 Tankers 110,082
[Paik et al 20030,b] >100 Tankers 33,820
[Harada et al 2001] 197 Tankers + 98 Bulk Carriers >250,000
[Yamamoto et al 1998a] 50 Bulk Carriers
[Paik et al 1998a] 44 Bulk Carriers
[Paik et al 1997a] 40 Tankers
[TSFC 1992] 52 Tankers
Table 4.3-4: Corrosion Wastage Surveys
Based on passed research, the effect of corrosion can be represented as an exponential
that sets in at an age of about 7.5 years. Therefore, we replace the second term as follows:
RCorrosionEffect = eac (AGE-7.5) (4.3-22)
The effect of design modifications is slightly more complicated. In order to create the
bathtub curve together with the other two terms, we know that it has to be of an exponential
form so we can represent it as follows:
RDesignEffect = aD + bDecD (AGE-dD) (4.3-23)
We then have to apply some boundary conditions in order to solve for the constants
and simplify the expression. First, we see that Eq. 4.3-23 is asymptotic with an asymptote
value of aD
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cD < 0: R AGE-no
D DesignEffect D
cD>O:RDesignEffect AGE-D-oo (4.3-24)
Based on the repairs of cracks in the database, and after verifying with surveyors and
superintendents, we can conclude that the vast majority of design modifications during
repairs are made between the age of 0 and 15 years. By assuming that the effect of design
modifications is equal to zero for a new ship (no repairs yet) and that it reaches 99% of its
final value at the age of 15 years, we get two boundary conditions that we can apply to Eq.
4.3-23. This gives us two additional equations:
BoundaryCondition 1: RDesignEffect (AGE = 0) = 0
-> aD= bD-cDdD (4.3-25)
BoundaryCondition 2: RDeignEffect (AGE = 15) = 0.9 9 aD
=> aD =-1O0DecD(15-dD)
By combining Eq. 4.3-25 and 4.3-26, we can solve for
Rearranging Eq. 4.3-25 yields:
bD DaDe
Substituting Eq. 4.3-27 into Eq. 4.3-26 and rearranging gives:
In100
CD 15
two of the constants.
(4.3-27)
(4.3-28)
Combining Eq. 4.3-27 with Eq. 4.3-23 reduces its form to:
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(4.3-26)
RDesignEffect = aD [1- cDAGE (
Substituting Eq. 4.3-28 into Eq. 4.3-29 gives the final form of the design effect in terms of
only one constant:
nl AGE
RDesignEffect aL e 15 (4.3-30)
Having determined the form of the three components, we can substitute Eq. 4.3-21,
4.3-22 and 4.3-30 into 4.3-20 to give the form of the Bathtub Curve as follows:
Rtotai = Rrigina +RCorrosionEffect + RDesignEffect
_enI- 1  AGE
=o +eac (AGE-7.5) +aD J __ 15
This expression can be simplified by renaming the three constants as follows:
A =aO +aD
B=ac
C=-aD
(4.3-31)
(4.3-32)
(4.3-33)
(4.3-34)
This reduces the Bathtub Curve expression of Eq. 4.3-31 to:
In 100 AGE
Rtotal -- A+e B(AGE -7.5) +Ce 15A (4.3-35)
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(4.3-29)
This is the final form of the Bathtub Curve. Non-Linear-Optimization was used to
optimize the coefficients A, B and C of Eq. 4.3-32 in order to fit the data of Fig. 4.3-5. The
resulting expression is given by:
In 100AGE
Rtotai =180.31 + e. 30 2 1(AGE-7.5) + 158.48e 15 (4.3-36)
Having determined constants A, B and C using non-linear optimization, we use Eq.
4.3-29, 4.3-30 and 4.3-31 to determine the coefficients ao, ac and aD, and then back-
substitute into Eq. 4.3-21, 4.3-22 and 4.3-30 to determine the individual contributions as
follows:
Rorigina - 33 8.79mm / yr (4.3-37)
RCorrosionEffect _e 0. 302 1(AGE-7.5) (4.3-38)
RDesignEffect =-15 8.48 1 e-  15Lsgffc(4.3-39)
Finally, the Bathtub Curve (Eq. 4.3-36) and its individual contributions (Eq. 4.3-37,
4.3-38 and 4.3-39) can be plotted along with the data of Fig. 4.3-4 on the same graph. The
result is presented in Fig. 4.3-8.
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Fig. 4.3-8: Decomposed Bathtub Curve of RA vs. A
This result clearly demonstrates how crack growth rates are gradually reduced by
design modifications during repairs (the blue curve) and how corrosion (in orange) has the
opposite effect as a ship gets older. This "Bathtub" shaped curve of average crack 
growth
rates, combined with the increased frequency and rigor of inspections as a ship gets older,
result in the observed pattern of mean and median crack sizes with respect to age depicted in
Fig. 4.2-45 of Section 4.2.5.3.
This Bathtub Curve is also observed for individual locations but a significant number
of cracks are required across a wide range of ages in order to demonstrate it. This is done by
picking the elements of each matrix RA (for every age) that correspond to the chosen
location "i" and compartment "j" ,RA ]  and plotting them against age "A". The result
for shell frame brackets, which was used in the previous analysis, is shown in Fig. 4.3-9.
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Crack Growth Rate on Shell Frame Brackets
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Fig 4.3-9: Bathtub Curve R .j vs. A for Shell Frame Brackets
Due to the absence of data in the early and late years of the ship's life, the Bathtub
Curve is not very well defined. However, a pattern is still evident showing that crack growth
rates in a given location vary significantly with age. That is why a separate crack growth rate
matrix R?, had to be constructed for each ship age. In the cases were enough data was
available, Bathtub Curves were used to read off elements of the R. matrices in order to
eliminate the effect of outliers.
4.3.7 Crack Growth Rates by Location
Having examined the crack growth rate vs. age relationship (Bathtub Curve), and
having adjusting the entries of the crack growth rate matrices using the bathtub curves, we
can proceed to compare the various locations and compartments in terms of crack growth
rates.
The first result is the average crack growth rate along the ship. The average crack
growth rate in each compartment "J" is determined as follows:
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Plotting Rj against "j" gives the average crack growth rate along the ship as shown
in Fig. 4.3-10.
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Fig. 4.3-10: Mean Crack Growth Rates per Compartment "i"
The crack growth rate seems to be significantly higher in the ballast hold (=5) and in
the first cargo hold (=10). This may be due to wave slamming. The fore peak, j=1 1, is of a
different geometry and, therefore, not comparable to j=10. The crack growth rate distribution,
very closely resembles the distribution of average still water bending moments along the hull
shown in .Fig 4.1-5 of Section 4.1.2.2.
Whereas in Chapter 4.2 we saw that the distribution of crack frequency was similar to
the distribution of wave induced bending moments, here we see that the distribution of mean
crack growth rates is similar to the average still water bending moments. This points to the
fact that crack growth rates are governed primarily by the still water bending moments (low
cycle, high amplitude stresses) while crack frequency or rack initiation is driven primarily by
wave induced bending moments (high frequency, low amplitude stresses). This is consistent
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with conclusions drawn by late research on "springing ships" [Drummen at al 2008, Jang et
al 2007, Gu and Moan 2000, Dudson et al 2001]. Though most of these studies cover a wide
range of ships, research has also lately focused specifically on the springing effects and
fatigue implications in bulk carriers [Hirdaris et al 2009, Storhaug et al 2007, Malenica et al
2006, Vidic-Perunovic & Jensen 2005], showing that it is very significant.
The average crack growth rate along the ship can also be examined with respect to
ship age. In other words, plots such as 4.3-8 can be produced for each ship age. The values to
be plotted against compartment "j" for each ship age "A" are obtained from the data as
follows.
-. i, . i~j [ A]i,
(4.3-41)
Due to the limited number of ships, however, it is more appropriate to produce the
plot for age groups (of five years) as opposed to one plot for each ship age. For example, to
create a plot for ship ages 6 to 10 years, the mean crack growth rates in each compartment "j"
are given by:
10
L ', -A .i [ A .i
R =^=6A=6:10,j 10(4.3-42)
A=6 i
The plots for each age group are shown in Fig. 4.3-11 to 4.3-22. They show no
significant changes in crack growth rate variations along the ship with respect to age.
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Fig. 4.3-11: Mean Crack Growth Rates by Compartment for Ages 0-5 years
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Fig. 4-3-12: Mean Crack Growth Rates by Compartment for Ages 6-10 years
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Fig. 4.3-13: Mean Crack Growth Rates by Compartment for Ages 11-15 years
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Fig. 4.3-14: Mean Crack Growth Rates by Compartment for Ages 16-20 years
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Fig. 4.3-15: Mean Crack Growth Rates by Compartment for Ages 21+ years
We can also examine mean crack growth rates by location across all compartments.
In this case, we consider groups of locations 1 to 6 as per Section 4.2.4. For example, group 3
is the lower wing tank area which includes locations 3A (i=10) to 3D (i=13). The value of
mean crack growth rate for this group is computed by:
Lower Wing Tanks: i=10:13
13
13
i=10 j
(4.3-43)
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The mean crack growth rate was thereby computed for the 6 location groups and
plotted in Fig 4.3-16.
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Fig. 4.3-
16: Mean Crack Growth Rates oer Location Groun
The highest crack growth rates were found to be in the bulkheads with an average of
371mm/year. This analysis can be repeated for each age "A" in which case the values are
obtained using the corresponding matrices for each age. For example, for lower wing tanks
(i=10 to 13), it would be:
RAJ=10:13 (4.3-44)
13
i=10 j
13 ~
i=10 j
Again, however, it is best to do it for age groups to ensure enough data points in each
result. The corresponding value for ages 6 to 10 years would be obtained as shown in Eq.
4.3-45.
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A=6:10,i=10:13
10 13
11LL-iA i [A ]i
A=6 i=10 j
10 13
Z=Z[6A]i=0
A= i=10 j
The plots of these results are shown in Fig 4.3-17 to 4.3-21.
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Fia. 4.3-17: Mean Crack Growth Rates by Location for Ages 0-5 years
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(4.3-45)
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Fig. 4.3-18: Mean Crack Growth Rates by Location for Ages 6-10 years
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Fig. 4.3-19 Mean Crack Growth Rates by Location for Ages 11-15 years
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Fig. 4.3-20: Mean Crack Growth Rates by Location for Ages 16-20 years
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Fig. 4.3-21: Mean Crack Growth Rates by Location for Ages 21+ years
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Along with the plots of crack growth rates by compartment, they can be used to
estimate the size to which a crack of a given size will grow if left in service, depending on its
location and the ship's age. The ranges observed were from 84mm/year, in cargo holds of
ships aged 16 to 20, to 786 mm/year, in bulkheads of ships aged 21 + years.
The average crack growth rate across the whole database can also be obtained using
Eq. 4.3-46
- [jZ[ IIj,*[&]1
(4.3-46)
The average crack growth rate across the whole database was 233mm/year. This is
very consistent with the findings of [Antoniou 1977] around thirty years ago. By considering
data from 29 tankers of ages 9 to 22 years old, which returned to the shipyard of
Skaramangas consecutively for repairs, and by assuming that no cracks were left over after
each repair, Prof Antoniou calculated an average crack growth rate of 250-300mm/year, but
he estimates the value to be closer to 200mm/year.
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4.4 Crack Safety
4.4.1 Background
Classification societies have a limited understanding of cracks. Therefore, they
choose to adopt a conservative approach. In other words, they inspect frequently and
rigorously, and they repair all cracks without exception to be on the safe side. Owners make
their decisions on maintenance, repairing, buying, selling and scrapping after factoring in
their perception of safety related to cracks, which is based solely on experience.
The fracture mechanics community has worked on the area but there are some
difficulties in obtaining reliable results. The vast majority of the work has been analytical
which requires many simplifying assumptions. Direct measurement based research is more
reliable but it is very difficult to collect confidential data. Some of the most important work
on safety implications of cracks in ships has been carried out in a joint project between PNU,
ABS, and Chevron. Paris Law is used to predict fatigue crack growth and thereby the crack
sizes throughout the hull [Paik et al 2003, Paik et al 2004]. The crack sizes are then used to
compute the effective areas of plates contributing to the longitudinal strength of the hull
girder as shown in Fig. 4.4-1.
Act
A0
P
Fig. 4.4-1: Calculation of Effective Area Due to the Presence of a Crack
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A longitudinal strength knockdown factor is then computed as follows:
R = Strength(new) _ o-,,* (A0 - A) _ (A0 - A)
Strength(old) oul,* Ao Ao (4'4~1
Similarly, longitudinal strength knockdown factors are computed to account for
corrosion and other forms of damage before combining them all together to one knockdown
factor.
There are several limitations of this approach, which we attempt to overcome in this
project. First, no real data is used to examine crack growth rates. Instead, Paris Law was used
which, as shown in Chapter 4.3, is extremely conservative in predicting crack sizes in capes.
Second, only the effective area of a crack plate is used, while the stress intensity at
the crack tip is ignored. The strength of a cracked plate is usually significantly lower than
that of a similar plate in which one of the dimensions is reduced by the length of the crack,
particularly when the crack is loaded in Mode I (see Fig. 3.3-9 of Section 3.3). Furthermore,
a lot of the danger is associated with the probability of fracture, which is determined by the
stress intensity at the crack tip.
Thirdly, the focus is on the longitudinal strength of the ship hull while the danger of a
leak is ignored. Most of the tragic losses of capesize bulk carriers begin by a leak which is
followed by a domino effect and a rapid sinking. The possibility of a leak into the cargo hold
that is loaded with heavy iron ore, is arguably the greatest danger when it comes to cracks in
capes.
4.4.2 Method Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a procedure to assess crack related safety as
a function of ship age. First, a danger value is assigned to each crack depending on its
location, size, growth rate, and inspection interval. Then a safety parameter is assigned on
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each ship based on the cracks in its hull and their danger values. Finally, the safety parameter
of each ship and its age are used to determine a safety function with respect to ship age.
4.4.3 Crack Danger Value
The danger value of each crack is associated with the likelihood of it reaching a
critical size, and the consequences. Both properties are very hard to quantify, but we can
assume they are a function of the current size of the crack, its growth rate, its location, and
the frequency of inspection. Therefore, we start by saying:
De ~~] =-~ei ,N) (4.4-2)
We can break down the danger value into two components. One component will be a
constant "C1" equal to the minimum danger value associated only with the location. In other
words, this is the minimum danger value assigned to a crack in a specific location,
irrespective to its size, growth rate and inspection interval.
The other component will be another constant "C2" multiplied by a function that is
associated with the possibility of the crack reaching a particular "critical length", and will
include the remaining parameters.
The total danger value is the sum of these two components so for each crack, we
have:
DC = C11 + C2i f '(a, i,[ j I I T]) (4.4-3)
The two constants "C1" and "C2" are the Criticality Parameters, which depend only
on the location. "C1" depends on how critical it is for a crack of any size to be present in that
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location, while "C2" depends on how dangerous it is for a crack in that location to reach a
critical length.
Three 2-D matrices have to be created with inputs for every location "i" and
compartment "j"; one for critical crack lengths "a"' and two for criticality parameters "C1"
and "C2 ". These three parameters are assumed not to vary with age, so only one matrix is
created for each parameter to cover all ages.
Critical crack lengths "a" have to be defined for each location. Since brittle fracture
is very unlikely, owing to the improvements in materials and crack-arrest design since WW2,
and due to the lack of data regarding brittle fracture crack lengths, the value chosen for the
critical length is not the critical crack length for fast fracture.
As in [Paik et al 2004], it is common to take the length of the component as the
critical length. That is relevant because, the crack often starts at the one end of the
component and results in leaking (from the sea or ballast tanks) when the crack reaches the
other end. This definition of critical crack length is not to say that all ship components are
designed using the "leak before break" concept. However, a great effort is made in design to
ensure that this applies throughout the ship during normal operating conditions. If data
becomes available on the brittle fracture lengths, and if these lengths happen to be smaller
than the corresponding values currently used, for example in cold water applications, then the
critical crack lengths can simply be adjusted. Alternatively, a more detailed model to
incorporate both values can be used. An alternative model that allows for this, was also
developed, and is discussed in Section 4.4.7.
Some adjustments have to be made for components that are very large, and in which
fast fracture would occur before the crack reaches the end. In bulkheads, for example, the
critical crack length is set to the length of each corrugation side. In cases where cracks are
very dangerous, such as the side shell, the critical crack length is simply set to zero in order
to maximize the danger value. After these adjustments are made, the 2-D Matrix ac is
created using average cape dimensions. The matrix elements ic] give the critical crack
length of location "i" and compartment "j".
The criticality parameters for each location are determined based on the experience of
surveyors of major classification societies and of superintendent engineers and naval
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architects. In cases where opinions varied, average values are used. Judgment is also used
based on past known accidents and on the description of cracks in the database. This was
only done for locations "i" amidships before adjusting values for the other compartments "j".
We want the crack danger value to range between 0 and 1. The function multiplied by
"C2" will also be designed to range from 0 and 1. Therefore, the criticality parameters range
from 0 to 0.5. Table 4.4-1 shows the critical crack lengths "a", and criticality parameters
"C1" and "C2" for each location "i" amidships (j=5&6).
Maximum criticality values are set for locations where cracks are very dangerous,
such as i=17 (3D in Fig. 4.4-2). Lowest values are assigned to cracks which do not pose a big
threat, such as those in i=26, which are usually on pipes.
The usual direction of propagation is also considered. High values are used for i=4
and i=6, in which cracks usually grow transversely towards the shell. Low values are used in
i=1, which usually corresponds to longitudinal cracks on the deck.
Another factor considered is that cracks in some locations, such as i = 14, 23 and 3
(iC in Fig. 4.4-2), are followed by a leak and become very visible. They are identified and
repaired quickly by the crew, so the criticality values are adjusted downwards. Locations that
are less frequently inspected by the crew, such as i=10, are adjusted upwards.
Finally, in some cases, one criticality parameter may be high and one low. An
example is location i=7 (2A in Fig. 4.4-2). The presence of a crack there is not very
dangerous, since it is very visible and does not propagate fast. If it reaches the side shell,
however, it becomes very dangerous. A few of these examples are shown in Fig. 4.4-2.
Having the base values amidships, the next task is to adjust them to each compartment "j"
along the ship. An array of adjustment factors for each compartment first has to be created.
We start by assuming a shape similar to that of the wave induced bending moment. That is
high amidships and gradually reducing towards the stem and bow.
One may argue that these results in double counting because the effect of the
wave induced bending moment is already captured in the crack growth rates which are
included in the function multiplied by "C2". However, failure from a crack is likely to occur
under a big rogue wave or under a storm. The resulting stress to which a crack will be
subjected in such an incident is also directly proportional to the wave induced bending
moment.
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Base Criticality Values by Location Amidships
"i" Letter Code aiCj=5,6 (mm) C1 I,j=5,6 C2 ij=5,6
1 1A 1,500 0.2 0.2
2 1B 350 0.3 0.4
3 1C 350 0.1 0.1
4 1D 300 0.3 0.4
5 1E 200 0.3 0.2
6 1F 300 0.4 0.4
7 2A 1,700 0.2 0.4
8 2B 600 0.5 0.4
9 2C 1,700 0.3 0.4
10 3A 1,800 0.3 0.3
11 3B 400 0.4 0.5
12 3C 400 0.2 0.2
13 3D 800 0.5 0.5
14 4A 700 0.2 0.3
15 4B 800 0.2 0.3
16 4C 400 0.4 0.4
17 4D 800 0.5 0.5
18 5A 1,000 0.3 0.4
19 5B 1,000 0.3 0.4
20 5C 1,000 0.2 0.4
21 5D 1,000 0.4 0.5
22 5E 1,000 0.2 0.2
23 5F 100 0.4 0.5
24 6A 2,500 0.2 0.3
25 6B 2,000 0.2 0.3
26 6C 400 0.1 0.1
Table 4.4-1: Critical Crack lengths and Criticality Parameters for i = 5 and 6
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Fig. 4.4-2: Typical direction of crack propagation for some cracks
Therefore, we start with a multiplying factor that ranges linearly from 0.5 at the stem
(j=1) and bow 0=11) to 1 amidships 0=5 and j=6). Some simple adjustments are then made
to these values. Based on previous accidents and discontinuities in the hull (e.g. at the
accommodation), the value at j=2 is set to 1, and the value at the bow (=11) is adjusted up to
0.8. Since the adjustment factor is used for both criticality parameters, it automatically results
in a scaling of the crack danger value relative to amidships. The resulting array F of
adjustment factors [F] is:
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F- = {.5,1.0,0.7,0.8,1.0,1.0,0.9,0.8,0.7,0.6,0.8} (4.4-4)
The arrays C1 1j= 5,6 and C2ij=5,6, from Table 4.4-1 are combined with array F in Eq.
4.4-4, to produce 2-D Matrices C and C2 with elements [ j.. and [2 . . respectively,
denoting the criticality parameters of locations "i" in compartments "j". These elements are
given by:
[1j = Clij 5 ,6 [1,] (4.4-5)
[(2 = 2i,j=5,6 - (4.4-6)
In Section 4.3, we developed the matrices with elements .] and [I, ] . So far
in this chapter, we have developed the matrices with elements [C ]., [a, ] and [U2 -j
The next step is to develop the crack danger value given by Eq. 4.4-3 in terms of these
parameters.
The function by which "C2" is multiplied, has to be in terms of the current crack
length ac, [ , I'and [dc . As mentioned earlier, this function is associated
with the likelihood of a crack reaching the critical length [d before the next inspection,
and it has to range between 0 and 1.
F
We start by defining a time to failure c which can be calculated for each crack.
This is simply the time that the crack needs to grow from its current length to the critical
length given its location and compartment. It is estimated as follows:
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F [ae -ac
T F ,J.
R ](4.4-7)
This value is then non-dimensionalized. By subtracting from this required time, the
time that a crack has until the next inspection interval (if it is not repaired), we get a time
margin. If this time margin is positive, it means that there will be a chance to repair the crack
at the next inspection. If it is negative, it implies that the crack is expected to reach its critical
length before the next inspection. A dimensionless time margin is then developed by dividing
by the inspection interval:
K CF _ I
c T, (4.4-8)
This parameter captures the likelihood of a crack reaching its critical value if it is not
repaired in the current inspection. It has the following two properties:
Tc*<O: The crack will reach the critical length before the next inspection
Tc*=l: The crack will reach the critical length two inspections from now
The crack danger function can now be determined in terms of only three parameters;
the dimensionless time margin and the two criticality parameters. After examining a wide
variety of options, the following model was constructed:
Dc = + [ 2] MIN [1,e""*] (4.4-9)
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The easiest way to understand this model is through a diagram. Fig. 4.4-3 shows a
plot of the crack danger value De as a function of dimensionless time margin Tc*. Note that
for a given location, compartment and ship age, Tc* is defined only by the current crack
length.
Fig. 4.4-3: DC as a function of T*
For T 0 the crack is expected to reach the critical length before the next
inspection, so the crack danger factor takes the maximum value of Dc = I + [0 .As
Tc decreases, the danger value decreases exponentially to its minimum value Dc = .
When T = 1, we are at the point where even if the crack is missed in the next inspection, it
will not grow to its critical length until the inspection after that. In other words, the crack
will reach the critical length two inspection intervals from now. At that point, the crack
danger factor is 10% along the way between the two extremes. It takes the value
Dc = [ j + 0.1 .(2J 1
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4.4.4 Examination of Inspection Intervals
The maximum danger value of a crack in location "i" and compartment "j" is given by:
DC = C(l]' + C(2]' (4-4-10)
From Eq. 4.4-9, we see that this happens when: T* <0
From Eq. 4.4-8 it follows that: TF -I [t i
Then from Eq. 4.4-7 we get: [C - a R [T '] [?A]j 1  (4.4-11)
In other words, if the crack keeps growing from its current length ac with growth rate
['?A j , it will reach the critical length [5d within an inspection interval (Ft' (before
the next inspection).
There are locations for which the cracks take this maximum location irrespective of
the size of the crack. One case is when the critical crack size is set to zero. This is done for
the most dangerous locations such as the side shell. The other case can be determined by
substituting ac =0 into Eq. 4.4-11. This gives:
L . [a 1 (4.4-12)
If this equation holds, it implies that a crack of any length is predicted to reach its
critical length by the next inspection. In other words, classification societies might consider
reducing the inspection interval .1
It is best, however, to consider dimensional time margins in order to get a feel of how
conservative current inspection intervals are even if they are shorter than this value. So far
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we have assumed that cracks start growing with rate [?A ] from a size equal to the
measurement resolution [5r . Therefore, the minimum time to failure in the absence of a
~F
visible crack can be evaluated. A 2-D Matrix 4A is thereby created for each age "A" with
elements [oAi,j calculated as follows:
F- ]i,j L [a i,j
TO i, (4.4-13)
The resulting inspection interval time margin can then be evaluated for each location.
A 2-D matrix fo7 is created for each ship age "A" with elements [fM 3calculated as
follows:
TMF _[T 5") - ' [) . i]
6 - T -________ -FliJ ij i-[AJ (4.4-14)
Note that current crack size does not appear anywhere in the equation. These values
are irrespective of current cracks. They simply measure how conservative current inspection
intervals are by comparing them to the time required for a barely unidentifiable crack to
reach its critical length.
By calculating this inspection interval time margin for each location and each ship
age, one can see when there is more room and when extra care during inspections is critical.
Before plotting the results with respect to age, we compute average values across the six
location groups (as opposed to each location "i") and across the whole ship. We also compute
average values across ship ages and group them in intervals of 5 years. The results are
presented in Fig. 4.4-4 and Fig. 4.4-5.
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Fig. 4.4-4: Inspection Interval Time Margins for Each Age Group vs. Location
Fig. 4.4-5: Inspection Interval Time Margins for Location Group vs. Age
The points with negative average margins indicate that the inspection intervals should
be reduced while the ones with high margins can afford less frequent inspections.
The results indicate that the inspection intervals of new ships should be slightly
shorter. That would be expected because there is on dry dock until the age of 5 years, after
which, ships are dry docked every 2.5 years. Furthermore, growth rates are relatively higher
at young ages. It should be noted, however, that since the average number of cracks for
young ships is much smaller, this result is not as threatening as it seems. The location which
on average needs more frequent inspections is the deck and top side tanks.
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4.4.5 Ship and Age Safety Parameter
Having defined the danger value for each crack using Eq. 4.4-9, we now have to
assign a value to each ship based on all the cracks in its hull. Intuitively, the ship safety
parameter S, should depend on the number of cracks in the ship and on the Danger value D,
associated with these cracks. Furthermore, we want to design this parameter so that it ranges
from 0 to 100.
Since we have a large database, it is reasonable to make this a "relative safety
parameter" that it expresses safety relative to that of the rest of the ships. The following
simple definition fits with the above requirements:
S = PercentRank 1 {
s L D (4-4-15)
C
A value of S, =85 simply means that 85% of ships in sample have a lower value of
1
, which is a measure of safety.
Dc
C
By choosing a percent rank we automatically satisfy the "relative" and the
0 S, 100 requirement. Furthermore, we ensure that the safety value does not go to
infinity in the extreme event that there are no cracks.
By summing over the danger values in the hull, we ensure that it depends directly on
the number and danger values of all the cracks in the hull. Finally, the reciprocal of the sum
is taken to ensure that a high value means safer than a lower value. Alternatively, one minus
the sum could be used. This was also examined and the results are provided later on for
comparison.
Having defined a ship safety parameter S, for each ship, the final step is to compute
an average safety parameter S, for each ship age A. That is simply done by computing the
average for each ship age:
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Y Ss
S = SEA (4.4-16)
SeA
The values of SA are then plotted against "A" to examine how the mean safety varies with
ship age. The result is presented in Fig. 4.4-6.
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- 100-
y = 0.0178x 3 - 0.5926x2 + 2.8245x + 70.584
80 -R2 0.7467
0. 60-
M 40-
20-
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Ship Age
Fig. 4.4-6: Average Ship Safety as a function of Ship Age
It turns out that this function can be well represented by a third order polynomial. The
data follows a clear trend with little scatter. Safety remains relatively level for the first few
years until the age of about 4 years. It then gradually decreases to reach a minimum at the
age of about 20 years before increasing again.
Up to the age of 20 years, the result is intuitive. Part of the reason accounting for the
increase after that point is the more frequent and rigorous inspections which step up at that
point, both from classification societies and from port state authorities. When a ship is over
20 years old it is usually scrutinized at every chance.
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Another reason is that many low quality vessels are scrapped relatively soon. This
leaves only the best designed, built and maintained vessels towards right of the graph.
Therefore, the result is biased in this sense. Consequently, Fig. 4.4-6 does not necessarily
show how the safety of a ship built today, will vary throughout its life. It simply shows the
average safety level of existing vessels of each ship age.
A recent study of total losses between 1997 and 2006, by the International Union of
Marine Insurance IUMI, found that losses, as a percentage of the existing fleet, were found to
decrease with age for ships aged 25 years or older [Wang et al 2009]. Given that detentions
are more frequent for older ships, [Wang et al 20091 explains this outcome by the fact that
bad quality ships have been scrapped.
Scrapping bad quality ships probably has an effect, explaining part of the outcome.
However, one should keep in mind that scrapping is mainly governed by the level of the
market. For example, only 4 capes were scrapped in the last market boom, between Nov
2003 and Sept 2008 [Clarksons 2009a]. Surely, there was a mix of quality in the fleet
throughout these years, but given the high market, ships were kept in operation. The four
ships were actually scrapped between July 2005 and May 2006, precisely at the lowest part
of the market during these 5 years.
Considering the last 50 years, market cycles have lasted an average of 8 years
[Stopford 2009]. Given that a low market is "required" for scrapping, the removal of low
quality ships does not perfectly explain the phenomenon depicted in Fig. 4.4-6 or the results
of the IUMI study. Other factors include the design improvements during repairs and the
more frequent and rigorous inspections, which also explain the more frequent detentions in
older ships.
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4.4.6 Alternative definition check
As mentioned earlier, a slight modification to the definition of the ship safety
parameter would be examined. That is:
S, =1- PercentRank D (4.4-17)
The results using that procedure are shown in Fig. 4.4-7.
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Fig. 4.4-7: SA vs. Age using the Alternative Definition of SS
This is essentially the same result as that in Fig. 4.4-6. Therefore, the result is not
sensitive to our choice in how we define the ship safety parameter.
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4.4.7 Alternative ship Safety Model
Several methods were considered before designing the above model. One example is
the following:
ZT..~A [B C D_
LDGj = ,, + i Aj [ + C + D (4.4-18)
S' = PercentRank (4.4-19)
sZ LDGSij
j i
Where:
LDGsi,]: Location Danger
L11 : Alternative Model Location Factor (similar to the criticality parameters)
ss : Distance from crack tip to the side shell
sac 1 : Distance required to reach critical length for fast fracture
sce11 : Distance from crack tip to the end of the component
B: Alternative Model dimensionless parameter
C: Alternative Model dimensionless parameter
D: Alternative Model dimensionless parameter
S': Alternative Model Ship safety Parameter
This model essentially, begins by assigning a dimensionless danger value to each
location and compartment depending on the number of cracks and a more detailed
calculation of their danger contributions. The ship danger value is then calculated by
summing these location dangers across the locations and compartments of each ship. The rest
of the procedure is essentially the same as the previous model. The percent rank again has to
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be used to ensure that the safety value does not tend to infinity in the extreme even that there
are 0 cracks. The main problem with this model is that it requires values of ss,
sac,1 and sce 1 .
4.4.8 Danger Composition by Location vs. Age
Using the ship safety model defined by Eq. 4.4-9, 4.4-15 and 4.4-16, we can examine
how the danger value is distributed on average throughout the hull for each ship age. This is
valuable information when it comes to deciding which areas to inspect in time constrained
inspections.
From Eq. 4.4-20 we have:
Dc = [ ij+ [(2]~ MIN [ l.e (nO")c
The contribution of total danger accounted for by a location "i" is given by:
DA= D (4.4-20)
i j
The danger contribution for groups can be determined as shown in the following
example. For lower location group 3 (Lower Wing Ballast Tanks) which includes locations
"i" from 10 to 13, the danger contribution is calculated by:
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13
A,i=10:13 D (4.4-21)
EAJiij
This is more meaningful not only in terms of presenting the data but also because a
surveyor makes a decision of whether or not to inspect a location group, such as the lower
wing ballast tanks as opposed to deciding on each specific location.
After doing this for all location groups, we can plot them against age "A" to allow for
comparisons. The result is shown in Fig. 4.4-8.
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Fig. 4.4-8: Location Danger Contributions vs. Ship Age
We see that the highest danger contribution is accounted for by the deck and top side
ballast tanks (location group 1). The danger contribution accounted for by this location is
almost half for new ships and decreases steadily to about a third for older ships. The cargo
hold region on the other hand is relatively safe in new ships and accounts for an increasing
portion of the total danger as the ship gets older.
We can also examine the danger contribution of each compartment "j" along the ship
length. For an average across all ship ages, the calculation is as follows:
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DCEj
i j
(4.4-22)
A plot of this against ship compartment "j" is shown in Fig. 4.4-9.
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Fig. 4.4-9: Average Compartment Danger Contributions
The ballast tank compartment (=5) accounts for more danger than all others on
average. The mid ship region including j=5 to 7 contributes about 50% to the total danger
value.
Variations with respect to age can also be examined by repeating the same plot for
ships within each age group. For age between 6 and 10 for example, the calculation would be
as follows:
DA= 6:10,j -
10
Z Z Dce~j~
A=6 j
10
A=6 i j
The results for each age group are presented in Fig. 4.4-10 to 4.4-14.
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Fig. 4.4-10: Average Compartment Danger Contributions for Ship Age 0 to 5 Years
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Fig. 4.4-11: Average Compartment Danger Contributions for Ship Age 6 to 10 Years
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Fig. 4.4-12: Average Compartment Danger Contributions for Ship Age 11 to 15 Years
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Fig. 4.4-13: Average Compartment Danger Contributions for Ship Age 16 to 20 Years
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Fig. 4.4-14: Average Compartment Danger Contributions for Shin Age 21± Years
No significant variations are observed with respect to age. Most of the danger is
associated with the compartments at the middle of the ship irrespective of age. One exception
is the fore peak for ages 6 to 10, though this could be because of limited data. One factor
contributing to this result is the scaling of the criticality parameters across compartments
using the array F .
Under classification rules, surveyors are often required to inspect some specific
compartments and are required to inspect a further one or two more of their choice. These
results can be factored into that decision depending on the ship's age.
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Age 2 1 + Years
4.5 Reliability Assessment
4.5.1 Introduction
Chapter 3.11, describes the calculation of a danger value for each ship Ds based on
the distribution of cracks in its hull right before a repair. This chapter will describe the
procedure for estimating the expected probability of failure for a ship at any point in time
based on the D, value of the ships in the database plus some additional data. Failure in this
context refers to sinking of a ship or the need for an emergency (unscheduled) repairs due to
the presence of cracks in the hull.
4.5.2 Background on Risk Assessment using Duration
Models
4.5.2.1 Basics of Reliability Analysis
The duration variable is the time to failure and can be described by its probability
density function f(t) and cumulative distribution function F(t) which are related as follows:
F(t) = f(r)dvr (4.5-1)
Three additional functions are introduced in duration analysis:
1. Survivor Function S(t): Probability that failure will occur after time t
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2. Hazard Function X(t): Probability that failure will occur very shortly after time t given
that failure has not yet occurred at time t
3. Expected Residual Lifetime Function r(t): Expected remaining time to failure
assuming failure has not yet occurred at time t
The survivor function is defined as follows: S(t) = P(T 2 t) =1- F(t) (4.5-2)
Combining Eq. (4.5-1) and (4.5-2) yields: as (t) -f(t)
at
1
The hazard function is defined as: A(t) = lim-P(Tf t + dt I Tf t)
dt-Oydt
By the definition of conditional probability it follows that:
1 P(Tf&t+dt)
A(t) = lim -
dt-*O dt P(Tf t)
lim 1 S(t) - S(t + dt) 1 dS(t)
dt-+Odt S(t) S(t) dt
Combining (4.5-3) and (4.5-5) yields the identity:
Following from (4.5-5): 1 dS(t)
S(t) dt
d
- In S(t)
dt
Integrating (4.5-7) and solving for the survivor function we get:
J2(v)dv = - dlnS(r)=
0
-In S(t)!lnKOiJ
S(t)= S(O0 (4.5-8)
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(4.5-3)
(4.5-4)
(4.5-5)
(4.5-6)f(t)
S(t)
(4.5-7)
Finally, setting S(0)=1 yields: S(t) = e 0 (4.5-9)
4.5.2.2 Duration Dependence and Duration Models
An important property is the positive or negative duration dependence which is
determined by the form of the hazard function.. This describes the relationship between the
instantaneous probability of failure and the elapsed time.
A positive duration dependence means that the hazard function increases with time
meaning that the older a component is, the more likely it is to fail. An example falling under
this category would be cars and other machines that break down due to ageing. A negative
duration on the other hand is described by a decreasing hazard function implying that
reliability increases with age which is very common for electronic equipment. Another
possibility is the absence of duration dependence meaning that the probability of failure is
independent of elapsed time.
One of the simplest duration models is the exponential distribution model which has
no duration dependence: A(t) =2, S(t)=e- and r(t)=. Other examples include the
Gamma distribution, the Weibull distribution, the bathtub curve distribution and the Log-
Normal Distribution [Gourieroux & Jasiax 2007].
The analysis of cracks in capes showed that average crack growth rates slow down
during the early years due to design modifications which eliminate stress concentrations, and
then accelerate after a certain age due to the effect of corrosion. Absent of repairs and based
solely on crack growth rates, the bathtub curve duration model may have been appropriate as
it would account for a decreasing hazard function during the early life and an increasing
hazard function during the later stages.
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The Bathtub Curve
Hypothetical Failure Rate versus Time
19 End ef Life Wear-O ut
Infant Mortality Increasing Failure Rate
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Normal Life (Useful Life)
Low "Constant" Failure Rate
Time
Fig. 4.5-1: Bathtub Reliability Curve [Wilkins, 20021
However, if we exclude the repairs, the hazard function at any point in time should
theoretically depend on the frequency, size and criticality of the cracks in the hull and should,
therefore, always be increasing. Consequently, the Weibull duration model is more
appropriate because it is a flexible life distribution model, allowing for the slope of the
hazard function to be controlled through its parameters. The Weibull CDF is:
F(t) =1- e-at' (4.5-10)
4.5.3 Developing a New Customized "Ship Reliability
Duration Model"
4.5.3.1 Basis
Scheduled repairs throughout the ship's life eliminate the great majority of cracks in
the inspected areas and represent big, sudden one-time decreases in the hazard function. The
duration at any point in time between any two repairs should be positive implying an
increasing hazard function which reaches a peak value just before the next inspection. This
can be simulated by a series of Weibull duration models. Starting from the Weibull CDF.
given by 4.5-10, we can derive the survivor and hazard functions
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C.D.F. (Eq. 4.5-10):
=> Survivor Function (Eq. 4.5-2):
=> PDF. (Eq. 4.5-3):
=> Hazard Function (Eq. 4.5-6):
S(t) = 1- F (t)= eat b
f(t) = at) abtb ~e atb
8t-
f (t)2(t) = =__ abtb-lS(t )
We can also use Eq. (4.5-8) to verify as follows:
- A(r)dr -Jabrb-'dr
S(t)=e0 =e 0 =e-"' =1-F(t)
4.5.3.2 Modifying and Connecting the Hazard Functions
Each of the 10 repair intervals considered throughout a ship's life can be modeled by
a separate distribution model. An example of a repair interval is from the intermediate
inspection between the 2 nd and 3rd special survey (scheduled at 12.5 years of age) until the
third special survey (scheduled at 15 years of age). Then, by joining the hazard functions we
get a shape that will look like Fig. 4.5-2.
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F(t)= 1- e-a
(4.5-11)
(4.5-12)
(4.5-13)
D, A
+ Average D(Age) At Surveys
RI R2 R3 R4... Time
Fig. 4.5-2: Proposed Discontinuous Hazard Function For Ship's life
The hazard function reaches a peak value at the end of the repair interval and then
drops at the repair. However, it is not realistic to assume it drops to 0. This is because not all
areas are inspected during all repairs, and because not all cracks are found in the inspected
areas. That is particularly true for cracks that are smaller than the minimum identifiable crack
length as defined earlier depending on the ship's age and the location on the ship. With the
exception of the first repair interval, therefore, the hazard function should start at a value
greater than zero. We can call that value "c" and modify the hazard function of each repair
interval "R" as follows:
AR(t) = CR + aRbRtRbR ~ (4.5-14)
"tR" is the time vector t, measured in months, for the corresponding repair interval "R" and
starts at zero at the beginning of the repair interval. The survivor function for that repair
interval is equal to 1 at tR = 0. Therefore, we can use S(O) = 0 in Eq. (4.5-8) to get:
tR tR
-f A(r)Rdr -f (c+abrb-l )R dr -[ct+atb]
SR (tR)S(Y 0 e0 =R (4.5-15)
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4.5.3.3 Determining the value of "aR"
Let's define the cumulative probability of failure at the end of the repair interval "R"
(ignoring previous repair intervals) as P(fail)R. Assuming that this value is known, we can
eliminate the constant "aR" in Eq. 4.5-15. Using the survivor function at the end of the repair
interval (tR= TR) from Eq. 4.5-15,
SR(TR) = e{cT+aT bR = 1-P(fa)R (4.5-16)
Solving for aR: aR CR +hl [1- P(fa)RR T~bR
The hazard function reduces to:
AR(tR) =cR+ b bRR R CR CRTR +1n[lbP(fa)R Ib-1
Tb RR
4.5.3.4 Determining the value of "cR"
The value of "cR" is the initial value of the hazard function for the repair interval "R".
It can reasonably be assumed that "cR" is a fraction of the peak hazard value of the previous
interval (just before the repair). This will be discussed later in more detail. If we denote that
fraction as "fR" we have:
R R R-1 R- ) (4.5-19)
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(4.5-17)
(4.5-18)
Where "R" is the current repair interval and TR-1 is the time at the end of the previous repair
interval. By combining with Eq. 4.5-18 we get:
CR fR *R-1 (TR-1)
=f {C - T + In [I-P(fail)] bT bl-1
T R-1
=fR c cT+ In [1- P(fail)] b
T R-1
=fR cT(1 - b) - bIn [1- P(fail)]
T R-1
(4.5-20)
By combining Eq. 4.5-18 and 4.5-20, we get a new expression for the hazard function:
( fR cT(1-b)-bIn[1- P(fail)] + In [1- P(fa)R2 f CTi R {RR RR
=C R -A b bR-R T R-1 TR
=C R ~ ARt Ibg -1
(4.5-21)
4.5.3.5 Determining the value of "bR"
The preferred way of determining the value of "b" is based on the cumulative
probability of failure half way between the repair interval (at t = T/2). This will be discussed
in more detail later. The cumulative probability of failure half way between the repair
interval can be expressed as a fraction "r" of the cumulative probability of failure at the end
of the repair interval:
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P(fail)R( ) = rRP(fa)R (TR) = rRP(fail)R
Using Eq. 4.5-16 we also have:
T~( T { (Z + a( 1b ]
P(fail)R(T)=1S R 2) =
By combining Eq.4.5-22 and 4.5-23, we get:
CR R +aR
~2
( T bR
~2
-I n11RP(fail)RI (4.5-24)
Solving Eq. 4.5-24 for "bR" and replacing "aR" using Eq. 4.5-17:
bR = (4.5-25)
4.5.3.6 The Hazard Function
By substituting Eq. (14.5-25) into Eq. (4.5-21), we get the final expression of the
hazard function for each repair interval "R":
2R W = CR - AtbR- (4.5-26)
where:
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(4.5-22)
(4.5-23)
In {cR & + R -[ CP(fail),,}-n R n f ji [lrRP(fail)R]}
In 2
(4.5-27)C R=fR {cT(1- b)- bln[1 - P(fail)]
CR R-1
cR R
n T
R2)
b R=
I n[i (fail)]
+ In 11 - rRP (fail) I
1n2
A TRCR +in [1 -P(fal)R IbA - TRbR RR ~~ b R R
(4.5-29)
In the first interval, the value of f is equal to zero. Therefore, we have a simple Weibull
distribution model in which:
S(T) = e~ab =1- P(fail)
Solving for a: a = - P(fail)]
(4.5-30)
(4.5-31)
The hazard function reduces to: A(t)= abtb- =
In[1- P(fail)] W-1
T bt-
where: b=
cT +1n[1- P(fail)]
c(!f +1In[-rP(fail)]
In2
This can also be obtained by setting fR =0 in Eq. (4.5-29)
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(4.5-28)
(4.5-32)
The only unknown parameters (for each repair interval) needed to construct the hazard
function using Eq. (4.5-29) are:
1. The length of the repair interval: TR
2. The CPF at the end of the interval: P(fail)R
3. The percentage drop of the hazard function during the previous repair: fR
4. bR or the CPF half way through the repair interval as a fraction of P(fail): rR
Section 4.5.4, which follows, will explain how the data is used to determine these
parameters. We can then proceed to construct the hazard function for the whole ship life by
joining all the repair intervals. This is given by a plot of X(t), which is calculated using Eq.
4.5-26 where t is in months and is continuous for the ship's life.
4.5.4 Using the data to Calibrate the Model
4.5.4.1 Length of the repair interval: TR
"t" is the time vector in months for the whole life of the ship, "tR" is the time vector
within the repair interval R and "TR" is the total time of the repair interval (e.g. 30 months).
The first repair interval is 5 years and the remaining 9 are 2.5 years each. These are not
always exact since there is a time window in which a repair can be carried out but the
scheduled values above are used.
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4.5.4.2 Cumulative probability offailure P(fail)R
P(fail)R is the cumulative probability of failure at the end of the repair interval R. The data
needed to approximate it consists of two parts:
1. The average danger factor at each scheduled repair DR - from previous chapter
2. Probability of failure between two scheduled inspections P(fail) - obtained from a
survey of 50 ships and their records
4.5.4.3 Average Danger factor DR
For each ship, we know Ds, the age and the type of survey. Not all ships undergo the
repairs at the exact scheduled age e.g. 7.5 years. Therefore, some grouping needs to be made
and the typical age is assigned to all these ships. After this grouping, all ships are of an age
that is a multiple of 2.5 (the scheduled repair interval). Having done that, an average danger
value is determined for each repair (each age) and that is denoted DR. This is the average
danger value at the end of the repair interval, just before the repair.
The aim is to determine the parameters for each interval that will define the shape of
the hazard function and its initial and peak value. It may be assumed that the hazard rate is
proportional to the danger value DR, but there needs to be a calibration to convert DR into a
probability of failure. In addition, an assumption has to be made in order to use the peak
value to determine the probability of failure throughout the interval.
4.5.4.4 Measured Probability of Failure PM(Fail)R
Using the records of several ships over a certain amount of time, the number of ship
years can be counted for each age as well as the number of failures for each ship age. Hence,
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for each repair interval, we have a number of ship years of records and the number of
identified failures yielding a measured probability of failure P(fail) for that repair interval:
Z Failures
PM (fail)R R (4.5-33)
1: Shipyea rs
R
4.5.4.5 Calculated Cumulative Probability of Failure Pc(fail)R
A plot of DR and P(Fail) vs. age should be similar showing that the cumulative
probability of failure at the end of a repair interval was measured to be high during the repair
intervals after which the calculated danger value DR was high. By plotting DR against
PM(Fail) and conducting a linear regression, a relationship can be deduced of the form:
PM (fa l)R = dDR + e (4.5-34)
After determining the constants c and d, a new "calculated" probability of failure can
be calculated for each repair interval by substituting the corresponding value of DR in:
P (fail)R = dDR + e (4.5-35)
The main purpose of doing this is to utilize the extensive data available in DR to
compensate for the limited amount of data available for measuring PM(fail)R accurately for all
10 repair intervals.
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4.5.4.6 Cumulative Probability of Failure P(fail)R
The probability of failure ultimately used is a combination of PM(Fail)R and Pc(fail)R
for each repair interval. A weighting function wi (between 0 and 1) is used to give this
estimate of the probability of failure within an inspection interval.
P(fail)R = WlM (fal)R + - w1 ) c (fal)R (4.5-36)
4.5.4.7 Initial Value of the Hazard Function cR (orfR)
cR is the initial value of the hazard function at each interval "R". Only in the first
interval, this takes a value of zero. The sources accounting for cR are:
1. Not all ship areas are inspected during the repair
2. Not all cracks are found and repaired in the inspected areas
Focusing on the first source, the areas typically inspected during repairs at each ship
age are known. In the safety analysis, the "danger" contribution of each area was also
determined as a function of ship age. Therefore, we can obtain a value of the fraction of
danger accounted by the areas which are not inspected in a given repair. In reality, we don't
know the danger contribution of non-inspected areas at that specific age since typically no
cracks will be reported in these locations and ages. However, we can approximate it by
interpolating between ages, or by reading off the regression plots of area-danger
contributions vs. age. Since we are assuming that the hazard function is related to the danger
value, we can use this number as an estimate of the remaining hazard due to un-inspected
areas (as a fraction of the value before the repair). This can be denoted that as fRu.
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D
fR U j=UnInspAreas
JRU D(4.5-37)Z D Rj
j=AlAreas
For example, say that the hazard function peaks at 1% at the end of the second repair
interval, and that the areas which are typically not inspected at that ship age (7.5 years)
account for approximately 5% of the total danger value. In that case, fRu = 0.05 and the
hazard function should drop by 0.95%,at the end of the first interval (as opposed to dropping
by 1% to a value of zero).
In order to account for the second source of "cR", it is reasonable to assume that the
number of cracks that go un-repaired in an inspected area are proportional to the number of
cracks that are repaired. This would apply both to cracks which are of an identifiable size but
go unnoticed and also to smaller cracks. Therefore, we can assume again that the remaining
danger value and, consequently, the remaining hazard value is proportional to the peak value
of the previous interval (just before the repair). We can call this constant of proportionality
fRI meaning that it is the remaining fraction of hazard in the interval "R" due to inspected
areas. Its value will depend on many factors such as the type of survey, the number of
surveyors, their experience, the available time, the condition and cleanliness of the ship etc.
The only way to get a reasonable estimate of this is by consulting experienced surveyors and
superintendents.
As we see, both sources of CR can be expressed as a fraction of the peak hazard value
of the previous interval. By combining the two fractions, therefore, we get a value that can be
used to determine cR using Eq. (4.5-19).
CRfRUfRILR-1R-1Lj=UnnpAreas + * (R-1 ) (4.5-38)
\ = AllAreas
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4.5.4.8 "Shape Parameter" of the Hazard Function bR (or rp)
After all other parameters are determined, the value of b is the one which defines the
shape or curvature of the hazard function. One way of determining the shape of the hazard
function is to assume it has the same shape as the Danger value of an average ship of the
corresponding age. Since the crack growth rate has been deduced for each crack, the danger
value of a ship can be projected backwards by projecting all the cracks backwards to their
earlier size and re-evaluating D at various intervals. By doing this for several ships of the
same age, a set of points can be obtained. T can be divided into 5 intervals and D be
evaluated at t = 0, T/5, 2T/5, 3T/5, 4T/5 and T. If T is 2.5 years which is typical, that gives a
value of D for t = 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2 and 2.5years. A curve can then be fit though these points of
the form:
DR N)=CR+ aRbRtR bR (4.5-39)
The parameters "cR" and "aR" can be determined by forcing the curve to meet the
measured danger values D at t=O and t=T or simply by using the already calculated values
from the hazard function for the corresponding repair interval. The value of "b" can then be
determined using the least squares method to give the best fit through the remaining points.
This has to be done for each of the 10 repair intervals in order to obtain the value of "bR"
which defines the shape.
The above method is based only on the danger values so it should be modified to also
include the data of emergency repairs. In Eq. (4.5-25) "bR" is expressed in terms of "rR". The
next step is to use the danger value and the data on emergency repairs to determine "rR"-
By considering the time of all failures relative to the previous survey, we can
determine how many occurred during the first half of the repair interval as a fraction of the
total. If there was a significant amount of repairs for each repair interval, this could be carried
out for each repair interval. Since the number of failures is limited, we can only get a
meaningful value for the total (i.e. only one value for all repair intervals). Denote that value
as rM:
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tRR Failures
rR =0O
rM tR TR (4.5-40)Z Z Failures
R tR=0
We can then get another estimate using by evaluating the danger value D at t = T/2 and at t =
T. This again is done by projecting the cracks backwards using the growth rates
corresponding to their location and the ship's age. Denote this value as rDR:
'D D _rTR
rDR= t= t (4.5-41)
Dt=T R DR
Finally, we can use a weighting function w2 to combine rM and rDR and get an estimate of
"rR" for each repair interval:
rR=w 2rM +(1-W2 )DR (4.5-42)
This value can then be substituted back to Eq. 4.5-28 to get the value of "bR" for each repair
interval R.
In{cRR +hl[-P(fail)RI}-ln CR 2+n[I (W2rDR +(1-W 2) rm) P(ail)R
bR2
In 2
(4.5-43)
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4.5.5 The Final Ship Reliability Model
Combining everything, the final model can be summarized as follows. In terms of
parameters that are directly obtained from the data, the hazard function for each repair
interval "R" is given by:
AR(t) = CR ARt b-l (4.5-44)
where:
Co = 0
DRj
CR _ 
j=UnInspAreas
TR-1 I D j
j=AllAreas
+f1~)-bR-1 II Z FailuresW R-1 +
Z Shipyears
R-1
(1- w,)(dDR-1
Z Failures
R 
- +(1-wl)(dDR
E Shipyears
t=V2
E Failures D r
R t=O + tR~ R,
EEFailures DR
R t=O
ZD~j
TR j=UnInspAreas
R ZDRj
j=AIIAreas
( ZFailures
-K f Shipyears +1-w<dDR
R
Z Failures
heR +(1-w,)(dDR e)
Shipyears
I Failures
W, R-1 -+ -w,)(dDR-1 eSShipyears
R-1
e) j
(4.5-45)
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+ e
CRR
CR (171) +2
bR
A- bR
TR bR
RIJ CR-1 R-1 (-R-1 )-R-1 InI-
By connecting the hazard function of all the repair intervals R, we obtain the hazard function
for the whole life of the ship.
4.5.6 Validating the Model
A more direct approach in calibrating the model would be to match the area under the
curve (Cumulative Hazard Function) to the measured cumulative probability of failure for
each interval and to match the peak hazard function of each interval with the Danger value at
the end of the interval. That would give us two equations, enough to get constants "a" and
"b" for each interval.
Using Eq. 4.5-16 and 4.5-33 we have:
Z Failures
SR(T,) = e IR- PM (fa)R = R (4.5-46)Z Shipyears
R
Then matching the ratio of peak hazard functions to the ratio of danger values at end of
intervals, we obtain:
DR R _R 2R- (4.5-47)
DR--
Combining with 4.5-14 we get:
AR(TR) = cR+ aRbRRb-1 _ DR R (4.5-48)
DR-1
596
So by applying Eq. 4.5-46 and 4.5-48 and by estimating "c" using the method described
above, the model parameters for each repair interval could be obtained. This is attractive
because it is simpler and because we do not need to worry about the cumulative probability
of failure half way through the repair interval. However, the problem is in calculating the
values of the first interval. Since we have no data before that to relate to, we would have to
guess an arbitrary peak hazard function of the first interval. That is why this method was not
chosen. However, we can verify our results against this logic. This is simply done by
checking if the predicted peak hazard functions follow the trend of danger values at the end
of corresponding intervals.
4.5.7 Results
Table 4.5-1 and Fig. 4.5-3 provide a summary of the data on ship emergency repairs.
36 failures in 740 ship-years imply a failure every 20.6 years on average which is relatively
high. These consisted of 34 emergency repairs and two sinkings.
FAILURE DATA SAMPLE
Ships 82
Ship-Years 740
Failures 36
Ship-Years per Failure 20.6
Table 4.5-1: Failure Data Summary
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Fig. 4.5-3: Graphical Representation of Emergency Repair Data
Fig. 4.5-4 shows a plot of the measured probability of failure within each interval (in
red) along with the danger value at the end of the repair interval (in blue).
Danger Parameter and Pm(Fail)
150- -20.0%
120 -- 16.0% 5
90 12.0%
60 - 8.0%
a 30 = 4.0% E0.
0- -0.0%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Typical Age of Repair Interval
Fig. 4.5-4: Danger Parameter and Measured Probability of Failure for Each Interval
Although the scale on the two y-axes is different, this plot shows that there is a very
similar trend in the two variables as one would expect. This confirms that the probability of
failure is closely related to the presence and danger of cracks.
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Fig. 4.5-5: Linear Regression of Measured Probability of Failure and Danger Value
The positive y-intercept of the graph shows that there is a small but non-zero
probability of failure even without cracks which is logical. The R2 value of 0.84 is high
enough showing that it is reasonable to combine the two sets of data. Based on these results,
weighting functions of 0.5 were used for wi and w2. Tables 4.5-2 and 4.5-3 show the
numerical results of the analysis using the above data that went into calibrating the model.
Repair Age ShipYears %(data) Failures PM(Fail) D %Ships Pc(fail) P(fail)
R1 (SS1) 0-6 206 28% 2 0.97% 7.44 19% 2.23% 1.60%
R2 (DD) 7-8 44 6% 1 2.27% 10.44 7% 2.53% 2.40%
R3 (SS2) 9-11 64 9% 1 1.56% 28.41 15% 4.33% 2.95%
R4 (DD) 12-13 50 7% 3 6.00% 50.26 11% 6.52% 6.26%
R5 (SS3) 14- 16 64 9% 4 6.25% 38.26 11% 5.32% 5.78%
R6 (DD) 17 - 18 44 6% 4 9.09% 39.37 6% 5.43% 7.26%
R7 (SS4) 19-21 76 10% 11 14.47% 135.6 13% 15.05% 14.76%
R8 (DD) 22 -23 62 8% 6 9.68% 72.47 10% 8.74% 9.21%
R9 (SS5) 24 - 26 98 13% 3 3.06% 26.39 7% 4.13% 3.60%
R10(DD) 27-28 32 4% 1 3.13% 3.47 1% 1.84% 2.48%
Table 4.5-2 Data Parameters and Calculation of P(fail)
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T P(fail) S(T) A(T) r F C A
R1 60 1.60% 98.40% 0.05% 0.26 20% 0.00% . -1.07x10-5
R2 30 2.40% 97.60% 0.18% 0.24 32% 0.02% -8.09X10-6
R3 30 2.95% 97.05% 0.25% 0.23 Ii 0.03% 45 -1.64x1
R4 30 6.26% 93.74% 0.62% 0.22 29% 0.07% .8 -3.62x 10-7
R5 30 5.78% 94.22% 0.46% 0.27 12% 0.07% -2.84x10_6
R6 30 7.26% 92.74% 0.67% 0.20 11% 0.% 310 4.88x10-
R7 30 14.76% 85.24% 1.70% 0.15 10% .07% 3.50 27xt10
R8 30 9.21% 90.79% 0.91% 0.27 0.15% .49 -5.38 x0_8
R9 30 3.6 96.40% 0.26% .33 0.07% -1.02 X
R10 30 2.48% 97.52% 0.18% 0.26 7% 0.02% -1.32
Table 4.5-3 Model Parameters
Only 9 out of the 36 failures occurred during the first half of their corresponding
repair interval which gives an rM of 25%. This was combined with the results based on crack
growth rates and danger values (rDR) for each interval to give the values of R above. The
average value of rDR across all intervals was 23.5% which is close enough to 25%.
The only repairs in which not all areas are inspected are the first and second
intermediate surveys meaning that only repairs R2 and R4 have a non-zero fRu. As a ship gets
older, more surveyors are, practically involved in the inspection and they inspect more
carefully as a ship gets older. They are also less stringent during the first two intermediate
surveys. After the age of 15, intermediate and special surveys are identical with the exception
of thickness gauge measurement requirements (irrelevant for our purposes). Based on these
considerations and on consultations with experienced surveyors and superintendents f~i
values were determined as follows. The initial value of fIu is 20% (for RI) and it decreases
by 2% per survey until the age of 15 (R5) and then by 1% per survey until it reaches 7% for
RIO. After doing that, the value of the first two intermediate surveys (R2 and R4) was set to
the maximum value of 20%. Finally, fRu and fRI were added to give the value of f.
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The values of c, b and A were calculated based on the final ship reliability model (Eq.
4.5-41) and then the individual hazard functions were constructed to give the final result
shown in Fig. 4.5-6. This is the hazard function for the ship's life.
Hazard Function (dt = I month)
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Fig. 4.5-6: Hazard Function throughout the ship's life
This shows the probability of an emergency repair for each month of a ship's life. The
shape of the hazard function is reasonable and similar to what was expected based on the
previous analysis. The tabulated results of this graph will be used in the financial analysis
that follows.
[Bai 2006] modeled the probability of failure of a double hull tanker with respect to
age, based on reliability assessment that considers the effect of corrosion, fatigue and the
impact of repairs. The results are shown in Fig. 4.5-7.
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Fig. 4.5-7: Resulting Time-Dependent Reliability Index of a Double Hull Tanker Considering the Repair
Scheme, Corrosion and Fatigue Cracks [Bai 20061
The results are surprisingly similar to ours, bearing in mind that a completely
different approach was used, and a different type of vessel is considered. The results of [Bai
2006] are theoretical predictions whereas our approach was data driven. The probability of
failure in [Bai 2006] is annual and therefore, it is of the same order of magnitude. The trend
of gradually increasing probability of failure, followed by sudden decreases to a finite value
during repairs is also the same. For some reason, only three repairs are evident in the results
of [Bai 2006}, while two of them have a relatively small impact. Our results also agree on the
fact that probability of failure is relatively low after the age of 25.
Similar analyses were also carried out by [Barltrop et al. 1992] and [Wang et al
2003b], who predict periodic peaks in the annual probability of failure due to fracture and in
the hull girder strength reliability index respectively. These peaks correspond to the timing of
repairs. Their results are shown in Fig. 4.5-8 and 4.5-9.
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Fig. 4.5-8: Probability of failure due to fracture with time [Barltrop et al. 19921
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Fig. 4.5-9: Annual Reliability Index of the Hull Girder Strength of an Oil Tanker for Different Corrosion Levels
[Wang et al 2003b]
Both our results and those of [Bai 2006], shown in Fig. 4.5-7, predict an annual
probability of failure that is an order of magnitude higher than that predicted by [Barltrop et
al. 1992]. The results of [Barltrop et al. 1992] do not extend beyond the age of 25 years, but
they show the same trend as ours until that age.
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Fig. 4.5-8 provides a plot of the danger value at the end of the interval and the peak
hazard function (also at the end of each interval). The purpose of this graph is to validate the
model as discussed under Section 4.5.6.
Danger Parameter and Peak Hazard
10
Typical Age
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of Repair Interval
Fig. 4.5-10: Model Result Validation Plot
The scales of the axes are different but it is clear that the predicted peak hazard
functions follow an almost exact pattern as the danger values at the end of the corresponding
intervals obtained by analyzing the cracks in the hull.
The cumulative hazard function in Fig. 4.5-11 shows the probability of having
undergone an emergency repair until the corresponding time.
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Fig. 4.5-11: Cumulative Hazard Function for ship's Life
The end value of the cumulative probability is 56.3%. This is the probability that a
ship will undergo an emergency repair at some point in its lifetime.
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4.6 Expected Failure Costs
4.6.1 The Various Cases and Relevant Costs
A failure as defined above has financial implications in terms of repair costs, loss of hire
(loss of earning time), the possibility of a total loss, and other costs including possible delay
claims. Whether an emergency repair or a total loss due to the emergence of cracks without
an accident, the failure is classified under "damages under natural causes" that are not
covered by the insurance. Therefore, the shipowner bears the whole cost and is not
compensated for any part of it unless he/she can prove a different cause.
The costs are very different when talking about a total loss or an emergency repair. Based
on the database of failures, we can assume that one out of every eighteen failures is a sinking
(i.e. a "late" emergency repair). Costs can also vary dramatically between emergency repairs.
In some cases, for example, it is unsafe for the ship to sail to the shipyard. It may also need to
unload at sea in order to undergo the repair which takes several months. Furthermore, the
repair costs are multiple times higher if you have to bring the yard equipment and workers to
carry out the repair at the ship's location. Based on the repairs of the database, approximately
a quarter of the emergency repairs are of this type.
Since we have an estimated probability of a failure being one of these three types, we can
proceed to estimate the relevant costs of each type and calculate a weighted average. The
estimates of costs that follow are based on the costs incurred during the failures in the
database.
Markets are extremely volatile meaning that ship values and daily earnings change
significantly on a daily basis. The purpose of this analysis is not to calculate the financial
implication on a ship's value as of today but rather to get a long term estimate of the financial
implication on a ship's value as a function of the ship's age. As such, historical values are
used in the analysis and the financial data required has been sourced from [Clarksons 2009a].
606
4.6.2 Repair Costs
Repair costs include bunker costs, disbursements, port dues, pilot fees and shipyard
costs. Bunker costs are calculated by assuming an average of fifteen days travel time (to and
from the repair yard), an average consumption of 45t/day and bunker prices of $400/t which
is close to the current price and three year average. This amounts to $270,000 of bunker
costs. Yard repair costs are much higher than those of scheduled repairs because emergency
repairs are usually not carried out in China (depending on where the ship is). Some
adjustments had to be made to convert the cost of emergency repairs that were carried out a
long time ago to present terms using today's prices and dollar values.
Ordinary Extreme Weighted
Repair Repair Average
Probability 75% 25% 100%
Yard & other $600,000 $3,500,000 $1,325,000
Bunkers $270,000 $270,000 $270,000
Total Repair Cost $870,000 $3,770,000 $1,595,000
Table 4.6-4 Weighted Average Repair Costs of Emergency Repairs
The weighted average cost of an emergency repair is $1.6M. This will be multiplied
by the hazard function to calculate the expected emergency repair cost per month throughout
the ship's life.
4.6.3 Loss of Hire
The expected lost revenues per month throughout the ship's life due to emergency
repairs are calculated as follows. Multiplying the hazard function by 34/36 (to exclude
sinking) and then by the expected off-hire days of an emergency repair yields the expected
607
loss of revenue earning days per month. Then multiplying by the expected daily rate gives us
the expected lost revenues.
The expected off-hire days are deduced using a weighted average of the two types of
emergency repairs. Including the fifteen days of travel time, off-hire time amounts to sixty
days for the usual type and one hundred and eighty days for the extreme type. The weighted
average is, therefore, ninety days.
For this part of the analysis. which aims to give an estimate of the financial
implications of expected failures at any given time, we must refrain from using current
market rates. Daily rates are extremely volatile as shown in Fig. 4.6-1 which refers to a ship
built in 1990. Despite the ship getting older, market volatility is so high that it was earning
about ten times as much as an eighteen year old ship than when it was new.
Daily Earnings of a 1990-Built Cape
$180,000 -
$160,000-
M $140,000-
2 $120,000*
C. $100,000.
$80,000
$, 
---
'E $60,000-
w $40,000
$20,000
$0r
Aug-90 Aug-92 Aug-94 Aug-96 Aug-98 Aug-00 Aug-02 Aug-04 Aug-06 Aug-08 Aug-10
Date
Fig. 4.6-1: Average Earnings of a Cape Built in 1990
Therefore, we use the ten year average daily earnings of a new capesize vessel. As of
September 2009, that value is approximately $44,500/day.
However, we still need to account for a discount in earnings due to ship age. To do
that, we consider the earnings ratio of the 1990 built ship to a 1999/2000 built ship. This is
shown in Fig. 4.6-2.
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Fig. 4.6-2: Earnings Ratio of 1990 to 1999/2000 built Cape
On the far left of the graph, the 1990 built ship is about ten years old whereas the
1999/2000 built ship is new, so this corresponds to the earnings ratio of a 10-year old to a
new vessel. On the far right, both ships have aged by ten years so this corresponds to the
earnings ratio of a 20-year old to a 10-year old. Noting the scale of the y-axis and the
volatility of the market, the linear regression fit is a fairly good representation of the results.
Therefore, we can use it to determine the earnings discount due to age as follows:
Age Ratio Earnings Ratio
10 to New (Regression Line - Left) 0.796
20 to 10 (Regression Line - Right) 0.880
20 to New (Implied = 0.796*0.880) 0.700
30 to New (Estimate) 0.600
Table 4.6-5 Estimated Age Discount for Daily Earnings
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Using the above figures and interpolating between the values, we can deduce the
appropriate discount from the new ship earnings, for each month of the ship's life. By
applying the ten-year average value for daily freight rate of a new ship of $45,500 we can
find the corresponding earnings throughout the ship's life.
4.6.4 Sink Cost
This only includes the value of the ship assuming total loss. Again, due to the
volatility of the market, to get a long term estimate we focus on 10-year average values. The
relevant values are summarized in Table 4.6-6
Quantity 10-year Average Value
New Ship Value $67.6M
20 Years Old Ship Value $23.9M
Scrap Price Per Ton (India) 289.65 $/ltd
Table 4.6-6 10-Year Average Values
Using the ten year average values and assuming linear depreciation, the new and
twenty year old values imply a depreciation of $2.185M per year. Assuming a lightship of
22,000t for the average cape, we get a ten year average scrap value of $6.38M. By projecting
the $2.185M per year depreciation beyond the twentieth year, and by using the 20-year old
value and the scrap value, we can calculate the average expected scrapping age of a cape.
This value turns out to be 28.009 years which is what we have been assuming so far (28
years). Therefore, we can calculate the value of a ship in the long term based on historical
averages using a linear depreciation of $0.18 per month from an initial value of $67.6M.
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4.6.5 Other Costs
Other costs vary depending on the type of failure. In the case of a sinking, these can
include ship replacement costs (in order to carry out charter obligations), "Increased Value"
as termed by insurance companies (stores, spares, bunkers and other items on board), crew
compensations, cargo claims, reputation costs (particularly for listed companies) etc.
Insurance companies grossly approximate "Increased Value" at about 20%-30% of the vessel
value. In practice, however, these cannot vary so dramatically with ship age. The value of the
cargo can be approximated using a typical price of $70/t for iron ore and assuming the ship is
loaded 55.8% of the time (based on the earlier ship loading survey analysis). For emergency
repairs, other costs again include reputation costs (particularly loss of business with the
particular charterer), potential delay claims by cargo owners and charterers etc. The total
other costs were estimated to be about $20M for a sinking and about $2M for an emergency
repair. The weighted average is $3M
4.6.6 Total Financial Implications of Expected Crack
Failures
The repair costs, loss of hire, sink costs and other costs can be calculated for each
ship age using the above procedure and added to give an estimated cost of failure for each
ship age. By multiplying this with the hazard function (probability of a failure in the given
month), we get the expected cost of failures as a function of ship age. This is shown in Fig.
4.6-3.
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Fig. 4.6-3: Expected Costs due to Potential Crack Failures
As shown, the expected costs curve has a similar shape to that of the hazard function.
The peak is at $101,057 per month when the ship is twenty years old just before carrying out
its repair for the fourth special survey. This curve shows an estimation of how much a
shipowner should be willing to spend if it were possible to insure against all the financial
implications of a failure due to cracks for each month of the ship's life.
To calculate the impact on the ship value, we need at each point in time to consider
all the future expected financial implications and discount them to the present. Since we are
concerned with a long term estimate as opposed to the current market, it is relevant to use a
typical discount rate of 10%. The present value of future potential failure costs until the end
of the ship's life are shown as a function of ship age in Fig. 4.6-4.
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Fig: 4.6-4: Present value of all future potential crack failures as a function of ship age
The total cost value is the value that one should account for when valuing a ship in
order to account for the possibility of crack failures. When a ship is new, this amounts to
$916,933. The breakdown of this value is 23% repair costs, 46% off-hire costs, 29%
potential sink costs and 2% other costs.
As a ship gets older, even though the number of future years (cumulative future
probability of failure) and the failure cost decreases, the present value of future potential
repairs increases until it hits a maximum of $1,769,015 at the age of 11.5 years. This is
because the years with a disproportionately higher hazard function get closer and the
corresponding high expected costs are discounted over fewer years. After the age of 11.5
years the present value of future expected crack failures gradually decreases as expected.
They gradually decrease to zero at the point when the ship is scrapped since there is no future
time left (the cumulative future probability decreases to zero).
Finally, Fig. 4.6-5 shows the total present value of future expected crack failures as a
percentage of the ship's current value.
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Fig 4.6-5: Financial Implications of future potential crack failures on Ship Value as a percentage
This graph shows the potential magnitude of ship valuation miscalculations if the
possibility of crack failures is ignored. Given a particular point in time, one can use current
ship prices and earnings as well as discount rates based on the current risk free rate to obtain
a more relevant impact on valuation. The above analysis, however, is based on historical
averages and provides an average long term estimate of the financial implications of potential
failures due to cracks.
At its peak value, the graph shows that the financial implications of future potential
crack failures amount to 5.67% of the value of an 18.75 year old ship. Therefore, including
the impact of expected crack failures would reduce the valuation of a ship of that age by
about 5.67%.
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4.7 Overall Conclusions
An extensive literature survey was carried out focusing on several aspects related to
cracking. The stresses acting on the hull were examined in order to observe any similarities
between the distribution of hull stresses and that of cracks throughout the hull. This consisted
of a survey analysis which was carried out to determine the average still water bending
moment distribution, acting along the hull throughout a cape's service life. The wave induced
bending moment distribution is observed by tabulating the values predicted by classification
societies.
A coding system for locations was devised in order to conduct the crack survey and
many modifications were made until it was finalized. This is recommended for further use in
future similar projects and is easily adaptable to a variety of applications. A sample of 29,567
cracks from 240 ships was investigated using this system and proved to be representative of
the world fleet. Measures which were taken to ensure the validity of the data include the
sourcing of data from owners in many cases where class records seemed incomplete.
The crack distribution throughout the hull was shown to be resembled by the stress
distribution to some extent. Some discrepancies are observed due to a variety of other causes
of cracking and the enhancement of the highly stressed regions. It is thus concluded that
crack incidences can be greatly reduced by ensuring that certain stress limits are not
exceeded. This can be achieved by avoiding heavy weather, sailing at a speed and direction
according to the weather, caring not to cause damages during discharging, and by reducing
loading and discharging rates in order to reduce the chances of deviating from a loading plan.
Similar trends to other crack surveys have been observed in many cases while
discrepancies were often attributed to the different focus of each work cited. An example of
this is in the analysis of the number of cracks per ship with respect to ship age where the data
of [Yamaguchi, I. 1968] only focuses on relatively young ships. Another case is in the mean
and median crack size with respect to ship age where [Antoniou, 1977] has probably not
captured the initial slope of the graph in oil tankers. Classification societies only record a
small number of cracks which pose a threat to the ship and this is evident by the small
number and large size of cracks reported in their surveys and investigations.
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Significantly different results were occasionally observed compared to those reported
in the literature. The importance of sample size is thus highlighted but more importantly, it
leads to the conclusion that cracks follow different patterns to other damages and that capes
exhibit a different cracking behavior to other ships. This emphasizes the importance of
projects based on a large sample, which are highly specific, focusing on a particular type of
damage in a specific ship type and size range.
Cracks are usually located in secondary components but if unattended, they can
propagate by fatigue onto the primary structure and pose a threat to the structural integrity of
the vessel. The majority of cracks develop in the mid-ship section where the wave induced
bending stresses and deflections are greatest.
The types of repairs and design modifications for the various cracks have also been
recorded and analyzed. This analysis led to conclusions regarding the general approach
depending on the crack size, cause and location. Some of the recommended repairs by
classification societies such as the use of a face plate instead of a collar plate in manholes
were reported very rarely or not at all as they are presumably less practical than others.
Regarding crack growth rates, Paris Law was found to be over-conservative
compared to the data, in line with recent findings. Three alternative, less conservative
approaches were introduced and tested on data using cracks on shell frame brackets. Crack
growth rates were estimated from the data as a function of ship age and location. They were
determined to follow a bathtub curve with respect to age, which is the superimposed effect of
an initial value, design modifications during repairs and corrosion as the ship ages. These
effects were decomposed by making some assumptions based on the data and on results of
previous research.
A Danger Model was developed using the crack growth rates derived from the
database and the criticality of each location based on previous accidents and a survey of
surveyors and superintendents. The Model was applied to the ships of the database and an
average safety parameter was determined as a function of age. Safety was found to decrease
with age until about 20 years, after which it gradually increases again. This is partly because
the data available in older ages is from ships that were of better quality on average since bad
quality ships are scrapped.
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A reliability model was developed by modifying the Weibull duration model to start
from a non-zero value and then combining a series of modified Weibull models to represent
repair intervals. The model was calibrated in terms of data from the danger model and from a
database of 82 capes, 740 ship years, 34 emergency repairs and two sinkings. The hazard
function was thus derived as a function of ship age, yielding the expected probability of
failure in each month throughout a cape's life. This was found to gradually increase between
repairs with sudden drops to a finite value during each repair, and with a peak just before the
fourth special survey at 20 years of age.
The present value of the expected failure cost was finally determined as a function of
ship value throughout the ship's life. Historical average values of ship earnings and prices
were used to do that, along with the cost of repairs as of Sept 2008, the hazard function
throughout a ship's life, average bunker costs and repair times etc. Almost half of the cost
was accounted for by expected loss of hire and the total present value as a percentage of ship
value was found to peak at 5.7% at 19 years of age based on historical data.
Although it hasn't been the main focus of this investigation to distinguish between the
various cape designs and shipbuilding yards, this is an interesting and important area for
future research. An investigation which examines the frequency of cracking with respect to
the shipbuilding yard would be of great interest to ship owners while one which examines the
effects of design aspects would also interest classification societies and shipyards.
Owners and classification societies would also be interested in the effects of hull
maintenance on cracking while the effect of corrosion and wear of scantlings would be useful
to IACS and individual classification societies for the development of new rules.
Further research in the effect of cracking with respect to ship age would mainly be of
interest to underwriters, charterers and cargo terminal operators which recently imposed an
age limitation of 25 years on capes that are used for the transportation of iron ore.
Another aspect which has lately become of outmost concern is that of high loading
and discharge rates. An investigation into the influence of loading rates on cracking would,
therefore, be of great interest to parties involved such as ship owners, cargo terminal
operators and the IMO.
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CHAPTER 5
RAFL Ship Valuation Model
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5.1 Crack Repair Costs and the Total Cost of Cracks
5.1.1 Introduction
Cracking in ships is controlled by improving design, minimizing operating stresses
and through regular inspections and repairs. Cracks often develop due to design flaws that
are already known in the design stage. The big trade-off which designers and owners have to
face in the construction of a new ship is whether to invest in a fatigue resistant design, or to
keep the construction cost low and incur the repair costs as cracks emerge later in the ship's
life. When it is decided that construction costs outweigh the benefits of a more crack resistant
design, modifications are made to solve the problem permanently after cracks appear. This
choice has to be made for hundreds of components throughout the ship's hull. Many of these
have been discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
In this section, a method is developed to quantify the total cost of cracks in order to
assess the cost effectiveness of new fatigue resistant designs that promise to reduce the
number of cracks and future repair costs. It is based on comparing the additional cost of a
proposed new design in a newbuilding, or of a design change during a repair, with the present
value of all the projected crack repair costs of the corresponding location. If the present value
of the repair costs of the cracks that will be avoided with the new design exceeds the
additional cost of implementing that design, then the design is cost effective.
The present value of the repair costs has to be determined for the various locations. A
general model was developed to do that and then several assumptions were made to give a
simplified version. First, the projected cracks for a given location have to be estimated and
then, the repair costs of these cracks and their present value have to be determined. The
model was applied to the reduced crack database (140 capes and 17,435 cracks) and coding
system of Chapter 4.
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5.1.2 Developing the Model
Crack repair costs can involve several components depending on the location and size
of the crack. Some of these cost components including staging and steelwork are specific to
each crack whereas others such as cleaning, venting and testing are specific to the location.
For example, the repair cost of 3 cracks far apart in one ballast tank will involve the staging
and steelwork cost for each individual crack, plus the cleaning, venting and testing of the
ballast tank. Introducing some nomenclature:
Parameters
CP: Cost Parameter for Ship
CT: Cost of time ($/day)
RC: Repair Cost
RT: Repair Time
RTNoCracks: Repair time without cracks
Crack-Specific Costs
k=1: Staging
k=2: Steelwork
Subscripts
i: Crack
j: Ship Location with crack
k: Repair Process
s: Ship
Location-Specific Costs
k=3: Cleaning
k=4: Venting
k=5: Testing
k=6: Gas Free
In order to capture all these crack repair costs throughout the hull, a summation has to
be carried out over the total number of cracks and another summation over the total number
of locations that involve one or more cracks. A high component of the crack cost may be
associated with the repair time besides the cost of the repair itself. This may be particularly
important in the case of large bulk carriers or tankers which at time are earning hundreds of
thousands of dollars per day. The following model accounts for these effects.
CP=RC+(RT-RTNoCracks ) * CT (5.1-1)
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k=2 k=6
RC=JZRCk+JZRCik (5.1-2)
i k=1 j k=3
k=2 k=6
RT= ZRlk+ZZR~k (5.1-3)
i k=1 j k=3
This captures both the repair costs and the cost of time lost during repairs. In the great
majority of cases, the additional time due to cracks is equal to zero. This is because the crack
repairs are usually carried out in conjunction with other repairs such as sandblasting,
replacement of corroded steel, coating etc. Since, all this additional timely work has to be
carried out as part of the dry docking or special survey regardless of the presence of cracks,
one cannot attribute the time spent to the shipyard and the consequent loss of hire to the
cracks. In other words, since (RT - RTNoCracks ~ 0 most of the time, the total cost
associated with cracks can be approximated as follows:
2 6
RC = I ZRCk+ZLRC~ (5.1-4)
i k=1 j k=3
Furthermore, the cost to gas free a fuel tank can probably be neglected because it is
very rarely incurred since the locations in which it is required show extremely low cracking
frequency. This essentially makes k=6 redundant. By eliminating this, the final simplified
crack repair cost for a given ship "s" is given as follows:
2 5
RC, = >,Z RCk+Z > RC k (5.1-5)
i k=1 j k=3
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5.1.3 Model Assumptions
The major assumptions involved in this model are summarized below:
1. The cost of time is neglected since cracks are usually not the determining factor.
2. Cost to Gas Free is neglected because it is very rarely incurred because the locations
in which it is required show extremely low cracking frequency.
3. Cost of ultrasonic measurements are neglected since only a few measurements are
usually taken and they are relatively cheap.
4. The final cleaning cost (required before painting) is included in the cost of steel. This
is done on the whole area to be coated - not just for cracks.
5. Coating is also neglected since a very small area is required for cracks. For example if
40m2 of coating is required for the cracks of a whole ship repair, that corresponds to
about 12 liters of paint or about $100 which is negligible. The coating is carried out
by the repair yard if the crack is in a highly corroded area and by the crew if
otherwise.
6. It is assumed that in order to ballast the top side tanks of a ship, it is not required to
first ballast the double bottom and the lower wing tanks. This may not be true for all
in service, but since ships today are built that way and since this model is intended for
future predictions (a ship that will be designed and built), that makes this assumption
necessary.
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5.1.4 Model Calibration
5.1.4.1 Basis for Calibration
In order to calibrate the model, the actual costs for each of the items have to be
determined. The actual numbers used in this case are based on what Chinese Shipyards were
charging on average in September 2008. Chinese shipyards were chosen because that is
where the great majority of big ship repairs for capes are carried out. Different numbers can
be used depending on when and where a particular ship will be operating and repaired.
5.1.4.2 Staging Cost (k=1)
Staging and de-staging is required in order to provide access to the location of the
crack for its repair. There is a charge per m3 that includes both staging and de-staging. In
some circumstances, when a crack is very high (e.g. in the upper part of a cargo hold) it is
more appropriate to construct a hanging staging which provides access through the hatch
opening. This saves a great deal of volume but the cost per m3 is much higher. Shipyards also
charge a different price on normal staging depending on the location (e.g. higher for staging
inside ballast tanks). Table 5.1-1 below shows the staging costs for closed and open spaces
and Table 5.1-2, gives a summary of the staging costs for each location using the same
coding system introduced in Chapter 4.
Staging Costs Charged At Each Location
Region Stage/De-staging Hanging Staging
$/m3 $/m3
Ballast Spaces 4 12
Open Spaces 3.5 12
Table 5.1-1: Staging Costs per m3
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Staging Costs Charged At Each Location
Region Stage/De-staging Hanging Staging
$/m3 $/m3
1 4 12
2 3.5 12
3 4
4 4
5 3.5
6 4
Table 5.1-2: Staging Costs per m3 for each location
The average staging cost required per crack depending on its location must be
determined. The average dimensions of each location are known since the model is applied
on capes. The amount of staging in m3 that would be required to repair a crack can therefore
be deduced. Since however the same amount of staging could be used to repair more than
one crack when cracks are close together, an adjustment or a "staging factor" must be
applied in order to avoid double counting. This factor depends on the frequency and
proximity of the cracks in each location and is approximated based on the crack distribution
of the database. The staging cost of each crack can therefore be determined using the amount
of staging required to access the crack depending on its location, the relevant staging factor
and the corresponding price per m3. Some additional approximations were required in some
of the locations as described in Table 5.1-3.
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Staging Cost Calculations
Region S Factor m3 $ $/Crack
1A 0.7 48 192 134.4
1B 0.7 48 168 117.6
IC 0.05 792 3168 158.4
1D Hang. Staging 1 9 108 108
Hatch Coamings 1E Hang. Staging 1 9 108
982.8Hatch End Beam 1E 1 864 3024
IF 1 144 576 576
Half Length (<10cracks) 2A and 2B - 3200 11200 Function
Full Length (=>10cracks) 2A and 2B - 6400 22400 Function
2C 0 0 0
3A 0.7 80 320 224
3B 0.5 64 256 128
3C 0.8 112 448 358.4
3D 0 0 0
4A 0 0 0
4B 0 0 0
4C 0 0 0
4D 0 0 0
5A 1 828 2898 2898
5B 2 792 2772 5544
5C 2 576 2016 4032
5D 2 216 756 1512
5E 2 32 112 224
5F 1 640 2240 2240
Aft Peak (Full) 6A 1 192 768 768
Aft Peak (Full) 6B 1 300 1200 1200
Aft Peak (1 crack only) 6A 1 100 400 400
Aft Peak (1 crack only) 6B 1 100 400 400
6C 0 0 0 0
Table 5.1-3: Calculation of staging cost per crack for each location
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5.1.4.3 Steelwork (k=2)
The base price charged by the Chinese yards considered in Sept 2008 ranged between
from 2.8 to 3 $/kg. This varied depending on parameters such as the size of the repair or the
relationship with the client and it was more often close to $2.8/kg. $2.8/kg is therefore
assumed in the following calculations.
On top of the base price, yards charge a premium for 4 things as follows. An
additional 20% for high tensile steel, 20% for a bend, 30% for a corner or stiffener, and 20%
if it is in a closed space (e.g. ballast tank). They therefore come up with a $/kg value based
on the above and charge accordingly. They also charge a minimum of 15kg per piece. This
gives 16 different combinations giving 16 different prices of steel depending on the
requirements. Table 5.1-4 below provides a list of those categories and uses the above
information to determine a $/kg amount for various category of crack repairs.
Using the typical dimensions of the componerit that has to be replaced in each
location when repairing a crack, the amount of steel in kg was calculated. By combining this
with the corresponding price per kg, the $/crack amount was calculated for each location and
summarized in Table 5.1-5.
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Steel $/kg Calculation
Region HTS Bent Angle-bar / Stiffener Closed Space $/kg
(20%) (20%) (corner) or Holland Profile (20%)
(30%)
1A YES 3.36
1B YES YES YES 4.76
1C YES YES YES 4.76
1D YES YES YES 4.48
IE YES 3.36
1F YES YES 3.92
2A YES 3.36
2B YES 3.36
2C YES 3.36
3A YES 3.36
3B YES YES YES 4.76
3C YES YES YES 4.76
3D YES YES 3.92
4A YES YES YES 4.76
4B YES 3.36
4C YES YES YES 4.76
4D YES YES 3.92
5A YES 3.36
5B YES YES 3.92
5C YES YES 3.92
5D YES YES 3.92
5E YES YES 3.92
5F YES YES 3.92
6A YES 3.36
6B YES 3.36
60 2.8
Table 5.1-4: Steelwork cost in $/kg for each location
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Steel Cost per Crack Calculation
Region $/kg Kg $/Crack
1A 3.36 30 100.8
1B 4.76 35 166.6
IC 4.76 35 166.6
1D 4.48 50 224
1E 3.36 50 168
1F 3.92 100 392
2A 3.36 15 50.4
2B 3.36 50 168
2C 3.36 30 100.8
3A 3.36 30 100.8
3B 4.76 50 238
3C 4.76 50 238
3D 3.92 100 392
4A 4.76 70 333.2
4B 3.36 50 168
4C 4.76 200 952
4D 3.92 50 196
5A 3.36 50 168
5B 3.92 100 392
5C 3.92 100 392
5D 3.92 100 392
5E 3.92 100 392
5F 3.92 150 588
6A 3.36 100 336
6B 3.36 100 336
6C 2.8 0 0*
Table 5.1-5: Steelwork Cost in $ per Crack for each Location
* The original piece was used in all such cases identified (6)
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5.1.4.4 Compartment-Specific Components (k = 3, 4 & 5)
When considering compartment specific components, it is important to be careful to
avoid potential errors with the coding system. The coding system used is such that each zone
along the length of the ship, from zones 2 to 9, corresponds to a cargo hold. This however is
not also the case with ballast tanks since there are only 5 ballast tanks in addition to the after
peak and the fore peak tank. To avoid confusion, Table 5.1-6 shows the compartment name
corresponding to each zone (of the coding system) and tank.
BALLAST TANK CONFIGURATION
Compartment ZONE Ballast Tank
After Peak 1 After Peak
Cargo Hold 9 2 5
Cargo Hold 8 3 5
Cargo Hold 7 4 4
Cargo Hold 6 5 4
Cargo Hold 5 6 3
Cargo Hold 4 7 3
Cargo Hold 3 8 2
Cargo Hold 2 9 2
Cargo Hold 1 10 1
Fore Peak 11 Fore Peak
Table 5.1-6: Ballast Tank Configuration and Corresponding Zones
The cost that shipyards typically charge is summarized in Table 5.1-7. They charge a
total dollar amount for cleaning and testing whereas they charge a per day amount for
venting. Venting is usually required for two days in a typical repair.
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COMPARTMENT COSTS
CLEAN 1 $/m,
TEST 1.2 $/m3
VENT 50 $/tank/day
Table 5.1-7: Compartment Costs
The typical size of each tank is shown in Table 5.1-8 based on the average capesize
bulk carrier. Note that these correspond to either the port or the starboard side.
BALLAST TANK SIZES
Volume (m)
Top Side Tank (1 side) 2500
Half Double Bottom & 1 Wing Tank 3000
Fore Peak (Half) 4000
After Peak (Half) 400
Table 5.1-8: Compartment Volumes
The testing procedure (k=5) after the repair involves pressurizing the compartment
and checking for leaks. This however is not always necessary and it is only carried out if a
crack is beyond a critical length. Critical crack lengths for testing each location are therefore
required in order to decide whether to include this cost. These are shown in Table 5.1-9.
A simple IF function was used when going through the summation throughout the
hull in order to determine whether to step up the total cost by the necessary amount. The
argument of the IF function involves the number of cracks being greater than zero for the
case of cleaning (k=3) and venting (k=4), while it is the largest crack being larger than the
critical length for the Testing component (k=5). The amount added to the summation if the IF
function is satisfied, is calculated using Tables 5.1-7 through 5.1-9. A summary is shown in
Table 5.1-10.
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TEST - Critical Lengths
Critical Length (mm)
1B 450
IC 450
1D 0
IF 450
3B 400
3C 400
4A 450
4C 450
ZONE 1 (ALL) 300
ZONE 11 (5A-F) 300
I able 5. I-9: Cr tical Crack Lengths for Pressure Testing tie various Compartments
SUMMARY OF COMPARTMENT COSTS ($)
IF CRACKS > 0 IF CRACKS > 0 IF MAX(SIZE)>CRIT
CLEAN VENT TEST
deck/tst (1) 5000 200 6000
cargo hold (2) 0 0 0
wing tanks (3) 3000 200 3600
double bottom (4) 3000 200 3600
Bulkheads (5) 0 0 0
(6) FORE PEAK (Zone 11) 8000 200 9600
(6) AFT PEAK (Zone 1) 800 200 960
Table 5.1-10: IF Function and Amount by which Summation is increased for Location-Specific Costs
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5.1.5 Results and Discussion
By applying the above model on the detailed database of 140 capes and 17,435
cracks, a wide range of results can be produced in order to assess the cost effectiveness of
design modifications. The average crack repair cost as a function of ship age is first
determined and presented in Fig. 5.1-1.
This is the average cost to repair all cracks during a repair as a function of ship age. It
should be noted however that these only represent a fraction of the total repair cost which
would include other components such as corroded steel renewals. It can be seen that the costs
incurred gradually increase and after a point they start to decline again since there are fewer
and smaller cracks to repair. Repair costs due to corrosion however would be much higher
and would heavily outweigh this decline if measured.
Average Crack Cost vs Ship Age
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Fig. 5.1-1: Average Crack Repair Cost for Ship Age Groups
The average repair costs are decomposed into the various repair processes (k=l to
k=5) for each individual year and shown in Fig. 5.1-2. This may be used when deciding
which repair yards to go to depending on the ship's age. In a more refined analysis, one may
then choose to apply the corresponding price-parameters to each ship depending on its age.
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Fig. 5.1-2: Average Crack Repair Cost vs. Ship Age by Process
Here we see that the average crack repair cost is relatively high during the
intermediate dry-docking surveys at 13 and 22 or 23 years and peak on the 4th special survey
at the age of 20 years. The average crack repair cost is about $0.49M in 2008 dollars. Staging
(k=2) on average accounts for 86% of the crack repair costs.
The average repair cost can also be decomposed into the various locations of the ship
or the compartments along its length for each individual year throughout its life. This
provides a picture of what an owner should expect to spend for crack repairs and where
throughout a ship's life on average.
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Fig. 5.1-3: Average Crack Repair Cost Decomposed into Regions for each Year
Fig. 5.1-3 shows the average repair cost decomposed into the various locations
(regions 1 through 6) for each individual year, while Fig. 5.1-4 shows how the costs are
distributed on average throughout the ship's length.
Cost Distribution Along Ship
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Fig. 5.1-4: Average Crack Repair Cost Decomposed into Zones Along the Ship's Length
There are two ways to calculate the percentage distribution of total cost by region as a
function of ship age. One can calculate the percentage accounted for by a location or repair
process for every ship, and then plot the mean of the percentages for each age. Alternatively,
the total amount spent in each location or repair process for all ships of a given age can be
plotted as a percentage of the total amount spent on those ships. The second method would
give a more accurate picture of what one should expect for a typical ship because the results
of the first method would be distorted by insignificant repairs.
Fig. 5.1-5 and 5.1-6 show how the costs are distributed among the various locations
on the ship as it ages. In Fig. 5.1-5, the percentage accounted by a location for every ship is
calculated and then the mean of the percentages is plotted for each age. In Fig. 5.1-6, the total
amount spent in each location for all ships of a given age is plotted as a percentage of the
total amount spent on those ships. In both figures, a linear regression curve of each plot is
being presented as opposed to the data points in order to emphasize the trends and compare
them.
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Fig. 5.1-5: Average Percentage of Total Repair Cost for Each Location as a function of Ship Age
Region Cost Allocation
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Fig. 5.1-6: Percentage of Total Cost Accounted by Each Location as a Function of Ship Age
It can be seen in both graphs that as a ship becomes older, cargo holds account for an
increasing amount of the total repair cost whereas the deck and top side tanks account for a
decreasing fraction. This can be explained by also examining Fig. 5.1-7 and 8 which are
similar plots to Fig. 5.1-5 and 5.1-6 but for the repair process as opposed to the location. Fig.
5.1-6 and 5.1-8 give a more accurate picture of what one should expect for a typical ship
because the results shown in Fig. 5.1-5 and 5.1-7 are distorted by insignificant repairs. Fig.
5.1-5 and 5.1-6 are complementary to Fig. 5.1-3, whereas Fig. 5.1-7 and 5.1-8 are
complementary to Fig. 5.1-2.
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Fig. 5.1-7: Average Percentage of Total Repair Cost for Each Process as a function of Ship Age
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Fig. 5.1-8: Average Percentage of Total Repair Cost for Each Location as a function of Ship Age
When a ship is young, there are relatively few and relatively large cracks. These
cracks usually develop due to high stresses at locations where there are high stress
concentrations and residual stresses that have not been relieved through operation and
repairs. As a result, some of these cracks are on the deck and in the ballast tanks which are
subjected to relatively high stresses as they are located at the upper and lower ends of the
hull. Due to their location, these cracks do not require a lot of staging but cleaning is
essential in order to carry out crack repairs in ballast tanks, even just for a few cracks. As a
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result, due to the small number of cracks and their location, cleaning accounts for a relatively
high fraction of the cost.
As a ship gets older on the other hand, the average number of cracks increases and
they are more evenly distributed throughout the hull. Cracks develop not only due to high
stresses but also as a result of wear from operation and corrosion in areas such as the cargo
holds. Therefore, cleaning costs reach a plateau much faster than staging which keeps
increasing with the number of cracks, particularly in the cargo hold area.
For young ships, therefore, the deck and ballast tanks account for a relatively high
fraction of the cost and a lot of that is cleaning while as a ship gets older, the cost shifts to the
cargo hold areas in terms of location and to staging in terms of process. This trend is evident
in Fig. 5.1-5 through 5.1-8.
In order to evaluate proposed design modifications or improvements, one needs to
know the present value of the repair costs that will be avoided. Shipping companies often use
a discount rate of about 10% (always higher than the bank interest rate). Certain shipping
companies often require a 15% return on investments but today interest rates are significantly
lower than what they have been in the previous couple of years. Either way, Fig. 5.1-9 and
5.1-10 show the present value of crack repairs for each location on the ship (Regions 1
through 6) using a 10% and 15% discount rate respectively.
Present Value Allocation (i=10 0/)
PV ($)
$1.8
0 $1.6
$1.4
$1.2
$1.0
$0.8
$0.6
$0.4
$0.2
$0.0
1. Deck & 2. Cargo 3. L.Wing 4. D.Bottom 5. 6. Other
TST Holds Tanks Bulkheads
Fig. 5.1-9: Present Value of Crack Repair Costs for Each Location Using a 10% Discount Rate
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Fig. 5.1-10: Present Value of Crack Repair Costs for Each Location Using a 15% Discount Rate
The average total present value of crack repair costs for the ship's life was calculated
to be -$2.3M using a discount rate of 10% and -$1.2M using a discount rate of 15%. This in
effect limits what an owner should consider investing against cracks in the design stage.
Owners who use a lower discount rate, meaning that they value money today compared to
later less than other owners, can afford to pay more against cracks in the design stage in order
to save on later repairs.
The break down of the present value into the various regions of the ship allows
choices about specific design modifications to be made. Using a discount rate of 10% for
example, the present value of the crack repairs in the cargo hold region amounts to -$1.5M.
Using this value, if a new design promises to eliminate all the cracks in the cargo hold region
throughout the ship's life, one should theoretically invest in it if it costs less than $1.5M
above the current design.
There are other considerations which would push this limit higher. For example,
cracks may also pose a safety issue requiring an emergency repair which involves additional
costs. Those might involve the whole ship, cargo and possibly the crew if the ship sinks, or
they might involve off-hire and high repair costs in the event of an emergency repair. The
present value of these safety issues has been quantified as a function of ship age in Section
4.6, using reliability analysis to determine probabilities of emergency repairs or loss due to
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cracks. The consideration of repair costs alone, serves as a lower limit i.e. it is worth
investing at least up to $1.5M in the design that will eliminate cracks in the cargo holds.
An interesting result is that even though ballast tanks accounted for about 60% of the
cracks by number, using a 10% discount rate, the cargo holds account for about -$1.6M or
68% of the present value of the total repair cost. That is because the repair of cracks in cargo
holds involves a lot of staging which is a high component of the cost. The big open space of
the cargo holds requires large volumes of staging and in many cases a hanging staging in
order to repair the cracks which increases the cost disproportionately.
When applied correctly, the above analysis should give a wide perspective of the
crack costs associated with each location. This is a guideline that is very useful when making
high level decisions or a series of minor choices. An example is when choosing materials
(e.g. high tensile steel) or weld specifications for large areas or for the whole ship. It is also
handy when having to make fast decisions during repairs.
If an important decision or design choice has to be made, the above procedure can be
used to address the issue more directly. If two widely used designs are to be compared, the
ships in the database can first be divided between those with each design type. By conducting
a separate analysis for each set of ships, an accurate estimate of the saved crack costs can be
determined and then evaluated against the cost of each design. An example of a design
choice for which such analysis would be suitable is the choice between a double hull or a
single hull configuration.
5.1.6 Combined Cost and Safety Implications of Cracks
In Section 5.1.5, we determined the average repair cost of cracks as a function of ship
age. In Section 4.4.5, we derived the average safety parameter due to cracks with respect to
ship age. Fig. 5.1-11 combines those into one graph.
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Fig. 5.1-11: Average Crack Repair Costs and Ship Safety Parameter vs. Ship Age
We see that young ships deteriorate, requiring more expensive crack repairs and their
safety decreases as time progresses. The maximum of crack repair costs coincides with the
minimum of safety due to cracks at the age of 20 years. This implies that 20 is the worst age
to own a cape. Older ships are probably in a better condition and require fewer crack repairs,
either because a lot of money has been poured into their repairs already, or because they had
a good design to start with, helping them get this far without being scrapped.
The idea that the high repair costs actually impact the safety level is more clearly
demonstrated when we consider the continuous hazard function, developed in Section 4.5.6,
in conjunction with the annual crack repair costs. This is shown in Fig. 5.1-12.
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5.1-12: Average Crack Repair Costs and Hazard Function vs. Ship Age
The big dips in the hazard function coincide with the heavy repair expenses during
the scheduled ship repairs. The most notable example is the fourth special survey at the age
of 20 years. The minor discrepancies are owed to the fact that not all ships carry out the
repairs at the exact scheduled date since there is typically a time window giving the operators
some freedom of choice in deciding when to take a ship out of service.
When deciding whether to modify a design during a crack repair or whether to opt for
a new fatigue resistant design in a new ship, one has to consider the present value of the
repair costs of projected cracks in the corresponding location. This was analyzed in Section
5.1.5. One also has to add to that, the present value of the expected failure costs due to
cracks. These are analyzed at an aggregate level in Section 4.6. A break down of these costs
into the various locations can be obtained based on the percentage contribution of each
location to the total danger value. This has been analyzed in detail as a function of ship age in
Section 4.4.8. Therefore, the total present value of the expected repair and failure costs can
be obtained for any ship location and ship age.
An interesting result, for a variety of purposes, would be to calculate the full financial
implications of cracks as a function of ship age, both as a monetary sum, and as a percentage
of the ship value. This can be done by extending the analysis of Section 4.6.6, to include
projected repair costs. The same set of assumptions as in section 4.6.6 is used, along with
Sep-2008 Chinese repair yard prices (as have been assumed throughout Section 5.1). Fig.
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5.1-13 gives a breakdown of the present value of projected future costs due to crack failures
(emergency repairs and losses), repeated in Section 4.6.6. Fig. 5.1-14 shows the breakdown
of the present value of projected scheduled crack repairs based on the analysis of this section.
Fig. 5.1-15 combines these results, to give the present value of total crack costs as a
percentage of the ship's value, using 10-year average data as in Section 4.6.6.
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Fig. 5.1-13: Break Down of the Present Value of Expected Crack Failure Costs vs. Ship Age
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Fig. 5.1-14: Break Down of the Present Value of Scheduled Crack Repair Costs vs. Ship Age
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Fig. 5.1-15: Present Value of Total Crack Costs as a Fraction of Ship Value vs. Ship Age
The cost of future cracks accounts for just under 5% of a new ship's value, while the
peak is just under 25% for a ship -18 years old. These values are overstated because the
analysis assumes crack repair costs based on prices in China in Sept 2008. Repair prices at
the time were unusually high because of market conditions. Freight rates and newbuilding
prices were at record levels and increasing. This led to a high demand for repairs, because of
the increasing fleet size, and to a shortage of supply because shipyards were more keen on
lucrative shipbuilding projects. As a result, there were massive queues of ships waiting for
repairs and Chinese repair yards had significant market power. The price of scheduled repairs
(blue line in Fig. 5.1-15) is therefore quite exaggerated. On the other hand, the projection of
expected failure costs (pink line), and the ship values, are based on 10-year averages.
The 10-year average data of crack repair prices, required to carry out the full analysis
of this chapter, is not available. However, a large database of repairs carried out in China
(used in Section 5.2) was used to estimate the 10-year average cost of repairs relative to
September 2008. The result was 42.15% and the analysis can be found in Section 5.2. This
value can be used to scale down the cost of scheduled repairs (blue line in Fig. 5.1-15), and
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repeat Fig. 5.1-15 to reflect 10-year average data. Using the 10-year average repair costs and
a discount rate of 10%, the net present value of projected scheduled crack repair costs for a
new ship is $0.9M. Fig. 5.1-16 shows how this value varies throughout the ship's life, along
with expected failure costs.
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Fia. 5.1-16: Present Value of Projected Crack Costs Using a 10% Discount Rate and 10-Year Avg. Values
Throughout the ship's life, the present value of scheduled crack repairs is similar to
that of expected crack failures. The total is $1.82M for a new ship and peaks at $3.98M for a
11.8 year old. Fig. 5.1-17 repeats Fig. 5.1-15, using 10-year average repair prices (as opposed
to Sep-2008 data). The total financial implications of cracks account for -2.7% of a new
ship's value and 13.1% of a 17.8 year old vessel's value.
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5.1-17: Present Value of Projected Crack Costs as a % of Ship Value, Using 10-Year Avg. Data
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5.2 Steel Renewals and Repairs
5.2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to use a large sample of capesize bulk carrier dry dock
repairs, to deduce statistics that can be used to predict the requirements throughout a ship's
life. Data was collected from shipyards, shipowners and shipyard agents who work as
intermediaries between shipyards and shipowners. Approximately half of the data came from
agents who represent the major Chinese shipyards.
5.2.2 Repair Database
Data was collected for a total of 346 repairs. Each data sample includes the repair
date and duration, ship age, tons of steel replaced and surface area sandblasted and coated.
Some data also includes the total cost of the repair, and the travel time to and from the
shipyard. Table 5.2-1 summarizes the main statistics of the data sample.
Summary Statistics
Number of Repairs 346
Mean Ship Age (years) 14.7
Mean Ship Size (dwt) 162,753
Mean Steel Replaced (tons) 392
Mean SB/Coating Area (M2) 21,490
Mean Repair Duration (days) 39
Table 5.2-1: Summary of Statistics for Repair Data
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The price paid to the shipyard was available for 187 of the repairs and the mean was
$1.3M. Travel time ranged between 0.5 and 4 days each way (to and from the repair yard).
13 of the repairs were carried out in the 1990s and the rest were from the 2000s. Fig. 5.2-1
shows the number of repairs carried out each year.
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Fig. 5.2-1: Distribution of Data of by Year of Repair
Fig. 5.2-2 Shows the age of ships at the time of repair. The number of ships repaired
is shown for each ship age.
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Fig. 5.2-2: Distribution of Data of by Ship Age at Repair
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The data is well distributed across ships of all ages and most of the dry docks occur at
the scheduled ages which are multiples of 2.5 years. The average tons of steel replaced, area
sandblasted and repair duration were calculated for each ship age and the results are
presented in Fig. 5.2-3, 5.2-4 and 5.2-5 respectively.
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Fig. 5.2-3: Average Tons of Steel Replaced as a Function of Ship Age
Sand Blasting and Coating vs. Ship Age
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Fig. 5.2-4: Average Area Sandblasted as a Function of Ship Age
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Fig. 5.2-5.2-5: Average Repair Duration as a Function of Ship Age
5.2.3 Cost of Repairs
The total price paid to the shipyard was available for 187 of the repairs, which is
slightly over half the database. These were used to calibrate a formula that gives an estimate
of the repair cost based on the remaining parameters that are available for the whole data set.
The formula chosen to describe the whole repair cost is:
P = A(Tons) + B(m2 ) + C(Age) + D(Days) + E (5.2-1)
The constants A, B, C, D and E were calibrated to fit the data, and then a repair cost
index was developed based on the average differences of data points from the formula over
time. The chosen time interval varied between a quarter and a year depending of the
availability of data. The index was developed for the past 10 years and adjusted as a
percentage of the September 2008 value, which seems to be the peak based on the data. This
part of the analysis had to be carried out because similar statistics are not available in the
open literature. These results have to be relied upon for the remainder of the analysis. The
results are shown in Fig. 5.2-6.
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Fig. 5.2-5.2-6: China - Cape Repair Cost Index
The average over the past 10 years is 42.15% of the September 2008 value and
71.17% of the current value (End 2009). The formula constants for Sept 2008 are
summarized in Table 5.2-2.
Constant Value
A 5,064
B 14.1
C 8,222
D 2,846
E 335,224
Table 5.2-2: Repair Pricing Formula Calibration Constants for Sep 2008
It is important to note the significance of these values as they are not prices charged
directly by the shipyards. As discussed in Section 5.1.4.3, the base price of steel in Sep-2008
was close to $2.8/kg and ranged up to $4.76/kg with surcharges. The value of $5,064/ton in
Table 3, however, includes the amount of staging, labor and other factors, that varies directly
with the amount of steel. The formula does not serve as a breakdown of costs into steel,
sandblasting etc. It simply estimates the total cost of a repair based on the inputs, when used
in combination with Fig. 5.2-6.
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It is interesting to note that the peak in ship repair costs roughly coincides with the
peak in orderbook size. As discussed in Section 2.7.1, the orderbook size peaked at 855
capes, or 105% of the world fleet, in October 2008. These numbers exclude the ships that
were being converted from single hull tankers to bulk carriers.
Ship repair prices peaked due to a combination of increasing demand, decreasing
effective supply, and increasing costs. Demand for ship repairs was increasing because the
fleet was expanding rapidly and no ships were being scrapped. Due to the extremely high
freight rates, it was worthwhile repairing old ships rather than scrapping them. Supply was
decreasing although new shipyards were being built, because they were shifting their
resources to shipbuilding since newbuilding prices were also at record high levels.
Newbuilding prices peaked at $99M for a typical Cape in August 2008. This was all at a time
when steel prices, labor costs and the cost of other raw materials was also relatively high and
increasing.
Another finding was that shipyards in the south were relatively more expensive than
in the north of China. Eight major Chinese shipyards were chosen and their average prices
charged were compared. The results are shown in Table 5.2-3.
Table 5.2-3: Repair Prices by Chinese Shipyard
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Shipyard Price as % of Typical
YIU LIAN 108
XINYA 100
IMC 100
COSCO 106
SHANHAIGUAN 96
CHENG SHIN 107
CHANG SHIN 92
GOUANGZHOU 109
5.2.4 Crack Cost as Fraction of Total Repair Cost
Table 5.2-2 can be combined with the data of Fig. 5.2-3, 4 and 5.2-5 to produced a $
amount for each year based on Sep-2008 prices. This can then be compared with the results
on cracks costs from Section 5.1.5, which are also based on Sep-2008 prices. Since no repairs
are available for year 27, there is only one repair for each of years 28, 30 and 32, and the
crack cost data only extends to 28 years. The average of the 3 data points of 27+ years was
used for the age of 27 and 28. The crack cost was calculated as a percentage of the total
repair cost for each year and the results are shown in Fig. 5.2-7.
Crack Costs as a %of Total Repair Using Sep-2009 Prices
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Fig. 5.2-7: Crack Repair Cost as a % of Total Repair Cost for each Ship Age using Sep-2009 Prices
The data of Fig. 5.2-7 implies that crack costs account for approximately 14% of total
repair costs as calculated by various ways. Excluding year 4, for which there is no data on
crack costs, and year 6, for which there is no data on total repair costs, the average fraction of
crack costs was 13.98%. Crack costs, summed over the 28 years account for 14.05% of total
summed repair costs, and the discounted crack costs, using a discount rate of 10% account
for 14.58% of the discounted total repair costs.
It is important, however, to note that the results for crack costs and total repair costs
come from two different data samples (different repairs). It is also important to note that the
result depends on how you distribute some of the repair costs that are shared between crack-
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related and non-crack-related works. For example, staging was included in the cost of cracks
but will also be necessary for other work such as sandblasting and coating.
Since the ship repair cost index of Fig.5.2-6, affects both the cost of cracks and the
total repair cost, the result of Fig. 5.2-7 which shows one as a percentage of the other, should
not be expected to change for another time period.
5.2.5 Prediction of Lifetime Repair Costs for Typical Cape
When examining Fig. 5.2-3, 5.2-4 and 5.2-5, there are several factors to keep in mind.
First, as shown in Fig. 5.2-2, there are no data samples for some ages and only one for others.
There is only one sample for the age of 32, which distorts the results as it is an extreme case
that lasted over 4 months. Second, a ship only goes on dry dock every 2 or 3 years, so no
single ship would undergo a repair pattern as depicted by those figures. Both these problems
are solved by grouping the ships and calculating an average for every survey type, as
opposed to every ship age. For example, all the ships aged 9 to 11 years are grouped under
one category, the second special survey (SS2) which is typically passed at the age of 10
years. That is because a 9 year old ship would typically not go on dry dock again during the
next two years. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 5.2-4.
This shows that an average cape would spend approximately 14 months at repairs,
replacing 4,325t of steel (roughly 20% of its lightship) and sandblasting 228,444m2 of its
surface area throughout its lifetime. Furthermore, time travelling to and from shipyards
would amount to an additional 45 days, assuming an average trip time of 2.25days (based on
the available data) of over the 10 scheduled repairs. The total time lost to repairs therefore
amounts to 476 days, or 16 days per year, assuming the ship is scrapped when 28 years old.
This leaves a remainder of 349 earning days, which is surprisingly close to the rule of thumb
of 350 earning days per year.
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Survey Age Typical No. of Steel Area SB Duration
Type Range Age Ships (Tons) (mA2) (Days)
SS1 0 to 6 5 62 25 9,371 16
DD 7 to 8 7.5 21 77 17,381 20
SS2 9 to 11 10 33 154 21,576 25
DD 12 to 13 12.5 33 346 20,355 36
SS3 14 to 16 15 48 321 23,035 39
DD 17 to 18 17.5 26 497 24,885 53
SS4 19 to 21 20 48 684 27,958 54
DD 22 to 23 22.5 29 860 26,379 61
SS5 24 to 26 25 43 648 26,837 53
DD 27+ 27.5 3 713 30,667 75
Total 346 4,325 228,444 431
Table 5.2-4: Average Repair Metrics for Scheduled Repairs
Another factor that should be considered is the ship deadweight. Since the
purpose of this section is to predict the repair costs for a typical 172,000dwt cape, the data
should be adjusted to account for the size. Since the average size of the ships in the database
was 162,753dwt, the difference will not be very big, but still worth examining. Since all
capes have a similar shape, by assuming that the amount of steel replaced is proportional to
the hull surface area and that the deadweight is proportional to the volume, the following
approximation can be made:
Tons172000 = Tonsdwt (172,000
Sdwt) (5.2-2)
Similarly, by assuming that the area sandblasted is also proportional to the hull
surface area, we can also relate the area sandblasted of a ship of size "dwt" to that of a
172,000dwt ship as follows:
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2172 ,000  -- Iwt d w 3,  dw dwt (5.2-3)
The duration of the repair may be assumed to also vary with the deadweight raised to
the power of 2/3, because it varies with the amount of steel replaced and area sandblasted.
However, one can make the argument that more people would work on a larger ship, thereby
finishing at the same time. One way to test this argument is to examine the repair speed with
respect to ship size for the whole dataset. Fig. 5.2-8 and 5.2-9 show the steel replacement
speed and the sandblasting speed respectively with respect to ship size.
Steel. Replacement Speed vs Ship Size
120,000 140,000 160,000
Ship Size (dwt)
180,000 200,000 220,000
Fig. 5.2-8: Steel Replaced per Day with Respect to Ship Size
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Fig. 5.2-9: Area Sandblasted per Day with Respect to Ship Size
It is clear from Fig. 5.2-7 and 5.2-8, that an argument cannot be made for the speed of
repair being higher in larger ships because of the use of more workers. Therefore, the original
assumption is maintained and the repair duration is scaled as follows:
Days 172,000 =Days s 7Y (5.2-4)dwt )
The data of all the repairs was converted to the 172,000dwt equivalent using the ship
deadweight in formulae 5.2-2, 5.2-3 and 5.2-4. The price of these repairs was then
recalculated by inputting the updated values in formula 5.2-1. The adjustment to 172,000dwt
resulted on average in an increase of tons replaced by 7.8%, area sandblasted by 6.1%, repair
duration by 5.7% and total repair cost by 6.3%. The analysis of Table 5.2-4 was repeated
using the 172,00dwt equivalent values and the results are presented in Table 5.2-5.
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Survey Age Typical No. Of Steel Area SB Duration Cost
Type Range Age Ships (Tons) (mA2) (Days) ($)
SS1 0 to 6 5 62 25 9,338 15 286,705
DD 7 to 8 7.5 21 80 17,969 20 468,512
SS2 9to 11 10 33 158 21,941 25 673,664
DD 12 to 13 12.5 33 369 21,720 38 1,146,676
SS3 14 to 16 15 48 340 24,868 42 1,117,665
DD 17 to 18 17.5 26 523 26,479 56 1,542,475
SS4 19 to 21 20 48 722 29,112 57 1,992,464
DD 22 to 23 22.5 29 948 28,343 66 2,490,328
SS5 24 to 26 25 43 725 29,804 58 2,022,227
DD 27+ 27.5 3 830 35,823 88 2,326,158
Total 346 4,720 245,397 465 14,066,873
Table 5.2-5: Average Repair Metrics for Scheduled Repairs for 172000dwt
The revised estimates for a 172,000dwt ship show that it is expected to spend
approximately $14M and 1.27 years on dry dock repairs, replacing about a fifth of its steel
over its lifetime.
In order to get a more representative result throughout the ship's life, the results of
Table 5.2-5 can be distributed across ages 0 to 28. This is done according to the fraction of
ships undergoing each scheduled repair, accounted for by each ship age. For example, the 33
ships passing the SS2, comprised of 15% ship aged 9 years old, 82% ships aged 10 years old
and 3% ships aged 11 years old. Therefore, the results for age 9 are calculated as 15% of the
SS2 values in Table 5.2-5. The three data samples in age groups 28, 30 and 32 years were
bundled together in the and distributed evenly between ages 27 and 28, to eliminate the effect
of outliers and to accommodate our lifetime assumptions throughout the project.
To accommodate for the lack of data in year 6, the average percentage of ships
undergoing a special repair in each of years 11, 16, 21 and 26 (the year following the
scheduled date) was calculated. The result was 14.38% and was applied to year 6. The
difference was removed proportionately from years 0 through 5 by multiplying the original
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values by 85.62%. This was done to satisfy the total of years 0 through 6 adding up to 100%
for the first special survey.
As for steel replaced, sandblasting and repair duration, the price column was also
calculated by multiplying the percentage of each age by the corresponding repair values in
order to avoid double counting. If the price column had been calculated by applying the
formula 5.2-1 on the year's data, it would result in double counting of the third and fourth
terms (as if a whole repair was carried out every year).
Age % of D/D in Steel Area SB Duration Cost
(Years) Year Age (Tons) (mA2) (Days) ($)
0 1.38% 0.35 129 0.21 $3,959
1 1.38% 0.35 129 0.21 $3,959
2 15.19% 4 1418 2 $43,550
3 23.48% 6 2192 4 $67,305
4 12.43% 3 1161 2 $35,632
5 31.76% 8 2966 5 $91,060
6 14.38% 4 1343 2 $41,240
7 47.62% 38 8557 9 $223,101
8 52.38% 42 9412 10 $245,411
9 15.15% 24 3324 4 $102,070
10 81.82% 129 17952 21 $551,180
11 3.03% 5 665 1 $20,414
12 30.30% 112 6582 12 $347,478
13 69.70% 257 15138 27 $799,198
14 27.08% 92 6735 11 $302,701
15 62.50% 213 15543 26 $698,541
16 10.42% 35 2590 4 $116,423
17 38.46% 201 10184 21 $593,259
18 61.54% 322 16295 34 $949,215
19 16.67% 120 4852 9 $332,077
20 62.50% 451 18195 35 $1,245,290
21 20.83% 150 6065 12 $415,097
22 51.72% 490 14660 34 $1,288,101
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As verification, the values of the row of totals of Table 5.2-6 are identical to those of
Table 5.2-5, showing that all we have done is, distribute the data of Table 5.2-5 throughout
the ship's life. As explained previously, had the "Total Cost" column been calculated by
applying formula 5.2-1 to the data of each row, the total would be greater than that of Table
5.2-5. That is because the 3rd and 4 th term would be included 29 times (every year) as
opposed to 10 (the typical number of repairs a ship is expected to undergo).
The travel time was also calculated for each year by multiplying the year's percentage
value by 4.25 days (to include the trips to and from the shipyard). This is added to the
Duration column but does not affect the cost of the repair. The results are summarized in
Table 5.2-7.
Age % of D/D in Repair Travel Total
(Years) Year Age Days Days Days
0 1.38% 0.21 0.0586884 0.3
1 1.38% 0.21 0.0586884 0.3
2 15.19% 2 0.645572 3.0
3 23.48% 4 0.9977022 4.6
4 12.43% 2 0.5281953 2.4
5 31.76% 5 1.3498324 6.2
6 14.38% 2 0.6113212 2.8
7 47.62% 9 2.0238095 11.4
8 52.38% 10 2.2261905 12.5
9 15.15% 4 0.6439394 4.5
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23 48.28% 458 13683 32 $1,202,227
24 20.93% 152 6238 12 $423,257
25 55.81% 405 16635 33 $1,128,685
26 23.26% 169 6931 14 $470,285
27 50.00% 415 17911 44 $1,163,079
28 50.00% 415 17911 44 $1,163,079
Total 10 4,720 245,397 465 $14,066,873
Table 5.2-6: Repair Metrics for Every Year Adjusted for 172,000dwt
10 81.82% 21 3.4772727 24.2
11 3.03% 1 0.1287879 0.9
12 30.30% 12 1.2878788 12.9
13 69.70% 27 2.9621212 29.7
14 27.08% 11 1.1510417 12.6
15 62.50% 26 2.65625 29.0
16 10.42% 4 0.4427083 4.8
17 38.46% 21 1.6346154 23.0
18 61.54% 34 2.6153846 36.8
19 16.67% 9 0.7083333 10.1
20 62.50% 35 2.65625 38.0
21 20.83% 12 0.8854167 12.7
22 51.72% 34 2.1982759 36.3
23 48.28% 32 2.0517241 33.9
24 20.93% 12 0.8895349 13.1
25 55.81% 33 2.372093 34.9
26 23.26% 14 0.9883721 14.5
27 50.00% 44 2.125 46.0
28 50.00% 44 2.125 46.0
Total 10 465 42.5 507.6
Table 5.2-7: Total Days Spent for Repairs Including Travel Time
Finally, the results of Table 5.2-6 and 5.2-7 can be used to determine the repair cost
per day and the number of earning days per month throughout the ship's life. This is done by
simply dividing the "Cost" column of Table 5.2-6 by 365 days/year and by subtracting the
"Total Days" column of Table 5.2-7 from 365 and the dividing by 12. The results are shown
in Table 5.2-8. A row is also added for repair costs per day with End-2009 prices by scaling
the results using the index of Fig. 5.2-6.
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Age Rep Cost (10-yr Avg.) Rep Cost (End 2009) Earning Days
(Years) ($/Day) ($/Day) per Month
0 $10.85 $7.72 30.37
1 $10.85 $7.72 30.37
2 $119.32 $84.92 30.15
3 $184.40 $131.24 30.01
4 $97.62 $69.48 30.19
5 $249.48 $177.56 29.88
6 $112.99 $80.42 30.16
7 $611.24 $435.04 29.45
8 $672.36 $478.55 29.36
9 $279.64 $199.04 30.02
10 $1,510.08 $1,074.79 28.38
11 $55.93 $39.81 30.32
12 $951.99 $677.58 29.32
13 $2,189.58 $1,558.42 27.92
14 $829.32 $590.26 29.35
15 $1,913.81 $1,362.14 27.98
16 $318.97 $227.02 29.99
17 $1,625.37 $1,156.85 28.48
18 $2,600.59 $1,850.95 27.33
19 $909.80 $647.55 29.55
20 $3,411.75 $2,428.29 27.23
21 $1,137.25 $809.43 29.34
22 $3,529.04 $2,511.77 27.37
23 $3,293.77 $2,344.32 27.57
24 $1,159.61 $825.34 29.30
25 $3,092.29 $2,200.92 27.49
26 $1,288.45 $917.05 29.18
27 $3,186.52 $2,267.98 26.56
28 $3,186.52 $2,267.98 26.56
Average $1,328.94 $945.17 28.94
Table 5.2-8: Daily Repair Costs and Earning Days per Month for Every Year
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The results indicate an average of $1,329/day for repair costs and an average of 347.5
earning days per year for a 172,000dwt cape. The present value of the repair costs, assuming
that the 10-yr average values of Table 5.2-6 are paid at the end of each year, amounts to
$2,306 using a 10% discount rate.
5.2.6 Verification of Results with Other Sources
Very limited data exists on the topic specifically for Capes. Only two reliable sources
have been identified for verification of the above results. First, an analysis has been carried
out by [Stopford 2009] using 1993 data from Clarksons Brokers, on the repair costs of Capes.
Second, a survey was carried out on 6 private and 4 public shipping companies that operate
capes. Not all companies have owned capes of all ages, but they submitted estimates of the
cost breakdown for the previous decade (average since 2000) and using today's prices. Fig.
5.2-10 presents the results by [Stopford 2009], which cover a wide range of ages and are
conveniently broken down in detail.
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Age of ship
0-6 6-10 11-15 16-20
Time out of evie (daya) 20 23 40 40
Timeln drydock (days) 10 14 23 i8 Total
Cost Items (D}
Dry-dock charges 62.000 68,000 E1,500 74,000 285 500
Prt charges, tugs, agency 70,000 73,300 92,000 92,000 327,300
General rvices 00.000 92,000 160,000 160,000 492,000
Hull blast, lean & panting 102,800 128,00 183,00 99,000 514,200
AN dry-dockpaint 164,100 17503 201,000 194,100 740,700
AN ste replacement 70,000 350,000 1,190,000 840,000 2,450,000
Gargo spaces 22,200 64,20 128,000 150,000 362,A00
BOast spaces 38,400 23,200 26,000 47,400 133,000
Hatch covers & dec ltlings 28,000 56,320 60,560 60,560 206,440
Main engine and propulon 46,000 42,000 48,000 48,000 184,000
Awdllaies 27.000 34,000 134,000 44,000 239,000
Pi*ig & valves 18,000 37,000 50,000 34,000 139,000
Navigation & comrnjniostkir 9,000 11.000 11,000 11,000 42,000
Accommodation .000 8,000 7,000 7,000 28,000
Swveys & sveyrs 70,000 78,500 113,000 108,000 39,500
LAnn1mein 1(Ano 4qaMono 1Aflnf inn,m 4Mn-n
Sparm parts & subcomrtactrs 70,000 100,000 100,000 120,000 390,000
Owner'sattendance 23,800 25,00 35,800 35,800 121,000
Estmated total 1,005,300 1,487,420 2,725,480 2.224,860 7,423,040
Awaged annual cost 201,060 293,484 545,092 444,972
Avraged day ost 551 804 1,493 1,219
Sourc: a~sn Rseeer, Capeslzrualty Su"rY 11993
Fig. 5.2-10: Standard Capesize Lifetime Periodic Repair Costs based on 1993 data [Stopford 2009]
Steel replacement (line 6) is the biggest cost component after the age of 5 years.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the cost breakdown of Fig. 5.2-10 to the results
produced by Eq. 5.2-1. The items of Fig. 5.2-10 that scale with our regression parameters
(tons, area, days etc), have automatically been incorporated in the regression constants (A, B,
C) summarized in Table 5.2-2. In our case, for example, the "tons" coefficient (A) includes
fractions of the other line items of Fig. 5.2-10 that scale with the amount of steel replaced.
For comparison purposes, the results of Table 5.2-7 have been converted to the same
aged groups of Fig. 5.2-10. That way, a direct comparison can be made between our results
and the average daily cost (bottom line) of Fig. 5.2-10.
The results of Fig. 5.2-10, are based on 1993 data. Unfortunately, the index we
developed in Fig. 5.2-6 does not go that far back, so these cannot be converted to today's
prices. Furthermore, the line items in Fig. 5.2-10 are only supplied in terms of $, (as opposed
to tons, m2 etc), so Eq. 5.2-1 cannot be applied on them. However, they can at least be
converted from 1993 dollars to today's dollars.
664
According to statistics of the Bureau of Labor, the Consumer Price Index was 144.5
and 214.5 for 1993 (year average) and for December 2009. This implies that $1,000 in 1993
have about the same buying power as $1,484.43 in 2010. The respective levels of the
Producer Price Index were 118.9 and 173.0, implying a buying power of $1,455.00 [CDRPC
2010]. The baseline year of the index is 1982. Taking the average, $1,000 in 1993 have about
the same buying power as $1,469.78 in 2010. According to [HBrothers 2010], 1000 dollars in
1993 have about the same buying power as $1,521.84 in 2010. The average of the two
sources is $1,495.78, so a dollar in 1993 had roughly the same spending power as $1.5 have
today. This can be used to convert the numbers of Fig. 5.2-10 to today's prices.
Table 5.2-9 provides a summary of our results using both 10-year average prices and
today's prices, the results of [Stopford 2009] from Fig. 5.2-10 in 1993 dollars and converted
to today's dollars, and the average results from the 6-firm survey for 10 year average costs
and using today's prices.
Ship Our Results: Our Results: Stopford: Stopford: Survey: Survey:
Age 10-yr Avg. Dec 2009 1993 Prices 1993 Prices 10-yr Avg. Dec 2009
(years) Prices Prices (in 1993$) (in 2010$) Prices Prices
0-5 $112 $80 $551 $824 $578 $438
6-10 $637 $454 $804 $1,203 $786 $602
11-15 $1,188 $846 $1,493 $2,233 $1,119 $816
16-20 $1,773 $1,262 $1,219 $1,823 $1,465 $1,019
21-25 $2,442 $1,738 - - $2,176 $1,495
26-28 $2,554 $1,818 - - - -
0-20 $928 $660 $1,017 $1,521 $987 $719
0 -25 $1,230.63 $875.84 - - $1,224.67 $874.27
Table 5.2-9: Dry Dock Repair Prices in $/Day vs. Age from Various Sources
The results stemming from our analysis of 346 repairs are very similar to those
reported in the Survey of 6 firms operating Capes. This is particularly true for the average
values between 0 and 25 years using both current and ten year average prices. Furthermore,
the Survey results also validate the index developed in Fig. 5.2-6. By comparing the last two
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columns of Table 5.2-9 we can get current prices as a percentage of 10-year average prices.
The values range from 68.73% to 76.54% with an average of 72.74%. Using the current
index value of Fig. 5.2-6 is 71.17% of the 10-year average, which is remarkably close.
When converted to current dollars, the 1993 results of [Stopford 2009] are
significantly higher than both the repair analysis results and the survey results. This indicates
that repair prices have decreased significantly in real terms. This could be due to
technological improvements, less use of HTS, Economies of Scale and other factors, but
most importantly due to the shift of repairs to low cost countries where they can be carried
out more competitively with cheap labor. To illustrate the latter, it is worth examining the
timing of the 346 repairs in our database, which is shown in Fig. 5.2-1. Out of the 8 repairs
that were carried out between 1991 and 1993, 5 took place in Singapore, 2 in Greece, 1 in
Japan and none in China. Of the 333 repairs from 2000 onwards, 331 were carried out in
China and 2 were carried out in Spain in 2001.
Table 5.2-10 shows the "Days out of Service" per year from our repair data and from
the data of [Stopford 2009] shown in Fig. 5.2-9.
Ship Age Our Results Stopford
(Years) (Days/Year) (Days/Year)
0-5 2.79 4.00
6-10 11.07 4.60
11-15 17.03 8.00
16-20 22.56 8.00
21-25 26.19
26-28 35.52
0-20 13.36 6.15
Table 5.2-10: Off-Hire Days Per Year
The average days out of service between the age of 0 and 20 years, based on our
results, are more than double those of [Stopford 2009]. Again it is worth referring to the
timing of the repairs in our database, which is shown in Fig. 5.2-1. 259 of the 346 repairs
(75%) were carried out between 2006 and 2008. This was during the high market when
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massive queues were building up outside shipyards and ships had to wait in line for days
before a dry dock was possible. This explains why the average off-hire time is on average
about a week per year higher that than reported by [Stopford 2009], whose results are based
on 1993 data (a more regular time period in terms of markets and repairs).
5.2.7 Projection of Repair Costs
By considering the Chinese cape repair cost index developed in Fig. 5.2-6 of Section
5.2, we see that it is inappropriate to assume a steady inflation in repair costs. Repair costs
are to a large extent associated with factors that are not closely related to inflation such as
freight levels, market outlook, supply of ships, shipyard capacity, newbuilding demand etc.
We will assume that both repair costs and associated off-hire time follows the past 10 year
average values going forward. In our projection, repair costs and off-hire time are only a
function of the ship's age and not time.
Table 5.2-9, shows that we are in good agreement with other sources and the results
seem reliable overall. However, for the age group 0 to 5, repair cost per day seems too low
compared to corresponding figures from our survey and from [Stopford 2009]. Using 10-year
average values, our analysis results show a cost of $112/day, whereas the survey results
indicate $578/day which is more reasonable. Results from [Stopford 2009] using 1993 prices
in today's dollars indicate $824/day which is even higher. For this age range, the most
reliable of the three values seems to be the survey result.
We will assume our database results for the 10-year average values. The cost/day
results for the 0 to 5 year range will be scaled by 578/112. This will maintain the ratio of
spending for each year but increase the average from $112/day to $512/day which is the
survey result. For the remainder of the ship's life, the database cost values will remain
unaffected. The database off-hire days will also not be modified. The results are summarized
in Table 5.2-11 in terms of $/day and percentage earning time (utilization).
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Age Rep Cost (10-yr Avg.) % Earning
(Years) ($/Day) Time
0 $56 99.93%
1 $56 99.93%
2 $615 99.18%
3 $950 98.74%
4 $503 99.33%
5 $1,286 98.29%
6 $113 99.23%
7 $611 96.89%
8 $672 96.58%
9 $280 98.77%
10 $1,510 93.37%
11 $56 99.75%
12 $952 96.46%
13 $2,190 91.85%
14 $829 96.55%
15 $1,914 92.04%
16 $319 98.67%
17 $1,625 93.70%
18 $2,601 89.91%
19 $910 97.22%
20 $3,412 89.57%
21 $1,137 96.52%
22 $3,529 90.04%
23 $3,294 90.70%
24 $1,160 96.41%
25 $3,092 90.43%
26 $1,288 96.01%
27 $3,187 87.39%
28 $3,187 87.39%
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Table 5.2-11: Daily Repair Costs and Earning Days per Month for Every Year
5.3 Operations of Listed and Private Companies
5.3.1 Introduction
In order to understand the operation and costs of capes for valuation purposes, it is
important to draw a distinction between Listed and Private Companies. Success in this
industry depends on many factors such as timing, the ability to raise finance, operating at a
low cost to stay in business throughout market downturns etc. Staying private versus being
listed in a major stock exchange gives a completely different set of advantages in terms of
these success factors and has a big impact on the way a company operates and expands. This
chapter provides an insight of this topic through a case study of a listed and a private
company that operates capes. The listed company is Dryships Inc. (DRYS) and the private
company is Lifedream Compania Naviera (LCN).
5.3.2 Success Factors in the Cape Market
The market is affected by factors such as countries' GDP growth, demand for final
products, terrorism and piracy, capacity constraints leading to congestion at ports or canals,
interest and exchange rates, steel and fuel prices etc. making it very volatile and
unpredictable. A detailed market analysis is provided in Chapter 2.
In general, when demand is high, orders for new ships increase. Since shipyard
capacity is constrained, delivery time also increases. The delivery of these ships then pushes
rates down. When rates are below a certain level, old ships which are no longer profitable are
scrapped. Supply thereby decreases leading to a recovery of rates. This, combined with
demand fluctuations makes the market very cyclical.
A group of panelist brokers keeps track of the average daily earnings of Capes and
reports them to the Baltic Exchange which then publishes indices. There is a market where
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FFAs are traded on these indices allowing owners and charterers to hedge their market
exposure. Fig. 5.3-1 shows the Baltic Average Dry Index since 1985 and Fig. 5.3- 2 shows
the corresponding daily earnings over the last 5 years.
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Fig. 5.3-1: Baltic Average Dry Index Jan-1985 - Dec 2009 [Lifedream 20091
671
Fig. 5.3-2: Daily Earnings of CAPE (blue), PMX (orange) and SMX (yellow): 0 - $260,000/day
[Dryships 20101
Fig. 5.3-3 shows the index pre-dating the Baltic index, which ranges back to 1976.
This Chart is kept at the Headquarters of LCN.
Daily earnings and ship values increased substantially at the end of 2003 due to
China's expansion. The introduction of derivatives (on the Baltic indices) around the same
period made the market more volatile. The market stayed extremely high compared to pre-
2003 levels, reaching a record high in 2008 and then rapidly collapsed after the financial
crisis. Average capesize daily earnings decreased by about 99% within a few months and
ship values followed. This is clear in Fig. 5.3-4 and 5.3-5 which show the prices of bulk
carriers of various sizes.
The market is highly fragmented and very competitive with approximately 1,500 dry
bulk operators. The vast majority of these are privately owned like LCN but some, including
DRYS have been listed on NASDAQ during this decade. In terms of dry bulk tons moved,
the 5 major US listed companies account for 4.29% market share and DRYS accounts for
1.21 [wikinvest 2009a].
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Fig. 5.3-3: Combined Shipping Freight Index 1976 - 2001 [Lifedream 20091
Fig. 5.3-4: Values of 5 year old Bulk Carrier Vessels [Cotzias 2009a]
Fig. 5.3-5: Values of 20 year old Bulk Carrier Vessels [Cotzias 2009a,
Success in this cyclical market lies primarily on the timing of investments and
chartering. The values of ships are less volatile than daily rates but still very volatile,
particularly for older ships. This presents big investment opportunities but is also very
dangerous. High charter rates can be locked in via long term contracts with reputable
customers but spot rates (short term) are more volatile and higher on average.
Metrics such as fleet utilization show how quickly a company can complete ship
repairs and find employment for its vessels. Unlike containerships, bulk carriers have not yet
been forced to lay up in the current market. Utilization therefore mainly varies with the
length of repairs. Ships undergo annual surveys, special surveys every 5 years and an
intermediate surveys between specials. Requirements generally increase with age.
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Heavy newbuilding orders were placed during the past five good years. As discussed
in Chapter 2, this led to a huge orderbook and increased delivery times to -4 years due to
shipyard capacity constraints. In early 2008, the capesize orderbook exceeded the size of the
fleet at the time while scrapping (retirement) was very rare. Huge oversupply is anticipated
as these orders are delivered until 2012. Scrapping has increased but this made the fleet
younger, thereby limiting future scrapping potential. Order cancellations are expensive and
have limited impact since supply is ultimately governed by the shipyard building capacity
which has increased dramatically. This is because any cancelled ship will still be delivered,
only to another buyer at a lower price, until market prices drop below the variable costs of
shipyards. Pushing back deliveries only delays the market recovery, while changing the order
to a tanker or a container ship is limited as they also have high orderbooks. In fact, tanker and
containership markets are worse so their orders are being changed to bulk carriers. Besides
anticipated oversupply, there is a weakening demand for raw materials by China and for
finished products by the west due to the bad financial situation.
5.3.3 Company Overview
5.3.3.1 Dryships Overview
DRYS completed an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange in February 2005. Fig.
5.3-6 shows the trend in its share price since then. It has a Market Cap of-$1.5bn and 254M
outstanding shares [Dryships 2009a], up from 30M in 2005 [Dryships 2009e]. Under Code
Section 883, the company pays no US taxes [Dryships 2009e]. The financial crisis and the
decline in ship earnings and values caused its share price to decline and it stopped
distributing dividends in late 2008.
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Fig. 5.3-6: DRYS Share Price [CNNMoney 20081
Its fleet grew from 27 ships in 2004 to 39 ships through a series of acquisitions,
financed primarily through subsequent equity offerings [Dryships 2009e]. The fleet includes
7 Capes, 30 Panamaxes and 2 supramaxes totaling ~3.4Mdwt [Dryships 2009b]. A list of
these fleets along with their employment are presented in Fig. 5.3-7.
In early 2008, it expanded into ultra deep water drillships via a $1.2bn acquisition of
Norwegian OceanRig ASA which owns two rigs and then ordered another 2 for $1.4bn with
expected delivery in 2011. Drilling accounts for 20.3% of its revenues while dry bulk
accounts for 79.7% [Dryships 2009e}. The oil rig section is managed separately in Norway
and DRYS plans to spin it off [Dryships 2009c].
Cardiff Marine is a privately held company which owns 13 dry bulkers and 21 tankers
and also operates the ships of DRYS for an annual fee [Cardiff 2009]. The founder of both
owns 9.3% of the DRYS (8.6% of common stock) and 70% of Cardiff. The remaining 30%
of Cardiff is owned by his sister [Dryships 2009e].
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Fig. 5.3-7: Dryships Fleet Employment Oct-2009 [Dryships 2009b]
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5.3.3.2 Lifedream Overview
LCN was founded in the mid-1970s and has since remained a private company,
wholly owned by one of the founders. It acquired its first ship in 1978 and has steadily grown
its fleet to 24 ships.. These include Capes, panamaxes, handies and also 3 containerships, of
total capacity 1.6Mdwt. The fleet size decreased during the market boom and is now
beginning to expand again. In 2002, it peaked at 27 ships of 1.8Mdwt. A detailed account of
the company's ship investments is shown in Table 5.3-1 and the current fleet along with
current employment contracts is shown in Table 5.3-2.
NAME dwt Age Acq
Aug- Apr-
VIRGIN STAR 8000 20 78 80
May-
LOBITO 8000 20
Mar-79 80
CITY OF May-
DUNDEE Jan-80 84
Jan-
CITY OF LEEDS 9000 18
Jan-80 81
CITY OF May-
CREMON Feb-81 84
Aug-
LOBITO PAL 9000 20 Ot28
Oct-82 83
Feb-
SEA ZEPHIR 18000 10
Jan-83 89
NICHOLAS H 17000
Mar-84
Oct-
88 64%
Sold nd%upPricel%Eqjp.Prof riceS Prof mosROEu RI
0.25 100% 0.2 0.7 0.65 20116%116%
0.6 33% 1.61 1 2.01 14684%253%
1.2 25% 3.03 0.3 2.13 52 62% 27%
1.2 25% 1.2 2.8 2.8 12933%233%
1.05 14% 3 0.5 2.45 39141% 45%
0.6 100% 0.4 1.2 1 10 26%226%
1.6 19% 7.02 4 9.42 73 77% 37%
1~~ 1 ,_j 4
2.8 25%
Mar-
LEO ONE 18000 10
Sep-85 89 100% 0.6 17% 6.54 4 9.94 42275%127%
AH 75000 17 Sep-85 Jan- 6% 2.5 0 2 -0.5 16 -15%
678
' 'I-
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May-
EMIL S 16000 10 Oct-85 99 16% 0.6 17% 7.41 0.5 7.31 163 37% 21%
Mar-
EMMA F 18000 11 Apr-86 89 129% 0.6 17% 3.03 4.2 6.63 35325%/1135%
Apr-
MARIE H 18000 11 Ar
Apr-86 00 129% 0.6 17% 9.08 0.6 9.08 168 38% 22%
May-- Jun-
CITY OF RIO 17000 10 a-Jn
86 89 133% 0.7 14% 10.17 0.5 9.97 37347%142/
Mar-
VANYA 30000 12 Jan-87 89 88% 1.5 20% 7.31 5 10.81 264330/165%
Jun-
EMIL S II 18000 16 Jun-90 99 -45% 1.8 100% 5.04 0.5 3.74 108 13% 13%
Mar-
LARGO 13000 20 Jul-90 91 38% 0.4 100% 0.1 0.6 0.3 81320/132%
Jun-
NATALIE 19000 11 Jun-92 97 18% 2.8 290/ 2.92 4 4.12 60 44% 20%
Oct-
AKAKI 19000 11
Jun-92 98 -9% 2.8 29% 2 0.6 -0.2 7 -4% -1/
SANTA17000 12 Aug- Aug-
MARGHERITA 92 98 -9% 2 25% 1.42 1 0.42 72 110/ 3%
Jan-
GREENOCK 18000 10 Sep-92 96 60% 2.8 29% 1.03 3.6 1.83 40 43% 16%
PANAMAX
65000 16
PRIDE Jun-94 7.5 20% 18.56
Oct-
STEFF 60000 20
Jun-96 02 13% 3 330/ 4.7 1.5 3.2 76 25% 120/
PANAMAX Aug- Oct-
61000 18
PEARL 96 00 -17% 5 20% 4.95 1 0.95 50 170/ 4%
PRINCE 42000 12 Jun-98 Jan- 458% 5 20/ 3.52 5 3.52 67 31% 10/
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TICHOLAS (cont) 04
Jan-
HELLEN C (cont) 42000 12
Jun-98 04 458% 5 200/ 3.01 5 3.01 67 28% 90/
MP TRADER 19000 18 Sep-
Jun-98 02 58% 1.1 91% 2.52 3.5 4.92 51 52% 49%
WESTERN
70000 10
TRADER Jan-99 8 25% 20.19
PANAMA~ -- ~
25000 17
EXPRESS Feb-99 2 100% 10
ACIFIC-
25000 17
EXPRESS Feb-99 2 100% 10.42
APE MARIA 18000 17 May- Oct-
99 07 1100% 6.8 9% 50.22 42 85.42 101 81% 36%
PANAMAX65000 16 May-
POWER 99 8 0% 23.71
PANAMAX STAR 65000 17 May-
99 8 0% 27.26
PANAMAX May-
65000 16 My
STRENGTH 99 8 0% 20.01
PANAMAX May- Jun-
61000 18
OTTER 99 09 350% 5 0% 23.02 2.6 20.62 121 18%
PIONEER Jun-
20000 18
EXPRESS Jun-99 01 106% 1.5 1000/ 1 1.5 1 24 29% 29%
DELMAS
25000 20
JACARANDA Jan-02 1.6 100% 9.77
DELMAS ALOE 25000 20 Jan-02 1.6 100% 6.09
DELMAS
25000 20
ACACIA Jan-02 1.6 100% 8.14
DELMAS
25000 20
CARTIER Jan-02 1.6 1000% 7.59
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PRINCESS
70000 12
NATALIE Feb-02 7 7% 27.45
Dec-
CAPE MAXIM 150000 17
Feb-02 09 344% 7.2 10% 37.18 10.2 40.18 94 68% 27%
Mar-
LAKE SUPERIOR 32000 20
Feb-02 09 120% 2.2 23% 22.03 1.7 21.53 85 710% 40%
CMC DIAMOND 40000 20 May-
(cont) Feb-02 04 240% 3.3 15% 2.04 5 3.74 27160% 40%
CMC PEARL Dec-
40000 17
(cont) Feb-02 04 450% 7 7% 3.02 10.5 6.52 34155% 260/
CAPE ATHOS 140000 21 Sep-02 9.5 0% 26.59
CAPE LORD 140000 20 Sep-02 9.5 0% 34.37
CAPE COSMOS 140000 21 Sep-02 9.5 0% 36.74
PANAMAX SUN 65000 20 Sep-02 8 0% 27.15
PANAMAX
70000 19
DAWN Sep-02 8.5 0% 33.07
MEXICO CITY 60000 25 Dec-08 2.7 100% 2.8
PANAMAkX 70000 12 May-
APPLAUSE 09 20 10%
CSL MARIE (cont) 50000 16 Mar-09 6.5 100%
CSL STEFANIE
50000 16
(cont) Mar-09 7 100%
ALEXANDER
50000 16
(cont) Mar-09 7 100%
CSL PATMOS 5000 17 Sep-
(cont) Apr-09 09 5 100% 0 6 1 5 55% 55%
CSL PACIFIC 5000 17 Sep-
(cont) Apr-09 09 5 100% 0 6 1 5 550% 55%
CAPE OLIVE 170000 13 Sep-09 30 10%
CAPT. ORE 46000 19 Sep-09 10 1000/
Table 5.3-1: Lifedream - Account of Ship Investments - Based on Data from [Lifedream 2009]
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The columns of Table 5.3-1 represent (in order), the ship's name, deadweight, age
when acquired, date of acquisition, date sold, % increase in BDI Index between acquiring
and selling (using pre-BDI index where shaded), acquisition price, % equity (cash) in
acquisition (remainder is bank loan), profit by operation, selling price, total profit, months
held, annualized return on equity, and annualized return on investment.
NAME DWT AGE CHARTERED YRS NETRATE
(AQ.) FROMDEC'09 (=GROSS-5%)
CAPE OLIVE 170000 13 5 30,000
CAPE ATHOS 140000 21 0.5 15,000
CAPE COSMOS 140000 21 2 18,000
CAPE LORD 140000 20 -
WESTERN TRADER 70000 10 5 15,000
PRINCESS NATALIE 70000 12 5 30,000
PANAMAX APPLAUSE 70000 12 3 16,000
PANAMAX DAWN 70000 19 6 20,000
PANAMAX POWER 65000 16 4 20,000
PANAMAX STAR 65000 17 6 20,000
PANAMAX STRENGTH 65000 16 2 50,000
PANAMAX SUN 65000 20 6 20,000
MEXICO CITY 60000 25 2.9 30,000
PANAMAX PRIDE 65000 16 2 10,000
CAPT. ORE 46000 19 5 22,000
PANAMA EXPRESS 25000 17 2 9,000
PACIFIC EXPRESS 25000 17 2 9,000
DELMAS JACARANDA 25000 20 1 9,000
DELMAS ALOE 25000 20 1 9,000
DELMAS ACACIA 25000 20 1 9,000
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DELMAS CARTIER
CSL MARIE (cont)
CSL STEFANIE (cont)
ALEXANDER (cont)
1 9,000
Table 5.3-2: Lifedream Fleet Employment Dec-2009 - Based on data from [Lifedream 20091
Fig. 5.3-8 shows the growth in number of ships and carrying capacity. The operation
management of the fleet is done in house and no additional vessels are managed on behalf of
other companies [Lifedream 2009].
Fig. 5.3-8: LCN Fleet Growth - Developed using data from [Lifedream 20091
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5.3.4 Company Objectives and Growth Strategy
5.3.4.1 Objectives and Growth Strategy of Dryships
DRYS's strategy is to offer safe and reliable transportation and make acquisitions in a
manner that adds shareholder value. The dynamics of the stock market are quite unique and
affect the company's strategy directly. Share prices are highly governed by earnings per
share and ROE, so listed companies are under pressure to keep making acquisitions in order
to boost earnings and demonstrate continuous growth. This is true particularly when the
market is high which means that acquisitions will inevitably be made at high prices. In 2008,
at the peak of the market, this need for fast earnings to boost ROE was one of the factors
leading the price of 5-year old vessels to be about 1.5 times that of a newbuilding order
which would be delivered after 3 years [Cotzias 2009c]. Besides having to make the next
quarter's numbers, listed companies are under a pressure to make big acquisitions of high
publicity, maintain a brand name and top quality personnel and directors, have full disclosure
of what they do, avoid bad press and keep the average age of their fleet low compared to
their competitors to impress their shareholders.
This handicap however, comes with a big advantage, namely the ability to raise
equity to finance acquisitions, and DRYS has taken full advantage of this. Since its listing,
DRYS has made a series of equity issuances and acquisitions of new secondhand ships,
keeping the average age of its fleet to about 8 years. It acquires ships in a good market and
charters them under long period contracts at high market rates to bring down the book value
and boost sales. It balances these with short term charters that allow for higher earnings in
good markets and regularly hedges its exposure via the futures market [Dryships 2009e].
By maintaining a reputation for performance, reliability and safety with its modern
fleet, DRYS has strong relationships with charterers and financial institutions. This
minimizes the number of disputes with charterers who are locked into high rate contracts
after the market declines, and maximizes the probability of obtaining loan covenant waivers
when the fair value of assets declines below a fixed percentage of the outstanding debt.
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5.3.4.2 Objectives and Growth Strategy of Lifedream
In contrast to DRYS, LCN is a low-cost operator with a long term view on growth. It
tries to invest at the bottom of the market and lock in high rates during market highs, thereby
maintaining low market exposure. This strategy means it may remain idle over years while
planning for a huge ROE as the cycle turns. Table 5.3-1 shows a detailed account. Following
this strategy, the company has managed to sell vessels on average at 45% higher than the
acquisition price, after operating them for an average of 4.6 years. The index was on average
145% higher on the selling date compared to the acquisition date. In ships that it has sold so
far, it has achieved an average annualized return on investment of 61% and, excluding some
projects which it financed by 100% debt, an average ROE of 155% - Based on data from
[Lifedream 2009].
Fig. 5.3-9 shows the fleet growth of the company, in number of ships, along with the
price of a 5-year old panamax, which is an indication of price levels. A big contrast with
DRYS is that LCN made no acquisitions throughout the market boom since 2003. Between
2005 and 2008, it made no acquisitions and only sold a cape which it had acquired for
$6.2M, for $42M commanding an annual ROE of 81% over 8.5 years (including operating
profits). This has caused the average age to increase to 23 years and the company is now
renewing its fleet. New additions are made, replacing older vessels in the long term contracts
that have been secured before the market decline [Lifedream 2009].
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Fig. 5.3-9: LCN Fleet Growth along with Asset Values -
Based on data from [Lifedream 20091 and [Clarksons 2009al
This strategy is complemented by strong, long-term relationships with key charterers
and financial institutions. LCN is in no danger of breaching any covenants as it maintains a
leverage of only 10% to save cash for acquisitions during downturns. However, it relies on
banks for financing of ships (along with its equity) since it doesn't have the option to raise
finance from the public markets [Lifedream 2009].
In contrast to DRYS, LCN is a low profile company that avoids publicity. LCN does
no advertising and maintains a structure that avoids cross liability of vessels. It often tries to
prevent reporting of its acquisitions in order to avoid signaling investment opportunities to
the market [Lifedream 2009].
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5.3.5 Fleet Additions / Removals
5.3.5.1 Fleet Additions and Removals of Dryships
As discussed earlier, in a high market, Dryships often pays a high premium for fast
delivery of vessels that it acquires in order to boost EPS. Since it is a listed company, the
board of directors has to approve all transactions and this may take several days during which
the market may change considerably. Since it has to make all its offers with a subject to BOD
approval when closing a deal, it has to effectively pay a premium to make its offer more
attractive than that of a competitor who has no subjects. This applies both when selling or
buying a vessel.
Though less competitive than private companies in its bids, DRYS takes advantage of
the equity markets to finance acquisitions. Tables 5.3-3 and 5.3-4 show the recent amounts of
equity DRYS raised, net of commissions and fees, along with vessel acquisitions and
disposals. DRYS also raised $387M net of expenses and commissions by issuing 400M in
5% convertible senior notes in Nov 2009 [Dryships 2009d].
Date Raised Equity (Net)
Dec 07 127.1M
Var 08 352.7M
08 101.6M
)8 41.9M
-Dec 08 167M
Table 5.3-3: DRYS Late Eauitv Raising [Drvshins 2009e1
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Year Acquisitions Disposals Equity Issue
Proceeds
2007 779,374 222,712 127,104
2008 851,006 253,875 662,664
Table 5.3-4: DRYS Acquisitions, Disposals and Common Equity Proceeds in 2007 and 2008
DRYS tries to maintain its fleet young so it sells mid-age vessels when they age or
when earnings decrease. When making acquisitions, it has the flexibility of paying a mixture
of cash, raised through debt and equity, with newly issued shares of its stock. This has
become a popular trend with listed companies recently.
The company's strategy in making acquisitions at high market prices led to several
cancellations after the market decline. In 2008 DRYS acquired 4 panamaxes (two
newbuildings) for 400M from Cardiff. These were then cancelled and Cardiff retained a
cancellation fee of $105m plus the $55m deposit while DRYS maintained the option to buy
the vessels until Dec 2009 at a price of $160m [Dryships 2009e]. Similarly, Dryships
acquired 9 capes from Cardiff for $1.17bn (19.4M shares plus 478.3M debt) which were then
cancelled at a cost of 6.5M shares. Another fee of 8m was paid and the seller maintained the
$6. 1m deposit to cancel the $61m panamax MV Petalidi acquisition [Dryships 2009e]. Deal
Alterations were also made by parties previously agreeing to purchase DRYS vessels.
Samsun renegotiated a lower price to buy the panamax MV Toro while paying an additional
$1.5m deposit and DRYS has maintained a $5.6m deposit and is pursuing legal remedies
against the buyer of the $55.5M panamax MV Delray [Dryships 2009e]. More recently in
2009, DRYS has cancelled ships after not being able to find employment or finance
[Dryships 2009d]. In November it cancelled the acquisition of two panamaxes (at zero cost),
and paid $42.8M to cancel a $114M order for a cape in a Korean shipyard which also kept
the 20% deposit [Dryships 2009d].
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5.3.5.2 Fleet Additions and Removals of Lifedream
LCN's strategy is to make heavy investment acquisitions close to scrap value near the
market bottom. Since it is less bureaucratic than listed companies, it can make quick bargain
acquisitions by making offers without subjects. Fig. 5.3-10 shows the additions and removals
to the fleet along with the market in terms of values.
Since scrap values are less volatile than secondhand vessel prices as discussed in
Chapter 2, the acquisitions are more important to look at than the removals (since removals
also include a lot of scrapping).
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Fig. 5.3-10: Fleet Additions/Removals and price of 5-year PMX - Developed using data from
[Lifedream 20091
LCN occasionally sells ships when opportunities emerge in good markets but it
usually operates vessels until scrapping them. So far the ratio of scrapped to sold vessels is
1.23 - Based on data from [Lifedream 2009]. When acquiring vessels, it usually secures bank
financing and pays cash, or pays cash and the finances to speed up the process. It also often
funds acquisitions with 100% equity. So far, on average it has financed acquisitions with
41% equity and 59% debt - Based on data from [Lifedream 2009]
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5.3.6 Chartering Strategy
5.3.6.1 Chartering Strategy of Dryships
Charters are either Voyage charters in which the owner pays CAPEX, OPEX and
Voyage expenses (including fuel), time charters in which the owner pays CAPEX and
OPEX, or bareboat charters under which the owner only pays CAPEX. There is a trend in the
cape market to use short time charters instead of voyage charters.
Dryships has a strategy to balance long term charters with spot market charters (short
term) [Dryships 2009e}. It also has 3 ships on bareboat and in some cases has profit sharing
agreements whereby the rate is attached to the index beyond a certain level window
[Dryships 2009b}. Long term charters are required when acquiring a vessel during a market
boom, in order to bring down the high capital investment without the risk of a downturn. On
the other hand, by staying on the spot market during peaks, a vessel can command higher
rates (long term charter rates are less volatile as discussed in Chapter 2), thereby boosting
earnings. There is therefore a pressure by the stock market to stay on short term charters to
boost ROE. Short term charters also allow the company the flexibility to sell, and also make
the CEO's optimistic view statements more credible.
When the market declined last year, DRYS found itself with 13 ships on the spot
market (coming out of charters within 30 days) [Dryships 2009e], which it then secured
under long term charters at lower rates [Dryships 2009b]. It also had long term charters at
relatively high rates, particularly for its capes. As many other shipping companies, it was
forced to renegotiate some of these rates down or go after charterers who failed to make
payments [Clarkson 2009]. DRYS tries to avoid such disputes by maintaining good
relationships with big clients. As of 2008, Cargill International Ltd accounted for 16% of
charter revenues and Shell accounted for 10% [Dryships 2009e].
Today, a lot of the value of its assets still is based on long term charters above current
futures level rates for the corresponding periods. This can be seen by comparing the
employment of its fleet in Fig. 5.3-7 with the FFA rates for the corresponding periods in
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Table 5.3-5. Table 5.3-6 shows typical vessel prices for various ship ages that can be used to
approximate the charter-free value of the DRYS fleet.
Period / FFA Rates ($/day) PMX CAPE
Spot 31,000 71,000
2010 Q1 25,000 48,000
2010 Q2 23,000 37,000
2010 Q3 20,000 33,000
2010 Q4 18,000 30,000
Cal 2010 21,500 37,000
Cal 2011 17,000 27,000
Cal 2012 16,000 24,000
Cal 2013 15,000 22,000
Table 5.3-5: Dec 2009 FFA Rates [Lifedream 20091
Values ($M) /
Year Built PMX CAPE
1997 25 40
1998 26 41.6
1999 27 43.2
2000 28 44.8
2001 29 46.4
2002 30 48
2003 31 49.6
2004 32 51.2
2005 33 52.8
2006 34 54.4
2007 35 56
2008 36 57.6
2009 37 59.2
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Table 5.3-6: Dec 2009 Ship Prices [Based on Indices and Recent Transactions]
5.3.6.2 Chartering Strategy of Lifedream
LCN's strategy has so far chartered all its vessels under long term charters of 2 to 5
years [Lifedream 2009]. Since it is operating older vessels, it seemingly makes more sense to
operate on the spot market in which newer ships don't command as big a premium as
discussed in Chapter 2. Furthermore, finding long term charters for older vessels is very
difficult. However, if an old ship comes out of a charter in a bad market it rarely finds
employment so it is almost certainly scrapped. That is precisely what happens to LCN's ships
today as they come out of their long term contracts. This is avoided by securing them under
long term contracts, thereby sustaining high ROE level for long periods. Strong long term
relationships with charterers help to achieve this and limit market exposure [Lifedream
2009].
When going into long term charters with old ships in a good market, the rates are
lower than those for younger ships. When the market declines, therefore, they are not much
higher than the spot rates of young ships so there is a much smaller chance of having to
renegotiate with the charter. So far, LCN only had to cancel one charter contract and
renegotiated one more in which it lowered the rate and extended the time [Lifedream 2009].
5.3.7 Risk Management
5.3.7.1 Risk Management of Dryships
DRYS has significant market exposure as it has many ships on short term contracts.
This exposure can be hedged through FFAs on the Baltic Indices. This is essentially the same
as chartering a vessel, with the difference being that margin calls are made frequently. These
can be very significant due to the high market volatility. After reporting a loss of $22.5M
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from FFAs in 2006, DRYS has stayed away from FFAs [Dryships 2009e].
DRYS is also exposed to Euro-Dollar exchange rates since its revenues are all in
dollars but it incurs many costs in euros. Furthermore, to indicate its exposure in interest
rates, a 1% increase in LIBOR would increase 2008 expenses by $1.1 M. DRYS therefore
hedges these exposures through interest rate swaps and derivative. In 2008, DRYS reported a
loss of $2.512M on forward contracts and a net gain of $0.198M on forward foreign
exchange contracts [Dryships 2009e].
Even though equity frequently issued, leverage is also high with debt to equity of
approximately 1. This is using the book value of assets as opposed to fair value. DRYS
claims that an asset impairment is not required after the market decline by discounting its
future cash flows [Dryships 2009e]. It is highly doubted given the magnitude of the decline
of market values. This can be observed by looking at the current fleet in Fig. 5.3-7, the
current market ship prices in Table 5.3-6 and the long term asset value of $2.7bn in Fig. 5.3-
11, which shows the company's consolidated balance sheet.
AISSETS
CURRENT ASSETS:
Cashandcashqia-...-.$ 576
Restricted cash_-......-. - - - - - . - - .- -- 6,791
Due from diaries*. ........ 316.163
Due frm related panies, .... .. ... 9,813
Other canent assets- -.-...- - - - - ...-.-.. .." . - - 372
Total current 333,715
NON-CURRENT A SSETS:
Investments in subsidarie*..-......-...- ........................... 1,465,660
Restrictedcash-. --...... ........- - -...... . .........- - - -. 5,308
Totalisom-current assth.. . ... . ...... .-.-.-................ 1470o,98
Total assets ............................ . ............................... 1,804,683
IJA8I1LITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EOUITY
CURRENT LIABILITIES:
Current portion of long-tena debt_ -........- ..- -..-.. . ... ..-......--..-----.--. $ 108,047 A
Duetosuodiaries*....-.-.......... 
-. .
Finandiatlnsrnanents..........,.,,.,,,..--...............-........------.......-..~-
Other current mitbilkies..........................-.... 
-............... ,442
Tota curentRablites-- -..--- - - - - -... ~..... .- - --- 110,489
NON<2URRENT LIABILITIES
Long term delt, net of current pirion.--- --- ----- . .---- --.- ,.-- 671560
Finamcial instruments. .--.---- ---- ---. - .-.-- -....- -.. 905
Total non-current liabilities n.t- - --- --.......- . - . 672,465
STOCK tOLDERS' EQUI I Y:
Comnxn stock. $0.01 par %abe; 75,00,000 and n.000,0000shares authritzed at
December 31, 2007 and 2001; 36.681.097 and 70.600.000 share, insued and utstanding at
December 31.2007 and 2008, rapcte.................. 367
Accumulated other comprchensre ..
Additional paid-in capital........454,538
Retained earntnts .......... 566,824
Total stockholders' equ1t.0.21,729
Total liabilities and stockhokters' eqth$ 1.04,683 $
Fig. 5.3-11: Dryships Inc. Consolidated Balance Sheet [Dryships 2009e]
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That means that true leverage is higher than what indicated from its financials.
Furthermore the company has very low cash reserves meaning that it must rely on future
equity issuing to repay it debt and finance any acquisitions [Dryships 2009e].
In Dec 2008, the company had a total debt of $3.2bn under its credit facilities and was
in breach of fair asset value covenants relating to $1.8bn of this debt [Dryships 2009e]. Since
May 2009, thanks to the good relationships in the industry, it managed to secure covenant
waivers from 5 of its lenders amounting to $1.7bn [Dryships 2009d]. This is important as
lenders can accelerate the debt forcing distress sales and causing the company to shrink
substantially if waivers are not granted.
DRYS has difficulty in diversifying as it has to defend such moves to investors who
invest in DRYS as a means of getting exposure to the dry bulk market. It has diversified its
risk by investing in ultra deep oil rigs but this was not well received by investors. It acquired
a company to do that for $1.4bn and then ordered another two rigs for approximately $800M
each [Dryships 2009e]. It had the intension of spinning that off but it may be difficult in the
current market. This was a significant diversification as drillships now account for -20% of
revenues [Dryships 2009e].
5.3.7.2 Risk Management of Lifedream
Being in a position to make large investments on the market downturns is critical to
LCN, so it makes a big effort to manage its risks on all fronts. It incurs only a small portion
of its expenses in currencies other than the USD so it is not that exposed to foreign exchange
fluctuations [Lifedream 2009]. Its policy is to have very high cash reserves and build them up
during market booms, until the crisis. As such its leverage is only about 10% until heavy
investments, are made during downturns [Lifedream 2009]. By maintaining high cash
reserves, it mitigates the risk of not being able to secure a bank loan to finance a bargain
acquisition.
It is actively involved in the FFA market mainly to be in touch with the market and
keep track of where it is going. Its hedging strategy is rather complicated since it operates old
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vessels and its exposure is limited. Its FFA positions are very small and it is net even on
FFAs as a standalone basis (zero net gain) [Lifedream 2009].
As can be seen in its fleet, it operates ships of a wider range of sizes as well as
containerships. With a well diversified fleet, and long term charters it has a steady flow of
income and very little risk of having to make distress sales. The 9 containership acquisitions
which it has made in the past were all for under $10M each, in contrast to the $800M
drillship acquisitions of DRYS - based on data from [Lifedream 2009].
5.3.8 Technical Operations and Performance
5.3.8.1 Technical Operations and Performance of Dryships
A detailed and a simplified version of the organization chart of Cardiff is shown in
Fig. 5.3-12 and a simplified version in Fig. 5.3-13.
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Fig. 5.3-12: Cardiff Marine - Detailed Organizational Chart [Cardiff 20091
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Fig. 5.3-13: Cardiff Marine Simplified Organizational Chart [Cardiff 20091
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Since Cardiff manages around 80 ships including both tankers and dry bulk carriers,
there are some departments dealing only with tankers, which have a more complicated
operation involving high pollution standards [Cardiff 2009]. The wet and dry fleets are
managed separately though they share some common departments such as HR and IT
[Cardiff 2009].
Focusing on the dry bulk, most departments, including Supply, S,Q&E, HR,
accounting, and crewing, cover the whole fleet. The technical, marine and operations
departments divide the ships into fleets of 15 to 20 with different superintendents and
assistants working on each sub fleet. There are managers supervising all fleets and "floating"
superintendents who attend ships when no-one else is available [Cardiff 2009].
This has several merits, namely sisterships or similar vessels can be put under one
sub-fleet so superintendent engineers, naval architects and port captains become familiar
with the particular vessels but also specialize on the particular type of vessels. By grouping
the sub-fleets the same way across the departments, technical department people deal with
the same marine and operations department people [Cardiff 2009]. This sort of team structure
is very convenient; it allows for accountability and maximizes employee learning curve
benefits.
Furthermore, as acquisitions of whole fleets are made, new teams are created to
supervise the new fleet. When several ships are constructed, the same employees work on
these ships from start to finish and know every detail on the ship. If ships are added
incrementally to the fleet, they go to one of the already existing sub-fleets until enough ships
are in the sub-fleets to create a new sub-fleet. That is why the number of ships per sub-fleet
varies between 15 and 20. Finally, some ships are more demanding than others and that is
taken into account when dividing the ships and adjusting the sub-fleet sizes [Cardiff 2009].
Naturally, as a listed company, DRYS has relatively high expenses. It compensates its
directors by amounts that are unheard of in the private sector. Namely, the CEO's pay in
2008 was 2M Euro salary plus 5M Euro bonus plus IM shares ($75.09 on granting date)
vesting over 8 quarters under its "Equity Incentive Plan" which has 1,834,055 restricted
common shares reserved. DRYS paid executive directors $9M while non-executive directors
received $0.705M. It also pays approximately $1.5M annually for pension benefits [Dryships
2009e].
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DRYS also pays a generous amount in euros to Cardiff for the management of its
vessels. Fees per vessel day include 575 for management, 100 for compliance with Section
404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 115 for financial accounting and 85 for operations and freight
collection. In addition Cardiff receives a 1.25% commission on all charters ($2M in 2007),
1% commission on all sales and purchases ($11.7M in 2007 and $11.8M in 2008), 0.2%
commission on all derivatives, 5% of all insurance premiums. DRYS also pays Cardiff
575E/superintendent-day on board a vessel in excess of 5 days per year, 150E/person-hour in
claims settling and 1000E annually for reporting. These were all paid based on an average
exchange rate for 2008 of 1.41 $/E. On top of that, Cardiff paid $1.4M in 2007 and $1,8M in
2008 for items not covered by the agreement. DRYS also leases its offices from its CEO for
E9.23M annually and pays audit fees of $1.55M [Dryships 2009e].
Based on the various exhibits of the 20-F form, I constructed a breakdown of
operating costs for DRYS in a way that facilitates easy comparisons with LCN. The
breakdown is shown in Table 5.3-7, and the values indicate dollars per vessel per day.
Dryships 2005 2006 2007 2008
CREW WAGES $1,974 $2,294 $2,609
INSURANCES $433 $459 $540
REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE $1,164 $834 $1,295
SPARES & STORES $1,395 $1,534 $1,179
TONNAGE TAX $21 $24 $37
Operating Expenses $5,067 $4,986 $5,145 $5,660
GENERAL & ADMINISTRATIVE $631 $609 $780 $1,497
MANAGEMENT FEES $532 $546 $610 $1,610
Total Operating Expenses $6,230 $6,141 $6,535 $8,767
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Table 5.3-7: Operating Expenses for Dryships in $/day per vessel - Based on Data from [Dryships 2009e]
Both general and administrative expenses as well as management fees per vessel
increased dramatically in 2008. Operating expenses are relatively high even compared to
other US listed dry bulk companies as shown in Fig. 5.3-14.
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Fig. 5.3-14: Operating expenses per vessel compared to key competitors [wikinvest 2009b]
Table 5.3-8 shows various performance measures of the Dryships Fleet and Fig. 5.3-
15 compares the utilization of the fleet to other major US listed companies.
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Table 5.3-8: Performance Measures of Dryships Fleet [wikinvest 2009cl
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Fig. 5.3-15: Fleet Utilization of Dryships and other major US listed Companies [wikinvest 2009dl
5.3.8.2 Technical Operations and Performance of Lifedream
LCN's organizational chart is shown in Fig. 5.3-16. The operation of containerships
and dry bulk carriers is very similar in terms of shore operations. Since LCN is a smaller
company than DRYS, operating only dry bulk and container vessels, it has a simpler
structure and operates more informally. The major difference regarding operations is that the
fleet is not divided into sub-fleets. All superintendents from the technical operations and
marine departments are responsible and visit all vessels.
This strategy misses out on all the benefits discussed earlier but there is one major
benefit. Superintendents can specialize not on the vessel but on the particular
problem/situation. LCN has experts on any given problem and therefore sends
superintendents on board depending on the problem. This is very important for LCN because
the average age of its fleet is 23 years old, so big problems arise frequently. Given the current
fleet size and age profile, this structure is optimal. In 2002, when the fleet size was
approaching 30 vessels, the company considered creating two sub-fleets for some of its
operations, and it probably will do so in the future if it keeps growing. This presents a kind of
diseconomies of scale for LCN.
The number of engineer superintendents who go on board vessels is only slightly less
than that of Cardiff which operates 3 times more ships. This is because they spend much
more time on board vessels particularly during repairs and when passing safety audits. LCN
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has lower wage crews and older ships so it invests more in closer supervision from shore and
by superintendents [Lifedream 2009].
Fig. 5.3-16: Lifedream - Organizational Chart [Lifedream 20091
Tables 5.3-9 & 5.3-10 summarize the operating expenses and performance metrics for
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LCN as Tables 5.3-7 & 5.3-8 do for DRYS. On average, DRYS has a higher fleet utilization
because it operates a younger fleet. In 2008, average fleet utilization was similarly high at
98% and 98.5% for LCN and DRYS respectively. Table 5.3-11 summarizes the percentage
difference between the two companies for each line item of expenses.
LIFEDREAM 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CREW WAGES $1,172 $1,316 $1,334 $1,600 $1,921
INSURANCES $479 $557 $564 $600 $707
REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE $1,229 $814 $1,321 $596 $2,011
SPARES & STORES $624 $653 $627 $780 $976
TONNAGE TAX $29 $37 $35 $38 $42
Operating Expenses $3,535 $3,378 $3,880 $3,614 $5,658
GENERAL & ADMINISTRATIVE $104 $109 $115 $116 $101
MANAGEMENT FEES $482 $526 $526 $549 $526
Total Operating Expenses $4,121 $4,013 $4,521 $4,279 $6,285
Table 5.3-9: LCN Operating expenses per vessel in $/day - Based on Data from [Lifedream 20091
Lifedream 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AVERAGE AGE OF FLEET 22.38 23.45 24.45 25.43 26.15 23.38
AVERAGE T/C EQUIVALENT PER DAY 17,156 18,739 17,372 22,06 18,75 17,43K
EARNINGS CAPACITY DAYS 8760 8030 8030 7665 7300 8760
NUMBER OF VESSELS 24 22 22 21 20 24
NET EARNING DAYS 8443 7641 7693 7181 6649 8585
OFF-HIRE DAYS 317 389 337 484 651 175
PERCENTAGE UTILISATION 95.97% 95.20% 95.80% 93.70% 91.10% 98%
AVERAGE VESSEL OPEX/DAY 4620 4667 5308 4754 5356 5517
DWT TONS 1,609,529 1,529,529 1,529,529 1,351,775 1,336,133 1,766,154
T/C EQUIVALENT REVENUES 144,852K 143,118K 133,645K 158,412K 124,668K 149633K
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VESSELS CHARTERED IN 0 0 0 0 0 0
AVERAGE AGE OF FLEET IN YEARS 22.38 23.45 24.45 25.43 26.15 23.38
TOTAL REVENUES 144,852K 143,118K 133,645K 158,412K 124,668K 149633K
Table 5.3-10: Performance Measures of LCN fleet - Based on Data from [Lifedream 20091
(Dryships-Lifedream)/Lifedream 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
CREW WAGES 48% 43% 36% 42%
INSURANCES -23% -24% -24% -23%
REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE (INC D/D) -12% 40% -36% -3%
SPARES & STORES 123% 97% 21% 80%
TONNAGE TAX 
-40% -36% -13% -30%
Operating Expenses 50% 29% 42% 0% 30%
GENERAL & ADMINISTRATIVE 480% 430% 572% 1389% 718%
MANAGEMENT FEES 1% 4% 11% 206% 56%
Total Operating Expenses 55% 36% 53% 40% 46%
Table 5.3-11: %Difference by which DRYS Expenses are higher than LCN -
Based on data from [Lifedream 20091 and [Dryships 2009e
With an average age of 8 years compared to 23, Dryships only pays 3% less for
repairs and maintenance and its operating expenses are 30% higher. It pays 23% less for
insurance and 40% more for crew wages - consistent with its policy of higher quality crews
than LCN. Overall, DRYS has total operating expenses 46% higher than LCN which is
remarkable given the age profiles of the two fleets. This may not seem important at times
capes and panamaxes are earning on average over $200,000/day and $100,000/day
respectively, and their expenses are less than $10,000/day. However, at times when revenues
are also less than $10,000/day, which is when the biggest growth opportunities emerge, this
difference is make or break for LCN.
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5.3.9 Conclusions
Dryships follows a growth strategy which is consistent with the pressures and
demands of the stock market. It tries to grow irrespective of where the market is and to a
great extent uses equity finance to finance acquisitions. This allows for rapid expansion
without having to wait years for the markets to bring about good investment opportunities. It
comes however at the expense of share dilution.
LCN is a more traditional, low-cost shipping company which grows through the
market cycles. It can afford to operate in this low cost fashion in part because it is not listed.
By keeping operating expenses below revenues even during bad markets, and by building
cash reserves and maintaining low leverage during the upturns, it can take advantage of
recessions and make investments with huge ROE.
The structure of DRYS is that of a company which operates many new ships and can
afford to split them into sub-fleets. This is easily scalable and offers several advantages
including learning. LCN on the other hand operates less formally (being private and not
having to report), with a structure that allows it to effectively manage old ships at low cost
with relatively high performance. Its structure is optimal for its fleet size and age profile but
it may have to be adjusted as the company grows.
5.4 Operating Cost Analysis
5.4.1 Introduction
Shipping costs have decreased dramatically on a per ton basis over the past century
due to economies of scale through the use of larger ships. Costs for a given ship size,
however, have increased substantially due to inflation, increasing fuel costs etc. Fig. 5.4-1
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shows the inflation in major factors affecting shipping costs since 1965. The capital cost,
shown as a dotted line, is based on the price of a newbuilding Aframax.
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Fig. 5.4-1: Inflation in Shipping Costs 1965 to 2007 [Stopford 20091
Shipping expenses are classified under Voyage Expenses, OPEX and CAPEX.
Voyage expenses include bunkers, canal dues, port and pilot fees etc. Operating expenses
include crew, insurance, maintenance and spares, supplies, management costs etc. Capital
expenses include the cost of the vessel and repairs, conversions etc.
When a ship is employed under a voyage charter, all the costs mentioned above are
covered by the ship owner who receives a payment on a $/ton basis. Under a time charter,
voyage expenses are paid by the charter while the owner pays for OPEX and CAPEX and
receives payment on a $/day basis. Under a bareboat charter, the charterer pays for both
Voyage expenses and OPEX while the owner receives payment in $/day.
Capes are usually chartered on period charters in which all voyage expenses including
bunkers are born by the charterer and incorporated into the daily rate. The rates reported on
voyage fixtures are converted into a time charter equivalent and taken into account in the
BCI which is published daily and on which futures are traded. The BCI will form the basis of
our future revenue projections. As a result, the cost of bunkers and other voyage expenses are
incorporated in the revenue projections. Therefore, we are not considered with voyage
expenses including fuel cost.
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The repair costs and off hire time were analyzed as a function of ship age in Section
5.2. Section 5.3 compared the operations of a private and a listed company. This Section is
focused on estimating typical operating costs as a function of ship age.
5.4.2 Open Literature Data
Limited relevant research exists on this topic for various reasons. Private companies
have no reason to report their data and often treat it as proprietary information. This is
because low operating costs are a key competitive advantage that can be of detrimental
importance to a company when going through a market downturn. On the other hand, low
operating costs may be seen by outsiders as an indication of a compromise on quality or
safety.
Management companies have an incentive to exaggerate their costs in order to keep
owners happy by performing better, to be conservative and avoid having to give explanations
when actual costs end up higher, and to absorb some of the benefits when actual costs are
lower than their quoted costs. Public companies usually outsource the management/operation
of their ships to professional management firms, so the operating costs they publish are
subject to the above biases.
Another reason is that as with dry-dock costs, which were analyzed in Section 5.2,
operating costs can vary significantly over time. This means that data which is more than a
few years old is obsolete, making it harder to find relevant data. Furthermore, even the data
by companies that is available cannot be applied to a specific ship type and age group
because it is a blended average of the ships in the company's fleet. In Section 5.3, we looked
at the operating costs of a public and a private company that operate capes. These are again
summarized in Tables 5.4-1 and 2 respectively.
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Dryships 2005 2006 2007 2008
CREW WAGES $1,974 $2,294 $2,609
INSURANCES $433 $459 $540
REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE $1,164 $834 $1,295
SPARES & STORES $1,395 $1,534 $1,179
TONNAGE TAX $21 $24 $37
Operating Expenses $5,067 $4,986 $5,145 $5,660
GENERAL & ADMINISTRATIVE $631 $609 $780 $1,497
MANAGEMENT FEES $532 $546 $610 $1,610
Total Operating Expenses $6,230 $6,141 $6,535 $8,767
Table 5.4-1: Operating Expenses for Dryships in $/day per vessel - Based on Data from [Dryships 2009e]
LIFEDREAM 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CREW WAGES $1,172 $1,316 $1,334 $1,600 $1,921
INSURANCES $479 $557 $564 $600 $707
REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE $1,229 $814 $1,321 $596 $2,011
SPARES & STORES $624 $653 $627 $780 $976
TONNAGE TAX $29 $37 $35 $38 $42
Operating Expenses $3,535 $3,378 $3,880 $3,614 $5,658
GENERAL & ADMINISTRATIVE $104 $109 $115 $116 $101
MANAGEMENT FEES $482 $526 $526 $549 $526
Total Operating Expenses $4,121 $4,013 $4,521 $4,279 $6,285
Table 5.4-2: LCN Operating expenses per vessel in $/day - Based on Data from [Lifedream 20091
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Companies don't all report data the same way and it is a complicated task to bring
them into the same format. What would be more complicated, however, is to compare two
companies on their costs of a single vessel. Dryships owns 7 Capes, 30 Panamaxes and 2
Supramaxes aged 0 to 15 years, while its fleet has varied slightly since 2005. The fleet of
Lifedream consists of 4 Capes, 10 Panamaxes, 1 Supramax, 2 Handy's, 4 general cargo ships
and 3 container vessels. It has also varied over the years and its age distribution is between
13 and 30 years. The results of Table 5.4-1 and 5.4-2 are affected by the whole fleet, so
extracting a $/day amount for a Cape of a certain age from these values is not trivial even
though both companies operate Capes.
[Stopford 2009] compiled data on operating costs of Capes as a function of age based
on 2007 values from V-Ships (a large management company) and other sources. The results
are conveniently broken down into sub-categories and are shown in Fig. 5.4-2. The provided
percentage value of each category out of the total cost is of more long term value since the
magnitude of costs varies from year to year.
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Fig. 5.4-2: Operating Costs for Capesize Bulk Carriers by age in $000/year [Stopford 20091
Crew costs appear to be the greatest cost category in Fig. 5.4-2. Fig. 5.4-3 shows a
detailed break-down of crew costs as given by [Stopford 2009].
710
00% RDSTotals"Rak Note Basic Aowances (ofiers FnPUP 2007 1993 % ch
Master Inds 1,957 3"933 300 35 6,235 3,44 171%
OhWe offer" 1.294 3206 200 35 4,735 3025 157%
2nd ofcer 1,077 1,773 - 35 2,885 2,338 123%
d ~ficer 1,030 1,320 - 35 2,385 1,650 146%
RCcia ofmer rado ofter no lnger reqLed in 2007 1.650 0%
CNeat "ngrr 1,760 3990 300 35 6,085 3,575 170%
1 st aengr 2nd eng 1,294 3206 200 35 4.735 3,025 157%
2nd asst angr rd eng. 1,077 1.773 - 35 2,885 2,338 123%
Phppines 670 849 - 182 1,501 1,521 99%
5AS 15 P W - 171 A s , R479 Am
3 0dr 558 542 - 171 3,812 3,888 96%
CooWeld chief oook 670 649 - 182 501 1,696 94%
Si 2nd Co* 55$ $42 171 1,271 1,296 98%
Messman 426 378 - 158 962 1,071 90%
Total crmw numbe modem lp: 20 456344 37,094 122%
AttikYona crew for 10-yea-dd sp
3rd asst engr Irda 1,0=0 1320 - 35 2,385 1,50 145%
Finrtvwan Fr- nffl 1077 1 R2OR - 2J95 2,33B 126%
AB Philpines 568 542 - 171 1,271 1,296 98%
1 Oiler 568 542 - 171 1,271 1,296 98%
Total cew number 10-year-old ship: 24 53.20 43,673 122%
Adtora crew w 20-eAr-od sho
2 ordnaty Philrpines 426 378 - 156 1,925 2,142 90%
seamen
1 ier 568 542 171 1,271 1.071 119%
1 ressman 426 378 - 158 982 1,071 90%
Total crew number 20-year-old ship: 28 572392 47,96 120%
Arnua cw costr 20-yarid ship 688.344 575.475 120%
8sn oLeer based cn 5 W serrut & Jno OMfere 3 y agn
bkxyees SOnsOost
t1993 data fom Stopcd 11997, Table 5,)
so V vl
Fig. 5.4-3: Crew Costs on 160,000dwt bulk Carrier in 2007 ($/month) [Stopford 20091
With the exception of the last row, the values in Fig. 5.4-2 are in $'000/year. The total
values of the major categories are presented in Table 5.4-3 in dollars per day.
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5 years 10 years 20 years
Crew Cost $2,036 $2,386 $2,619
Stores & Consumables $759 $800 $953
Maintenance & Spares $449 $926 $1,077
Insurance $537 $666 $1,159
General Costs $904 $816 $904
Total $4,685 $5,595 $6,712
Table 5.4-3: Operating Costs for Capesize Bulk Carriers (2007) by [Stopford 20091 in $/Day
5.4.3 Company Survey Results
In order to estimate typical operating costs, a survey was performed on 6 private and
4 listed companies that operate Capes. The importance of including both listed and private
companies is highlighted by Section 5.3. These companies were asked to provide estimates
of daily operating cost items as a function of ship age, using today's prices (End of 2009) and
10-year average prices. The chosen ship ages were 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years. The same cost
categories chosen by [Stopford 2009] in Fig. 5.4-2 were used to aid direct comparison.
Not all companies operated capes of all ages today and over the past 10 years.
However, some provided estimates based on expenses which they incurred on vessels of a
different age or of a different type such as Panamaxes. Average values of the responses were
then calculated and presented in Table 5.4-4 and 5.4-5.
End 2009 Prices 5years 10years 15years 20years 25 years
Crew Cost $2,183 $2,203 $2,412 $2,503 $2,564
Stores & Consumables $395 $602 $712 $889 $986
Maintenance & Spares $152 $198 $286 $531 $547
Insurance $686 $798 $912 $989 $1,113
General Costs $756 $813 $864 $924 $1,034
Total $4,172 $4,614 $5,186 $5,836 $6,244
Table 5.4-4: Survey Results for Cape Operating Costs in $/Day using End-2009 Prices
10-Year Avg. Prices 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years
Crew Cost $1,840 $1,843 $1,964 $2,062 $2,073
Stores & Consumables $325 $489 $570 $726 $790
Maintenance & Spares $147 $189 $271 $501 $515
Insurance $558 $648 $731 $786 $882
General Costs $640 $683 $724 $767 $858
Total $3,509 $3,852 $4,260 $4,842 $5,118
Table 5.4-5: Survey Results for Cape Operating Costs in $/Day using 10 Year Average Prices
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Tables 5.4-4 and 5.4-5 show that operating costs increase with age and they have
increased from the 10-year average value for all ages. Not every number in the tables is from
exactly the same source because some companies could not provide reliable estimates for
some of the values. Despite this, all the results, which are based on the average of the
available data, continuously increase with age. This is true for both Table 5.4-4 and Table
5.4-5 and it should increase our confidence in the results.
On the other hand, this is not true for the data provided by [Stopford 2009], which
seems to be derived from a more diverse variety of sources. For example, as we see in Table
5.4-3, the total general costs for a 10-year old ship are lower than those of both the 5-year old
and the 20-year old ship, which makes little intuitive sense. Another example can be seen in
Fig. 5.4-2 where the maintenance cost for the 10-year old ship is equal to multiple times that
of the 5-year old and the 20-year old ship.
Fig. 5.4-4 shows a plot of the values in Table 5.4-3, 5.4-4 and 5 to facilitate
comparison.
* 10-yr Avg
Daily Operating Costs * Current
$8,000- * Stopford ('07)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Ship Age (years)
Fig. 5.4-4: Operating Costs vs. Ship Age using Current 10-year Average and 2007 Prices
The results for each set of data are remarkably linear with respect to ship age, with R2
values exceeding 0.98 in all three cases. This is particularly surprising given the fact that
some distortion is inherent due to the variation of sources within each data set.
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Comparing across data sets, the linear regression curves are approximately parallel,
diverging slightly as the ship age increases. This is natural because higher costs are incurred
at higher ages, so one would expect the difference to also increase. In other words, the
percentage difference is fairly constant. Comparing Current-Price results to the [Stopford
2009] results, it varies between 12.3% and 21.3% with a mean of 16.2% and a standard
deviation of 4.6%. Comparing the Current-Price results to the 10-Yr Avg. price results, the
difference varies between 18.9% and 22.0% with a mean of 20.6% and a standard deviation
of 1.3%.
On average, operating costs using 10-year average prices are 82.93% of operating
costs using current prices. The operating costs provided by [Stopford 2009], which are shown
in Green, are based on 2007 data and are higher than both the survey results based on End-
2009 prices and those based on 10-year average prices. This is perhaps because 2007 may
have been a relatively expensive year or because operating costs sourced from management
companies such as V-Ships are higher than the typical for reasons discussed under Section
5.4.2.
5.4.4 Monthly Operating and Dry-Dock Costs
Since the regressions in Fig. 5.4-4 are quite accurate, we can interpolate to get an
estimate of the operating costs for every ship age. This is done using both 10-year average
and End-2009 prices, and the corresponding values are combined with dry-dock costs from
Table 5.4-8 of Section 5.2 to produce the total in $/day. The results are summarized in Table
5.4-6.
Fig. 5.4-5 shows a regression plot of the combined operating and dry dock costs with
respect to ship age.
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10-yr Avg Prices End-2009 Prices
Ship Age (Years) Operating Dry Dock Total Operating Dry Dock Total
0 $3,054 $11 $3,064 $3,601 $8 $3,608
1 $3,138 $11 $3,149 $3,708 $8 $3,716
2 $3,222 $119 $3,341 $3,815 $85 $3,900
3 $3,306 $184 $3,490 $3,923 $131 $4,054
4 $3,390 $98 $3,488 $4,030 $69 $4,099
5 $3,474 $249 $3,724 $4,137 $178 $4,315
6 $3,559 $113 $3,671 $4,245 $80 $4,325
7 $3,643 $611 $4,254 $4,352 $435 $4,787
8 $3,727 $672 $4,399 $4,459 $479 $4,938
9 $3,811 $280 $4,091 $4,566 $199 $4,766
10 $3,895 $1,510 $5,405 $4,674 $1,075 $5,749
11 $3,979 $56 $4,035 $4,781 $40 $4,821
12 $4,064 $952 $5,015 $4,888 $678 $5,566
13 $4,148 $2,190 $6,337 $4,996 $1,558 $6,554
14 $4,232 $829 $5,061 $5,103 $590 $5,693
15 $4,316 $1,914 $6,230 $5,210 $1,362 $6,573
16 $4,400 $319 $4,719 $5,318 $227 $5,545
17 $4,484 $1,625 $6,110 $5,425 $1,157 $6,582
18 $4,569 $2,601 $7,169 $5,532 $1,851 $7,383
19 $4,653 $910 $5,562 $5,640 $648 $6,287
20 $4,737 $3,412 $8,149 $5,747 $2,428 $8,175
21 $4,821 $1,137 $5,958 $5,854 $809 $6,664
22 $4,905 $3,529 $8,434 $5,962 $2,512 $8,473
23 $4,989 $3,294 $8,283 $6,069 $2,344 $8,413
24 $5,074 $1,160 $6,233 $6,176 $825 $7,002
25 $5,158 $3,092 $8,250 $6,284 $2,201 $8,485
26 $5,242 $1,288 $6,530 $6,391 $917 $7,308
27 $5,326 $3,187 $8,513 $6,498 $2,268 $8,766
28 $5,410 $3,187 $8,597 $6,606 $2,268 $8,874
Table 5.4-6: Operating and Dry Dock Costs vs. Age
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Fig. 5.4-5: Operating and Dry Dock Costs using 10-Yr Average and End-2009 Prices
The R2 values have decreased from 0.99 and 0.99 for just operating costs in Fig. 5.4-4
to 0.9 and 0.83 for combined operating and dry dock costs in Fig. 5.4-5. Including dry-dock
costs adds a lot of scatter to the data.
Focusing on operating costs, we can describe them using a linear function with
respect to age, for both sets of prices. For consistency, we use months (M) as the time
increment. This is shown in Eq. 5.4-1 and 5.4-2.
10yrAvg = 7.013917M +3053.5 (5.4-1)
OCEnd-2009= 8.943333M + 3600'-6 (5.4-2)
Where M = age in months
Dry dock costs are not linear due to the irregularity of repairs. To obtain the monthly
values we can simply assume the annual value to be constant throughout each given year
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5.4.5 Inflation in Operating Costs
The survey results of Table 5.4-4 and 5.4-5 show that average operating costs based
on 10-year average prices are 82.93% of average operating costs based on current prices. To
get the implied average inflation in operating costs Ioc, we can solve Eq. 5.4-3.
1 N
O ),o (1 +I~c )
n"=1 =82.93%
OCO (1+I) 1 =8 N-1 (5.4-3)
Where: N = Number of years (10 in our case)
OCo = Operating cost for the first of the 10 years (Year 2000)
Ioc = Operating cost inflation
Solving Eq. 5.4-3 for Ioc yields an average operating cost inflation of:
I = 4.43%
This seems quite high if one compares it directly to US inflation over the same time
period. It is important to note that significant variations occur from year to year while this is
only an average estimate over a 10 year period. Furthermore, it excludes dry dock costs for
which, as we saw in Section 5.2, the 10 year average value is 140.5% of the current value
(reciprocal of 71.17%).
We can include dry dock costs to determine an estimate of the average inflation of the
combined costs (operating and dry dock costs). Table 5.4-7 shows the combined costs using
10 year average prices divided by the combined costs using current prices throughout the
ship's life.
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Age Combined Costs Combined Costs Combined Costs (10-yr Avg.) /
(Years) (10-yr Avg) (End-2009) Combined Costs (End-2009)
0 $3,064 $3,608 84.92%
1 $3,149 $3,716 84.74%
2 $3,341 $3,900 85.67%
3 $3,490 $4,054 86.10%
4 $3,488 $4,099 85.08%
5 $3,724 $4,315 86.30%
6 $3,671 $4,325 84.89%
7 $4,254 $4,787 88.87%
8 $4,399 $4,938 89.09%
9 $4,091 $4,766 85.84%
10 $5,405 $5,749 94.03%
11 $4,035 $4,821 83.70%
12 $5,015 $5,566 90.11%
13 $6,337 $6,554 96.69%
14 $5,061 $5,693 88.90%
15 $6,230 $6,573 94.79%
16 $4,719 $5,545 85.11%
17 $6,110 $6,582 92.83%
18 $7,169 $7,383 97.10%
19 $5,562 $6,287 88.47%
20 $8,149 $8,175 99.67%
21 $5,958 $6,664 89.41%
22 $8,434 $8,473 99.54%
23 $8,283 $8,413 98.45%
24 $6,233 $7,002 89.02%
25 $8,250 $8,485 97.24%
26 $6,530 $7,308 89.36%
27 $8,513 $8,766 97.11%
28 $8,597 $8,874 96.88%
Average $5,561 $6,049 90.69%
Table 5.4-7: 10-year Average vs. End 2009 Combined Operating and Dry Dock Costs
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The mean is 90.69% with a standard deviation of 5.26% and a range of 83.7% to
99.67%. By replacing 82.93% with 90.69% in Eq. 5.4-3, we can solve for the average
inflation of the combined costs Ic instead of Ioc. The equation becomes:
1 Nn-
NL cc,, (1 +Ic )
n=1 90.69% (544)
ccO (1+IC, )N
Where: N = Number of years (10 in our case)
CCo = Combined operating and dry dock cost for the first of the 10 years
(Year 2000)
Ice = Combined operating and dry dock cost inflation
Solving Eq. 5.4-3 for Ioc yields an average combined cost inflation of:
I = 2.24%
This may seem like a number more closely aligned with US inflation. However, by
considering the Chinese cape repair cost index developed in Fig. 5.4-6 of Section 5.2, we see
that it is inappropriate to assume a steady inflation in dry dock costs. We have also discussed
that dry dock costs are to a large extent associated with factors that are not closely related to
inflation such as freight levels, the outlook of the market, the supply of ships, shipyard
capacity, demand for newbuildings etc.
On the other hand, operating costs are primarily based on factors that are more
closely related to inflation, such as crew costs, supplies and consumables etc. A key factor to
note about inflation is that it is sensitive to measurement method and whether it accounts for
seasonality adjustments. Another important thing to consider is that the basket of goods and
services comprising the operating costs of a Cape derives from a variety of industries and
countries around the world, so it is worth looking at inflation beyond the US.
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Fig. 5.4-6 and 5.4-7 show estimates of inflation using today's methods and methods
that were used in the past.
Different ways of measuring inflation
During the Reagan and Clinton administrations, the method of calculating
rising prices was altered in ways that lowered the official inflation rate.
Below is a calculation of how the inflation rate would looK today If it were
measured by the former methods.
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Fig. 5.4-6: US Inflation using Current, Pre-1998 and Pre-1983 Methods [One-Simple-Idea.coml
It is important to note that the lines measuring inflation by the various methods are
parallel, meaning that one is roughly a multiple of the other. The pre-1998 and pre-1983
methods yield slightly less than double and triple values respectively relative to the current
method.
Annual Consumer Inflation - CPI vs SGS Alternate
Through January 2010 (Shadcw$tatsacom, RLS)
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Fig. 5.4-7: US Inflation by CPI-U and SGS Alternative CPI-U [Williams 20101
The CPI-U is the consumer price index for all urban consumers, which is the broadest
in coverage. While the headline number is usually seasonally adjusted, the formal CPI
reported, is not. The SGS Alternative CPI-U attempts to adjust for allegedly, methodical
changes over the recent decades that have moved concept away from being a measure of the
cost of living needed to maintain a constant standard of living.
Fig. 5.4-6 and 5.4-7 clearly show that the measurement methods for reporting
purposes have a very significant impact on inflation. It is unclear which of these should be
more relevant for our purposes. Furthermore, one can see that there is a big disparity between
the buying patterns of urban consumers in the US (the measure of the CPI), and the operating
costs of a cape that travels around the world. Fig. 5.4-8 shows the global inflation (inter-
quartile range and median) since 1950.
Inflation throughout the world has decreased over time due to several factors such as
globalization, better monetary policy, luck, the emergency of a new economy and the
attendant acceleration of productivity, lower target rates, greater weight on inflation
stabilization than on output stabilization, steeper Philips curves or a decline in wedge
between natural and socially optimal output levels [Wynne and Kersting 2007, Sentance
2008]. Another factor as we saw earlier is the change of methods in measuring inflation.
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Fig. 5.4-8: Postwar Global Inflation since 1950 rWynne and Kersting 20071
Inflation rates in developing countries since 2000 have been approximately 3 times
higher than in developed countries (and much higher in previous decades) [Wynne and
Kersting 2007]. An important thing to consider is that, at least since 2000, US inflation,
global inflation and inflation of various developed and developing countries around the
world, move to a great extent in parallel to each other [IMF 2005]. Table 5.4-8 shows US
inflation over the past 10 years based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
5.4.6 Projection of Operating Costs
The mean US inflation or the Cumulative Average Growth Rate (CAGR) of the CPI-
U index over the past 10 years has been about 2.6%. The operating cost inflation over the
same time period, calculated by Eq. 5.4-3, was 4.43% which is approximately 1.721 times
the US inflation rate.
As discussed previously, one of the reasons for this is that cape operating costs are
highly affected by inflation rates in other countries, many of which are developing and have
significantly higher inflation rates. The mix of countries and mix of goods and services
involved in cape operating costs is somewhat intricate and not directly liked to the inflation
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Year US Inflation Based on CPI-U (%)
2000 3.4
2001 2.8
2002 1.6
2003 2.3
2004 2.7
2005 3.4
2006 3.2
2007 2.8
2008 3.9
2009 -0.3
Mean or CAGR 2.57
Table 5.4-8: US Inflation since 2000 [CDRPC 2010. CPS 201C1
of any one particular country. Another reason is the fact that US inflation, as measured by
various current and past methods yields a wide range of results, and it is unclear which of
those would be most relevant for our purposes.
An important fact that we can use going forward is that, as discussed earlier, US
inflation, as measured by the various methods, global inflation, and inflation in various
developed and developing countries around the world, move to a great extent in parallel. This
enables us to make an assumption that the inflation of operating costs will also move in
parallel with US inflation going forward. Thereby, we can approximate the inflation of
operating costs as a multiple of the US inflation going forward.
The average multiple over the previous 10 years was 1.721. As time progresses, due
to globalization and the improvement in developing countries, we would expect this multiple
to decrease. Indeed the gap between inflation in many developing and developed countries
around the world has declined over time. As an approximation, therefore, we can assume the
multiple to begin at the 10-year average value (1.721) and decline linearly to 1 over 30 years
(a decline of 0.002 per month).
A forward view on US inflation can be extracted from the relative pricing of Treasury
Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) and regular US government Treasury Bills (T-Bills).
The difference between the two prices is not only an expectation of future inflation but also a
level that can be hedged. Fig. 5.4-9 shows the Term structure of real yield (TIPS), nominal
yield (T-Bills), and inflation based on prices of March 22, 2010.
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Fig. 5.4-9: Term Structure of Real Yield, Nominal Yield and Inflation as of March 22 2010 [Bodie 20101
723
We can therefore start with Eq. 5.4-2, which describes the current operating costs as a
function of the ship's age using today's prices, and adapt it to also be a function of time and
therefore dependent on inflation. The equation becomes:
OCN(n) = (8.943M +3601)(1+MAX (1,1.721-0.002n)I,]"
(5.4-5)
Where: N: Month at which operating costs are evaluated
n: Months from today
M: Ship's age in months at the time when the operating costs are evaluated
OCN(n): Nominal Operating costs in $/day at "N" months from today
I: Average US monthly inflation until month "n" - as predicted by current
TIPS and T-Bill prices with a tenure of "n" months
In real terms (2010 dollars), the operating costs will be:
OCNr = (8.943M +3601)[1+MAX (0,0.721-0.002n)In]n
(5.4-6)
Where: OCN(r): Real Operating costs in $/day at "N" months from today
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5.5 Valuation Methods
5.5.1 Introduction
There are two main approaches to valuation. The first is to say that the value of an
asset is what you can sell it for in the current market. For this to hold true, we must assume
high market efficiency, information distribution, liquidity etc. The second is an attempt to
quantify the "intrinsic value" of an asset which can be though of as the present value of all
the cash flows it is expected to generate in the future. The semi-strong form market
efficiency says that assets may not always be priced at their intrinsic value but they gravitate
towards it (at various speeds). This creates investment opportunities for those able to identify
mispriced assets.
Valuation methods in general fall under three categories, DCF (Discounted Cash
Flow), relative valuation (based on multiples or comparables) and contingent claim valuation
(option pricing based). Each method has its strength and weaknesses and one may be more
relevant than the other depending on the application. DCF valuations require an estimation of
the projected revenues as well as the risk-adjusted discount rate. Relative valuation assumes
that the chosen comparables are very similar in many ways which is often unrealistic. Option
based valuation requires a mature and liquid enough market from which parameters can be
drawn or estimated with reasonable accuracy and it is limited in long term valuations since
an assumption has to be made about constant variance and dividend yields.
In this section we will review the methods currently used in the valuation of ships.
We will also briefly look at shipping company valuation since that has implications for the
values of its assets (mainly ships) which one can theoretically extract. According to
[Clarksons 2009b], 6 uses for ship valuations are:
1. Establishing a fair value for buying or selling a ship
2. Establishing the collateral value for a bank loan
3. Monitoring covenants depending on asset value
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4. Appraising the borrower's net worth
5. Asset valuation for prospectuses
6. Appraising the hull insurance value
Another important reason should be for public companies to check if asset value
impairments are necessary on their books.
5.5.2 Ship Valuation Methods
5.5.2.1 Adjusted Comparables Pricing Method
This method is by far the most popular and falls under the category of relative
valuation. Brokers use it to carry out ship valuations for their clients based on the most recent
comparable transactions. Their clients, namely potential sellers, buyers and banks then use
these estimates and often update them with their own views to make their decisions. The
main assumptions of the valuation are "willing buyer, willing seller" and the good condition
of the ship (broker will not inspect but if a survey is due, he should account for it as the
market would) [Clarksons 2009b].
Much like in the real estate market, the closing price of the most recent similar
transaction is used as a base line and then adjustments are made for differences in key
characteristics. These include the ship's type, size, age, condition, yard of build, specification
(coatings, gear, and speed), main engine, fuel consumption and survey status. The first three
are the most important while others are accounted for more crudely e.g. by having 3 tiers of
shipbuilding yards. The broker may also consider other influencing factors such as freight
rates, investor liquidity, newbuilding prices and expectations [Clarksons 2009b].
Often, a number of recent transactions are used to form a baseline. Due to the high
market volatility, brokers also incorporate their views on market changes since the last
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transaction into the valuation. Slight variations of this method also exist in which new
transactions are input into a statistical model which updates the baseline values.
The value of an asset is defined as the present value of the profits it is expected to
generate throughout its life. This expectation changes continuously and is affected by many
factors that are extremely hard to keep track of and quantify. Examples include the future
supply of ships, cost of oil, demand for transportation, interest rates, political issues etc. One
can assume that the market views on all these parameters have been incorporated into the
closing prices of previous transactions. Assuming that the market has it right is reasonable as
long as people generally have the same information. By using previous closing prices as a
baseline, one is directly incorporating all the relevant parameters without having to go
through the tedious and uncertain calculations and forecasts. This makes the method
extremely convenient and transparent, explaining why it has been the predominant method
used by brokers for many decades.
Unfortunately, changes in the world financial markets and in the shipping industry
have limited the applicability of this method. There has been a tremendous increase in the
volatility of the shipping market over the past decade. This is partly due to the introduction of
shipping derivatives and also due to other market forces. Fluctuations in daily earnings of
Capes by $10,000/day over night were not uncommon in the past few years. This precludes
the use of many transactions that have occurred more than a few days ago. A relevant
baseline price can only be formed using very recent transactions, which are often not
available. One option brokers have is using less similar comparables, which reduces the
accuracy of price adjustments. Their other option is to go back further in time to find more
similar comparables. This places more weight on the broker's perception of how market
changes should impact ship values over time, making the valuation more subjective.
The credit crunch impacted shipping directly in 2008, leading to minimal transactions
over a period of extreme volatility in freight rates. This was followed by a limited number of
transactions which were deemed by brokers as not applicable for valuation purposes.
Average daily earnings of capesize bulk carriers decreased from $233,988 per day in June-
5th 2008 to $2,316/day in December-2"d 2008. Over those six months, there were steep daily
declines in average daily earnings of up to $32,939/day, so people were reluctant to make
investments. Using the pre-decline quoted price of $154M (for a new vessel with prompt
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delivery) as a baseline would be unreasonable since people would not invest anything near
that in the declining market.
As a result, valuation using the above procedure became a complete guessing game.
Some transactions that occurred around the decline were deemed inapplicable because they
were distressed sales i.e. by companies needing immediate cash to stay in operation. Brokers
thought they were not reflecting fair market values, which require a willing buyer and seller,
so they could not be used to predict the fair value of another ship. The need for more rigorous
valuation methods quickly became obvious to the shipping industry including banks, brokers,
analysts, shipowners etc.
The research department of Clarksons shipbrokers had been keeping time series of
ships with different specifications (size and age), that were often provided to clients. They
also provided an online service where one could enter some key parameters and obtain an
estimated ship valuation based on a simple model. The website is no longer available and
they were forced to discontinue their valuation series in October 2008 until early 2010 due to
the problems discussed above. According to Clarksons head of research, Dr Stopford "It was
reasonable to have halted them for a while because there were reasonable concerns that
people may not have understood quite how subjective the market was... Often parts of the
sale and purchase market are not very liquid and that is part and parcel of the valuation
process and we rely on brokers to make their best judgment" [McCarthy 2010].
Even when the relevant data is available, the comparables based method has serious
weaknesses in a volatile or a changing market. Up until the beginning of the market boom
which started in 2003, valuations were very simple using the method. The market was
relatively stable and linear depreciation was a good approximation which allowed brokers to
estimate the value of a ship fairly accurately based on a standard adjustment to the price of a
similar ship of a significantly different age. When the market went to record levels, nobody
expected it to stay high. They valued the earnings of a ship over the immediate future much
more than those over the later years because they expected rates to return to "normal". The
implications of this phenomenon are analyzed in great detail in Section 2.5.
The value of old ships increased disproportionately relative to that of newer ships,
linear depreciation became completely inappropriate, and other factors such as delivery time
suddenly became crucial. As a result, valuations using the comparables method became much
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more difficult and inaccurate and it took significant time for them to adjust. On the other
hand, people's expectations of the market were clear from the levels at which futures were
trading for each of the following years. Therefore, a valuation procedure that took this
explicitly into account would be far more adaptive to this kind of changes.
5.5.2.2 Shadow Pricing
As discussed in Section 5.5.2.1, the traditional methods based on comparables
became impossible to apply when there were not enough transactions considered to be
between a willing buyer and a willing seller. A new valuation method was proposed by
[Levine 2009] as an attempt to overcome this problem. It is based on the high historic
correlation between charter rates and ship prices and on the premise that charter rates
measure the earning power of a ship and thereby its value.
By using a large database of fixtures and transactions (20 years worth), time series are
formed for 6-12 month rates and ship prices (in current dollars) for various types and ages of
bulk carriers and tankers. To apply the method, we first look at the prevailing charter rates
for the ship we want to value. Then we go to the historic data at times when the charter rates
were the same, and pull out all the transaction prices of similar ships (same age and size).
Then we form a distribution, we look at the mean, median, range and inter-quartile range,
and decided the "shadow price".
As the traditional method described in Section 5.5.2.1, this method also falls under
the comparables based valuation category. It is in fact a multiples based valuation using the
Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio. The shares of firms that are preparing for an Initial Public
Offering (IPO) are usually valued by assuming a P/E ratio similar to that of comparable firms
in the same industry. [Levine 2009] applies the same concept but to historical data of
equivalent ships. The key assumption is that P/E ratios remain within a reasonable range over
time.
As an example, [Levine 2009] presents the valuation procedure of a 15 year old
70,000dwt PMX bulker in February 2009. This is shortly after the steep market decline when
shadow pricing would come in handy. The short term charter rates for these ships were
729
approximately $14,500/day so the database was searched for 15-year old PMX sales that
occurred at periods when 6 to 12 month charter rates were in the range of $14,000/day to
$14,999/day between January 1st, 1990 and February 1st, 2009. Since this is a very popular
example, 803 rate/value pairs were found. The price range was $8.9M to $58.8M, the inter-
quartile range (50% of data) was $11.3M to $13.2M, the median was $12M and the mean
was $13M.
Based on the above results, the shadow price of a 1994-built (15 years old),
70,000dwt bulk carrier in February 2009 earning $14,000/day to $15,000/day is between
$12M and $13M [Levine 2009]. Comparable transactions that occurred around that time are
summarized in Table 5.5-1 along with average short term time charter rates at the time of the
transaction.
Early 2009 -15 year old PMX Transactions (Shadow Price ~ $12.5M)
Date PMX Rates Ship Name DWT Built Yard Price
(2009) ($/day) ($M)
Jan-i' t  4,326 Cumbria 69,000 1994 Imabari 6.5
Feb-10' 12,182 Glorious Wind 72,119 1997 Hitachi 18.4
Mar-30 11,481 Energy 69,255 1993 Imabari 15.1
Apr-7 h 13,500 Island Globe 73,119 1995 Samsung 18.7
Apr-27 15,750 Brave NY 69,993 1997 Sasebo 20.2
Apr-28t 15,625 Trinity 69,607 1993 Hashihama 16.0
Apr-28th 15,625 Prem Proova 69,286 1994 Hashihama 16.0
Table 5.5-1: Transactions of~70,000dwt, 15-year-old Bulkers Near February 2009
Data from [Clarksons 2010, Tradewinds 20101
As shown by the actual transactions, noting the differences in ship age and daily
earnings, the shadow price gives a rough estimate that falls in the ballpark of actual closing
prices. The big advantage is that charter rates are almost always observable because unlike
the S&P market, the charter market usually operates efficiently without interruptions. An
estimate of ship values can thereby be inferred from observable data during periods of low
transaction liquidity during which traditional valuation methods are impossible to apply. The
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method gained some traction and Shadow Prices were regularly referred to throughout 2009
for valuing ships [Martin 2009a] [Martin 2009b] or whole fleets [Martin 2009c].
It is important, however, to realize that it only gives a rough alternate estimate and is
not intended as a primary valuation method. First, the range of values obtained from
historical data is often very large ($8.9M to $58.9M in the previous example) and it may not
be clustered around a certain point. This introduces a lot of inaccuracy in interpreting the
data. Another limitation is that for less popular time charter rate/ship combinations than the
previous example, the process is much more difficult and there are often not enough
historical data to derive reliable shadow prices. Most importantly, current earnings may be a
convenient metric but the fundamental asset value depends on the expected future cash flows.
This is better represented by the term structure of charter rates or the futures curve.
In Section 2.5.7, we saw that even though prices and earnings of Capes are highly
correlated, the prices in March 2007 were much higher than in the peaks of February 2004
and December 2004 while charter rates were significantly lower. That was because the longer
the high rates lasted, the more people believed that they were not just temporary. In other
words, their expectations for futures earnings (which can easily be inferred from futures
curves), were relatively higher. This, obviously, had a big impact on ship values, which is not
captured by the shadow valuation method.
The same is true when freight rates drop from high levels. The longer they remain
low, the more people believe they will not recover, and the more ship values decline. Such a
metric could be captured by taking an integral over the recent historic earnings, rather than
looking at the current value, but a much more direct and reliable approach would be to look
at the term structure of the forward curve.
5.5.2.3 Proposed "Modified Shadow Price"
As suggested in Section 5.5.2.4, I believe it is more relevant to look at the current
expectations of charter rates through the forward curve instead of taking a snapshot of current
rates. However, the beauty of this method is its simplicity which would be compromised by
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doing so. Instead, I recommend a slight modification which makes it even simpler and more
transparent. This will also incorporate elements of the comparables method from historic
periods when it was applicable.
The first step is to look at the prevailing charter rates and identify historic periods
during which the charter rates were at the same levels. After doing that, instead of forming a
distribution of the transactions that occurred within these periods, one can simply take the
mean of the published ship value indices (which were derived using comparables at that
time). This gives less information about our confidence in the result but has 3 advantages.
First, you don't need a 20-year database of fixtures and transactions. Second, the price
adjustments for ships that are not quite the same (most) is left to the experts, namely the
panelists who submit quotes to the Baltic Exchange or other brokers. This, of course is only
an advantage if you have more confidence in them doing that. Lastly, it gives an equal weight
to each period during which the charter rates were the same rather than giving an equal
weight to each ship. This is important because if many ships happen to be sold at a specific
period then that period dominates the others. The dominating period may be one of
adjustment during which people's expectations have not yet stabilized and therefore,
transaction prices reflect earnings in a different way.
5.5.2.4 Hamburg Valuation Standard
The Hamburg Valuation Formula, developed by the Hamburg Shipbrokers
Association, is arguably the state of the art in ship valuations. [VHSS 2009] describes its
details and purpose along with a few examples. The very few transactions concluded during
the global financial crisis can not be used as representative for valuation purposes because
they were forced sales. Therefore, the new ship valuation standard was introduced to prevent
a downward spiral of prices [Hagen 2009].
[VHSS 2009] also argue that charter rates are unsuitable as a basis for a projected
earnings analysis because they are in some cases at the level of operating expenses.
Therefore, they developed a "conservative" method to calculate the Long Term Asset Value
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(LTAV) based on the long term earnings potential. They define a dysfunctional market, in
which traditional valuations are impossible, when at least two of the following conditions
apply:
1. Few ships for sale relative to world fleet (of same type) for 3+ months
2. Few market participants relative to total number of parties for 3+ months
3. The buyer or seller is knowingly under time pressure / distress etc.
4. Absence of essential regular market conditions (e.g. financing) for many
5. Difference between prices and LTAV exceeds 30% for 3+ months
Before going into the details of the valuation, it is important to explain the incentives
behind it. This will help understand several of its elements. The standard ship loan covenant
of banks stipulates that the outstanding loan should remain below 70% of the asset value.
When the market was high, banks had a policy of accelerating principal repayments (as
described in Section 2.9), as a precaution to avoid breaching these covenants. Due to the
market volatility, this proved inadequate. Following the rapid market decline, fair market
values and conventional valuation methods indicate that covenants are violated for many
ships acquired in the last few years.
Under normal circumstances, additional equity would be required from shipowners to
bring the debt to 70% of the ship value. However, during a low market they may find that
difficult. Banks have a choice between turning a blind eye and repossessing the vessels. They
want to avoid owning ships while selling them in the low market would require steep
discounts. They are also are reluctant to impair the asset values on their books in order to
maintain healthy ratios and the ability to issue new loans. Therefore, they grant 12-month
covenant waivers hoping that a market recovery will improve asset values to satisfy the
covenants.
In order to facilitate this policy, particularly in containerships which have been struck
the most by the current crisis, banks have required an alternative method that avoids the use
of recent transactions. The Hamburg Valuation Scheme was thereby developed which
calculates a LTAV for the ships, based on "potential earnings" as opposed to current market
conditions. It was developed by 4 auditing companies and around 10 shipping finance banks
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excluding Deutsche Bank, the only bank in Germany that refused to participate [Garfield
2010c], and which maintains its opposition a year later [Garfield 2010d].
The Hamburg valuation Formula for the long term asset value is [VHSS 2009]:
LTAV= ,jCB) + RW
= 1+ 1(I+1 T(5.5.1)t=1(+it (+)
Where:
LTAV: Long Term Asset Value
t: Time in years
T: Remaining life in years
C, : Annual net charter rate of year "t"
B: Annual operating costs (constant)
i: Discount rate (constant)
R W: Residual value of ship
To calculate "C, ", prevailing charter rates are assumed for year 1 and the 10-year
historic average for the remaining years. If the ship is chartered, the charter rates apply until
it expires and then the current 10-year historic average applies. 6% commissions are
deducted to get the net rate. When a 25 year horizon is used, charter rates are reduced for the
last 5 years by 30% for bulkers, and 15% for containerships and tankers. 360 earning days
per year are assumed except for years of class renewal (every 5 years) when the number is
reduced to 345. "B" is equal to the 10-year average operating costs and is held constant
throughout the ship's life.
The discount rate is held at 6.6% throughout the ship's life, justified as follows. A
bank margin of 1.375% over the 10-year average LIBOR (4.036%) sets the cost of debt at
5.411%. A risk premium of 3% over the 10-year average US 10-year T-Bill rates (4.63%)
sets the cost of equity at 7.63%. A weighted average is then calculated assuming 70% debt
and 30% equity, and a 0.5% risk premium is added for conservativeness, bringing the
discount rate to 6.6%.
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For ships over 15 years old, "T" is calculated assuming a 25 year life and "RW" is
based on 10-year average scrap values. For ships up to 15 years old, a 20 year life is assumed
and "RW" is equal to the 10-year average scrap value multiplied by 4.45 for bulkers, 3.7 for
containerships and 2 for tankers. As examples, a Supramax (57,000dwt) and a Cape were
valued at $57.5M and $100.1M respectively using this method in March 31't, 2009 [VHSS
2009].
This method was introduced during a time when traditional valuations had been
halted, so it quickly gained high acceptance and publicity. Clause Brandt, partner at
PricewaterhouseCoopers in Hamburg, says that auditors are widely applying the Hamburg
Ship Evaluation Standards [Bockmann 2010] while Hamburg-based ship valuator
Ingenierburo Weselmann has used it to value over 180 vessels [Macqueen 2009]. According
to Koopman and Rehder, current and previous chairmen of the Hamburg Shipbroker's
association, banks in Germany are using the formula on their existing lending books to
demonstrate to their central bank that they are not overstretched [Garfield 2010a, Garfield
2010b].
Some major German banks have decided not to apply the Hamburg formula, but
instead agree to defer payments until 2011 or 2012 when a charter rate recovery is forecast
[Bockmann 2010]. According to a leading Hamburg maritime lawyer, some auditors had
sympathy for it but others did not. He says, "It seems to be a question of whether you are
engaging somebody who likes it and gives a different result, which means you have to do a
bit of auditor shopping". In an environment without viable alternatives, one can predict the
incentives and consequences which are confirmed by the fact that "MOST accountingfirms
in Germany are using a controversial ship valuation formula to determine vessel prices for
crisis-stricken KG funds and companies, as statutory deadlines to finalize 2009 financial
statements loom" [Bockmann 2010].
Inevitably, the method has received high criticism from several senior industry
figures. According to some, "It's a fudge - intellectually it does not stack up" and many are
surprised at those who support and use it. According to Karsen Wetwitschka of Deuche
Bank, "Basically, it would relieve bank's balance sheets which would help banks and
eventually shipowners, but the question is whether it makes sense ... We believe market values
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- as little as we like them - just reflect markets and we have to live with that" [Hagen and
Porter 2009].
A London broker openly accuses it of being the result of a collaboration between
stakeholders who avoid facing reality, to make the numbers appear more appealing [Garfield
2010b], while others have directly accused the banks who use it claiming that "Banks should
not act as pawnbrokers giving 60% to 80% of a necklace's value because that is what it can
be sold at tomorrow" [Garfield 2010c ].
I personally realize the merits of a stable valuation and the benefits to the banks and
ultimately to their clients. However, I personally tend to agree with those criticizing the
Hamburg valuation method. Many crucial parts of the valuation are questionable starting
from the conditions describing a dysfunctional market, to the use of constant 10-year average
charter rates, operating costs and earning days throughout the ship's life, and the 7.63% cost
of equity based on a premium over historic US T-Bill rates. Given the circumstances, the
underlying interests and the outcome, one can't help but question the incentives behind such
choices.
Besides these obvious uncertainties, the core idea of ignoring the market is against
my principles. First, people often jump too quickly to the conclusion that a "distressed" sale
is at the "wrong" price. It is important to understand that distress on one side of the
transaction on its own is not enough to distort values. During a "forced sale", buyers often
compete and inevitably drive the price to "the maximum one is willing to pay for it" i.e. its
true value. Acquisition demand has in fact been such as to prompt several IPOs and spin-offs
to raise equity for that specific purpose over the past several months. Furthermore, the fact
that charter rates are at operating costs is not an excuse to ignore them (or "almost" ignore
them), it actually indicates important information about the ship's value. Rates below
operating costs or even close to zero are not unheard of in the volatile shipping industry. I am
not advocating that rates will remain at these levels throughout the ship's life but they should
certainly be taken into account more heavily than by the Hamburg Valuation Formula.
A better approach would be to look at futures rates which indicate market
expectations for future earnings. These reflect changes that occur in the world that should
impact ship values. It seems strange that the Hamburg Valuation formula would yield similar
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results today as it would if applied before the crisis. This is particularly true if a ship has a
charter longer than one year.
One can evidently find many excuses to ignore the market both in terms of charter
rates and transaction prices but the ship value is inevitably defined by the market. The
Hamburg Valuation was introduced to cover a need when there were not enough transactions
to observe market values. When S&P activity recovered, however, the disparity between the
two became very clear. According to [Porter 2009], "The revival of the secondhand activity
also casts a spotlight on the Hamburg valuation formula, which throws up hugely different
figures from the actual prices now being achieved in the real world"
The Hamburg valuation method has been criticized by many for its biases and
inaccuracies and primarily the fact that it essentially ignores the current market and looks at
the previous 10 booming years instead. Nevertheless, it is the most sophisticated method
available and is being widely used by auditors and, at least internally, by several major
banks.
5.5.2.5 Short-Term Forecast Valuation
In Chapter 2, we examined the method used by Marsoft to forecast ship earnings
based on projected fleet utilization. Marsoft also has a procedure involving a combination of
methods to produce valuation forecasts for its clients [Marsoft 2010a]. Similar to its earnings
forecasts, its valuation forecasts span out to several years but they also produce them for the
immediate future. That will be our primary focus because at the limit, a very short term
valuation forecast can essentially be treated as a current valuation.
The first step of the process is to obtain an "earnings-based" valuation for a 5-year
old vessel of the ship type to our interest. A two parameter linear regression model is
calibrated against historic data relating the 5-year-old ship value to the newbuilding price and
the 1-year charter rate. Note that the two regression parameters are in fact highly correlated,
which may be an issue.
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To obtain the forecast of the 5-year old ship value for a certain future date, current
newbuilding price forecasts and 1-year charter rate forecasts for the same future date are
applied to the regression formula. The charter rate forecast is based on projected fleet
utilization (described in Chapter 2), while the newbuilding price is forecasted by a model that
combines projected 1 year charter rates, Chinese Won - US Dollar exchange rates, steel
prices and shipyard utilization.
Next, adjustments are made to convert the 5-year-old ship valuation to 10-year-old
and 15-year-old ship valuations. These results are published in Marsoft's quarterly reports.
To obtain a valuation for an older ship or of a different age, simple interpolations are used
between the above valuations and the scrap value.
To produce a customized valuation, as discussed earlier, they use a combination of
five methods including the above. The five methods are:
1. The above earnings-based valuation
2. Comparables-based valuation (Section 5.5.2.1)
3. DCF valuation using their own charter rate forecasts for the first 5 years and a 10 to
20-year historic average beyond that (typically without an age related discount)
4. Linear depreciation between the newbuilding and scrap prices to obtain an estimate
assuming a scrapping age of 25 years
5. Historic mean of values for an equivalent ship
By assigning different weights to the results of each of the above methods, a
customized valuation is obtained.
5.5.2.6 Other Valuation Methods
Ship valuations can be obtained using Monte Carlo Simulations as done by [Adland
2000] at MIT. This involves identifying the factors that affect ship values and their
distribution parameters, performing thousands of simulations in which they are allowed to
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evolve randomly, and then form a distribution of the resulting ship values (one from each
simulation) based on which one can decide the valuation or a range with some confidence.
Alternatively, valuations can be based on freight rate forecasts that can be obtained by
a wide range of methods. Examples include the use of projected fleet utilization as done by
Marsoft or Monte Carlo Simulations on freight rates which are used by Sydney Levine.
[Adland 2003] proposes a nonparametric one-factor model and extends it to a nonparametric
non-Markovian discrete-time model for freight rates. He tests the models and shows that
freight rate volatility should be modeled as a function of freight rate levels (time charter
equivalent). The work of [Voudris 2006] at MIT, demonstrates the accuracy of Artificial
Neural Networks along with genetic algorithms in predicting bulk freight rates up to 18
months in advanced, and uses the method to forecast the Cape market.
People often make crude estimates using methods similar to those incorporated in the
weighted average valuation of [Marsoft 2010a]. Using linear interpolation between the
current newbuilding and scrap prices gives a rough estimate which can be very misleading in
some cases as discussed in Chapter 2. The inter-quartile range of all historic transactions
prices can be referenced but is only valid if the current market is not at extremes.
People often apply selected weights to various valuations or they simply update their
prior views after seeing a new one. As the Black-Litterman model uses Bayesian Updating to
allow investors to incorporate their private views in optimum portfolio allocations based on
the CAPM, I believe it won't be long until this concept is applied to ship valuations.
5.5.2.7 Summary and Comparison of Ship Valuation Methods
A simple way to summarize the essence of the predominant ship valuation methods
would be to say that the comparables method looks at what similar ships are selling for,
shadow pricing looks at what similar ships were selling for when they were earning as much
as your ship is earning today, the Hamburg valuation method looks at what your ship was
earning yesterday (as a proxy for tomorrow) and [Marsoft 2010a] combines elements of
everything with its market forecasts in a single valuation.
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An important aspect to consider about the valuation is its volatility. The volatility of
the comparables based valuation will depend on the frequency of transactions. If there are
frequent transactions, the valuation can be updated frequently to reflect changes in the
market. The Hamburg valuation uses 10-year historic average rates, which means that any
current changes in the current market will have an insignificant impact on the valuation,
making it very stable. Short term charter rates, on which shadow pricing is based, are very
volatile. This makes the volatility of shadow prices higher but the impact is dampened due to
the way the method works. In fact, if we assume that freight rates and ship values are
perfectly correlated, then the volatility of the Shadow Valuation is just about right.
We will now compare the methods by considering valuations for a 5-year old
172,000dwt Cape as of March 2009. Many brokers, including Clarksons, had discontinued
valuations but others including Cotzias Shipping Group and Intermodal had not. The ship
value indices produced by the Baltic Exchange from a panel of brokers were highly
questioned last year but they were also not discontinued. These are summarized along with
the Shadow Price, the Hamburg Valuation and Marsoft Valuations (forecasts for the second
quarter of 2009) in Table 5.5-2.
Valuation Method / March 2009 Value of Source
Broker 172,000dwt 5-Year Cape
Baltic Exchange $48.3M [Martin 2009b]
Cotzias Shipping Group $47.OM [Cotzias 2009c]
Intermodal $42.OM [Intermodal 2009]
Shadow Pricing $41.7M [Martin 2009b]
Hamburg Valuation $94.5M Based on [VHSS 2009]
Short Term Forecast $40.8M [Marsoft 2009]
Table 5.5-2: Valuation Method Comparison for a 5-Year-Old 172,000dwt Cape as of March 3 1". 2009
The disparity between the first three valuations of Table 5.5-2, which are based on
comparables, indicate the amount of subjectivity involved due to the lack of transactions.
Their average is $45.7M. The shadow price and Marsoft's valuation are in the ballpark but
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lower than all three, while the Hamburg Valuation is the only one not in the forty's and is
higher than twice the average of the comparables based values.
5.5.3 Company Value Based Estimations
5.5.3.1 General Company Valuation Methods
The value of a firm is equal to the value of its assets or equivalently the value of its
equity plus the value of its debt. As for direct asset valuation, there are again various
approaches to valuation. One of the most widely accepted methods is the Discounted Cash
Flow valuation which has various versions that will be discussed in Section 5.5.3.3. A less
popular method is valuation from an accounting perspective, using financial statements. This
is presented in Section 5.5.3.4. Both approaches rely on the projection of future performance
and the discount factor.
Another common valuation approach is based on multiples. This is very often used
when valuing a company that is preparing for an IPO or for a merger. A set of comparable
companies are selected from the same industry and certain ratios (multiples) are calculated.
Typical examples include price over sales, price over EBITDA, price over book value (of
assets) etc.
For price, people look at the values at which the company's shares are trading i.e. the
price of its equity (averaged over a time period to account for fluctuations). The underlying
assumption is that comparable companies within a given industry should have roughly the
same chosen multiples as well as other parameters such as leverage, working capital etc.
Therefore, the average is calculated across the comparables for each multiple and that is
applied to the company being valued. The average industry multiples are combined with the
company's observable metrics (Sales, EBITDA, Book Value etc) to yield estimates of its
equity value.
741
Nobel Laureate Robert Merton has introduced a very powerful valuation framework
under which the debt and equity of a company can be treated as options on the company's
assets. Options are securities that allow you to buy (if a "call" option) or sell (if a "put"
option) the underlying asset in the future at a pre-specified price (the strike price). They will
be discussed in more detail in Section 5.6. Since the prices of options are directly observable
in the securities market, by replicating the company's debt and equity using combinations of
options, one can directly obtain the value of the company's debt, equity and assets.
By examining the payoff to the equity holders as a function of the asset value, we see
that they are equivalent to the payoffs of a call option with a strike price equal to the amount
of the debt. Both the equity and the call option have a zero payoff unless asset value exceeds
the debt amount, beyond which the payoff increases linearly with the asset value. Similarly,
we can replicate the debt's payoffs by going long on a bond and shorting a put with a strike
price equal to the outstanding debt (the put replicates the expected default loss). As for the
debt holder, the payoff to this replicating portfolio increases linearly with the asset value
from zero up until the point where the assets are worth as much as the outstanding debt, and
remains constant beyond that. The method can also be used to value the debt depending on
its seniority (again by replicating payoffs), and thereby break down the company's value
further into components.
5.5.3.2 Shipping Company Valuations and Extracting Asset Values
The general company valuation methods discussed in Section 5.5.3.1 are commonly
used across many industries. Some analysts, however, use variations or different approaches
across the board or within specific industries. Due to the fact that asset values are extremely
volatile in the shipping industry, valuations are very often based on some kind of forecasting
of asset values. Much like the Shadow price looks at historical price-to-earnings multiples for
ships, one can also look at other multiples for shipping companies historically and use them
for current valuations.
742
[Shahrim & Webb 2009] describe the methods that were used by HSBC Global
Research to carry out valuations of shipping companies in the interesting period of January
2009. Their valuations of container shipping companies were based on asset values partly
because of the low visibility of earnings. However, many companies were not disclosed the
market value of fleets so asset values had to be obtained otherwise. This was done by
assuming that the price over book value ratio will drop within one year to the bottom value it
reached in the down cycle of 1998.
Their valuations of dry bulk companies were based on replacement value per share
considering the adjusted fleet value, the net cash and the earnings per share during the 2nd
half of 2008 (the period since the market decline). The adjusted fleet value is calculated
assuming a zero value for all ships on order and all purchase options and a decline of more
than 75% for the existing dry bulk fleet relative to the first half of 2008 (before the market
decline).
In theory, if you know the value of a shipping company, you can then extract the
value of its assets which include ships. The value of the shipping company can be obtained
by one of the many methods discussed, or simply by looking at its market capitalization if it
is publicly traded. That is the value at which its stock is currently trading at multiplied by the
outstanding shares. One can also use an average share price across a meaningful period to net
out stock market fluctuations. This is attractive because as with the comparables based ship
valuation, it directly gives you the value that the market thinks the company (and assets) is
worth, factoring in all relevant parameters.
In practice, however, this is not practical for various reasons. First, most company
valuations require the asset values as an input or they need the projected ship earnings which
could be used directly in a ship valuation if they are known in advance. If we use the stock
price instead, there will be other factors significantly distorting our valuation such as the
stock market sentiment, company announcements about the strategic plans etc.
Even with an accurate company valuation, the task of allocating the value between
tangible and intangible assets is non-trivial to say the least. First one would have to account
for the value of intangible assets such as goodwill, the competence of the management team,
company reputation, industry relations etc. Even after one gets to the point where they have
stripped out the value of the ships, they are left with the task of allocating that value to each
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ship. This would be a nightmare in most cases since the fleet would typically include ships of
various types, sizes, ages specifications, surveys due etc.
5.5.3.3 DCF Valuation
Discounted cash flow analysis will form the basis for the new ship valuation method
developed in Section 5.6. Therefore, we will not go into great depth in this section. The idea
is that the value of a company is equal to the present value of all the cash flows it is expected
to generate in the future. The free cash flows can be defined in terms of many different
parameters. [Koller et al 2005] demonstrate the equivalence between discounted cash flows
and discounted economic profit starting with the following definitions.
~,FCF
V = X(5.5-2)
t=1 (1+rWACC
FCF = NOPLA T, - NetIC, (5.5-3)
NetIC, = IC - IC,_1  (5.5-4)
Where:
V: Present value of the company (Assets)
t: Time period (year)
FCF,: Free Cash Flow (Unlevered) in year "t"
rWACC : Weighted Average Cost of Capital (discount rate for company)
NOPLA T: Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes (profit from core operations minus
income taxes related to core operations) for year "t"
NetiCt: Net Invested Capital
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ICt: Invested Capital in year "t"
In practice, free cash flows are predicted until a certain time in the future and then a
terminal value is calculated at that point by assuming a constant growth rate beyond that in
perpetuity.
FCFI TV
V Z (, + rwAcc)T (5.5-5)
t=1 
-|- + WACC WC
FCF1TV = - (5.5-6)
rWACC - g
Where: TV: Terminal value of company at year "T" (Present value
of a growing perpetuity)
g: Assumed annual growth of future cash flows
Starting from Eq. 5.5-2, [Koller et al 2005] go on to show that the enterprise value of
a company is equal to the book value of its invested capital plus the present value of future
economic profits. Note that if the current book value is different from the true economic
value, this will show up in the future economic profits (through impairments). Since the
summation goes to infinity, any disparity will be captured.
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*FCF
V=
* NOPLA T - NetIC * IC* IC
t=1 (1+rWACC t=o (1+rWACC) t=O (1+rWACC )t
NOPLAI -(IC, -IC ) IC (1+rWACC )ICt
=1 (1+rWACC ) t  t=1 (1+rWACC )t  t=1 (1+rWACC )
=C 0  NOPLAt T rWACCICt
=1 (1+rWAcc )
- Economic Pr ofitt
=1 (1+rWACC)
(5.5-7)
The weighted average cost of capital is derived from the cost of equity, the cost of
capital, the company's debt to equity ratio and the tax rate if that is relevant. The cost of
capital is essentially the cost at which a firm can borrow money to finance its projects. The
cost of equity is the fair amount by which the equity holders should expect to be
compensated, and is much more intricate. There are several methods used to estimate it but
the most widely adopted is by far the CAPM. The CAPM is based on the premise that
diversification is costless, so investors need to be compensated only for bearing systematic
(un-diversifiable) risk. Adjustments are often made to CAPM as will be shown in Section
5.6.
There are three common methods for applying discounted cash flow valuation. These
are the Weighted Average Cost of Capital method, the Flow to Equity (FTE) method, and the
Adjusted Present Value (APV) method.
V FCF
WACC: V D+E (5.5-8)
t=1 (1+ rwAcc)t
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ECF(
FTE: (559)
t=1 (1 + rE)
* FCF v
V = .' + PV(TS)
t=1 (1+ r
APV: FCF, * rD, 1r FCF, + rD, r (5.5-10)
t=1 (1+ ru)t t=1 + r,)t ,=1 (+ r)'
Where: D: Debt
E: Equity
rE: Cost of levered equity
Cost of unlevered equity
rD : Cost of debt
Tax rate
ECE: Levered cash flow to equity holders
PV(TS): Present value of tax shields (from tax deductibility of
interest payments)
If applied correctly the three methods should yield the same results. Solving them
simultaneously gives the following two conditions that must be true for the methods to be
equivalent.
ECF = FCF - (1 - r)rD (5.5-11)
E D
rWACC = rE + (1 rD (5.5-12)A A
PV(TS) = rD (5.5-13)
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Depending on the conditions, one method may be more useful than the others. For
example, if the leverage of the company is kept constant, it is usually more convenient to use
the WACC method. Otherwise, we calculate the present value of the tax shields and the
unlevered firm value and add them to get the value of the levered firm. The FTE method can
be used to value the equity directly if the amount that equity holders will receive in each
period is known in advance.
Note that the difference between the weighted average cost of capital and the
unlevered cost of equity arises from tax shields (only). Shipping companies typically do not
pay corporate taxes. By setting the tax rate to zero, the value of the tax shields disappears and
the APV method becomes redundant to the WACC method. Therefore, in valuing shipping
companies one typically has a choice between using the WACC method and the FTE
method.
5.5.3.4 Valuation Using Financial Statements
Valuation from an accounting perspective is similar to conventional DCF. A key
difference is that more emphasis is given to the accounting ratios of a firm. Again, there are
several interlinked models, namely discounted dividends, abnormal returns and abnormal
earnings. There are inter-linked and should yield the same results if applied correctly. We
start by presenting the dividend discount model which is the simplest. It states that the value
of the equity (the value of the shares), is equal to the sum of the discounted dividends (cash
distributed to the shares):
Sd
E = t (5.5-14)
,= (1+rE
t: time
E: Value of Equity
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dt: Dividends at time "t"
rE: Cost of Equity
The problem with applying this method is that a very big percentage of firms
(particularly new and growing ones) do not pay dividends. Note that it makes no difference
to the value of the firm if dividends are paid out or reinvested in the same business. However,
dividends are hard to forecast because they depend on the company's growth policy which
may be unclear or on future opportunities which are not known in advance.
The second method is essentially the same as the flow to equity DCF model, with a
different way to derive the cash flows. The value of the equity and equity cash flows are
given by:
ECFtE = (5.5-15)
t=1 (1 + rE
ECF = NI - CAPEX + DEP - ANWC - ABVND (5.5-16)
Where: CAPEX: Capital Expenditures
DEP: Depreciation
ABVND: Change in Value of Net Debt
The importance is to capture all the cash flows in forecasting. In order to do that, one
must adjust the financials under GAAP for unrealized gains and losses, changes in asset
values, accounting rule changes, foreign currency translation gains and losses etc. Once that
is done for previous years, one can proceed to forecast the future financials and equity cash
flows and then apply the valuation formula.
The third method is more important, while the first two are often used for verification.
It is based on the same principle as the equivalence between cash flows and economic profits
by [Koller et al 2005] derived in Eq. 5.6-7. We will present its derivation starting from the
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discount model. We start by relating this year's Book Value of Equity (BVE) to that of the
previous year, through net income and dividends:
BVE, = BVE,_, + NI, -d, (5.5-17)
We define "abnormal earnings" as the difference between actual earnings and those expected
by shareholders (return on equity multiplied by last year's equity):
4, = NI, - rE B VE 1  (5.5-18)
By combining Eq. 5.5-17 and Eq. 5.5-18, we can solve for the dividends as follows:
d, = s, +(1+rE)BVE,_ - BVE, (5.5-19)
By substituting this definition of dividends into the dividend discount model (Eq. 5.5-14) and
through further manipulation, we arrive at the abnormal earnings model:
E = e, +(1+ rE)BVE,_1 - BVE
t=1 (1 + rE t
I ___+ * BVE * BVEt
t=1 (1+ rE)t t=1 (1+ rE Y t=1 (1+ rE)t
0 *0 B VE *0 B VE
I + -V BV (5.5-20)
1 1+ rE )t t=0 (1 + rE )t =1 + rE )t
=BVE +
0 t=1 ,(1 + rE)
This tells us that the value of equity is equal to the current book value of equity plus
the present value of the expected future abnormal earnings (above expected earnings i.e.
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wealth creation). Before applying the method, one must make sure to adjust for any asset
impairments in order to get a starting book value that reflects the true economic value.
Alternatively, disparities can be factored into the projections of future earnings. An asset
value impairment, for example, will result in negative abnormal earnings when it occurs.
Since the summation term extends to infinity, if applied correctly, the valuation will reflect
the true economic value.
Abnormal earnings arise from some sort of advantage like competitiveness or relative
efficiency which allows the company to outperform its competitors and investor
expectations. In the long term, abnormal earnings will be forced to zero by competition. In
other words, the Return on Equity (ROE) converges over time to the cost of equity. Note that
abnormal earnings can be negative as well as positive. Below is a summary of how one
would apply the method.
1. Analyze industry, key trends, competition, performance metrics & outlook
2. Analyze company, strategy, accounting decisions and financial statements
3. Choose a relevant time horizon after which there will be a terminal value
4. First look for accounting procedures and adjust to reflect changes in equity
5. Restate historical financial statements
6. Project the financial statements considering all the above data
7. Get the same valuation using abnormal earnings/returns & discounted dividends
The major advantage over the conventional DCF methods is that the terminal value
(which is often inaccurate) is a much smaller fraction of the total value. That is because the
terminal value in this case only includes a forecast of abnormal earnings (not the whole cash
flows). The Book value of Equity captures a lot of what is in the terminal value of a DCF
model. This is a powerful approach but is much less popular than conventional DCF
methods. Therefore, we present an example using a US listed shipping company. The
valuation will be done for Dec 2009, so the Dec 2008 financials will be used 2008 (the last
available annual statements). Note that this is an intrinsic valuation, meaning that it should
not fluctuate significantly.
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5.5.3.5 Valuation Example - Diana Shipping (DSX) in December
5.5.3.5.1 Industry Analysis
5.5.3.5.1.1 Overview & Trends
DSX specializes in Panamaxes (60,000 to 80,000 dwt) and Capes. The industry has
been examined in detail in Chapter 2. One of the key trends is that following the financial
crisis, average capesize daily earnings decreased by about 99% and ship prices soon
followed.
5.5.3.5.1.2 Industry Structure/Key Players
The market is highly fragmented and closely resembles perfect competition with high
cyclicality (Section 2.1). Several big players are also involved in other sectors such as tankers
or containerships. Most companies are privately owned but several have been listed in the US
in recent years. In terms of dry bulk tons moved, the 5 major US listed companies account
for 4.29% of Market Share (MS). Table 5.5-3 shows how they compare across various
measures sourced from published data, primarily their 10K forms (20-F).
MS TOT AVG REV NI M.CAP NET DEBT! ROA ROE
(%) DWT AGE ($M) ($M) (10/28) DEBT EQUITY (%) (%)
DRYS 1.21 4.2 10.6 248 56.7 $3.32B $2.58B 1.21 13.71 64.42
GNK 1.02 3.5 6.37 107 107 $446M $734M 1.5 5.83 21.89
NM 0.84 2.9 4.5 206 21.1 $302M $420M 0.80 6.19 51.95
EGLE 0.84 2.9 6 125 52 $329M $602M 1.16 4.36 12.49
DSX 0.66 2.3 3.4 190 134 $1.06B $167M 0.12 9.99 21.10
Table 5.5-3: Comparison of 5 major US-listed Dry Bulk Companies
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5.5.3.5.1.3 Performance Metrics
Due to the high cyclicality of the market, success primarily lies on the timing of
investment and chartering decisions. Stock prices, however, are governed by earnings per
share and growth rates, so listed companies have a pressure to stay on the spot market and
keep making acquisitions even at high prices. Their ability to raise finance through equity
markets is critical in order to finance acquisitions without high leverage and the associated
risk. Listed companies publish metrics such as fleet utilization i.e. operating days over
available days (available days are ownership days less days at repair). This shows how
quickly a company can employ its vessels and is typically close to 100%. Unlike
containerships, which have impacted more by the financial crisis, bulk carriers do not lay up
in the current market. As such, these metrics are less important.
5.5.3.5.1.4 Market Outlook
As of Dec 2008, the dry bulk orderbook was above 72% of the fleet with delivery in
the following 36 months. A huge oversupply is anticipated as these orders keep coming in.
Scrapping (removals) has increased since the market crash but the average fleet age has
decreased, thereby limiting future scrapping potential. Order cancellations are expensive and
have limited impact since supply is ultimately governed by the shipyard building capacity
which has increased dramatically. Any cancelled ship will still be delivered, only to another
buyer at a lower price, until market prices drop below the variable costs of shipyards.
Delaying deliveries only delays the market recovery, while converting the orders to tankers
or containerships is unlikely as they also have high orderbooks. In fact, the tanker and
containership markets are worse so their orders are being changed to bulk carriers, further
increasing the dry bulk orderbook. Besides anticipated oversupply, the market outlook is bad
due a weakening demand for raw materials by China and the bad financial situation resulting
in low consumption and demand for finished products in the west.
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5.5.3.5.2 Company Analysis
5.5.3.5.2.1 Company Overview
DSX completed an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in March 2005.
Its fleet grew from 7 ships in 2004 to 19 ships in 2009 (plus one newbuilding with March
2010 delivery) over a series of acquisitions financed primarily through subsequent equity
offerings. Under Code Section 883, the company pays no income taxes to the US (or
elsewhere). As of Dec 2008, the company had $337M in revenues, $221M in net income,
$1,057M in asset book value and a ROE of 27.6%. Over 90% of its assets are ships. It has
been very profitable with a high ROE primarily because of the market boom. Growth in daily
earnings has been tremendous while operating costs remain fairly constant, giving rise to
these results. The low leverage results from the company's low debt policy and frequent
equity issuances to finance. The company recently entered the low part of the cycle, so these
metrics are almost certainly going to worsen in the next few years.
5.5.3.5.2.2 Strategy
1. Reputation for performance, reliability and safetv
This enables strong relationships with charterers, shipping members and financial
institutions, thereby achieving better contracts, avoiding renegotiations or disputes, and
allowing access to finance and possible covenant waivers if needed. The company achieves
this by maintaining a modem, high quality fleet. Its average age of -4 years is below all key
competitors and -10 years lower than the industry average [UNCTAD 2007]. Its experienced
management team (CEO with over 40 years experience in shipping) manages vessels
internally for full control. It has credit facilities from 2 major banks and its 3 largest
charterers consistently account for approximately half the revenues.
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2. Expand fleet in a manner that creates value for shareholders
DSX continuously buys and sells ships to keep the average age low and finances them
through equity to maintain a strong balance sheet (lowest leverage amongst key competitors).
It acquires ships in a booming market and locks them in long term charters at high rates to
bring down the debt and boost revenues. It balances these with short term charters that allow
for higher earnings in a good market and regularly hedges its exposure via the futures market
(though less than its competitors).
3. Low cost efficient operations
DSX operates only two ship types (PMX and Capes) and 4 groups of sister-ships
allowing for operational efficiency. This policy is complemented by internal management of
vessels which allows full control of costs by a very experienced management team with
technical expertise
4. Success Factors / Sustainability
The company relies on its few big charterers to keep paying the agreed rates which
are significantly above market levels. Though Diana Shipping has not experienced any
problems yet, there have been many recent renegotiations and bankruptcies. Two of its three
biggest charterers, Australian Wheat Board and Cargill rely heavily on wheat prices. If the
price of wheat declines, that will have a big impact on their ability to keep paying Diana
Shipping the high contracted charter rates.
The company relies on the recovery of the market to avoid asset impairments. Though
leverage is low, a high fraction of asset value is tied in the charter contracts which are not
recognized by banks. If assets keep declining, there may be a danger of breaching loan
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covenants. This will remove the option of drawing down on the company's credit facilities to
finance future growth.
The high operating efficiency - low cost strategy with over 99% fleet utilization has
been achieved with an extremely young fleet. As the fleet ages, off-hire time and
maintenance costs will increase while managing older ships requires different capabilities. To
sustain its operating performance, the company has to demonstrate the ability to operate older
ships efficiently or keep investing in new ones which may become more difficult (raising
finance might be a challenge).
Finally, the company's growth till now was facilitated by a growing industry. If the
industry begins shrinking, sustaining the growth strategy may be difficult.
5.5.3.5.2.3 Accounting Analysis
Most of the major dry bulk shipping companies invested heavily at very high prices
last year and asset values dropped dramatically after the market crash. Some managed to lock
in high charter rates through long term contracts but many of these are being renegotiated by
charterers and several charterers are now operating under Chapter 11. As a result, these
shipping companies have an incentive to overstate their assets in order to avoid recording
expenses due to asset value impairments but also to avoid breaching bank loan covenants.
Diana Shipping reports its assets at book value and discounts them assuming a 25
year lifetime and a scrap value of $150/ltd (residual value of steel per ton of lightship). These
assumptions are reasonable when considering historical averages. An impairment test is
carried out by summing the undiscounted future cash flows which are determined using its
charter contracts and 10-year average values of daily rates for the non-contracted periods.
These assumptions are less reasonable because of the time value of money, the risk
associated with the expected cash flows, and because the previous 10 years were
phenomenal. I therefore find it necessary to conduct a more relevant impairment test.
I projected the book value of assets from Dec 2008 to Dec 2009 using the company's
depreciation method after accounting for yard installments for ships on order, the prepaid
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installments and the ship delivered etc. I then calculated the fair value of assets including
their charters as of Dec 2009. This shows if impairment would be necessary in Dec 2009.
The impairment amount is then discounted back to Dec 2008. The 10-year T-bill is assumed
for the risk free rate to account for a blended average of the discounting periods. The equity
beta of 1.6 is quite high and somewhat unreliable but the resulting discount rate of 9.7%
seems reasonable and close to what is being used in the industry. Earning days per year are
assumed to be 350 going forward (higher than utilization so far) because ships are getting
older and will have to undergo major repairs more frequently. This is more in line with the
industry average.
Since December 2009, no contracts seem to have been renegotiated. Therefore, I
assumed that they will be paid in full. To calculate the value of these charters, I compare the
contracted rates to the current market rates of a charter for a similar ship and for a period
equal to the remaining contract period. I then calculate the difference and discount the
resulting "above market" future cash flows to Dec 2009 using the cost of equity as per the
CAPM model. The market value of the "charter-free" ship is observed from recent
transactions of similar vessels and from data published by the Baltic exchange and brokers.
The vessel redelivery period typically ranges a few months. In cases where the
contract is above market rates, charterers will try to deliver the ship at the start of the window
whereas if the contract rate is lower than the market, they will keep the ship as long as
possible. This assumption is applied in deciding the delivery date. The charter value is the
present value of an annuity of the difference between contract and market values. The
outstanding payment of $14.7M is deducted from the fair market value of the ship on order
because it has not been paid yet. The ship was ordered for $60.2M in 2006 and the final
payment of 25% is due upon delivery in March 2010. It is discounted 3 months to December
resulting in $14.7M. Table 5.5-4 shows the summary of the results while Table 5.5-5 shows
the detailed analysis ship by ship.
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ITEM VALUE
Dec 2008 Vessel Net Book Value 960,431,000
Dec 2008 Vessel Advances 27,199,000
Dec 2009 Vessel Net Book Value 1,023,107,000
Dec 2009 Charters Market Value 158,596,741
Dec 2009 Charter-Free Ships Market Value 824,309,141
Dec 2009 Vessel Fair Market Value 982,905,882
Asset Impairment In December 2008 -36,646,416 (-3.82%)
Table 5.5-4: Summary of Impairment Test Results
An impairment of ship values would be immaterial. If this analysis was carried out in
Dec 2008, using charter-free market values of that period, it would be substantially more
significant. Given the information available in Dec 2008 (ship values and the possibility of
renegotiating contracts), the company should have probably carried out an impairment.
Perhaps the decision not to, was in line with its strategy of maintaining big accounts with
major clients and thereby good relationships, avoiding the risk of contract
cancellations/renegotiations. On the other hand, a bankruptcy of any of these clients would
result in a big decrease in fair market values.
The above analysis also highlights the risk of a future impairment since $159M of the
asset value lies in contracts above market rates. As the market declines, more of the charter-
free market value ($824M) is shifted to the $159M, increasing the risk of future impairments.
As for the remaining balance sheet, it is in line with the company's strategy. The
company rents its office under a 3 year renewable lease from its wholly owned subsidiary to
which it also pays management fees per vessel. The accounts between the two companies
don't appear on the balance sheet and the building book value is depreciated over 20 years.
Its PP&E is insignificant and no intangible assets or goodwill are recorded while vessels
including (vessel construction advances) account for 93.4% of total assets.
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IMPAIRMENT TEST CALCULATION
Ship Dwt BLT Delivery Rate Dec-09 Charter Ship Val Tot Fair Val
Rate Val ($m)
Coronis 74381 2006 Apr-10 14000 26000 -1,708,350 34,000,000 32,291,650
Erato 74444 2004 Feb-10 15000 28000 -1,119,355 32,000,000 30,880,645
Naias 73546 2006 Sep-10 19000 23000 -1,116,433 34,000,000 32,883,567
Cijo 73691 2005 Mar-10 11000 27000 -1,829,546 33,000,000 31,170,454
Calipso 73691 2005 Mar-10 9400 27000 -2,012,500 33,000,000 30,987,500
Protefs 73630 2004 Aug-11 59000 20000 19,960,105 32,000,000 51,960,105
Thetis 73585 2004 Mar-10 10500 27000 -1,886,719 32,000,000 30,113,281
Dioni 75172 2001 Sep-10 12000 23000 -3,070,190 29,000,000 25,929,810
Danae 75106 2001 Apr-11 12000 21000 -4,153,824 29,000,000 24,846,176
Oceanis 75211 2001 Sep-10 18000 23000 -1,395,541 29,000,000 27,604,459
Triton 75336 2001 Nov-10 17000 22500 -1,827,560 29,000,000 27,172,440
Alcyon 75247 2001 Nov-12 34500 19000 14,071,966 29,000,000 43,071,966
Nirefs 75311 2001 Feb-10 60500 28000 2,798,388 29,000,000 31,798,388
Norfolk 164,218 2002 Jan-13 74750 30000 42,557,305 43,000,000 85,557,305
Aliki 180235 2005 Mar-11 45000 38000 3,052,700 54,000,000 57,052,700
Salt Lake 171810 2005 Aug-12 55800 32000 20,036,121 52,000,000 72,036,121
City
Sideris GS 174186 2006 Oct-10 36000 41000 -1,529,015 54,0000000 52,470,985
Semirio 174261 2007 Apr-11 31000 37500 -2,999,984 56,000,000 53,000,016
Boston 177828 2007 Sep-11 52000 35000 9,956,708 56,000,000 65,956,708
Houston 177729 2009 Oct-14 55000 27000 38,201,269 60,000,000 98,201,269
New York 177000 2010 Jan-15 48000 25000 32,611,194 60,000,000 77,920,335
(Mar2010)
25% payment due March 2010 for "New York" -14,690,859
Total: 158,596,741 824,309,141 982,905,882
Table 5.5-5: Impairment Test Calculation
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The long term debt of $238M is $214.7M on a $300M revolving credit facility by
RBS and $24.1M on a $60.2M loan facility by Fortis Bank. This accounts for 84.5% of total
liabilities. The company reports deferred revenue of unearned charter payments that have
been received and when acquiring ships with charters attached at rates significantly different
from market levels. This resulted in negative Net working capital last year.
5.5.3.5.2.4 Financial Analysis
The company has a very high ROE, equal to 19% for 2006, 37% for 2007 and 28%
for 2008. The standard DuPont breakdown and the DuPont alternative breakdown for 2008
are shown in Eq 5.5-10 & 5.5-11 respectively while Table 5.5-6 shows a summary of 10 key
ratios calculated for years 2006, 2007 and 2008.
NI Sales AssetsROE = x x = 65% x 32% x 136%= 28% 5.5-21Sales Assets Equity
ROE =(NOPAT x Sales +(Spread x NetFinLev)
Sales NetAssets)
= (67.3% x 0.38)+ (18.1% x 0.1) 5.5-22
=28%
The alternative DuPont ratio shows a big spread but low leverage, which is consistent
with the company's strategy. ROE is heavily accounted for by profit margins which have
been extremely high due to the record high market levels. The collapse in daily rates
occurred in September 2008 and this impacted operating ROA bringing it down from 2007
levels since some vessels were trading on the spot market. Net financial leverage was also
lower for 2008 bringing down ROE. Going forward, daily earnings are unlikely to recover
any time soon so ROE is expected to decline significantly and remain low over the next few
years even though some of the vessels have long term contracts at high rates.
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2006 2007 2008
ROE 18.8% 37.0% 27.6%
Operating ROA 20.6% 29.0% 25.8%
Revenue Growth 12.6% 64.1% 77.1%
Gross Margin 68.7% 73.9% 79.6%
Net Income Margin 52.6% 70.5% 65.5%
Current ratio 5.70 2.05 1.03
Debt to Equity 0.04 0.38 0.12
Net Long Term Assets / Revenues 271.4% 257.2% 266.1%
Interest Coverage 16.19 20.01 36.01
Dividend Payout Ratio 120.5% 97.6% 111.8%
Table 5.5-6: Calculation of Ten Key ratios for DSX from 2008 to 2009
Growth rates were significant due to the increase in the number of vessels from 7 in
2004 to 18 in 2008 but also due to the increase in daily earnings. The company took delivery
of a Cape in November 2009 and is expecting one in March 2010. Both were ordered in 2006
and no other orders have been placed since. Due to the market outlook, it is questionable
whether the company will keep adding ships to its fleet. Its margins have been very high
because operating expenses are relatively stable whereas the revenues are much more
volatile. In a market boom, margins go through the roof whereas in a bust, even though
expenses also typically come down (as they have, slightly since 2008), margins decrease
dramatically. Net long term assets over revenues are low during a market boom because
revenues are more volatile than asset values. This is expected to increase going forward.
The current ratio of 3.43 is high, showing that the company has no problem paying its
short term dues. The 0.31 debt to equity ratio is low, in line with the low-debt strategy. Its
interest coverage ratio of 36.01 is also very high, again in line with the low debt strategy.
Going forward these may decrease as earnings and net income decline. The company has a
high dividend policy, resulting in a very low or negative sustainable growth rate. However it
recently decided to suspend dividends due to the market situation. An inconsistency with its
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strategy worth noting is that its operating expenses per vessel are higher than those of its key
competitors even though it operates the youngest fleet (Fig 5.5-1).
DSX DRYS EGLE
(No data)
EXM GNK NM
Fig. 5.5-1: Operating expenses per vessel compared to key competitors
[http://www.wikinvest.coml
5.5.3.5.3 Valuation
5.5.3.5.3.1 Adjustments and Horizon Choice
No asset impairment or other adjustments were deemed necessary following the
accounting analysis. A horizon of 9 years was chosen because the company's charter
contracts span until 2015 and it is reasonable to expect the current market crisis to have
finished, thereby enabling us to make steady long term assumptions beyond that point.
5.5.3.5.3.2 Revenue Projections
Revenues were projected using current charters and futures on the Cape and Panamax
Baltic indices for the non-contracted periods. We also know from quarterly reports that
revenues for first three quarters of 2009 were $180,700,000. Table 5.5-7 shows the revenue
projections for each ship and Table 5.5-8 shows the total revenue projections along with year
on year growth.
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$5.25K
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$3.75K
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REVENUE PROJECTIONS
Ship Q42009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Coronis 1,225,000 6,300,000 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Erato 1,312,500 6,941,667 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Naias 1,662,500 6,562,500 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Clio 962,500 6,300,000 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Calipso 822,500 6,160,000 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Protefs 5,162,500 20,650,000 13,300,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Thetis 918,750 6,256,250 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Dioni 1,050,000 4,725,000 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Danae 1,050,000 4,200,000 6,066,667 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Oceanis 1,575,000 6,300,000 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Triton 1,487,500 5,979,167 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Alcyon 3,018,750 12,075,000 12,075,000 11,506,250 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Nirefs 5,293,750 9,595,833 5,950,000 5,600,000 5,250,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Norfolk 6,540,625 26,162,500 26,162,500 26,162,500 9,238,542 7,000,000 7,000,000
Aliki 3,937,500 9,450,000 11,025,000 8,400,000 7,700,000 7,000,000 7,000,000
Salt Lake City 4,882,500 19,530,000 19,530,000 15,703,333 7,700,000 7,000,000 7,000,000
Sideris GS 3,325,000 12,250,000 9,450,000 8,400,000 7,700,000 7,000,000 7,000,000
Semirio 2,712,500 10,850,000 9,916,667 8,400,000 7,700,000 7,000,000 7,000,000
Boston 4,550,000 18,200,000 12,937,838 8,400,000 7,700,000 7,000,000 7,000,000
Houston 3,208,333 19,250,000 9,450,000 8,400,000 7,700,000 7,000,000 7,000,000
New York 0 13,300,000 16,800,000 16,800,000 16,800,000 16,800,000 7,816,667
(Mar2010)
Table 5.5-7: Revenue Projections by Ship
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues ($M) 235.4 231.0 206.2 179.4 140.5 123.0 120.5
Growth -30.23% -1.85% -10.74% -13.02% -21.68% -7.82% -6.94%
Table 5.5-8: Aggregate Revenue and Revenue Growth Projections for DSX
A revenue growth of 5% was assumed thereafter in perpetuity. This is relatively high
but is in line with industry expectations since the market is directly linked to that of
developing countries (major cargos are iron ore and coal) such as China and India. Delivery
of a new ship takes about 2 years in the current market. This assumes no secondhand ships or
"resales" will be bought and that newbuildings will be ordered again in about 3 to 4 years
after the older ships in the market have been scrapped and the market begins to recover.
5.5.3.5.3.3 Remaining Projections
The bulk of costs varies with ship ownership days. Over the past 3 years the average
for DSX was -$8800/day. Costs decreased after the market crash so I assume a constant rate
of $8000/day going forward. Ownership days are based on the company not increasing its
fleet size until 2015, after which point they grow with revenues (daily rates are assumed
constant). Table 5.5-9 shows the cost projections.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Ownership 5,813 4,897 6,913 6,996 7,239 7,300 7,300 7,300 7,300 7,300 7,665 8,048 8,451
Days
COGS ($/ 6,245 10,169 9,938 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000
ShipDay)
COGS 36.3 49.8 68.7 56.0 57.9 58.4 58.4 58.4 58.4 58 61 64 68
($M)
Table 5.5-9: Cos projections for DSX
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To project the book value of assets, depreciation was projected using the company's
method. That is linearly depreciating ships to 25 years of age at which point they are worth
their scrap value at a price of $150/ltd (lightship ton). The total residual value of the fleet was
estimated at $50M. Other assets are very low but they were projected to increase with
revenues. This ignores economies of scale for conservativeness because the company has
indicated that it is reaching capacity and approaching the point of diseconomies of scale (it
has expanded greatly over the past few years). The cash on its balance sheet was reduced
going forward because it is preparing to make its final shipyard installment in March 2010.
Cash was then also projected to grow with revenues in line with the company's policy of
maintaining $400,000 per vessel in liquid assets. The financial projections are summarized in
Table 5.5-10.
Financial Projections
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Ships 18 18 20 20 20 20 20 20 21 22.05
Revenue 337.4 235.4 231.0 206.2 179.4 140.5 129.5 120.5 126.5 132.9
Ships B. Val 960.4 995.9 964.5 927.9 892.8 859.1 826.7 795.6 765.8 737.2
Depreciation 42.7 46.5 36.6 35.1 33.7 32.4 31.1 29.8 28.6
Other Assets 69.0 60.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 52.5
Total Assets 1,029.4 1,055.9 994.5 967.9 942.8 909.1 876.7 845.6 815.8 789.7
COGS 68.7 56.0 57.9 58.4 58.4 58.4 58.4 58.4 61.3 64.4
NOPAT 225.4 136.8 126.6 111.2 85.9 48.4 38.7 31.0 35.4 39.9
Table 5.5-10: Financial Projections for DSX
Net working Capital over revenues has been highly volatile and occasionally
negative. That is highly attributable to deferred revenues which include received but
unearned charter payments and the value of charters attached to vessels that are being
acquired (when the rate is different from market rates). Going forward, most charters will be
under period contracts which are paid periodically throughout the charter so this item will
decrease making NWC positive. A value of 2% was chosen for the long term and projections
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over the next few years beginning from zero and gradually approaching that value. The
resulting projections are shown in Table 5.5-11.
KEYASSUMPTIONS
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
REVENUESg 30.23% -1.85% -10.74% -13.02% -21.68% -7.82% -6.94% 5.00% 5.00%
NOPATM. 58.10% 54.81% 53.94% 47.87% 34.44% 29.91% 25.76% 27.97% 29.99%
NWC/Revenues 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
Assets/Revenues 417.4% 450.0% 1497.8% 611.5% 638.4% 660.2% 605.2% 554.8%
Table 5.5-11. Key Assumotions for DSX Valuation
5.5.3.5.3.4 Long Term Projections
Long term assumptions are based on long term historical averages while it is assumed
that the company will maintain a ratio of approximately 2 Panamaxes per Cape in the long
term. Tables 5.5-12 and 5.5-13 show the analysis and results.
LONG TERM ASSUMPTIONS
Value Earnings/da Expenses/da NOPAT M. Assets/Revenue
y y s
Cape 40,000,00 25,000 9,000 0.64 4.57
0
PMX 25,000,00 12,500 6,000 0.52 5.71
0
Weighted 30,000,00 16,667 7,000 0.56 5.33
Average 0
Table 5.5-12: Lona Term Assumption Analysis for DSX
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TERMINAL VALUE ASSUMPTIONS
Terminal Value
Revenues Growth 5%
Nopat Margin 56%
NWC/Revenues 2%
Assets/Revenues 533%
Table 5.5-13: Long Term Assumption Results
5.5.3.5.4 Results & Sensitivity Analysis
5.5.3.5.4.1 Expected Results
Applying the valuation models, using the above assumptions, we get a share value of
$12.38. The share is currently trading at $15.88. Perhaps that is because the market expects
the company to take advantage of the low market prices and grow through the crisis. That is
indeed the intention of the management (as of many other shipping companies). I assumed no
fleet expansion until 2015 because of the current difficulty of raising finance, the market
conditions and future outlook, and the fact that the company has expanded rapidly and will
need some time to digest this growth and bring down its expenses to cope with new market
levels. This is compensated for by assuming a relatively high 5% growth in perpetuity
beyond 2015. We will also carry out a "best case" and "worst case" scenario by modifying
our assumptions.
5.5.3.5.4.2 Worst Case (Charter Contract Cancellation Scenario)
It is assumed that the company is forced to renegotiate all its contracts down to
market rates. This is somewhat extreme but no asset impairments are made. The consequence
is a worse decline in Earnings and NOPAT margins while Assets/Revenues are forced up (no
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asset impairment). NWC/Revenues is left the same, earning days are kept at 350/year and
long term assumptions are adjusted to 4% growth and 50% NOPAT/Revenues. The resulting
projections are in Table 5.5-14. The Share value under these assumptions becomes $9.81
KEYASSUMPTIONS
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
REVENUES g 35.79% -15.33% -12.30% -7.76% -6.37% -6.80% 6.94% 0.00% 5.00%
NOPA TM. 54.47% 43.08% 40.96% 36.98% 33.71% 29.91% 25.76% 27.97% 29.99%
NWC/Revenues 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
Assets/Revenues 525.7% 576.7% 601.6% 618.2% 638.4% 660.2% 605.2% 554.8%
Table 5.5-14: Worst Case Key Assumptions
5.5.3.5.4.3 Best Case (Fleet Expansion Scenario)
Under the best case scenario, no charter renegotiations are made. The fleet grows by
an additional Cape and two Panamaxes every year from 2010 onwards. The price at which
these assets are acquired is assumed to vary with the futures value for average daily earnings
of the given calendar year. These new additions are chartered at rates given by futures for
each period. This pushes revenues and assets up and NOPAT margins down. That is because
market charter rates are lower than the average contract rates of the company since its high
rate charters are not renegotiated.
Earning days per year are increased from 350 in the base scenario to 360. This is
assisted by the new additions which help keep the average age low. Costs per ship day are
adjusted down to 6,000 which is close to the industry average, assuming some EOS with the
fleet expansion. Long term growth is kept at 5%, while NOPAT/Revenues is increased to
65%. The resulting projections are in Table 5.5-15. These assumptions bring the share value
up to $14.34
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KEY ASSUMPTIONS
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
REVENUESg 29.8% 12.4% -12.2% -12.6% -20.2% -7.8% 6.1% 5.00% 5.00%
NOPATM. 64.3% 64.6% 60.6% 52.0% 36.6% 27.9% 19.7% 20.3% 21.0%
NWC/Revenues 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
Assets/Revenues 395.8% 462.6% 539.7% 686.7% 752.3% 809.1% 777.5% 746.4%
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Table 5.5-15. Worst Case Key Assumptions
5.5.3.5.5 Summary of Valuation
In order to predict a share value equal to the $15.88 at which the share is trading,
some aggressive assumptions are necessary. This can be done by assuming the best case
scenario and adjusting the long term annual revenues growth to 6.5%. To conclude, even
though the company compares very favorably to its major competitors, and while analysts
currently suggest buying the share at $15.88, my assumptions and forecasts indicate that it is
currently overvalued.
Its key advantages are low leverage and probability of breaching loan covenants, the
fact that assets currently don't have to be impaired, that it might be in a position to take
advantage of low market prices for growth, and that a big portion of future revenues is
secured under long term charters. Its key disadvantages are the bad prospects of the market,
that it must rely on a few big charterers to keep paying above-market rates, and that potential
contract renegotiations may necessitate asset value impairments.
5.5.3.5.6 Asset Value Extraction
While ship values were assumed to carry out the impairment test, they were not part
of the valuation. We made assumptions about future earnings, which could have been used
directly in a ship valuation. Nevertheless, we can still make some crude assumptions to
extract ship values from our valuation and the share price.
Our base case scenario values the equity at $929.4M ($12.38/share). The company's
total liabilities stand at $281.7M. For simplicity, we take the debt at face value instead of
deducting the value of a put option to account for expected default losses following Merton's
model. This brings the asset value to $1.21Bn. In its Dec 2008 report, non-ship assets
(including intangibles) amounted to $98M. Assuming this is still true, we get a total value for
the fleet equal to $1.1Bn.
The next step is to distribute the total fleet value to the individual ships. We will do
that by assigning points to each ship, that are roughly proportional to its value. A new Cape
is equivalent to 1 point. Using the company's straight line depreciation approach a 25 year
old Cape is worth its scrap value, which we can assume is approximately 10% of the value of
a new ship. Therefore, a 25-year old Cape is equivalent to 0.1 points, and each year of age
decreases the ship's points by 0.036. Based on the industry rules of thumb, we multiply the
points of a Cape by 2/3 for a Panamax. The fleet list and the points per ship are summarized
in Table 5.5-16.
The total number of points of the fleet were 13.46. This is the equivalent of new
Capes. Dividing the fleet value ($1.lBn) by the number of points brings the value of a new
Cape to $82.8M. We can use the point ratio to value Capes of different ages and we can
repeat the analysis with the trading value of the stock ($15.88/share) to repeat the valuation.
The results are summarized in Table 5.5-17. both sets of results are slightly higher than
actual values, perhaps because the company underestimates its non-ship assets, which we
have used to arrive at the fleet value.
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SHIP DWT BLT POINTS
Coronis 74381 2006 0.570667
Erato 74444 2004 0.522667
Naias 73546 2006 0.570667
Clio 73691 2005 0.546667
Calipso 73691 2005 0.546667
Protefs 73630 2004 0.522667
Thetis 73585 2004 0.522667
Dioni 75172 2001 0.450667
Danae 75106 2001 0.450667
Oceanis 75211 2001 0.450667
Triton 75336 2001 0.450667
Alcyon 75247 2001 0.450667
Nirefs 75311 2001 0.450667
Norfolk 164,218 2002 0.712
Aliki 180235 2005 0.82
Salt Lake City 171810 2005 0.82
Sideris GS 174186 2006 0.856
Semirio 174261 2007 0.892
Boston 177828 2007 0.892
Houston 177729 2009 0.964
New York (Mar2010) 177000 2010 1
Table 5.5-16: Point Allocation to DSX Fleet for Asset Value Allocation
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Ship Age Points Valuation Trading Value
0 1 $82.77 $102.29
5 0.82 $67.87 $83.88
10 0.64 $52.98 $65.47
15 0.46 $38.08 $47.05
20 0.28 $23.18 $28.64
Table 5.5-17: Extracted CaRe Values based on Equity Valuation and Equity Trading Price
5.6 New Valuation Model
5.6.1 Critique and Choice of Valuation Approach
One approach would be to do company valuations and extract the asset values from
the results. The advantage of this approach is that company valuations can be referenced
from other analyses for verifications, many companies exist so averaging out the results may
eliminate errors, and we have several methods such as multiples based, DCF, the accounting
approach etc. There are however two major problems with this method. First, the company
valuation relies on a valuation of the assets, which we are trying to extract, or on a projection
of future earnings which relies on forecasting the asset earnings. This defeats the purpose of
the exercise.
We can get around this by using the market cap of the company, averaged over a
period of time, as our valuation. The value at which a company is traded implies a value of
its assets as viewed by the investors. We can extract that value by considering the firm's
assets, its share price and the number of outstanding shares. For a liquid share, this should
give a reliable estimate of the total asset value. However, this does not overcome the second
limitation which is that the assets of most publicly traded companies consists of other types
and sizes of ships as well as non-ship assets. Furthermore, the capes in the fleet will be of
various sizes and ages and with various time charters attached. In order to extract the value of
a particular cape, we will have to make an assumption about the value of the remaining
assets. This will obviously introduce unacceptable errors in our valuation.
The comparables based approach has been applied by brokers using rules of thumb
coupled with intuition and experience. Though comparables based models have not been
published, this approach is by far been the most widely used in the industry. Its major
limitation is that it relies on similar sales that have been conducted very recently and that
qualify as willing-buyer willing-seller. These are often not available, particularly during a
sudden downturn of the market as the one that was experienced after the credit crunch at the
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end of 2008. This limitation led to the development of other approaches such as the Shadow-
Pricing approach and the Hamburg Valuation.
Another major limitation of this approach, which holds even when there are
qualifying comparables, is that it takes the view that the market has it right. This means that
the sale on which the valuation will be based was at the "right" price. This approximation is
becoming less valid as the mix of owners is becoming more complex. Publicly traded
companies, for instance, value newer ships and immediate earnings disproportionately
compared to private companies. They also finance their acquisitions through equity and often
even pay in stock as opposed to having to raise debt which can be difficult for private
companies at times. The relevant differences between private and public companies have
been analyzed in great detail in Section 5.3. As a result, it would not be appropriate for a
private owner to base a valuation on a comparable acquisition or disposal by a public
company. This explains why most of the prompt-delivery resale acquisitions, that involved a
very significant premium over newbuilding orders, have been conducted by listed companies
over the past several years, whereas most of the newbuilding orders were placed primarily by
private companies.
Shadow pricing was developed to overcome the problem of limited comparables. It
provides a good rough estimate relative to historical multiples but no more than that. Future
expectations of the market are the main driver or ship values. By valuing ships based on
multiples of current earnings that have been derived from historic data, shadow pricing
implicitly assumes that future market expectations are related to current market levels in the
same way they have been in the past. This is clearly a bad approximation since the shape of
the forward curve is not constant over time. Forward curves have been examined in Section
2.8. The forward curve today is much flatter than in was in 2008 when the market was
multiple times higher. That means that people were then expecting a much bigger decline in
daily earnings than they are today. This should surely impact ship values but is not captured
by the shadow pricing model. Furthermore other parameters such as operating costs and
interest rates also change over time and have to be accounted for.
Hamburg Valuation is a more scientific approach but the motives in its development
were questionable and that explains several of its crude assumptions. One of those is the cost
of equity, which is based on US bond returns (plus a spread) and is only 7.63%. Another one
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is the use of 10-year average earnings to project future revenues at a time when the market
outlook and futures point to significantly lower rates over a long period of time. A third
example is the approximation of the residual value as 3.45 times the scrap value for 20 year
old bulk carriers. Besides these crude approximations that point to a higher valuation, the
main limitation of the Hamburg Valuation is the use of recent historical average data as
opposed to forward looking data.
We will use DCF. If applied correctly, the 3 approaches should yield exactly the same
result. Of the 3 approaches, since we assume no income taxes, the APV is essentially the
same as WACC. To apply FTE, we have to determine the bank installments which means
that we have to know the initial amount borrowed. This requires our knowledge of the ship
value which is what we are set to find. In order to avoid having to take this iterative
approach, we can use the WACC method.
Another choice would be to use forward views on ship values and carry out a
valuation taking a no-arbitrage approach. In Section 2.6.3, we derived a forward curve on
ship values based on newbuilding prices. The limitations of this approach are that the
forward curve goes out only up to 5 years, and it only applies to new ships. Options on ship
values were at some point introduced but the liquidity was too low and they were
discontinued. This approach could potentially be combined with the model that we will
develop if in the future these options become liquid enough.
5.6.2 Proposed Valuation Model
Having decided that the WACC method is the most relevant valuation approach, we
will make use of the findings in the thesis so far to develop and apply a model for the
valuation of capes. Using futures, determined probabilities of crack failure, repair costs and
operating expenses, we can predict the expected monthly unlevered free cash flows
throughout the ship's life. Discounting them to the present with an adjusted Weighted
Average Cost of Capital (WACC) should yield the ship's value as per the WACC method.
Under the WACC method, the net present value of a project or a company is as follows:
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N0 UCFNPV = ( + t - InitialInvestment (5.6-1)
t=1 (1+ rWACC)t
Where: t = Measure of time (typically years)
UCFt = Unlevered cash flows at time "t"
NPV = Net present value of the project or company
rwACC = Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Initial Investment = Cost invested at t =0
The unlevered cash flows of a company are conventionally defined as follows
UCF = EBITDA - CAPEX - ANWC (5.6-2)
Where: EBITDA: Earnings Before Interest Depreciation and Amortization
CAPEX: Capital Expenses
ANWC: Changes in Net Working Capital
Note that in Eq. 5.6-1, the initial investment, which occurs at the beginning (t=0), has
been pulled out of the summation and that is why the summation begins with t=1 as opposed
to t=0. We can pull this back in and start the summation at t=0. Furthermore, we will switch
the parameter "t" for time with "n" which indicates the number of months from the
investment date. Also, note that to get a valuation, we must assume that the net present value
of the project is zero, meaning that an investor would be indifferent between undertaking the
project or not. In place of WACC, we will be using an adjusted discount rate which will be a
function of time (function of "n"). Making these adjustments and substituting Eq. 5.6-2 in
Eq. 5.6-1, we get:
c EBITDA - CAPEX, - ANWCn = 0
I (+ n -(5.6-3)
n=o (+.
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When we are dealing with the unlevered free cash flows of a ship, our expected
EBITDA is essentially equal to the expected revenues minus the expected operating costs. In
our model, we will quantify the expected revenue losses and expected additional costs due to
crack failures as a separate term which is equal to the probability of failure times the failure
cost.
The net working capital is the amount of liquidity required to run the business on a
daily basis (current assets minus current liabilities). This is cash that is not available to the
extract, so any changes in net working capital should be deducted from the free cash flows.
Changes in net working capital usually result from factors that require an increase in the cash
held by a company. This may be due to an increase in volatility, or an expansion of the
company. Since we are dealing with a single ship, the changes in net working capital from
one period to the next will be small. In our model, the small changes in net working capital
are captured under management fees that are paid by the ship owner to the managing
company. These are included under operating expenses. Therefore, we have:
EBITDA, - ANWC, = Rev, - OpEx- - P(fail), FailCost (5.6-4)
The capital expenses in a ship include the investment cost i.e. the ship value at n=O
which we are trying to identify, plus the repair costs throughout the ship's life. Therefore, we
have:
CAPEXn= = ShipValue (s.6-5)
CAPEXn>0 = RepCost, (5.6-6)
We will use the convention that all cash flows occur at the end of the time interval i.e.
the end of each month. For "n=O" the only cash flow is the ship value (part of CAPEX). All
other revenues and costs are equal to zero since they correspond to the month before the ship
is acquired. Therefore, we have:
777
Revo = OpExo = P(fail)0 FailCost =0 (5.6-7)
We have a assumed a life of 27.5 years meaning that a ship will be scrapped just
before the intermediate survey after the 5th special survey. This assumption has been
discussed in the previous chapters and seems to be close to what the market has historically
assumed. Due to the discounting this will have an insignificant impact on the valuation.
Using 27.5 years as the ship's lifetime means that "n" will start from zero and increase until
330 months minus the ship's age today in months. Pulling everything together and
substituting into Eq. 5.6-3, we get our valuation model as follows:
Ship Value =
Li-Ageo Rev, - OpEx, - Rep Cost, - P(fail), FailCostZa (1+i,)"
(5.6-8)
Ship Value:
n:
Revo:
Life:
Revn:
OpExpn:
RepCosts,:
P(fail)n:
FailCost:
Ship Value Today
Month of ship's life
Ship's age today (in months)
Number of months in ship's life (27.5 years = 330 months)
Revenues during month "n"
Operating expenses during month "n"
Repair costs during month "n"
Probability of failure due to cracks during month "n"
Cost of failure due to cracks
Discount rate for month "n"
An important aspect of the proposed valuation model is that we will be using forward
looking data wherever possible to quantify the required parameters. This applies to both
numerator and denominator terms. Traditional valuation approaches, including the Hamburg
Valuation Method, which is the current state of the art in ship valuation, are based on
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Where:
historical data. As Nobel Laureate Robert C. Merton would put it, this is equivalent to
driving on the highway at 60mph while looking at the rear view mirror. The analogy is
particularly true for the volatile shipping industry where the previous decade has been
completely different from the one before, and completely different from the current market
outlook for the next one.
The great advantage of using forward looking data when possible is that they can
simply be hedged through derivatives markets. In other words, if one disagrees about the
projections, they can simply bet on their beliefs and make money. So there is nothing to
argue about regarding the relevance of forward looking projections. On the other hand,
traditional models that are based on historical data or market forecasts, can be manipulated to
produce distorted results and can be easily disputed. Put in other words, there is nothing to
assure you that the previous ten years will repeat themselves or that some analyst's forecasts
(on which a valuation is based) will materialize. If on the other hand you want insurance on
the forward looking projections, you can simply get it by trading derivatives accordingly.
In the valuation formula (5.6-6), the parameter "n" is in months meaning that we will
assume a monthly time period as opposed to annual. This avoids the approximation that all
earnings and costs are incurred at the end of each year. Note that "n" contains information
simultaneously about the time we are in and about the ship's age at that time. The parameters
in the numerator are functions time or ship age or both, so for a given ship valuation, they are
defined by the month "n".
One could make the argument that each of the parameters of the numerator should be
discounted at a different discount rate. That is because different risks are associated with
each of them. For example, operating expenses and repair costs are more certain than
revenues and therefore should be discounted at a lower discount rate. However, the widely
adopted convention is to calculate the expected net profits or cash flows for each period and
discount those at a discount rate related to the riskiness of the overall profits. Furthermore,
note that at the extreme, the alternative could lead to a negative net present value even for an
expected positive net profit in each of the future time periods.
Note that it would also be convenient to apply a discount factor using continuous
compounding. We choose monthly discounting to keep the model simple and accessible to a
wider audience. We will need continuous compounding to incorporate the hazard function
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(risk due to crack failures) into the discount rate before converting back to monthly
discounting. This will be carried out in the final stage of determining the discount rate.
5.6.3 The Discount Rate
5.6.3.1 Cost of Equity
5.6.3.1.1 Introduction
The cost of equity is the minimum expected return which an investor requires in order
to carry out an investment. This is quite ambiguous and varies across investors so analysts
use rules of thumb and great judgment with some guidance from approximate models. In
general, the higher the risk in an investment, the higher the required return. Risk can be
systematic, meaning that it is due to market fluctuations, or idiosyncratic to the specific
investment.
Though there is big room for speculation, the cost of equity will have a significant
influence on valuations so it is worthwhile spending time and effort to get a reasonable
estimate. There are several types of investors in the cape industry who probably have
different required returns. One reason for this is that some are well diversified, while others
have a limited ability to diversify the idiosyncratic risk away, and therefore have to be
compensated for it. Therefore, the industry ownership structure is of great relevance in our
valuation.
As of March 2010, there are 994 Capes in the world fleet. 671 of these are owned by
50 companies. Fig. 5.6-1 shows the number of capes in each of these 50 fleets. The
remaining one third of the world fleet (323 Capes) is owned by 175 owners (an average of
1.85 Capes per owner). For convenience, we will define 4 categories of owners. These are
large public companies, small public companies, large rivate companies and small private
companies.
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Examples of large private companies from the top 50 list in Fig. 5.6-21 include
Angelicoussis (22), Cardiff Marine (20), Enterprises Shipping (13), Polembros (12), Alpha
Tankers (11), Carras Hellas (7), Marmaras (6) and Neda Maritime (6). They are privately
held companies with estimated annual revenues measured in $looMs. The brackets indicate
the number of capes in each company's fleet.
Small private companies are not present in the top 50 list. They are companies with
annual revenues below $100M. The average company of this group would own
approximately 2 Capes, 7 Panamaxes and 3 Handies or Handymaxes, with total annual
revenues of -$75M for 2009.
Large public companies include Mitsui (45), COSCO (43), NYK (42), Zodiac (37), K
Line (14) etc. They are companies with various operations in and out of shipping, various
kinds of fleets including capes, and whose annual revenues are in the billions. This group
also includes cargo owners such as Vale (13).
Small Public include Genmar (9), Navios (8), Diana (8) and Excel (6) from the top 50
list. They are comparable in size to the average large private company, with revenues in
$looMs.
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Cape Industry Structure (Top 50 Owners)
Capes in Fleet
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines
China Ocean (COSCO)
Nippon Yusen Kaisha
Kawasaki Kisen
Zodiac Maritime Agy.
Angelicoussis Group
Hanjin Shpg Co.
Cardiff Marine Inc.
HOSCO
BW Ltd.
General Ore Corp.
Shoei Kisen K.K.
Chang Myung Shipping
Korea Line
Vale
CMB N.V.
Enterprises Shpg.
Polembros Shpg.
Hyundai M.M.
U-Ming Marine Tran.
China Steel Corp
Tai Chong Cheang
L. Alpha Tankers & Frt.
0) Nissen Kalun K.K.
C Nippon Steel Shpg.
Sincere Navigation
General Maritime0 Toyo Sangyo Co.
Shinwa Kalun Kaisha
Navios Maritime
Fredriksen Group
Sanko S.S.
STX Pan Ocean
Diana Shipping Inc.
Sea Star Ships
C Transport Maritime
Reederel H. Vogemann
Sinokor Merchant Mar
Carras Hellas
Ocean Longevity
ZOSCO
Neda Maritime Agency
Marmaras Nav. Ltd.
Daiichi Chuo
Dong-A Tanker Co.
TMT Co. Ltd.
Chinese Mar. Trans.
Asahi Shpg. Co.
Kumiai Senpaku K.K.
Excel Maritime Carr.
Fig. 5.6-1: March-2010 Top 50 Cape Fleets (671 capes out of 994 in World Fleet)
Table 5.6-1 attempts to quantify the individual market share the 4 groups. The first
column refers to the top 50 owners in Fig. 5.6-1. The remaining third of the world fleet (323
ships) is treated separately before aggregating the results in the last two columns. The
estimated public versus private ownership split is approximately 55 to 45.
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INVESTOR TYPE Ships from % of Ships from Total % of
Top 50 Remaining Remaining Number of World
List Fleet Fleet Ships Fleet
PUBLIC LARGE 373 10% 32 405 41%
PUBLIC SMALL 95 15% 48 143 14%
PRIVATE LARGE 203 25% 81 284 29%
PRIVATE SMALL 0 50% 162 162 16%
Total 671 100% 323 994 100%
Table 5.6-1: % of World Fleet Owned by the 4 Defined Investor Groups
The reason for developing Table 5.6-1, was to determine the weights that we will
apply on the cost of capital of each investor group to determine a weighted average that we
will use in the valuation. One could argue that the investor with the cost of capital that yields
the highest valuation will be the ultimate buyer, so only the lowest cost of capital is relevant.
However, there are three major counterarguments to this.
First, the valuation depends on the discount rate but also on financial projections,
which will vary between investors. As a result, acquisitions are made by all investor groups.
Otherwise, we would only have one investor group, which is clearly not the case. Second,
even if everyone has similar needs and projections, as the investor with the lowest cots of
capital buys enough, they stop competing for acquisitions, so the cost of capital of the other
investors, who are now the buyers, becomes relevant. Third, the transaction price does not
only depend on the valuation of the buyer but also on the valuation of the seller, who most
likely will be from a different investor group. Lastly it is reasonable to assume that as owners
renew their fleets, setting relative fleet growth rates aside, future transactions will be carried
out in a roughly equal proportion between investor groups as the current ownership structure
of the world fleet. Therefore, it is a good approximation to use a weighted average cost of
capital, based on the weights determined in Table 5.6-1.
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5.6.3.1.2 Short Overview of Build-Up Method
We will employ the build-up method to compute the cost of capital for each of the 4
classes of investors. This method is based on the principle that higher returns are required for
riskier investments. We start from the risk free asset, and add risk premiums for various
classes of risk to get to the cost of capital.
Starting from the risk-free rate, we employ the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
which accounts for systematic risk (market risk). This will require a list of comparable
companies whose operations are primarily dry bulk shipping (preferably capes). CAPM
assumes that the investors are well diversified so that idiosyncratic risk is eliminated. This is
a reasonable approximation for listed companies, but significant adjustments will be required
for private companies.
An alternative framework will be discussed for determining the parameters required
for the CAPM, using a completely forward looking approach. This will be based on the
Black-Scholes option pricing formula and will not require comparables. Unfortunately, the
approach cannot yet be applied in its complete form because the shipping derivatives markets
have not matured to an adequate level. However, some of its elements can be applied and
will be used to verify the results from the comparables based approach. The method may
become more useful as the required prices become observable in the market. This is likely as
the derivatives market is expanding and more instruments are being introduced. A SWAP on
container rates was recently introduced by Clarksons, while tanker FFAs have now started
being traded in terms of $/day as opposed to World Scale.
The first adjustment on CAPM is to account for the risk due to leverage. Adding debt
increases the riskiness of the firm and that affects our calculation of the required returns.
Adjusting for this requires "un-levering" the betas of the comparable firms using their debt to
equity ratio. This yields the unlevered beta or asset beta. Next, we have to account for excess
cash on the balance sheets of our comparables to strip out its effect on the beta. This will
leave us with the operating asset betas. We will then take an average across our comparables
to net out company-specific errors. That will yield the unlevered beta, which is applicable to
well diversified investors.
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For the case of private investors, we will employ a method described by [Damodaran
2002] in order to add back idiosyncratic risk to the unlevered beta and remove it from a well
diversified portfolio perspective. This will give us the "total beta", which is applicable to
private companies.
Having the applicable unlevered betas for public and private companies, we will re-
lever them using our debt to equity ratio which will be a function of time. Multiplying the
resulting equity betas by the historic market risk premium will give us the adjusted CAPM
premium over the risk free rate. Note that the risk free rate also varies with time. The next
step will be to add risk premiums based on company-size, industry/company-specific risks,
illiquidity, control and patient capital. These will be determined separately for each type of
investor based on estimates and methodologies developed by earlier studies. Finally, a
weighed average of the resulting returns on equity will be determined.
Note that the build up method does not end here. Some identical adjustments have to
be made to the cost of equity and to the cost of debt. These include inflation and the risk
premium due to potential crack failures, and will be incorporated directly to the WACC after
accounting for the cost of debt. Table 5.6-2 shows an outline of the procedure to get to the
cost of equity and to the final discount rate which will be a function of time.
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Risk / Adjustment Type Method Result
Start with Risk Free Rate (T = time)
+ Systematic Risk CAPM
- Leverage Risk Un-lever Betas Unlevered Betas
- Excess Cash Effect Asset-Weighted Beta Operating Asset Betas
- Company Specific Errors Take Average Operating Asset Beta
+ Idiosyncratic Risk (Private Comp) "Total Beta" Total Beta
± Leverage Risk: D/E (t) Re-Lever Betas Levered Beta (t)
± Size/Company/Industry Risks Previous Studies Cost of Equity (T) for
+ Illiquidity / Control and Patient each investor type
Capital Premiums
Combine Costs of Equity Weighted Average Cost of Equity (T)
Account for Debt/Equity time (T) Weighed Average WACC (T)
Account for Inflation (-r) Subtract Inflation (,r) Inf. Adjusted WACC (T)
Account for Risk due to Cracks Incorporate Hazard Hazard-Adjusted
Function WACC (Discount Rate)
Table 5.6-2: Build-Up Method to Calculate the Discount Rate
5.6.3.1.3 The Risk Free Rate
The risk free rate is the highest rate of return to which an investor has access with
zero risk. The return on US T-Bills is typically used as a proxy to the risk free rate. Ship
owners often keep cash in bank deposits on which they earn LIBID minus a spread. As a rule
of thumb, LIBID is -0. 125% below LIBOR. Fig. 5.6-2 shows the yield curves for both
Treasuries and Libor as of March 19, 2010.
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Fig. 5.6-2: Treasury Yield and Libor Swap Curves as of March 19, 2010 [WSJ 2010al
Since the current yield curves are very similar, it really does not matter which we
choose. However, T-Bills are a better proxy for various reasons. First, they are publicly
traded, accessible to anyone and liquid so their prices are well documented. Bank deposits
are guaranteed by the government up to a maximum of $100,000 per account while several
banks have been bailed out by governments both in the US and in Europe. Therefore, one
could argue that T-Bills are just as safe if not safer than bank deposits. Finally, the published
betas which will form the basis of our return on equity calculations are determined using T-
bills as a proxy for the risk free rate.
T-Bill rates are published daily for various tenures. Average values were taken
between the 28 of February and the 18 of March and are summarized in Table 5.6-3.
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TENURE YIELD ON T-BILLS
1 Months 0.11%
3 Months 0.15%
6 Months 0.22%
1 Year 0.38%
2 Years 0.91%
3 Years 1.44%
5 Years 2.37%
7 Years 3.11%
10 Years 3.68%
20 Years 4.46%
30 Years 4.61%
Table 5.6-3: Inflation as a Function of Tenure Based on TIPS/T-Bill Yield Soreads
By interpolating between the values of Table 5.6-3, we can construct the term
structure of the risk free rate. This is shown in Fig. 5.6-3.
Fig. 5.6-3: Term Structure of Risk Free Rate Based on T-Bill Yields
Fig. 5.6-3 gives us the risk free rate as a function of time, rf (r). This will be the
starting point for determining the cost of equity.
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Term Structure of the Risk Free Rate
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5.6.3.1.4 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
The CAPM estimates the returns on a publicly traded stock as follows:
r = rf +,, (rm -rf)+ a, (5.6-9)
The beta of the stock is calculated by regressing the historical returns on the market
returns using the following formula:
Cov(rj,r,,) _-.O. = ri =M p ' -L (5.6-10)
' Var ( r,, ) ' -,
A beta value equal to 1 implies that the stock is as volatile as the market. A higher
beta indicates a higher volatility which indicates a higher risk and therefore results in a
higher required return. Note, that we are only concerned with the portion of the risk that is
correlated with the market, systematic risk which cannot be diversified. We are not
concerned with the remaining risk because it can be diversified away at negligible cost
without sacrificing expected returns.
A low beta may result from a less volatile stock (i.e. with low stand-alone risk), but it
could also be due to a low correlation with the market. In that case, the stand alone risk of the
stock may be high, but the low calculated required return is justified by the diversification
that the stock offers, which in turn improves the Sharpe Ratio of an investor's portfolio
(slope of the maximum achievable return vs. volatility curve).
The Jensen's alpha term denotes the ability to consistently generate returns higher
than the "fair" value given its risk and is almost always zero due to market efficiency. Since
assets are equal to debt plus equity, we have the following equations:
r = rf +p,(rM -rf ) (5.6-11)
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rD = rf +/1D (rM f) (5.6-12)
rA = rf + pA (rM -rf) (5.6-13)
p8A = D + p )a (5.6-14)D+E D+E (
In fact, Eq. 5.6-7 neglects the effect of interest tax shields or assumes a tax rate of
zero. This is true in our case, since earnings from shipping are typically not taxed. However,
in the general case, since interest is tax deductible, in fact we have:
D D(1-r))pL, U (+E( r)u3D (5.6-5
By assuming a zero tax rate, we get Eq. 5.6-7. By assuming a zero debt beta, we get
the Hamada Formula:
pL U1+D(1 (5.6-16)
The beta of debt is proportional to the correlation of the return on debt with the return
on the market. It is close to zero but 0.2 is typically used for accuracy. Fig. 5.6-4 shows an
estimate of the beta of debt as a function of credit rating of the company.
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Fig. 5.6-4: Beta of Debt vs. Credit Rating [Pratt & Grabowsky 20081
It has been observed that the beta of companies gravitates to the industry average beta
over time and that companies with the biggest errors gravitate faster. Bloomberg
automatically adjusts historical betas to forward looking betas by shifting them towards their
peer group average beta.
The CAPM uses a single factor beta to relate excess returns of a portfolio with excess
returns of the market. However, small stocks (growth stocks) and those with higher book
value of equity to market price ratio (value stocks) significantly outperform the market on
average. Fama and French therefore introduced the Fama-French 3-Factor model to estimates
returns as follows:
r =r, (r -r,)+bSMB+bHML+a (5.6-17)
p3 in this model is analogous to the beta from CAPM but not equal to it since we also
have other factors. SMB stands for "Small (market cap) Minus Big" and HML stands for
"High (book value of equity to price ratio) Minus Low". These parameters measure historic
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returns of growth stocks in excess of large firms and of value stocks in excess of stocks with
lower market price to book ratio. Table 5.6-3 shows values for applying the model as of
March 2010.
January Last 3 Last 12
2010 Months Months
Rm-Rf -3.51 4.79 35.25
SMB 0.43 3.04 18.07
HML 3.51 3.63 40.22
Table 5.6-4: Fama-French Model Data on March 2010 [French 20101
The Fama-French is a more complete and slightly more accurate model. However,
data for CAPM are better documented and more widely accessible. Furthermore, the build up
method allows us to make adjustments to the CAPM returns in order to account for the
additional factors considered in the Fama-French Model as well as others. The return on
equity is given by:
r,(t)= rf (t) +/J,(t) MRP+Z RP (5.6-18)
Where: t: Time
r, (t): Cost of Equity
rf (t): Risk Free Rate
)6e (t): Beta of Equity
MRP: Market Risk Premium
Z RP: Sum of Risk Premiums over CAPM
792
5.6.3.1.5 Cost of Equity for Small Public Firms
To apply the CAPM, we have to create a list of comparable firms. These are chosen
so that their operations are predominantly focused on dry bulk carriers and preferably Capes.
To avoid the need for major adjustments, it is important for the chosen not to be involved in
unrelated operations or have significant unrelated assets on their balance sheets. Furthermore,
our list should be limited to companies with adequate trading history (over 5 years) in order
to obtain reasonable beta estimates. The list of six comparables is summarized in Table 7.
Equity betas of publicly traded companies are published in various sources. These are
the "levered betas" since they take into account the leverage of the firm. To un-lever those
betas, we must use the following formula:
piA = D D + e =WD/3D wefe (5.6-19)D+E D+E
By assuming a typical value of 0.2 for the debt beta, we calculate the "asset beta" or
"unlevered beta". The data on comparables was sourced from their 10-K forms, [Bloomberg
2010], [Googlefinance 2010], [Yahoofinance 2010] and [Trade-Ideas 2010]. Table 5.6-5 lists
the comparables along with their (published) equity betas, their debt structure and the
unlevered betas. Fig. 5.6-5 shows their market share in the global dry bulk industry.
Equity Beta Debt (M) Equity (M) Assets (M) Asset Beta
DRYSHIPS 3.63 2,994 2,805 5,799 1.86
EXCEL 3.09 1,827 1,401 3,228 1.45
DIANA 1.60 307 971 1,278 1.26
NAVIOS 2.98 1,908 894 2,801 1.09
GENCO 2.40 1,408 929 2,337 1.07
EGLE 2.52 988 620 1,608 1.09
Table 5.6-5: Beta Un-levering of Comparables
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Fig. 5.6-5: Dry Bulk Market Share of Comparables [wikinvest 2009a]
It is important to have a complete understanding of the full set of assets of a company
when applying this model. This includes assets both on and off the accounting balance sheet.
[Jin et al 2006) demonstrated the importance of considering the "true balance sheet"
particularly for company with large pension funds. They showed examples where operating
asset betas are overstated by between 32% and 139%, which result in huge errors in the cost
of capital and valuations. That is because only the net assets of pension funds are recorded in
a company's balance sheet, so the beta of the full assets and debt in the pension funds is
wrongfully omitted. Constructing a "Risk Balance Sheet" is often helpful when faced with
complicated situations.
In our case, we don't have pension funds but extra care is needed in choosing
comparables without hidden assets that are irrelevant to Capes. Along those lines, an
important adjustment is that for excess cash on the balance sheet. Excess cash typically has a
beta of zero. The right amount of cash required to run a company depends on the industry
and can be quoted as a percentage of revenues or a percentage of Assets. Not much guidance
is available on this but we can take the average of our listed companies as an estimate of the
right amount of cash. Due to the rapidly changing environment in the shipping industry, we
will replace annual revenues with 4 times the quarterly revenues of the quarter during which
we have the cash held on the balance sheet.
We calculate the average percentage cash of total assets and the average percentage
cash over 4 times quarterly revenues. This yields two estimates of the "right" amount of cash.
By subtracting this value from each firm's cash, we get two values of excess cash, from
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which we take the average. Only positive values are recorded and the rest are set to zero.
Table 5.6-6 shows the results of this analysis.
Cash Cash/ Cash/ Excess Cash
Implied Excess Cash ($M)
($M) 4*QRev Assets ($M)
Rev. Asset Average
Implied Implied
DRYS 693.2 89.6% 12.0% 247 143 195 195
EXCEL 94.6 13.6% 2.9% -308 -212 -260 0
DIANA 251.6 108.1% 19.7% 117 130 124 124
NAVIOS 275.1 42.8% 9.8% -95 9 -43 0
GENCO 188.3 48.9% 8.1% -34 -34 -34 0
EGLE 72.3 43.0% 4.5% -25 -80 -52 0
Average 57.7% 9.5%
Table 5.6-6: Excess Cash Calculation
To be more accurate, we would have to go back and perform this calculation over
time in order to calculate the average amount of excess cash that was held by the company
throughout the period over which the betas were calculated. In this case, however, we have a
very small percentage of excess cash in our comparables to justify that analysis. To remove
the effect of excess cash and determine the beta of operating assets, we use the weighted
average formulae:
aA= ( opA + ExA I T AAl'P C TA )JX
Where: TA =OpA+ ExA
(5.6-20)
(5.6-21)
i.e. total assets are equal to operating assets plus excess assets (mainly excess cash), for
which the beta is taken to be zero. It follows that the company's operating asset beta is:
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/8OpA ( TA [ (ExA 1 TA T -= ))8-- ExC] TAOpA _ TA _ OpA
Table 5.6-7 shows the comparables' beta adjustments for excess cash.
(5.6-22)
Excess Cash ($M) Total Asset Beta Operating Asset Beta
DRYS 194.9 1.86 1.92
EXCEL 0 1.45 1.45
DIANA 123.8 1.26 1.40
NAVIOS 0 1.09 1.09
GENCO 0 1.07 1.07
EGLE 0 1.09 1.09
Average 1.31 1.34
Table 5.6-7: Beta Adjustment for Excess Cash
The average unlevered beta increased from 1.31 to 1.34. The influence was small
since our comparables did not have significant excess cash, but carrying out the procedure
may be important under different circumstances. We will call this the market beta to
distinguish it from the total beta which we will calculate later. We have:
PM =/AOpA= 1.34 (5.6-23)
This value of beta is applicable to our second group of investors (small public firms),
since the data used so far came from comparables of that group. If we were valuing a
company, the next step would typically be to re-lever the beta using a target debt to equity
ratio, or an industry average debt to equity ratio. Using the average debt to equity ratio of our
comparables (54%), we get an equity beta of 2.7. However, in our case, the debt to equity
ratio of a cape varies with time as the principal is paid down. This means that our equity beta
will be a function of time.
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Returning to Eq. (5.6-11), for the case of small public companies, all the risk
premiums in the summation term are set to zero. That is because the return on equity will be
applied to companies of the same size and risk profile and ownership structure as the
comparables on which the betas where based. The CAPM is often applied by analysts to
calculate the cost of equity of these small public firms without any adjustments. We assume
that the CAPM yields the true cost of equity for these firms from which we have also
obtained the betas in order to avoid introducing any bias. Premiums over CAPM for the other
investor groups are then calculated relative to those of small public firms. Solving Eq. (5.6-
12) for the bet of equity, we get:
ie (t= WE(t) (5.6-24)
Combining this with Eq. 5.6-11, and setting the sum of the risk premiums to zero yield:
S~+ WD (t)D
re,SmallPublic f L ] MRP (5.6-25)
The debt to equity weight will be determined as a function of time in a later part of
the analysis. The unleveraged market beta was calculated to be 1.34, and the beta of debt is
taken to be 0.2. The Market Risk Premium (MRP) varies depending on which period you
look at and whether you start measuring during a crisis or a boom. Between 1926 and 2005,
MRP was 5.22% [Pratt & Grabowsky 2006], and the most commonly used and relevant value
according to latest research is: MRP = 5.2% Plugging these values into Eq. 5.6-18, we get
the cost of equity for small public firms as follows:
rf ()L1. 34 -0.2wD 5.2% (5.6-26)re,SmallPublic f (t )+ 5.2 (5.-26
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5.6.3.1.6 Cost of Equity for Large Public Firms
For large public firms, as for small public firms, we need not be concerned with the
diversifiable idiosyncratic risks and other premiums due to illiquidity, control and patient
capital that are relevant to private companies. The applicable operating asset beta is the same
as for small public companies. The main difference that we need to account for is the size
premium. This is one of the most important adjustments, which is explicitly accounted for in
the Fama-French model described earlier.
To adjust for size premium, we can use the famous studies carried out by Morningstar
(Ibbotson) since 1926 and by Duff & Phelps since 1963. Fig. 5.6-6 shows the excess returns
over CAPM based on company market capitalization according to the Morningstar's
(Ibbotson) studies between 1926 and 2005, using the MRP of 5.22%. Fig. 5.6-7 defines the
company size groups used in Fig. 5.6-6.
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Fig. 5.6-6: Size Risk Premium over CAPM from Ibottson Study 1926 - 2005 [Pratt & Grabowsky 20081
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Duff & Phelps publish risk premiums over CAPM using 8 different measures for
company size including market cap, revenues, number of employees, book value of equity
etc. They produce regression relations that are very convenient to apply such as the following
[Pratt & Grabowsky 2008]:
Size Premium (Over CAPM) = 12.594 - 2.8651og(Market Cap)
Size Premium (Over CAPM) = 9.253 - 2.052log(Book Value of Equity)
Size Premium (Over CAPM) = 8.817 - 1.550log(Revenues)
(5.6-27)
(5.6-28)
(5.6-29)
These give the premium in the discount rate in excess of CAPM. The third relation
(Eq. 5.6-22) is particularly useful when valuing private companies for which there is no
market cap. Fig. 5.6-8 shows the regression plot for that equation.
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Fig. 5.6-8: Duff & Phelps Study CAPM Premium vs. Revenues Regression [Pratt & Grabowsky 20081
A size premium is normally added on the discount rate for smaller companies. That is
because smaller companies are inherently more risky and perform better on average than
larger ones. Our calculated CAPM returns are based on the betas of small public companies.
These betas have been derived from the returns of small public companies and therefore
include the inherent size premium for small public companies. Therefore, to adjust these
returns for large public companies, we need to subtract the size premium of small public
companies and add the size premium of large public companies. Therefore, we have:
re,LargePublic e,SmallPublic SmallPublic L argePublic
fl -WD (t)fD M P X5PM +.Z
re,LargePublic -f U M -SSmallPublic LargePublic) E
(5.6-30)
Table 5.6-8 gives the size premium over CAPM returns for our comparables based on
the Morningstar (Ibbotson) studies (Fig. 5.6-6 & 5.6-7).
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Market Capitalization ($M) Decile SP over CAPM
DRYS 1440 6 1.73
EXCEL 463 9 2.76
DIANA 1050 7 1.67
NAVIOS 604 8 2.33
GENCO 657 8 2.33
EGLE 322 9 2.76
Average 756 8 2.26
Table 5.6-8: Average Size Premium for Comparables using the Morningstar Studies
Table 5.6-9 shows the results after applying the three formulae of Duff & Phelps (Eq.
5.6-20-22) to our comparables. After doing that, we take an average of the resujts for each
comparable and then take the average across the comparables.
MCap Equity Assets 4xQ.Rev SP SP SP Average
($M) ($M) ($M) ($M) (Rev) (MCap) (Equity)
Eq.5.6- Eq.5.6- Eq5.6-22
20 21
DRYS 1,440 2,805 5,799 773.84 4.34 3.55 2.18 3.35
EXCEL 463 1,401 3,228 697.6 4.41 4.96 2.80 4.05
DIANA 1,050 971 1,278 232.88 5.15 3.94 3.12 4.07
NAVIOS 604 894 2,801 642.28 4.47 4.63 3.20 4.10
GENCO 657 929 2,337 384.92 4.81 4.52 3.16 4.16
EGLE 322 620 1,608 168.08 5.37 5.41 3.52 4.77
Average 756 1,270 2,842 483 4.76 4.50 3.00 4.08
Table 5.6-9: Average Size Premium for Comparables using the Duff & Phelps Studies
The average size premium over CAPM for our comparables is 2.26% using the
Morningstar (Ibbotson) studies and 4.08% based on the Duff & Phelps studies. Taking the
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average of those two, we get 3.17%. This is the size premium relevant to small public
companies.
SP =3.17% (5.6-31)SmallPublic
By definition, we neglect the size premium of the large public companies. So we have:
SPLargePublic = 0% (5.632)
Combining Eq. 5.6-23 and 5.6-26, we get the cost of equity for large public
companies as follows:
1.34-0.2wD
re,LargePublic rf (t)+ WE(t) 5.2%-3.17% (5.6-33)
5.6.3.1.7 Cost of Equity for Large Private Firms
The value of 1.34 is the unlevered beta which is applicable to public firms. It assumes
a fully diversified investor, since the CAPM only accounts for idiosyncratic risk. We need to
add back idiosyncratic risk in order to remove the stock from a well diversified portfolio
perspective. That is because owners of private companies are heavily invested in their
companies and lack the resources to fully diversify, so they bear additional idiosyncratic risk
and therefore require additional compensation.
One approach in estimating the additional returns for a private firm relative to a
public one is to use the difference between the returns of private equity or venture capital
firms and publicly traded stocks. Between 1990 and 2000, the difference was (24-15) = 9%.
However, errors in this approach are large for several reasons including the fact that no
adjustments for company size are made [Damodaran 2002].
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[Feldman 2005] describes several methods to calculate a return on equity for private
stocks. First we can following research indications that all betas drift toward the riskiness of
the market and therefore assume a beta of 1. We can also assume a beta for an aggregate
industry or develop a model to estimate the beta for a disaggregate sector using the operating
earnings of the sector and the overall economy. We can also regress the accounting earnings
of a private company with the stock market, or try to create a tracking portfolio and make the
relevant adjustments.
The most neat and accurate method for our purposes is described by [Damodaran
2002]. He describes a method to calculate the "Total Beta" which is simply a volatility ratio,
for the case of private investors. The total beta sets the correlation between firm returns and
market returns to one, and is therefore essentially a volatility ratio. Thereby, the "total" risk is
captured in the beta. We have:
TOTi,m fl'm (5.6-34)
Pi,m ~m
The advantages of using Total Beta and its effectiveness in solving several of the
CAPM problems, are discussed by [Butler & Pinkerton 2009]. Note that by using the total
beta, the CAPM becomes:
MRP
r - r +J. M (5.6-35)
In other words, the investor is compensated by an equal amount per unit of volatility
as if investing in the market portfolio. This leaves the stock uncorrelated with anything which
is exactly how we want to look at it from a private firm's perspective. However, in doing so,
it measures the total risk meaning that it also captures risk premiums due to size and
company specific factors. This is important to understand in order to avoid double counting
when calculating risk premiums for the private companies. In other words, for private
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companies, we only have to apply the excess risk premiums relative to the investor group
from which we calculated the total betas (small public companies).
According to the procedure described by [Damodaran 2002], to get from the average
unlevered beta to the average total beta, we simply divide by the average correlation of
returns on our comparables to returns on the market. Table 5.6-10 shows the Total Beta
calculation for our comparables.
R Squared Correlation Operating Asset Beta Total Beta
DRYS 0.288 0.537 1.92 3.58
EXCEL 0.267 0.517 1.45 2.81
DIANA 0.336 0.579 1.40 2.41
NAVIOS 0.308 0.555 1.09 1.96
GENCO 0.323 0.568 1.07 1.89
EGLE 0.256 0.506 1.09 2.16
Average 0.544 1.34 2.46
Table 5.6-10: Total Beta Calculation for Comparables
The average total beta is 2.46. Dividing the average unlevered beta by the average
correlation also yields approximately the same result. So we take:
PTot = 2.46 (5.6-36)
We will re-lever the total beta using the debt to equity ratio which is a function of
time. Then we will apply this to our model and include the additional relevant risk premiums
to get the cost of equity for large private companies. Therefore, we have:
re,LargePrivate = rf + t WE MRP+ RPLargePrivate
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(5.6-37)
From Eq. 5.6-16 & 5.6-29, the total beta (2.46) is significantly larger than the market
beta (1.34) because the earnings of the comparables are significantly correlated with the
market. Therefore, private company investors are severely penalized relative to public
company investors because of their limited ability for diversification. The total beta
essentially adds one of the risk premiums that we are concerned about. That is the industry or
Company Specific Risk Premium (CSRP), which can be diversified at negligible cost by
public investors, but which has to be born by private investors.
The lower cost of capital due to the market beta being lower than the total beta is one
of the big advantages of going public. Others include access to capital, liquidity and potential
employee incentives using stock options. A big disadvantage of public firms is related to
agency cost and will be captured in some of the other risk premiums that will favor private
companies. The owners of a public firm (the shareholders) have very limited control over the
management, other than electing the board of directors. This does not insure that the right
incentives are in place as efficiently as in a private company where the manager is typically
the sole owner.
When there is a company buy-out, a premium is paid over the stock price for
"control". The buy out in fact eliminates agency costs, so the premium paid gives some
guidance for their magnitude. Activist funds essentially try to capture this value (of control)
without paying for it. In our case, part of the agency cost will be captured under the control
premium and part of it under patient capital. This will favor private companies and will tend
to offset the effect of limited diversification.
Having captured the industry or company specific risk premium under the total beta,
the summation of risk premiums will include the size premium relative to small public firms,
the illiquidity premium, the patient capital (family effect) premium and the control premium.
Therefore, we have:
RPL argePrivate =SJLargePrivate ~SPSmallPublic + [IP+ FE + CP]Largeprvate
(5.6-38)
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We have defined the large private companies to be of a similar size as the small
public companies. This means that the size premiums cancel out, so the relative size premium
is equal to zero. We have:
SP -SP -0 (5.6-39)L arg ePr ivate SmallPublic-
Before moving on, to consider the other risk premiums, lets assess the
company/industry specific risk premium that we have implicitly added through the total beta.
The Butler Pinkerton Model gives an estimate for the company specific risk premium of
publicly traded companies based on the total beta, which can then be used as a benchmark for
private companies [Butler & Pinkerton 2009]:
CSRP =(re -rf p(ToI -fu ,6 -SP (5.6-40)
In our case, the relative size premium is equal to zero (Eq. 5.6-31). Applying this in
the Butler Pinkerton Model (Eq. 5.6-33), we get the company (industry) specific risks, as
follows:
CSRP = ( , - )u) *MRP = (2.46 -1.34) * 5.2% = 5.84% (5.6-41)
It is worthwhile comparing this result to that of estimation procedures used by
valuation analysts. [Feldman 2005] provides the guidelines shown in Table 5.6-11.
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Measurement CSRP (%) Applicable
A Profitable only for the last 3 years or less 0.50 YES
B No audited statement is produced for each year 0.50 Private
C Receive over 30% of revenues from 5 1.25 YES
customers
D Cannot change suppliers without sacrificing 0.50 Varies
quality or cost
F Personnel critical to the firm's success 1.00 YES
F Highly competitive industry 1.25 YES
Total 5 >4
Table 5.6-11: Valuation analyst guidelines for CSRP [Feldman 20051
Most if not all these risks in Table 5.6-11 would apply to the shipping industry but the
maximum of this measure is 5%. However, several studies have indicated values of 8% over
CAPM over 25 years, or even up to 40% [Feldman 2005]. It is also important to note that
approximation systems such as the one in Table 5.6-5 have been developed based on typical
industries for which analysts carry out valuations. The volatility and risks inherent in the
shipping industry are profound compared to most of these industries. Therefore, our estimate
of 5.84% for CSRP seems very reasonable.
The next step is to calculate the illiquidity, patient capital and control premiums.
Value discounts due to lack of marketability have been examined by restricted stock studies
and pre-IPO studies. These indicate discounts of 30-35% relative to fair market value while
combined lack of control and illiquidity can add up to significantly more in family held
firms. That is because a minority share holder has no voice while the shares may also be
callable at a low price.
Illiquidity or marketability discount relates to the fact that shareholders will have to
sell at a discount if they want to exit. For them to be properly compensated, this corresponds
to a premium that has to be added on expected returns (the IP).
The "patient capital" of private firms has a counter acting effect, meaning that it is an
advantage which they have over public firms, and therefore corresponds to a negative
premium on the discount rate. Private firms have the ability to take a long term view on
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profitability and adjust the timing of their investments to take advantage of opportunities
very effectively. This is crucial, particularly in the shipping industry which is very cyclical
and volatile. Public firms are under pressure to keep low cash on their balance sheets and
invest their resources to boost earnings per share (which drive stock prices) for the next
quarter. Therefore, they take a short term perspective relative to private companies. The
value of patient capital has been studied in various papers and is very significant, particularly
in volatile industries.
As Feldman's procedure with industry specific risks, [Clinger & Morin 2006] use a
buildup method to estimate the equity premium due to patient capital, as summarized in
Table 5.6-12. The last column refers to the typical case in private shipping companies based
on my view.
Measurement If Applies Score
Vision Clear, developed vision -1 YES
Management Includes outside professionals & advisors -1 ~50%
Ownership Regular family meetings -1 YES
Communication Clear communication & annual reports -1 ~50%
Governance Transparent governance -1 YES
Succession Buy-sell agreements in place -1 YES
Strategy Strong strategic plan & accountability -1 YES
Total 
-6
Table 5.6-12: Family Business Attributes Risk Analysis [Clinger & Morin 20061
[De Visscher 2010] provides a framework for thinking about the combined effect of
illiquidity and patient capital in private firms. The adjustment on equity returns for a
privately held firm is:
[rf ++(r r *[1+IP [FE' (5.6-42)
Where IP' and FE' are the illiquidity factor and family effect and both range from 0
to 1. Due to the structure of this formula, we see that an equal family effect and illiquidity
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factor result in an overall decrease in the cost of equity. We already have an estimate of -4%
for the Patient Capital risk premium, so we can focus on a separate estimate of the illiquidity
premium. We will assume a typical value of 20% for the illiquidity discount. This, however,
is applied on the total value (of equity shares) so we need to convert it into a premium over
the discount rate. To do that, we have to assume an initial cost of equity and the weighted
average time over which the cash flows are received. This is a form of duration like the one
we use for bonds but not quite the same. To get the effective "Duration" denoted as D, we
can solve the following Eq. assuming a new ship which has a 28 year life:
28
> CF
28 CF =
NPV = E ( Y ,= " (5.6-43)
y=O (1 +r,) (1+,)
Where y: year in the ship's life
CFy: Cash flow in year "y"
D: Effective duration of cash flows
NPV: Net present value of all cash flows
re: Cost of equity
To get the duration, we use the above formula with a preliminary estimate of an
unadjusted cost of equity by using the total beta of 2.46 (unlevered), a risk free rate of 2%, a
debt to equity ratio of 54% (the average of our comparables), a debt beta of 0.2 and a market
risk premium of 5.2%. For the cash flows (equivalent to bond coupon payments), we will
assume a linear decrease from the initial value to 60% of the initial at the end of the ship's
life and a residual value (equivalent to the bond dace value) equal to twice the first years
earnings. These estimates are based on the current market. The cash flows are thereby given
as a function of the year as follows:
1CF, =1- y, CF8 = 2.6 (5.6-44)
%-/Ih~y 27 0.68 2(.-4
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Solving Eq. 5.6-36 yields a duration of 7.96 which means that earning the cash flows
of a new ship as they come along is equivalent to earning the total amount in eight years (as
an estimate). Now to convert the illiquidity discount (ID) to an illiquidity risk premium (IP),
we set up and solve the following equation:
NPV = 1 (1-ID)= (5.6-45)
1+re (1+r +IP)D
By applying the same values for the cost of equity and duration as above, and an
illiquidity discount of 20%, we solve for the illiquidity premium and find a value of 3.57%.
Using this and the patient capital value of 6%, we can solve the [De Visscher 20101 formula,
5.6-35 backwards to get IP' of 12.6% and FE' of 18.9%. The combined effect of illiquidity
and patient capital is equal to:
IP +PJC -2.3Private Public '43% (5.6-46)
This value will also be applied to small private firms while the corresponding values
for public firms (small and large) are equal to zero.
The control premium in a merger is the difference between acquisition price and the
price at which the shares are traded between minority shareholders. Control Premium and
Minority Discount measure the same thing and are related as follows:
MID =1- 1 (5.6-47)1+CP
Typical control premiums can be examined by comparing acquisition premiums over
the stock price. Values between 35% and 50% are typical. However, one must also extract
the value of synergies to calculate the "pure control premium", which is on average
approximately half of the reported control premium [Feldman 2005]. The most obvious
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control rights attached to a share are the voting rights, which can be easily quantified for
companies with dual-class stock. The value of the voting rights is simply equal to the
premium in the price of voting stocks over the trading price of non-voting shares. Estimates
of voting premium vary widely across countries, but in the US, typical values are 5 to 10%
[Lease et al 1983, 1984, Zingales 1995].
There is limited guidance in the published literature on quantifying a premium on the
return on equity to account for the value of control. We are concerned with the fact that the
CAPM estimates the value to shareholders of publicly traded companies. Shareholders
include the founders who have control but, also many minority shareholders who don't. In a
typical private firm, the sole owner has full control.
From the shipowner's perspective, full control corresponds to a lower risk on the
future cash flows. It also eliminates agency costs relative to the public company, in which
managers have the authority and incentive to cater to their own interests which may be
conflicting with those of the owner. Therefore, control translates to a reduced cost of equity.
However, we must bear in mind that the controlling managers of the public companies we are
considering own a significant percentage of the stock (15% or more). In other words, agency
costs can't be excessive. Furthermore, a significant portion of the value we are trying to
quantify is already captured in the patient capital term of Eq. (5.6-36). Based on these
considerations, a reasonable value for control premium over the cost of equity rate would be:
C--Priva= -15/ (5.6-48)
Note that the corresponding value for public companies is zero. Also, it is important
to note that this premium is over the cost of equity of private firms, which will be blended
with the cost of equity of public firms to get the average cost of equity. Then that value will
be blended with the cost of debt using the debt to equity ratio, to arrive at the WACC, which
will then be adjusted for inflation and risk of crack failures. Therefore, errors on the
estimated control premium will not have a material impact on our results. Putting everything
together, we have:
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- r 2.46 
- wD~ t .2 5 2 .3 %( 
. -9re,LargePrivate f (t)+ 5.2%-3.93% (5.6-49)
5.6.3.1.8 Cost of Equity for Small Private Firms
As for large public firms, we will employ the total beta in order to incorporate
idiosyncratic risks back into the cost of equity. Again, this takes care of CSRP. This leaves us
with:
ro - WD (t)k/JD
re,Small Private ~ f WE (t) MR + RsmallPrivate (5.6-50)
The first risk premium that we need to account for is the size premium. To do that, we
have to estimate the excess size premium for small private companies, relative to small
public companies. We have assumed average annual revenues of $75M for the typical small
private company. Applying the Duff & Phelps formula based on revenues (Eq. 5.6-22), we
get
Size Premium (Over CAPM) = 8.817 - 1.550log(75) = 5.91% (5.6-51)
Subtracting the average for our comparables (4.76% from Table 5.6-8), gives us
1.15%. Using the smallest group from the Morningstar (Ibbotson) studies (Fig. 5.6-6), we
have 6.36%. Subtracting the average of our comparables (2.26% from Table 5.6-9), we get
4.10%. Taking the average between the results based on the two studies (1.15% and 4.10%),
we get 2.63%. Note that this is in excess of what is captured in the total beta. We therefore
have:
SPsma Private - SsmallPublic = 2.63% (5.6-52)
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Regarding, illiquidity, patient capital and control premiums, the same principles apply
as for large private companies. Therefore, we have:
Private + vt = -2-43% (5.6-53)
&
CP =--1.5% (.-4
Putting everything together, we get:
re,LargePrivate = rf (t)+ 246 5.2%-1.30% (5.6-55)
WE _
5.6.3.1.9 Summary and Weighted Average Cost of Equity
Eq. 5.6-19, 5.6-26, 5.6-39 and 5.6-45 estimate the cost of equity for each of the 4
investor groups as a function of the risk free rate and the leverage, which in turn will be a
function of time. Replacing the weight of equity with one minus the weight on debt in these
equations, we get the final forms:
e,LargePublic rf + 1.2wD )5. 2 %-3.1 7 % (5.6-56)
1- WD(
e;,SmallPublic rf (t 1. + 4-0. 5.2% (5.6-57 )
1 - WD 
_
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r ~2.*46-wD(t) 0.2
re,LargePrivate f D _ 5.2%-3.93%
r (t)+246-wD (to2
e,SmallPrivate rf ( + 2.46 - wD____0.2 5.2%-1.30%1- WD()
(5.6-58)
(5.6-59)
Table 5.6-13 provides a summary of the equity risk premiums over the risk-free rate,
using the build up method. Note that the use of total beta in place of the market beta for
private companies, accounts for the CSRP which is diversifiable.
Investor Group Weight Unlevered Size Net Illiquidity & Control
Beta Premium (Relative Patient Capital Premium
to Public Small) Premium
Public Large 41% 1.34 -3.17% 0% 0%
Public Small 14% 1.34 0% 0% 0%
Private Large 29% 2.46 0% -2.43% -1.50%
Private Small 16% 2.46 2.63% -2.43% -1.50%
Weighted Average 1.84 -0.87% -1.09% -0.67%
Table 5.6-13: Equity Risk Premiums for the 4 investor groups using the Build-Up Method
Finally, using the weighted average values, we get total return on equity as follows:
re(t )=rf (t) + AMRP+ YRP
r, (t= rf (t)+ 184-w(t0. 5.2% -1.76%
-E (tE
(5.6-60)
(5.6-61)
The risk free rate and the debt to equity ratio in our analysis will be a function of
time. However, we can carry out a preliminary analysis by making some assumptions to keep
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them constant. We will assume a constant debt to equity ratio equal to the average of our
comparables (54%), a constant risk free rate of 2%, a market risk premium of 5.2% and a
cost of debt equal to the risk free rate plus a 2.5% spread. Based on these assumptions, we
can estimate approximate typical values for the cost of equity and weighted average cost of
capital for our 4 investor categories. The results are shown in Table 15.
Note that the adjustments to account for the risk of crack failures and inflation (since
we are discounting in real terms), will be applied after determining the WACC and will
counteract each other. Consequently, the approximation in Table 5.6-14 is also an
approximation of the discount rate.
Investor Group Public Public Private Private Weighted
Large Small Large Small Average
Cost of Equity 12.74% 15.91% 24.68% 27.31% 18.97%
-Discount Rate 8.29% 9.75% 13.78% 14.99% 11.16%
Table 5.6-14: Approximate Cost of Equity and Adjusted WACC using Typical Values
This is only a crude estimate, but typical constant values for WACC applied by
analysis are about 10% for shipping companies, which is very close to our prediction. The
cost of equity values are also close to the returns that investors of these categories expect on
their investments.
5.6.3.1.10 Alternative Method Based on the Black-Implied Volatility
We have developed a procedure to estimate the relevant cost of equity for the
valuation of capes based on a combination of historical data (from comparables) and forward
looking data (the risk free rate). Option pricing theory allows us to focus more on forward
looking data which is a big advantage.
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Unlike futures, options involve a cash transaction today. The holder of an option has
the right to buy the underlying asset (if it is a "call" option) or the right to sell it (if it is a
"put" option) at the predefined strike price which defines the value of the option. The option
holder has the right to exercise the option on the day it matures if it is a "European" option or
at any time until maturity if it is an "American" option. The price of an option depends on the
strike price, the time to maturity, the risk free rate, the current price and the volatility of the
underlying asset. The Black-Scholes formula for the valuation of a call option of a non-
dividend paying stock is given by:
C=SN(d,)-PV(K)N(d 2) (5.6-62)
SIn
di= + 2 (5.6-63)
d2 =d2 - T (5.6-64)
N(y)= 
- e 2 du (5.6-65)
Where:
C: Value of call option today
S: Price of underlying stock option today
N : Cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
K : Strike price
PV(K): The value of the strike price discounted from maturity PV(K) = Ke-rT
T :Time to maturity
a: Volatility of the underlying stock
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Having the price of the call, we can determine the price of the put and vice versa
through the put-call-parity as follows:
P= C-S+PV(K) =PV(K)[1-N(d 2)]-S[1-N(d1 )] (5.6-66)
The most interesting thing about the Black-Scholes formula is that it does not require
the probabilities of the various outcomes regarding the future value of the stock. In other
words, the prices of puts and calls do not reflect any information about the value of the price
tomorrow. They are not based on any such views and therefore can't be used to extract such
information. They do however imply a view about the future volatility of the underlying
asset. In other words, by solving Eq. 5.6-52 and 5.6-55 backwards, using the prices at which
puts and calls are currently trading, we can back out what is termed the Black-Implied-
Volatility.
As a side note, if the Black-Scholes formula was perfect, the strike price would have
no effect on the calculated volatility. In practice however, there is a skew, often cancelled a
volatility "smile" or "smirk". When the options are far out of the money or far into the
money, meaning that the strike price is very different from the current price of the
underlying, there is an error in the predicted volatility. In practice, several options near the
money are used to back out the implied volatility and an average value is taken. The implied
volatility is then published as an index, which is actually traded.
The VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) gives us the annualized
implied 30-day volatility of the S&P 500. As of March 22 "d 2010, VIX is trading at 16.68%
[CFE 2010b]. To get the implied volatility for the next 30 days, we simply divide by the
square root of twelve, which yields 4.8%. That means that the market expects the S&P 500 to
be up or down by 4.8% from current levels 30 days from now. Futures are traded on the VIX,
which allows us to construct the term structure that shows how the 30-day implied volatility
will vary over time. The term structure of the VIX as of March 2 2nd 2010 is shown in Table
5.6-15.
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Expiration Date Bid Price Ask Mid Implied
30-Day Vol
4/17/2010 14.97 16.56 15.79 4.56
5/22/2010 17.28 18.77 18.04 5.21
6/19/2010 18.66 20.47 19.58 5.65
7/17/2010 19.23 21.38 20.33 5.87
9/18/2010 20.39 22.41 21.43 6.19
12/18/2010 21.49 22.96 22.24 6.42
3/19/2011 21.97 23.38 22.68 6.55
6/18/2011 22.46 24.45 23.47 6.78
12/17/2011 23.6 24.97 24.29 7.01
12/22/2012 24.38 26.06 25.23 7.28
Table 5.6-15: VIX Term Structure as of March 22"d 2010 [CBOE 20101
Besides the 30-day VIX, there are other indices for different maturities. The CBOE 12 month
variance index, was trading at 26% as of March 22 2010 [CFE 2010]. This tells us that the
current 12-month volatility of the S&P 500 is:
S&P500,12M = 26% (5.6-67)
The Baltic Sale and Purchase Assessment Index (BSPA) is based on average price
assessments of standard ships, reported by an international and independent panel of sale and
purchase brokers. It is published bi-monthly for various ship types including the cape by the
Baltic Exchange. Options traded on that index with various tenures allow a ship owner to
hedge the value of a ship for various points in time in the future. By considering the prices of
various options of certain tenure "T", we could extract the implied average volatility of the
value of a cape.
We have seen how the volatility can be implied for various points in the future from
the current prices of options. In theory, it would also be possible to get a forward view of the
correlation between two assets if we had the prices of options that would allow you to
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exchange one asset for the other. Such options exist for companies whose executives are
compensated on the relative performance of the stock price relative to the market (the strike
price is the ratio of the stock price to the level of the S&P 500). If we had the price of an
option to exchange a unit of the BSPA-Cape index with a unit of the S&P 500, we could use
the following formula:
,T ~ SPA-Cape,T S+ &P500,T - 2 PBSPA-Cape,S&P500,TO"BSPA-cape,TUS&P500,T
(5.6-68)
VBSPA-Cape (t)
S S&P)= (
(5.6-69)
T:
t:
VBSPA-Cape t):
VS&P500 (t):
S (t):
UBSPA-Cape,T :
Tenure (time to expiration)
Time variable
Value of the BSPA-Cape index
Value of S&P 500 index at time "t"
The underlying asset of our exchange option
Black-Implied volatility of the exchange option
with tenure "T"
Black-implied volatility of BSPA Cape index
for tenure "T"
JS&P500,T : Black-Implied volatility for S&P 500 index for
tenure "T"
PBSPA-Cape,S&P500,T: Correlation between BSPA-Cape and S&P 500
over time "T"
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Where:
By using current prices of options on the S&P 500, options on the BSCA-Cape index,
and options to exchange units of one for the other, we can back out the implied volatilities for
each using Eq. 5.6-52 to 5.6-55. Then, by substituting those into 5.6-57, we can get the
forward implied correlation between the value of a Cape and the S&P 500 for the period "T".
Now, recall that we used the "market beta" for public investors and "total beta" for private
investors. We can extend their definitions to use the BSPA-Cape index as opposed to the
share price of companies owning capes, and to use forward implied parameters from the
prices of current options as opposed to average historic values:
~BSPA-Cape,T
Pm,T - PBSPA-Cape,S&P500,T 0 (5.6-70)
0 7S&P500,T
T BSPA-Cape,T
PTot,r SPO, (5.6-71)
0S&P500,T
Note that these are equity betas that assume the industry average leverage for a cape
of the same age. Cape prices are in fact published for ships of various ages (new building,
new with prompt delivery, 5, 10, 15 and 20 years old) and there is also the Baltic Demolition
Index (BDA) which indicates the price of an even older vessel. By performing the analysis
using options on the relevant indices to match the age of the ship with the option tenures "T",
we can obtain the forward implied market and total betas throughout as a function of time
throughout the ship's life.
A more rigorous approach would be to base the betas on the volatility of the ship
value as opposed to the revenues. To calculate the volatility of the ship value, we have to
assume a value of beta and as we shall see later, it turns out that the value volatilities and
consequently the betas are higher for older vessels. This approach would allow us to
determine the betas for each ship age using an iterative approach.
We can then weight these betas using the percentage of public and private owners and
proceed with the analysis as in the previous method using the comparables. A difference is
that in this case, the beta also be a function of time (which is more appropriate). The
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interesting part is that the industry average leverage of the cape of each age is already
factored into these beta values so there is no need to un-lever and re-lever them using
leverage assumptions. Performing this analysis using prices of liquid options, is just about as
accurate as you can get in terms of using current market data to extract what the future
discount rate must be.
The major limitation of this approach is that, at least for the time being, the liquidity
of options on the BSPA-Cape index is not at a level so that we can extract reliable implied
volatilities, while the described "exchange option" which is required to extract the forward
correlation, has not been introduced yet.
Real options are often included as part of deals in the shipping industry. For example,
a charterer may be granted the option to buy the vessel at a pre-specified price after the end
of a long term charter, in exchange for an increased charter rate. The present value of the
charter rate increase could be used to value the option and potentially to extract an implied
volatility for ship prices. However, since ship characteristics (including age) vary
significantly, and since these deals are not standardized, this method is unlikely to produce
accurate results.
Futures were only introduced this past decade in the shipping industry and rapidly
gained momentum, with options being introduced a couple of years ago and the volatility
index on earnings being introduced last year. I believe that with continuing IPOs of shipping
companies in US stock exchanges, as external investors become more involved in the
shipping, and as the shipping industry investors continue to become more sophisticated,
liquidity in the existing derivatives will continue to increase and more exotic instruments will
be introduced. In a few years time, it is very possible that the relevant prices will be available
to apply the above method and obtain a complete forward view on the discount rate as a
function of time throughout the ship's life.
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5.6.3.1.11 Approximate Beta Verification Using Derivatives
As we discussed, the method based on options to determine the forward discount rate
cannot be applied in its entirety due to the lack of liquidity in the various instruments etc.
However, we can attempt to combine some historical data with forward data on available
derivatives that can be used as proxies to the required data, in order to produce a rough
estimate.
Shipping freight rate options are "Asian" options meaning that they settle at the
average of over a settlement period. As of March 23 rd 2010, the futures for the BCI in Q2 is
trading at $35,000/day. Table 5.6-16 summarizes bid/ask prices for puts and calls with
different strike prices for the second quarter of 2010.
Strike Price Bid Ask
CALL 40,000 2000 2500
CALL 45,000 1000 1500
33,000 PUT 33,000 2500 3250
30,000 PUT 30,000 1250 1750
Table 5.6-16 02 2010: Option Prices as of March 23, 2010 with Q2 Futures at $35,000/day
[Clarksons 20101
The call options for Q2'2010 with a strike price of $40,000/day are trading for
approximately $2,250/day. The value of $2,250 times the number of days in the settlement
period (the second quarter) is paid by the buyer of the option. Then, at the end of each month
in the settlement period, the average BCI is calculated. If the average is higher than $40,000,
the call option is exercised by the holder and they get the monthly average minus the strike
price ($40,000/day) times the number of days. If the month average is lower, the strike price
is simply not exercised.
This is different from the futures contract in which the long position has to pay if the
market level is below the strike price, but there is no cost to enter into the contract. The put
option, on the other hand is exercised when the underlying (the BCI average in the settlement
period) is less than the strike price. The underlying asset is the future rate for Q2 which is
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trading at 35,000/day. The options of Table 5.6-16 are all out of the money, meaning that
they would not make money if they were exercised today (calls are above the underlying and
puts are below it).
[Levy 1997] extended the option pricing theory to Asian options. The pricing of
Asian options is discussed by [Ellefsen and Sclavounos 2009] and in section 8.2.5 of
[Alizadeh and Nomikos 2009]. Implied volatilities from options in the BCI are similarly
backed out of option prices and a volatility index is composed by the Baltic Exchange and
traded daily. Implied volatilities as of March 2 2nd 2010 are summarized in Table 5.6-17.
These are the Baltic Option Assessments (BOA) of the implied volatility for an "at-the-
money" option (strike price equal to forward rate) in the dry bulk options market submitted
by brokers in London.
Table 5.6-17
Description Average Movement
IVCTCCURMON Mar (10) 81.86 0.46
IVCTCCURQ Mar (10) 81.86 0.46
IVCTC_+1Q Q2 (10) 84.29 0.29
IVCTC_+2Q Q3 (10) 71.07 -0.43
IVCTC_+3Q Q4 (10) 62.21 -0.49
IVCTC_+4Q Q1 (11) 61.00 -0.4
IVCTC_+1CAL Cal 11 56.14 -0.66
IVCTC_+2CAL Cal 12 51.71 -0.39
IV CTC_+3CAL Cal 13 49.57 -0.23
Implied Volatilities for Baltic Capesize Earnigs as of March 22"d 2010 ~Baltic 20101
The row in black indicates an annualized volatility of 56% for the next year. Due to
the way shipping options work, it is important to realize that this is the volatility of a whole
year's earnings. The "Cal 11" is a packet of 12 monthly settlements on the average of the
BCI over the whole of 2011. The implied volatility of the daily BCI would be significantly
higher. Since capes are normally chartered in period contracts that span from a few months to
several years, when assessing the volatility of their earnings, it is more relevant to use the
implied volatility of an option from a calendar year, as opposed to using the implied volatility
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of daily earnings. We have seen in chapter 2 that ship values have historically moved with
period earnings. Therefore, we will use the current volatility of the ship's earnings a year
from now, as a proxy for the current annual volatility in the value of a cape. Using the
implied volatility of the "Cal 11" option, we get:
BSPA-Cape,12M 0 BCI,Cal-11 = 56% (5.6-72)
We already have the implied annual volatility of the S&P 500 from Eq. 5.6-56.
Combining that with Eq. 5.6-61 and Eq. 5.6-60, we can get an implied total beta for 12
months:
7BSPA-Cape,12M 56
iTot,12M 0BSP-Cpe12M 26- 2.2 (5.6-73)
~S&P500,12M 2
To get the market beta, we need a forward view for the correlation between the ship
values and the S&P 500. Since the "exchange option" required for that is not traded, our best
estimate is the historic correlation between the two. The BCI has a relatively short history,
but it has been almost perfectly correlated with the BDI and its predecessors which go back
much further. Over the long term (25 years), the BDI and the S&P 500 have had a positive
correlation of 0.5 [Research Reloaded 2009]. Assuming that this long term correlation holds
going forward, we can apply it to Eq. 5.6-59 and Eq. 5.6-62 to get the market beta for the net
12 months:
BSPA-Cape,12M 56
Pm,12M = PBSPA-Cape,S&PM 07S&P50.5 = 1.1
~S&P500,12M 26
(5.6-74)
This was a very approximate analysis using very crude assumptions, just to
demonstrate how the alternative method would be applied with the appropriate data, and to
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verify that the results using the comparables based approach are in the right ballpark. The
alternative method would yield the betas as a function of time but in this approximation we
have calculated the 1-year betas and assume they hold constant. The values were 2.2 and 1.1
for the market and total beta respectively. The earlier method based on comparables resulted
in corresponding values of 2.46 and 1.34 which are very similar.
As we will derive in a later analysis, the implied volatility of the ship value is higher
than the volatility of the revenues. That is because the volatility of profits is higher than the
volatility of the revenues, since costs are relatively stable. The volatility of a new ship's
value is currently about 67%. This is based on current option prices and a method that we
develop later that combines Black-Scholes with portfolio theory and our valuation model.
The volatility of 67% corresponds to a total beta of 2.6 and a market beta of 1.3 (using the
historic correlation between the BCI and S&P 500 of 0.5 as a proxy). These results are even
closer to the corresponding values of 2.5 and 1.3 derived by the comparables method. Note
that using the volatility of old vessels will yield higher betas and the mismatch is explained
by the fact that the comparables on which the betas are based are US-listed companies that
own primarily new ships.
5.6.2.2 Cost of Debt
[Feldman 2005] Describes a method to estimate the cost of debt of a company based
on Z-scores. The Z-score is calculated as a linear function of 5 financial ratios that can easily
be determined from a company's financial statements. A table is then used to convert the Z-
score into a credit rating and a corresponding yield spread over treasures as a function of
maturity. The higher the Z-score, the higher the credit rating. The yield spread decreases with
the Z-score and increases with maturity time.
This model, however, is not very relevant to shipping. Rather than issuing bonds,
shipping companies typically borrow from banks at a spread over LIBOR. LIBOR is the inter
bank rate and historical rates are shown in Fig. 5.6-9.
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Fig. 5.6-9: Historic LIBOR Rates
The spread depends on the client and their relations with the bank but also on the
credit markets. In a regular market (before the market crash), typical spreads were 90 to 150
basis points over LIBOR (perhaps 80 for exceptional clients). Today, the typical would be
about 250 basis points and probably not lower than 200 basis points.
Since the spread is locked in for the whole duration of the loan, it applies until the full
debt is repaid. The spread may be different if the owner chooses to refinance at a later date
(after repaying the initial loan at today's spread). However, since there is no forward market
for spreads, we will not attempt to make the spread a function of time. We will assume a
constant spread of 2.5% over LIBOR, which will be a function of time. Therefore, we have:
rD (t) = LIBOR (t) + R = LIBOR (t) + 2.5% (5.6-75)
To get LIBOR as a function of time, we can look at what swaps are trading for. This
will give us a forward looking estimate of interest rates, but also the interest rate at which
each bank installment can be hedged by the owner, should they choose to do so. Fig. 5.6-10
shows historic Swap rates for various maturities.
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Fig. 5.6-10: Historic SWAP Rates
From Fig. 5.6-10, we see that in the most part, the forward curve on interest rates has
been upward sloping. When the lines converge, it means that the forward curve was flat i.e.
interest rates were relatively constant with tenure. For today's values, we will take the
average between Oct-15-2009 and March-15-2010 so that the range is centered at the start of
2010. The next step is to construct the yield curve. We could use complicated smoothing
functions for this purpose but given the shape of the curve and the frequency and location of
the data points, simple linear interpolation is adequate. After interpolating through the swap
rates, we add the 2.5% spread to get the cost of debt. The resulting cost of debt as a function
of time is shown in Fig. 5.6-11, along with the corresponding swap rates.
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Fig. 5.6-11: Swap Rates and the cost of Debt as a function of time
5.6.2.3 Weighted Average Cost of Capital
The WACC for a ship at any point in time, is a function of the cost of equity, the cost
of debt the leverage, and the tax rate. In our case, the tax rate is assumed to be zero, since
shipping companies typically don't pay a tax on revenues. Having developed methods for
obtaining the cost of equity and debt, the next step is to estimate the percentage of debt as a
function of time.
Prior to the credit crunch, it was not uncommon for banks to finance up to 80% of the
ship's value. Today, spreads are much higher but also loans are much harder to secure and
cover a smaller percentage of the acquisition price. A bank will typically finance up to 70%
of a new ship under a 10 year loan with a time horizon of 17 years. That means that the
percent debt will begin at 70% and decline linearly with a gradient that would bring it down
to zero when the ship would be 17 years old, but a balloon payment of the outstanding loan
will be paid and bring the debt down to zero when the ship is 10 years old. Typically, the
owner will refinance when the balloon payment is due, so the debt decrease will be gradual.
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The owner may choose to refinance the ship again and again when the time comes
under terms that will prevail at the time. Furthermore, the ship value will fluctuate with the
market so the percent of debt will also fluctuate. Loan covenants typically apply, which
require that the outstanding loan remains below 70% of the charter-free market value of the
ship. As the debt is repaid, chances of that occurring decrease but many of these covenants
were breached when ship values collapsed towards the end of 2009. When that happens, an
owner may be called to pay down more of the principal that would normally be due.
However, for valuation purposes, using the currently available data, it would be most
appropriate to assume that the debt will begin at 70% and decline linearly to zero when the
ship is 17 years old.
Between 2004 and 2008, when market values were very high, banks required
accelerated principal repayments in order to bring down the debt levels to the historic
average ship value. This was done as a precaution to minimize the chances of a covenant
breach, even though evidently it was not enough. Under these circumstances, the debt to
equity ratio is not a single linear function of time. The appropriate method to deal with this
for a valuation has been described in Section 2.9.
For a 10-year old and a 15-year old vessel, the bank will typically finance 60% of the
acquisition price with a time horizon of 20 years (ship age). The percentage debt in this case
is approximated as a linear decrease from 60% at the start when the ship is 10 or 15 years
old, to 0% after 10 or 5 years when the ship is 20 years old. For a 5-year old ship, the bank
will probably finance 70% of the ship value, and a time horizon of 18.5 years has been
assumed (average of new ship and 10 year old ship). For a 20-year old ship, we will assume
100% equity throughout the ship's life (no bank loan).
Using the above approximations, we have the percentage of debt as a function of time
for a given ship. Since the value of the ship is composed of debt and equity, we also have the
percent of equity as a function of time.
WD (t)+wE (t) =1 (5.6-76)
829
Now, having the weight of debt and equity as a function of time, as well as the
average cost of equity from Section 5.6.3.1 and the cost of debt from Section 5.6.3.2, we can
combine them to get the weighted average cost of capital as a function of time.
rwAcc (t) = We(t)r, + wD (t)( - rD (t) (5.6-77)
The bracket including the tax rate accounts for interest tax shields since interest is tax
deductible. In our case, since the tax rate is taken to be zero, we have:
rWACC W = We(t)r + wD trD (t) (5.6-78)
Since bank installments are typically paid annually or biannually, for simplicity we
will assume the percentage of debt and equity to be constant within each year. Since LIBOR
would theoretically be hedged separately for each bank installment, it follows that the cost of
debt would have to be constant within each year. For consistency, we also make the cost of
equity and hence the weighted average cost of capital constant within each year.
5.6.2.4 Accounting for Inflation
Two ways are generally used to account for inflation in discounted future cash flows.
The first one is to account for inflation in the numerator terms, i.e. the projected revenues and
costs. The second way is to account for it in the discount factor and leave the numerator
terms as real projections.
Shipping freight rates and most of the terms in the numerator are not directly related
to inflation. The markets are cyclical and are governed by factors such as supply demand,
congestion, technological improvements etc. However, the cost of debt is directly affected by
inflation because the role of interest rates is partly to offset the decline in the value of money.
A lender will demand a higher return if inflation expectations are high. Similarly, the return
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on equity is higher because an investor will require a higher return on the investment in
periods of high inflation.
Today, inflation is low, so accounting for inflation will not have a major impact on
the valuation. However, it is important to include it in the model which should be applicable
regardless of chosen time period. Given the above discussion, it makes more intuitive sense
to account for it in the discount factor.
Since shipping costs and revenues are denominated in dollars, ship owners have
access to American debt, and companies are increasingly being listed in American stock
exchanges, US inflation would be the most appropriate to use. Furthermore, that is most
convenient because we can extract a forward view on inflation for each time period in the
future from the TIPS / T-Bill yield differences. To adjust the discount rate, we simply
subtract the inflation values from the return on debt and equity for each corresponding time
period.
A forward view on US inflation can be extracted from the relative pricing of TIPS
and regular US T-Bills. The difference between the two prices is not only an expectation of
future inflation but also a level that can be hedged.
TIPS were introduced in 1997. The principal in TIPS is adjusted semiannually to
reflect rises in the CPI, but it is NOT reduced in periods of deflation (the government
guarantees the face value). They are free of fees and commissions so friction costs are very
limited when hedging against inflation. As of February 2 2 nd 2010, the yield on the new 30-
year TIPS was 2.17%, while the 30-year nominal issue had a yield of 4.63% [Swedroe 2010].
This implies a US inflation rate of 2.46% over the next 30 years. We could use the yield
curve of TIPS and T-Bills to determine the implied inflation for each year going forward.
Table 5.6-1 shows current rates for TIPS and T-Bills with corresponding tenures
published by the United States Department of the Treasury. Average values were taken over
the period Feb-28 to Mar-23 2010. The difference between corresponding values, which is
also shown in Table 5.6-18, is an estimate of average inflation over the equivalent period as
the tenure.
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Tenure TIPS T-Bills Inflation
5yr 0.48% 2.37% 1.89%
7yr 1.01% 3.11% 2.10%
1Oyr 1.46% 3.68% 2.22%
20yr 1.96% 4.46% 2.50%
30yr 2.14% 4.61% 2.48%
Table 5.6-18: Average Feb-28-2010 until March-23-2010 [USDT 2010a, USDT 2010b}
Based on Table 5.6-18, future projections of inflation are relatively flat. This means
that we can reasonably use linear interpolation to infer values of average inflation for the
years between the available tenure lengths. However, we need to make some assumptions
regarding values between now and 5 years, which is our first data point. Average inflation for
2009 was -0.34% (deflation), and the corresponding values for January and February of 2010
were 2.63% and 2.14% respectively [CPS 2010. Table 5.6-19 shows a summary of average
US inflation forecasts for years 2010 (our year 1) and 2011 (our year 2) from 14 independent
studies, along with the average for each year (taking the range mid point for the Federal
Reserve study).
To estimate average inflation for durations less than 5 years, we can extrapolate our
data backwards using the inflation levels for 5 years and 7 years (our first two data points).
This results in an estimated inflation of 1.46% for year 1 and 1.57% year 2 which is
remarkably close to the average forecasted values. It therefore seems an accurate enough
approach for our purposes.
Using this method, we can plot the term structure of inflation which is shown in Fig.
5.6-12 along with the TIPS/T-Bill yield spreads from Table 5.6-18. Note that the values read
off the ordinate indicate the average inflation from today until the time measured off the
abscissa, not the inflation at that point in time.
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Inflation Forecast
Source 2010 2011
[UMICH 2010] 1.10% 1.40%
[WFSE 2010] 1.30% 1.70%
[WSJ 201Ob] 1.90%
[Reuters 2010] 1.30% 1.60%
[Bloomberg 2010] 1.20%
[CNBC 2010] 1.50% 1.70%
[Fed. Reserve 2010] 1.1%-1.7% 1%-1.9%
[SPF 2010] 1.30% 1.50%
[OMB 2010] 1.30% 1.70%
[CBO 2010] 1% 0.90%
[USAToday 2010] 1.80%
[ABA 2010] 1.20%
[MorganStanley 2010] 1.40% 1.90%
[Livingston 2010] 2.20% 1.80%
Average 1.42% 1.57%
Table 5.6-19: Inflation Forecasts from Various Sources
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Term Structure of Inflation
+ TFIST-Bill Yield Spread - inflation
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5.6-12: Inflation as a Function of Tenure Based on TIPS/T-Bill Yield Spreads
Fig.
For consistency with the weighted average cost of capital calculation, we will assume
the inflation to be constant within each year. We can then obtain an inflation adjusted
weighted average cost of capital for each year by subtracting the inflation (based on Fig. 5.6-
11) from the initial weighted average cost of capital of the corresponding year:
DF = -
(1+rc(t))' (1+rwcc(1±rACC~)) t  rWACC~t)
rW (t)I(t) (5.6-79)
=> rwIAc CC) = -WAcc 
~ t rwAcc (t)- W t
Where: rWAcc (t): Weighted average cost of capital (constant within each year)
rWACC (t) : Inflation-adjusted WACC (constant within each year)
I(t): Inflation from yield spread of TIPS and T-Bills (constant within each
year)
5.6.2.5 Incorporating the Hazard Function
In Section 4.5, we developed the hazard function due to cracks throughout the ship's
life. This corresponds to a probability that the ship will undergo an emergency repair or a
total loss. The purpose of this section is to account for that effect by incorporating the hazard
function as a credit spread over the inflation adjusted weighted average cost of capital. This
will give us the discount rate throughout the ship's life.
The hazard function has been calculated continuously as a function of the ship's age,
while the inflation adjusted weighted average cost of capital is a function of time and will be
constant throughout each year. Since we have chosen months as the time increment (i.e.
discounting each months unlevered free cash flows to the present), after incorporating the
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hazard function, we will have the discount rate for a given initial ship age, as a function of
time in months.
In order to incorporate the hazard function into the discount rate, we have to use
continuous compounding as opposed to monthly. Changing to continuous compounding
would allow us to use a discount rate that is a function of time and to incorporate the hazard
function into it. Using continuous compounding, the present value of a cash flow "XT" at time
"T" is given by:
XT -rT
PV(xT)=n x (5.6-80)
n )
Where: XT: Cash flow at time T
T: Time in Years
PV(xT): Present value of cash flow at time "T"
n: Number of compounding periods per year
rn :Annual interest compounded "n" times per year
r00 : Constant continuously compounded annual interest rate
When the interest rate changes over time, we can begin by expressing the
continuously compounded return as:
x
rt ~~~~ (5.6-81)
x
Where rt,: Continuously compounded interest rate (varies with time)
x: Principal amount
x': Return on principal over an infinitesimal time increment (its-
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time derivative)
By simple integration, it follows that:
rdt = f -= In xTf C PV(xT)i
0 PV(xr) X
Hence, the present value "x,",is given by:
PV(XT) =
-fj rdt
xTe 0
(5.6-82)
(5.6-83)
By solving Eq. 5.6-69, we get the equivalent annual continuously compounded
interest rate "r, " is given in terms of the annual interest rate "r" and number of compounding
periods per year "n" as follows:
r,= nin I+ r (5.6-84)
n
Now, recall the survivor function which gives us the probability of survival until time
"t" as a function of the hazard function:
S -f A(r)dr
Where:
2(r):
(5.6-85)
Survivor function (probability of survival until time "t")
Hazard function (function of time variable T)
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Assuming we want to discount a cash flow at time "t" to the present at the risk free
rate, while accounting for the probability of failure (due to the hazard function). The
expected present value will be determined by combining Eq. 5.6-72 and 5.6-74 as follows:
-f A(zrjdr -f r (r)dr -frr +A(r))dr
E[PV(X)] = S(t)PV(X )= e Xe 0  =Xe 0
(5.6-86)
Since we are taking the present value equal to the discounted expected returns, we are
implicitly assuming a risk neutral investor with a linear utility function. Instead of calculating
the present value of the expected returns, one could calculate the present value of the
expected utility (in "utils") by assuming a utility function for the investor, and then convert
that into $ through the inverse utility function.
A typical hazard function of a risk averse investor starts linear and diverges as more
is at stake. This means that investors are approximately risk neutral when little is at stake,
which is intuitive. An example often used is the exponential utility model:
u =1-e-", C ~10-5  (5.6-87)
Where x: Cash flow "x"
u: Utility of cash flow "x"
c: Constant that defines the risk averseness and is typically in tens
of millionths
The Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) of a utility function is equal to the second
derivative of the utility function, divided by its first derivative:
u"
UARA , (5.6-88)
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Note that the exponential utility model displays a constant risk aversion which is
equal to "c". This is not true for all utility functions.
The expected present value model, can be modified by replacing X with X* in order to
account for the investor's risk-averseness. However, this can be avoided as long as the
investor is adequately diversified and as long as the hazard function is not too big relative to
the risk free rate. In our case, we can make these assumptions and avoid predicting the utility
function of investors, particularly because the hazard function will be small relative to the
discount rate.
Having discussed the basic principles and assumptions, we begin by converting the
annual inflation adjusted weighted average cost of capital to an annual continuously
compounded rate:
rAcc, -n In 1+ (5.6-89)
n
Where: rWACC (t): Annual inflation adjusted weighted average cost of
capital
rWAcC, Annual continuously compounded inflation adjusted
WACC
n: Number of compounding periods per year (typically
equal to 1)
t: Time (in years)
Based on Eq. 5.6-72, we can then calculate the discount factor resulting from the
continuously compounded inflation adjusted WACC. That is the factor by which a cash flow
at time "t" is multiplied to give its present value. It is important to note that the weighted
average cost of capital is calculated for "t" to start with, so it is constant and can be removed
from the integral. Therefore, we have:
838
t-f rACC (t)dr
DF(t)= , e(1 + rWAcc(t))
= erWACCt (t
Since the hazard function assumes a monthly time interval, and since the integral
boundaries (t) will also measured in months instead of years, for consistency, we have to
convert the continuously compounded annual rate to a continuously compounded monthly
rate. To calculate that, we consider the present value of a payment "x" one year from today:
PV(X12m = xl y= e
-1 2rwAcc *X2m = e-rWAcct*xly
(5.6-91)
X12m = X1y: Cash flow in one year
PV(Xi2 M = x1,) :Present value of cash flow in one year
rF 4 c :Monthly inflation adjusted continuously compounded WACC
rwAcc, :Annual inflation adjusted continuously compounded WACC
It follows that: rWAc, 12
The discount rate, with "t" measured in months becomes:
t
-f r;Acct (t)dr
DF(t)= e = e- rACC (t)t
Now, to incorporate the hazard function, we have to note that in our case, we have
three possibilities; a total loss, an emergency repair lasting 6 months and an emergency repair
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(5.6-90)
Where:
(5.6-92)
(5.6-93)
lasting 2 months. Given that a failure occurs, the probabilities of being in each of the three
categories has been estimated as 1/18, 9/36 and 25/36 respectively. Using the theory
described above, the discount factor becomes:
- rwAcc, (t}+-A(z ) dr-- A(r jdr- fA(r )dr-
DF =e 0 t-5 t-1t (5.6-94)
Again, since the continuously compounded inflation adjusted WACC has been pre-
defined for time "t", it is constant and can be removed from the integral. This leaves us with:
-rcc (t)t+I A(7-)dr+ r 9 + ( r 2()drA WCt 18f 36 J36
DF =e - 0 t-6 t-2
t (5.6-95)
We can proceed to derive the spread on the continuously compounded inflation
adjusted weighted average cost of capital as follows:
DF e-{rcc (t)+[1 A(r)dr+kf A(r)dr+ - A(r )drjt -' (t)+S(t)]t
DF(t)=e C~ t1 0 '6 -6 '6-2 _,r; ( w )cc, ()]
(5.6-96)
The spread on the continuously compounded inflation adjusted WACC is given by:
S,(t)[= fA(r )dr+- f A (r jdr+ - J 2(r)dr (5.6-97)
t1036t-6 36t-2
Therefore, the monthly continuously compounded discount rate is given by:
it cc (t t (t) (5.6-98)
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This can be converted to an annual continuously compounded discount rate as follows:
i(t )=12i' =12(re (t + S,(t))= rwacc (t) + 12S,(t)
Recall that we can relate the continuously compounded discount
compounded discount rate as follows:
i,(t)=nIn 1+ )
n )
(5.6-99)
rate to a discretely
(5.6-100)
By combining Eq. 5.6-88 and 5.6-89, we can compute the discretely compounded
annual discount rate as follows:
SrWAcc, (t)+12S, (t)
n e "
S r12St 12St (t)1+ wxcc)e n 1]=(n+rwAcc(t))e
n
-n
(5.6-101)
Unfortunately, it is not possible to convert the spread over the continuously
compounded interest rate to a spread over the annual discount rate analytically without it
being a function of the actual discount rate. However, it can be calculated in retrospect by
subtracting the inflation adjusted weighted average cost of capital from the annual discount
rate.
Since our values for cost of equity and debt are based on annual compounding, we
have n=1, so Eq. 5.6-91 simplifies to:
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i~) n e "n 1
i(t) = (1+ rwAcc (t))e 2 St(t) -1
Where: rAcc(t) = We(t)r, + w (t)r (t) (t)
1 1t9 25
S,(t)= A(r) dr+-- A(r)dr+- A(r) dr
t _18 36 t-5 36 t1
We have thereby developed a formula that combines the hazard function with the
inflation adjusted WACC to give a hazard and inflation adjusted WACC or in other words
the discount rate as a function of time. Note that this will vary from month to month even
though the inflation adjusted WACC is taken to be constant throughout the year. The hazard
function adds a credit spread on the discount rate due to the possibility of off-hire time from
crack failures.
Now, we can proceed to get a preliminary estimate of this spread as a function of the
inflation adjusted WACC. We will assume that the inflation adjusted WACC is constant
throughout the ship's life. Then we calculate the average difference of the final discount rate
from the inflation adjusted WACC over the ship's life. The analysis is performed for various
ship ages and inflation adjusted WACC levels and the results are presented in Table 5.6-20.
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Inflation Adjusted WACC
Age (years) 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% Average
0 0.10% 0.11% 0.11% 0.12% 0.12% 0.11%
5 0.12% 0.12% 0.13% 0.13% 0.14% 0.13%
10 0.13% 0.14% 0.15% 0.15% 0.16% 0.15%
15 0.15% 0.16% 0.16% 0.17% 0.18% 0.16%
20 0.15% 0.16% 0.17% 0.17% 0.18% 0.17%
25 0.13% 0.14% 0.15% 0.16% 0.16% 0.15%
Table 5.6-20: Spread over constant discount rate to account for the off-hire possibility from crack failures
(5.6-102)
According to Table 5.6-20, we see that the average credit spread ranges from 0.1% to
0.2% over a wide range of reasonable inflation adjusted WACC levels and that the using a
value of 0.15% would be a good approximation. The spread increases with the WACC and
also with ship age until the age of about 20. Note that these are average values throughout the
ship's remaining life. Maximum spreads for particular time periods can be orders of
magnitude larger, due to the shape of the hazard function.
It is also important to bear in mind that this does not account for the full effect of
cracks. This simply accounts for the possibility of off hire time due to crack failures. The
expected cost of repairing crack failures is a full separate term on the numerator of our
valuation formula, while the cost of repairing cracks in scheduled repairs is incorporated into
the repair costs term (also in the numerator) and has been quantified separately in section 5.1.
An equivalent spread over the discount rate to account for the full effect of cracks can
be determined after we carry out the valuation. This can be done by setting the discount rate
to arrive at the same valuation after excluding the relevant numerator terms that incorporate
expected costs due to cracks.
5.6.3 The Numerator Terms
5.6.3.1 Revenues
As discussed earlier, we will use futures to quantify the revenues because futures
rates can be hedged. Futures only span out for 5 years, so we have to make some kind of
projections beyond that. The forward curve flattens out towards the end and we also have
rates on recent time charters of approximately 10 years, which can be used as a guidance.
An argument could be made that the revenues for the first 5 years can be hedged
through futures, so they should be discounted at the risk free rate, whereas revenues beyond
that have a greater risk and therefore require a different approach. In order to make that
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assessment, we need to examine the relationship between the forward and the spot market.
Hedgers and speculators trade in the futures markets and together, their actions determine the
basis, which is the difference between the spot and the forward price. [Clark et al 2001]
summarize the elements that motivate their actions and ultimately determine the basis as
follows:
- Expected evolution of the spot price
- Carrying cost
- Convenience returns
- Speculators premium
- Systematic risk premium
As discussed by [Clark et al 2001], the above elements are not necessarily present
simultaneously at all times, while the basis converges to zero at maturity. In the shipping
industry, it turns out that the first element (market expectation) heavily outweighs the others
meaning that the futures prices reflect the market expectations. This is mainly due to the high
volatility of the shipping market, while factors such as a high orderbook, an iron-ore price
agreement or an expansion plan announcement by a country like China, imply changes in
supply or demand that can have a drastic impact on future freight rates. This makes the effect
of market expectation very high, while the effects of the other factors are very small by
comparison.
The underlying asset is ton-miles for which there are no storage costs, no dividends or
holding benefits, and a limited risk of a stock out (the market rates vary but there generally is
a supply of ships). Consequently, carrying costs and convenience returns do not come into
play.
The speculators premium is based on the hypothesis of normal backwardation
suggested by economists John Maynard Keynes and John Hicks. They argued that the natural
hedgers of a commodity will hold a net short position and will accept loosing money on their
positions since they enter contracts to reduce risk. Speculators on the other hand have to
expect a profit to enter into a contract and they hold a net long position. This gives rise to a
premium by which futures rates trade lower than the market expectation.
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One reason why this is not relevant in shipping is that, unlike other commodity
futures markets, the shipping futures market is very small compared to the physical market.
The other important reason is that there are hedgers on both sides of the trade with relatively
equal negotiating power. Ship owners and shipping banks (who finance ship acquisitions) go
long on futures to hedge their owned ton-miles. Charterers and cargo owners go short on the
futures market to hedge their need for ton-miles. Speculators are few in comparison and
generally cannot command a premium against those two groups of natural hedgers who
generally have no trouble finding a counterpart.
The systematic risk premium is to compensate the investor for taking on systematic
risk by holding on to an asset whose value will vary and is correlated to some extent with the
market. By discounting the expected market value with the CAPM rate, and the futures value
with the risk free rate, you can derive the differential between the two, which is the
systematic risk premium. Based on the analysis by [Copeland & Antikarov 2001], we can
say:
E(S,) E(S,)-SRP F
(1±+rCAPM) (1+rf )t (+±rf) t(5613
E (St) = FI1+CAPM ]F +SRP (5.6-104)
Where: E (St): Expected value under the objective measure (not risk-neutral)
F : Futures price
rCAPM: CAPM returns
rf : Risk-free rate
PV: Present value
SRP: Market price of the risk in CAPM (Systematic Risk Premium)
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Eq. 5.6-92 shows that the expected market price is higher than the futures price by the
systematic risk premium which accounts for the variability of the price and its correlation to
the market (meaning it is an un-diversifiable risk).
While hedging eliminates the variability of the spot market, the alternative is typically
a period time charter which has the same effect. It is not direct exposure to the high volatility
of the daily spot rate, so hedging does not eliminate that risk. As discussed earlier, the time
charter rate for a year in the future can generally be hedged with a counterpart who needs to
hedge their need for the equivalent ton-miles; therefore, no premium is required to eliminate
the variability of time charter rates.
One could argue that by hedging also eliminates credit risk (charter default).
However, additional cash is required for marking-to-market. This is an alternative to the cost
of insuring against the charterer default risk. As market volatility increases, both the charterer
default risk increases and the required cash for marking-to-market increases. Note that we
will use the futures as a proxy of the expectation for the time charter rates with a reputable
charterer. Surely, there may be higher expectations for rates with risky charterers.
Another argument could be made that the risk premium associated with the ship
earning the spot market rate (operating risks) should be applied when discounting physical
rates but not futures rates. In fact, even when the earnings are hedged, the shipowner still
bears these risks. From the long position in the future, the owner receives the futures price
and pays the market price. Then the owner relies on the ship to get back the spot market rate.
Thereby, the shipowner is still exposed to the same ship operating risk as they would be had
they not hedged the earnings in the first place. For that reason, the ship risk premium should
be applied to the discount rate of the earnings regardless of whether they are hedged or not.
What follows is a short mathematical explanation:
E (St) 
_E ( S, - As_
1+ rs )t ( +r) t  (5.6-105)
Where: As: Risk premium to account for ship risks
r: Discount rate without ship risks
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r2s Discount rate adjusted for ship risks
As with the hazard function in the discount rate, we are incorporating the expected
default losses as a risk premium of default by treating the ship operating risks or the hazard
function as a fictitious credit risk. This is essentially merging the theories presented by
[Copeland & Antikarov 2001] for incorporating the financial risk and by [Duffie and
Singelton 2003] for incorporating the credit risk.
Now consider the present value of ship revenues, of a long futures position, and of a
hedged ship's revenues, which is the sum of the two.
P (hi Rv) E (St) E ( SJ- AsPV(Ship Rev, (5.6-106)(1+ri )t (1+r)t
F - E (S,
PV (LongF)= - F (s ) (5.6-107)(1+r)t
PV (Ship Rev)+ PV (LongF) = t -E(S, + ,(1+ r)t  (1+r)t
F - A_ F (5.6-108)
(1+r)t (I+r )t
Where: PV (Ship Re v): Present value of the expected earning of the un-
hedged ship
PV(LongF): Present value of a long futures position
This discussion implies that futures rates are a good indicator of market expectations.
To test this hypothesis, we can compare historical futures rates and physical market rates.
Note that it is meaningless to regress futures rates that are known in advance with the actual
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spot rates that materialize during the futures period, because market expectations keep
changing. The right way is to compare time charter rates and futures rates on the same day
for equivalent periods in the future. However, we can expect the time charter rates to be
slightly higher because there is typically a grace period for the ship re-delivery, meaning that
a small optional period is included at the end of the charter. The analysis was carried out in
Section 2.8 and the difference between futures and charter rates was statistically
insignificant. An extensive study was carried out by [Alizadeh and Nomikos 2009] who also
found that futures are the best predictors of market rates meaning which essentially means
that market expectations are the dominant factor affecting the forward curve.
Futures rates will be applied in place of the revenue projections, and discounted at the
rate that incorporates all the risk premiums. Another way to look at this is that futures are
used as a means of getting the best forecast of the earnings for an un-hedged vessel. Since the
futures rates are equivalent to the market expectations, the predicted revenues that would be
used in valuing an un-hedged ship would be the same as those for valuing a hedged ship
(equal to the futures rates). Since hedging is done at zero cost, the value of the hedged ship
should be identical as that of the hedged ship. In other words, the discount rate used to value
both would have to be the same and equal to the risk adjusted weighted average cost of
capital.
The futures rates are for a Baltic Cape which is defined as a 172,000dwt vessel up to
7 years old. Futures rates are published for months, quarters and whole years. By applying
the no-arbitrage condition, we can deduce the futures level for various periods from the
futures levels of other overlapping periods. For example, the futures rate for one year is
related to the futures rates of its constituent months and the futures rates of its constituent
quarters as follows:
4 -rf(Tq-t) 12 -r(T.-t)
F (t,T)=Z e FQ(t,Tq)= F M tm (5.6-109)
q=1 Ze Trf(-t) m=1 e-rf;Tm-t)
q=1 m=1
Where: rf : Continuously compounded risk free interest rate
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t:
T:
m:
q:
Fy(t, T):
FQ (t, T,):
Fm (t, T.):
Time variable
Time of maturity
Index that denotes the month
Index that denotes the quarter
Futures level for calendar year "y" with maturity T,
Futures level for quarter "q" with maturity T
Futures level for month "m" with maturity T
Eq. 5.6-96 must hold or else, someone can make money without any risk simply by
selling and buying the same underlying portfolio of futures at different prices. We can apply
this principle to rates of long period time charters and futures to obtain implied forward
estimates of freight levels beyond the 5 years. Since capes are typically chartered for a year
or so, we will deduce a freight level for each year and keep it constant throughout the whole
year. For example, we will use the rates from BCI futures for calendar years 2010, 2011,
2012, 2013 and 2014. Since these are published daily, we will take the average value for each
from the beginning of November 2009 to the end of February 2010 (in order for our range to
be centered at the beginning of the year). The results are summarized in Table 5.6-21. There
has been very little variation in the values throughout this time interval as indicated by the
standard deviation in the third column of Table 5.6-21.
Table 5.6-21: Average Futures Rates for Calendar Years 2010 to 2014 from Start Nov'09 to End Feb' 0 Based
on data from [Clarksons 20101
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Calendar Year Futures Rate Standard Deviation / Mean
2010 $33,773 7.6%
2011 $26,522 3.2%
2012 $25,638 3.1%
2013 $25,203 3.0%
2014 $24,927 2.9%
Before extending the earnings projections, we have to account for the reduction factor
in earnings due to age. In Section 4.6.3, we carried out this analysis based on 10-year historic
data and determined that the average earnings of a 10-year, 20-year and 30-year old ship to
the earnings of a new ship were on average approximately 80%, 70% and 60%. However,
these have been affected by the fact that in the very high market, due to the shortage of
supply, old ships were commanding relatively higher rates than they normally would.
Today, the earnings of older vessels amount to a smaller percentage of the earnings
for a new vessel because there is no shortage of ships. Given the massive orderbook, it is
most likely that there will be no real shortage of ships going forward either. It is therefore
appropriate to repeat the analysis using post-crash data only. As of March 22, 2010, 28 time
charter fixtures have been reported so far in 2010 and 106 for 2009 by Clarksons
Shipbrokers. These range from 4 months to 4 years. By comparing charters of similar periods
fixed at similar times for ships of different ages, we can repeat the analysis and produce the
same results as those used in Section 4.6.3, based on recent data. The results are summarized
in Table 5.6-22.
AGE (Years) Reduction Factor (% of New)
0-5 100%
10 95%
15 90%
20 80%
25 65%
30 50%
Table 5.6-22: Reduction Factor in Earnings Relative to a New Ship as a Function of Ship Age -
Based on data from [Clarksons 20101
Linear interpolation is used between the values of Table 5.6-22 to obtain reduction
factors for intermediate ages. Note that we have just quantified gross earnings, on which
there is typically an address commission of 3.75% and a broker commission of 1.25%.
Therefore, the net earnings, which will be used as the revenues projections in our model, are
equal to 95% of the futures values after accounting for the age discount.
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Having quantified the levels for the first 5 years for a new ship, the earnings discount
factor as a function of ship age, and the commissions, the only thing that is left is projecting
the earnings for a new ship from 6 years onwards. Since the futures curve flattens out, one
approach would be to simply project the Cap 14 futures rates going forward. However, since
the terminal value of earnings will have a significant impact on the valuation, it would be
best to obtain a more accurate estimate using long term charters. Of the following list, the
first three charters were fixed in January 2010 and the 4 th one in May 2009:
1. 12 Year charter at $27,431/day by Chinese charterer with delivery in 1 year
2. 10 Year charter at $24,000/day by major charterer with delivery in 2 years
3. 10 Year charter at $23,500/day by major charterer with delivery in 2 years and only 3%
total Commission
4. 15 Year charter at $26,500/day by unknown charterer with prompt delivery
If we account for the commission difference, charters 2 and 3 are almost identical and
equivalent to a $24,000/day charter from 2012 to 2022. Having the rates for various tenures,
we need to satisfy the no-arbitrage constraint (as in Eq. 5.6-96), but we also need an
additional constraint distribute values to each individual year. An example is the flexible
functional form suggested by [Pilipovic 2007]:
T (t, T) = Ae a(Tt) +B (e a2 (Tt) -e a(Tt) ) + C (e-(T-t) _ e-a2(Tt) (5.6-110)
The objective is to follow the trend of the established forward curve in a reasonable
manner, while satisfying the no-arbitrage constraint. Table 5.6-23 shows the interest rate, the
futures levels and the example charters.
851
Interest Rate Discount Period Futures Charter 1 Charters 2&3 Charter 4
0.91% 0.5 $33,773 $33,773 $33,773 $26,500
1.44% 1.5 $26,522 $27,431 $26,522 $26,500
1.90% 2.5 $25,638 $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
2.37% 3.5 $25,203 $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
2.74% 4.5 $24,927 $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
3.11% 5.5 ? $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
3.30% 6.5 $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
3.49% 7.5 $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
3.68% 8.5 $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
3.76% 9.5 $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
3.83% 10.5 $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
3.91% 11.5 $27,431 $24,000 $26,500
3.99% 12.5 ? $27,431 ? $26,500
4.07% 13.5 ? $26,500
4.15% 14.5 ? $26,500
Table 5.6-23: Table of Rates to set up the No-Arbitrage Constraint
In the columns for the charters, the years until the charter starts have been filled in
with the futures rates for the corresponding years. The question marks denote the futures
rates for the years that we are seeking (after accounting for the age reduction factor). The
first column indicates the interest rate applicable to each year while the second column shows
the period over which earnings will be discounted (it is assumed that all earnings are received
at mid-year).
The point of this table is that by discounting all the columns to the present, using the
interest rate and discount period in the first two columns, we must get the same results to
satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. In practice, it may not be possible to get exactly the same
present values, but we must try to get close. Priority will be given to satisfy Charters 2 and 3
because they are more reliable. That is because they were conducted in January 2010, by
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major charterers meaning that they don't include a premium due to risk of charterer default
etc. Table 5.6-24 attempts to satisfy the constraints while gradually reducing the forward
curve towards an asymptote as it seems to be heading. The annual change in the percentage
decrease of earnings from year to year was held constant at 0.2% for this purpose.
Calendar Year Futures Rate Change From % Decrease Change in
Previous Year % Decrease
2010 $33,773
2011 $26,522
2012 $25,638 $883 -3.33%
2013 $25,203 $436 -1.70%
2014 $24,927 $276 -1.10%
2015 $24,702 $224 -0.90% 0.20%
2016 $24,529 $173 -0.70% 0.20%
2017 $24,407 $123 -0.50% 0.20%
2018 $24,334 $73 -0.30% 0.20%
2019+ $24,309 $24 -0.10% 0.20%
Table 5.6-24: Projection of Futures Curve Using Long Term Charters and No-Arbitrage Constraint
The terminal value of $24,309/day is held constant going forward. When applied to
Table 5.6-22, after accounting for the age discount as per Table 5.6-21, these values result in
an error in the present value of +0.86% for Charters 2 and 3, -9.81% for Charter 1 and -
5.72% for Charter 4. Indeed, Charters 1 and 4 include a risk premium relative to Charters 2
and 3, which are by major charterers. Since the charters are of similar length, two are
underestimated and two are overestimated by the forward curve there is little room for
improvement. Furthermore, the error on the two most reliable charters is almost zero, so we
shall keep the projections of Table 5.6-24.
Finally, we have to multiply the daily earnings by the earning days per month which
also account for off-hire time due to repairs. The earning days per month or equivalently, the
percentage earning time, has been determined as a function of ship age in Table 5.6-6 of
Section 5.2.7. To get the revenues at month "n", we use the formula:
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Rev = ED(Ageo +n)* BCI * ARF (Ageo +n)*(1-%Com)
(5.6-111)
n:
Revn:
ED(Age):
BCIn:
Number of months from valuation data (Jan 2010)
Daily revenues of ship in month "n"
Earning days per month as a function of age (Table 5.6-
6 of Section 5.2.7)
Daily revenues of a Baltic Cape (new ship) in month
"n" (Table 5.6-23)
Ageo: Age of ship at the beginning (Jan 2010)
ARF (Age) :Earnings reduction factor due to ship age (Table 5.6-
22)
%Com: Address and broker commission (total of 5%)
We also have to account for the residual value of the ship as an earning at the end of
its life. For that, we will assume a lightship of 22,000, multiplied by a historical average of
250 $/ltd, which is also used in the Hamburg Valuation Model. Using these values, we get a
scrap value of $5.5M. Note that this is in real terms. Therefore, we have:
RevL = 5,500,000 (5.6-112)
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Where:
5.6.3.2 Operating Expenses
The analysis to derive the operating costs was carried out in Section 5.4. Since we
accounted for inflation in the discount rate, we have to use the equation developed for the
operating costs in real terms (Eq. 5.4-6). Based on that, we have:
OpExn =[8.943(Ageo +n)+3601]*[+MAX (0,0.721-0.002n)In]n
(5.6-113)
Where: n: Months from valuation date
OpEx,: Real Operating costs in $/day, "n" months from
valuation date
Ageo: Age of Ship at the valuation date
In :Average monthly inflation until month "n" (Section 5.6.2.6,
Fig. 5.6-11)
5.6.3.3 Repair Costs
The repair costs were determined in real terms as a function of ship age in Section 5.2
and summarized in Table 5.6-6 of Section 5.2.7. These are the real values that are assumed to
remain constant over time. Since inflation is accounted for in the discount factor, these values
will not be a function of time. The values of RepCost, are only a function of ship age and
are held constant throughout each year.
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5.6.3.4 Expected Failure Losses
The expected failure losses for each month are equal to the probability of a failure in
that month, multiplied by the cost of failure. The probability of failure in a given month is
approximately equal to the hazard function. We can see that by considering the change in the
survivor function from one month to the next (that is by definition equal to the probability of
failure in that month):
n n+1
P(fail)n =S(n)-S(n+1)=e o -e o
n n+1 n+1
-fA (r) dr + fA (r)'dr ~ A (r) dri A (n)
0 0 n
The hazard function has been developed as a function of time in Section 4.5. The
failure cost has also been estimated in Section 4.6 as a weighted average of the various cost
of the three types of failures. The three types of failures included a "2 month" emergency
repair, a "6 month" emergency repair and a "late" repair (sink / total loss). The cost
components included loss of hire, loss of the ship value (in case of total loss, "other costs"
including reputational costs, and "repair costs" which also include transportation to and from
the shipyard.
In the our model, we have already incorporated the potential loss of hire due to an
emergency repair or total loss as a credit spread over the discount rate. Therefore, our
measure of failure cost will only consist of the weighted average "repair costs" and "other
costs". These have been quantified in Section 2.4 and are not a function of ship age or time
(inflation is already accounted for in the discount rate). We have:
P(fail)n FailCost ~ A (n) * [EmRC + EmOC] (5.6-115)
Where: n: Months from valuation date (Jan 2010)
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P(fail),: Probability of failure in month "n"
FailCost: Cost of failure due to cracks
A(n): Hazard function for ship age corresponding to month
5.6.4 Valuation of Non-Standard Ships
There are four methods by which the model can be applied to determine the value of a
Cape which has different characteristics from the generic type that we have so far assumed.
They are the following:
1. Carry out the valuation for standard Cape and then adjust for the non-standard ship as
a broker would, using the standard cape valuation as a comparable.
2. Calculate an Adjusted Present Value (APV) of the expected future cash flows. This is
similar to the present value of the tax shields that arise from the tax deductibility of
interest payments. Each difference from a standard ship can be associated with
additional cash flows. For example, a ship with better fuel efficiency or a better
coating specification will result in a certain amount of savings throughout its life
relative to the standard ship. By projecting these additional cash flows and
discounting them to the present, one can find the price adjustment over the standard
valuation. This method has the benefit that it separately defines the value of the
specific non-standard ship attributes.
3. Adjust the numerator terms of the RAFL ship valuation model to reflect those of the
non-standard Cape. For example, projected revenues, operating and repair costs may
be different for a double hull Cape (discussed in Section 3.7.2). A smaller ship may
command lower earnings, and often brokers have been kept track of these (e.g.
Clarksons' time series for 127,500dwt Cape earnings since the 1970s). Adjusting the
terms accordingly will result in the valuation of the specific ship.
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4. Use a large database of transactions to statistically determine the historical impacts of
ship characteristics on transaction prices. Using regression analysis, one can
determine the price premium due to factors such as engine type, shipyard, ship
condition or special survey due, ore carrier etc. It is important in the regression
analysis to make sure that the parameters are not too correlated. The RAFL ship
valuation model is then adjusted with a summation term that accounts for these
parameters, multiplied by the remaining ship's life (assuming a 28 year life). The
summation term includes calibrated constants "a" for these effects, multiplied dummy
variables "D" that take a value of one if the characteristic applies and zero otherwise.
The RAFL model then becomes:
Ship Value = - OpEx - RepCost -P(fail) FailCost+ (28 - AGE) aD'
n=1 (1+i 0 )
(5.6-116)
aDi =(a,D Condition + 2DYard + a3DEng + a 4 Dcranes + a5Dorecarrier
(5.6-117)
Each of the four methods described is more appropriate for different adjustments. It is
therefore most appropriate to combine them when incorporating effects of different kinds.
For example, one may use method 2 or 3 to account for a difference in ship size, coupled
with method 4 to account for a non-conventional ship engine such as a Pielstick or
Mitsubishi instead of a Sulzer or B&W make.
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5.7 Results, Analysis and Comparisons
5.7.1 RAFL Ship Valuation Model Results
The new Risk-Adjusted Forward-Looking (RAFL) ship valuation model was applied
as described in Section 5.6, to Capes of various ages, using data centered about the beginning
of 2010. The results are summarized in Table 5.7-1.
Table 5.7-1: Summary of Cape Valuations using the RAFL Model
Fig. 5.7-1 to 5.7-5 show the expected profits each month throughout the ship's life
(the black line) and their present value (in red bars). Note that in each case, the final payment
at the end of the ship's life is $5.5M (the predicted scrap value). The current value of the ship
is equal to the sum of the present values, which is equal to the area in red.
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Ship Age (Years) RAFL Valuation
0 $61,854,689
5 $52,207,769
10 $41,918,214
15 $30,825,049
20 $19,521,489
Fig. 5.7-1: Expected Profits and their Present Value Throughout the Life of a New Cape
Expected Profits During Ship Life for 5-Year-Old Cape
PV of E[Profits] - Expected Profits
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Fig. 5.7-2: Expected Profits and their Present Value Throughout the Life of a 5-Year-Old Cape
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Expected Profits During Ship Life for New Cape
PV of E[Prof its] - Expected Profits
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Expected Profits During Ship Life for 10-Year-Old Cape
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Fig. 5.7-3: Expected Profits and their Present Value Throughout the Life of a 10-Year-Old Cape
Expected Profits During Ship Life for 15-Year-Old Cape
PV of E[Profits] - Expected Profits
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Fig. 5.7-4: Expected Profits and their Present Value Throughout the Life of a 15-Year-Old Cape
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Expected Profits During Ship Life for 20-Year Old Cape
PV of E[Profits] - Expected Profits
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Fig. 5.7-5: Expected Profits and their Present Value Throughout the Life of a 20-Year-Old Cape
Fig. 5.7-6 to 5.7-10 show the discount rate and the resulting discount factor
throughout the ship's life. The discount rate (blue line) is determined by the cost of equity,
the risk free rate, the leverage, the inflation and the history of the hazard function. The
combination of these factors which vary throughout the ship's life gives rise to the resulting
shape. The discount factor is the number by which expected profits are multiplied to get their
present value. That is only dependent on the time from the present and the corresponding
discount rate at that point in time (the blue line is not integrated to calculate the discount
factor).
Discount Rate and Discount Factor for New Cape
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Fig. 5.7-6: Discount Rate and Resulting Discount Factor Throughout the Life of a New Cape
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Discount Rate and Discount Factor for 5-Year-Old Cape
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Fig. 5.7-7: Discount Rate and Resulting Discount Factor Throughout the Life of a 5-Year-Old Cape
Discount Rate and Discount Factor for 10-Year-Old Cape
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Fig. 5.7-8: Discount Rate and Resulting Discount Factor Throughout the Life of a 10-Year-Old Cape
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Discount Rate and Discount Factor for 15-Year-Old Cape
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Fig. 5.7-9: Discount Rate and Resulting Discount Factor Throughout the Life of a 15-Year-Old Cape
Discount Rate and Discount Factor for 20-Year-Old Cape
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Fig. 5.7-10: Discount Rate and Resulting Discount Factor Throughout the Life of a 20-Year-Old Cape
Note that the increase in the discount rate with age for the 20-year-old ship in Fig 5.7-
10, is mostly due to the increase in the risk free rate (time value of money).
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5.7.2 RAFL Model vs. Transaction Prices
The valuations were carried out by taking average values between November 2009
and February 2010. That was because the market was relatively stable over this time period.
Table 5.7-2 summarizes all the Cape transactions that took place between November 2009
and February 2010.
Month Cape Dwt Yard Engine Notes Age Price
NOV Knock Nevis 564,650 Sumitomo for storage 31 ?
NOV NB Resale 177,000 China MAN-B&W 0 59
NOV Long Charity 174,000 Hitachi B&W 25 13.7
NOV Grand Fortune 150,877 Sanoyas Sulzer 16 28
NOV NB Resale 180,000 STX Dely 12/10 0 62
DEC Azul Glory 178,633 Daewoo B&W 12 40.6
DEC Cape Victory 177,359 Namura 7 52
DEC Alameda 170,726 Samho B&W 9 45
DEC CHS Star 150,149 Hyundai B&W 19 17.5
JAN Oriental Bay 179,764 Sasebo MAN-B&W 0 71.5
JAN NB Resale 179,000 Sasebo MAN-B&W Cido resale 0 71.5
JAN Azul Glory 178,633 Daewoo B&W 12 39
JAN Star Beta 174,691 Poland Sulzer 17 22
JAN Cape Africa 149,533 Taiwan B&W 19 18.8
JAN Peace Blossom 148,982 Spain Sulzer 23 11.6
FEB Oriental Cosmos 179,764 Sasebo MAN-B&W 0 71
FEB Cape Olive 169,963 Mitsui B&W 14 27
FEB Lowlands Billiance 169,631 Samho B&W 8 48.5
FEB Ocean Comfort 149,477 Taiwan B&W 18 19.5
FEB Marine Corona 139,496 Kawasaki B&W 28 7.2
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Fig 5.7-11 shows the transactions of Table 5.5-2 along with the valuation results of
Table 5.5-1. The transaction prices are shown in blue circles while the valuations are in red
triangles. The current scrap value which is approximately $8.8M is assumed to apply at the
age of 27.5 onwards, and is shown in black triangles. The dotted line is the valuation line
showing the values obtained for each ship age through linear interpolation between the
valuations.
Valuation Results vs. Transaction Prices
(Nov'09 to Feb'10)
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Fig 5.7-11 RAFL Valuation Results and Actual Transaction Comparison
The valuations are surprisingly close to the transaction prices across all ages. The new
ships that were bought in excess of $70M, all went to a single buyer, Indian-based Five Stars.
If we exclude that buyer, we get an almost perfect match. The vessels over 27.5 years old
went for slightly less than scrap value because they are smaller (less lightship) and one also
needs to account for transportation costs to the scrap yard. This is particularly true for the 29-
year-old 127,907dwt "North King" which has a special survey due and will almost certainly
not be further traded.
This means that current ship prices appear to be close to the intrinsic ship value. It
shows that the model is reliable and can be used to estimate the value of a ship when there
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are no comparable sales. More importantly, it can be used to determine when a ship is worth
buying or selling by looking at its current market price relative to the valuation line. Ship
values fluctuate with the market but will tend to return to their intrinsic value. This creates
investment opportunities which can be identified using our model. The valuation line will
also vary with time but this can be hedged against as we will show in Section 5.8.
Furthermore, it can be used to make sure one doesn't overpay or undersell a ship given a
certain market.
Since ships are trading at prices almost equal to the valuations, a case can't be made
about the effect of cracks not being incorporated. Market participants probably account for
this and other factors intuitively or by applying crude safety margins which, for this case,
appear to be in the ballpark. One advantage of the model is that it can be used to quantify the
various effects on value, including cracks and also break down the value into components.
We will see this in the next subsections.
Note that the transaction prices used in Table 5.7-2 and Fig. 5.7-11 are for ships that
are not identical to those being valued. Furthermore, our valuation for a new ship assumes
that the ship is in the water, whereas a newbuilding with a later delivery would sell at a
discount to our valuation. For greater accuracy we would have to adjust these values for size,
shipyard, special survey due etc. This was avoided because it introduces subjectivity which
would undermine the results. However, brokers have done this work using these transactions
and we can use their results directly. Table 5.7-3 shows the standard Cape valuations by
Cotzias Shipbrokers, as published in their monthly reports, along with the mean values
between November 2009 and December 2010.
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SHIP AGE NOV DEC JAN FEB MEAN
Newbuilding 67.0 68.0 69.0 70.5 68.6
5 50.0 51.5 53.0 55.1 52.4
10 42.1 42.1 42.1 42.1 42.1
20 19.0 17.8 17.0 16.0 17.5
Table 5.7-3 Cotzias Shipbrokers Valuations [Cotzias 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b]
As discussed in Section 5.5, along with others, Clarksons had stopped publishing
valuations after the market crash until early 2010. However, they have now also published
valuations for some of the later months (in retrospect). Table 5.7-4 shows their standard Cape
valuations between November 2009 and February 2010, along with the mean over that
period. Note that some of the valuations published by Clarksons are for slightly different
deadweights than the standard, as indicated in Table 5.7-4
SHIP AGE NOV DEC JAN FEB MEAN
Newbuilding (175-180kdwt) 56.5 56 56 56 56.1
5 52.5 55 55 56.5 54.8
10 44 44 44.5 44.5 44.3
20 (150 kdwt) 16.5 16 18 17.5 17.0
Table 5.7-4: Clarksons Shipbrokers Valuations [Clarksons 20101
Fig 5.7-12 shows a plot of the mean values (between the two sets of quotations),
along with our valuations.
Valuation Results vs. Broker's Quotes
(Nov'09 to Feb'10)
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Fig 5.7-12 New RAFL Model Valuation Results and Broker Price Quotations
The results are almost identical to the average of the broker quotes over the period
considered. The differences are smaller than those observed between the two sets of prices
quoted by brokers, which are interpretations of the same set of data.
5.7.3 Crack Credit Spreads
Here, we will deduce the effective credit spread that should be applied on the
discount rate to account for the effect of cracks. Recall our valuation model:
Le-Age Rev, - OpEx, - RepCost, - P(fail), FailCost
ShipValue = Z F
n=1 + 'n
(5.7-1)
Where:
i(t)= (1+r Acc(t))e 2 st(t) -1 (5.7-2)
rIACC(t)= W,(t)r, + wD D(t) - 1(t) (5.7-3)
1 1 9 t25t
St(t)= A(r)dr+- A(r)ddr+- A(r )d-r (5.7_4)
t 18 36,_ 36t-1
We have broken down crack costs into three components. The first is the potential
revenue losses as a result of off-hire time due to crack failures. This was incorporated into
the discount rate as shown in Eq. 5.7-4 and 5.7-2. The second is the expected cost of failures
excluding loss of hire, which appears in the last numerator term of Eq. 5.7-1. The third is the
cost of scheduled crack repairs which forms part of the third term in the numerator of Eq.
5.7-1.
Having solved for the ship values, we can solve for the effective spread on the
discount rate that would account for each of these costs. We write the valuation formula in
the following equivalent forms, where we introduce the credit spreads:
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Life-Age0 Rev - OpEx. - RepCost, - P(fail), (FailCost + OffHire)
n=(1+ rACC,n)"
Ship Value =
Ship Value =
Ship Value =
Life-Age
n=1
Ship Value =
Where:
(5.7-5)
Revn - OpExn - RepCostn - P(fail)n FailCost
(1+rACCn +sl)"
(5.7-6)
Revn - OpEx, - RepCostn
(1+r' +(s. )77)G WACC,n + 2
Rev, -OpEx 
-Non CrackRepCostn
(1+rWACCn +s)S
SI - S2 S3
Si : Spread to only account for crack failure off-hire losses
s2: Spread to account for the total cost due to crack failures
S3: Spread to account for all crack-associated costs (failure and scheduled
repairs)
To determine the spreads, we simply solve Eq. 5.7-5 to 5.7-9 iteratively to get equal
ship values as determined by 5.7-1. To get the non-crack repair costs required for Eq. 5.7-8,
we turn to the analysis of Section 5.2-4 where we got the crack costs as a fraction of total
repair costs throughout the ship's life. We first solve for the crack repair costs by multiplying
the predicted total repair costs by the fraction for the corresponding age (from Section 5.2-4).
Then we deduct the crack repair costs from the total repair costs to get the non-crack repair
costs, and solve for S3 . The results of the analysis for all ship ages are summarized in Table
5.7-5 and Fig. 5.7-13.
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Life-Ageo
n=1
Lif-Ag* o
n=1
(5.7-8)
(5.7-9)
Ship Age (Years) 0 5 10 15 20
Si (Failure Offhire Only) 0.10% 0.12% 0.30% 0.40% 0.12%
S2 (All Failure Costs) 0.17% 0.25% 0.54% 0.80% 0.51%
S3 (Total Crack Costs) 0.31% 0.49% 1.05% 1.65% 2.02%
Table 5.7-5: Crack Credit Spreads
Discount Rate Crack Spreads
2.00%
1.50%
--- Failure Off hire
1 1.00% --- Failures
) 0.50% Total Crack Effect
0.50%
0.00%
0 5 10 15 20
Ship Age
Fig 5.7-Fig. 5.7-13: Crack Credit Spreads as a Function of Ship Age
Here, we see that crack credit spreads are substantial, particularly for mid-aged ships.
Keep in mind that this is a spread directly over the weighted average cost of capital, after
adjusting for inflation. In practice, one would probably include all repair costs in the
numerator and not account for crack repair costs in the discount rate. Therefore, one would
probably be using the S2 credit spread to only account for potential crack failure losses. That
would be the red line in Fig 5.7-13.
The spreads corresponding to the failure costs are determined by the hazard function
(and its history). Since the hazard function peaked at age 20 (4th special survey) and did not
increase as much thereafter, the crack failure spreads applied to a 20-year old ship (until
scrapping age) are slightly lower than those for the 15 year old ship. However, crack repair
costs tend to increase substantially after the age of 15, causing the total crack spread to keep
increasing.
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We can also solve for the equivalent constant discount rate that would result in the
same ship valuations using Eq. 5.7-10. The results are summarized in Table 5.7-6.
ShipValue = Rev, - OpEx - RepCost, - P(fail), FailCost
n=1 (1+ie)"
(5.7-10)
Ship Age (Years) 0 5 10 15 20
9.53% 9.60% 9.07% 8.65% 7.64%
Table 5.7-6: Effective Constant Discount Rate
Note that this is highly affected by the term structure of interest rates, which is
upward sloping, causing the discount rate for the 20-year old ship to be lower. It is also
important to note that the spreads calculated above assume a discount rate that varies with
time, they are not spreads over the constant discount rate. The results are very close to what
is typically used by analysts for shipping company valuation. BDP 1 Consulting Ltd has been
applying a weighted average cost of capital for shipping companies that typically ranges
between 5% and 12.5% [bdpl(a), bdpl(b)]. In November 2009, Credit Suisse was using a
weighted average cost of capital of 10% for the valuation of Diana Shipping [Lewis 2009].
Note that these rates are typically used for nominal discounting meaning that they have not
been adjusted for inflation.
Next, we can also solve for the present value of each of the crack costs (an alternative
to applying the spreads over the discount rate). We get this by keeping the discount rate of
the original valuation and removing the relevant costs. This is the intermediate step in the
previous analysis, just before adding the calculated spread in order to bring the value back to
the original level. The present value of the relevant costs are summarized in Table 5.7-7 and
Fig 5.7-14.
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Fig 5.7-14: Present Value of Expected Crack Costs as a Function of Ship Age
The results show that the present value of all crack-associated costs considered is
consistently over $ 1M between the age of 0 and 20 years, and exceeds $2M, when the ship is
around 10 years old. This highlights the importance and need for research on fracture
mechanics and methods to eliminate cracks in ships. Approximately half the cost is due to
potential crack failures. The present value of crack costs declines with ship age after a certain
point because as the ship gets older, there are fewer years remaining and therefore fewer
remaining future crack costs.
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Ship Age (Years) 0 5 10 15 20
PV(Failure Offhire Only) $387,842 $330,764 $597,316 $481,856 $73,399
PV(All Failure Costs) $656,817 $706,335 $1,087,831 $968,002 $309,272
PV(Total Crack Costs) $1,183,448 $1,399,211 $2,114,887 $2,004,248 $1,209,764
Table 5.7-7: Present Value of Crack Costs
5.7.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity of the valuations was examined with respect to four key variables. The
first one is the continuation value of the base revenue which is the daily revenues of a new
Cape beyond the period that is observable from futures prices and long term charter rates.
The second parameter is the residual or scrap value at the end of the ship's life. Those two
parameters resemble the revenues that are more difficult to hedge. Therefore, sensitivity with
respect to these two parameters indicates the amount of risk involved when buying the ship.
The third parameter is the discount rate which was the most complicated variable to
estimate and on which we spent the most effort and time. The sensitivity of ship values to the
discount rate will tell us if all that effort is worthwhile. The fourth parameter is the operating
cost which was chosen because the shipowner has significant influence over it. The
sensitivity analysis will quantify the potential benefits to the ship owner who makes an effort
to reduce operating costs.
To carry out the sensitivity analysis, we calculate the percentage change in the ship
value following a one percent change in each of the parameters. Note that most of the
parameters are functions of time or ship age, in which case all the values taken by the
parameter throughout the ship's life are changed by one percent. The sensitivity of the ship
value is examined for both an increase and a decrease of each parameter (by one percent) and
the mean response is recorded. The responses were symmetric except with respect to the
discount rate for which the ship values were slightly more elastic when decreasing it. In other
words, negative and positive changes in the parameters had an equal impact on the ship
value, except for the discount rate, in which a decrease had a slightly bigger impact than an
increase. The results of the mean responses are summarized in Table 5.7-8 and Fig 5.7-15.
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Age (years) Cont.Rev Disc.Rate OpExp ResVal
0 0.4006 -0.5814 -0.2927 0.0079
5 0.3668 -0.5118 -0.3582 0.0147
10 0.3128 -0.4258 -0.4537 0.0288
15 0.1535 -0.3355 -0.5637 0.0618
20 0.0000 -0.2966 -0.6855 0.1642
Table 5.7-8: % Change in Shio Values given a +/-1% Change in Sensitivity Parameters
Fig 5.7-15: Sensitivity Analysis of Valuations
The continuation revenues have a significant impact when the ship is young and no
impact after the age in which the remaining ship's life is short enough to infer all revenues
from observable market data. On the other hand, when the ship is young, the residual value
has almost no impact and that increases substantially when the ship gets older. Note that the
residual value is more easily hedged as the ship gets older and it becomes more significant.
Therefore, it poses less of a problem in terms of risk hedging relative to the continuation
revenue.
We see that the discount rate has the biggest impact on the valuation of a new ship
and the second biggest impact in the case of a 20-year old ship. This justifies the detail and
effort we put in its calculation. The operating expenses have a significant impact on the ship
value, which increases with age meaning that this is an area well worth focusing on for the
shipowner.
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5.7.5 Valuation Model vs. Alternative Methods
5.7.5.1 Introduction
Alternative ship valuation methods were discussed in Section 5.6. These include
methods that are adopted by the industry as well as proposed modifications and alternatives.
As we did with our ship valuation model, we will carry out valuations for ships 0, 5, 10, 15
and 20 years old using those methods as of the start of 2010. Then we will compare the
results to each other and to market transaction prices.
5.7.5.2 Valuation by Adopted Alternatives
5.7.5.2.1 Comparables-Based Valuation
The quotations from brokers that are based on adjustments and interpretations of the
observed transaction prices were considered in Section 5.7.2. Fig. 5.7-16 shows a plot of the
quoted prices by Cotzias and Clarksons, along with the mean of the two and the transactions
that occurred during the same period.
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Broker Quotes and Transaction Prices
(Nov'09 to Feb'10)
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Fig 5.7-16 Broker Quotations and Transaction Prices
There is some discrepancy between the two brokers at age equals zero. All the broker
valuations are for a newbuilding as opposed to a delivered ship, whereas the transaction
prices also include ships with prompt delivery (re-sales). The discrepancy may arise from
looking at newbuilding quotations from different shipyards.
There is no point in using this graph in assessing the accuracy of this method since
the valuations are based on the actual transaction prices observed in the market. The major
limitation of this method is the fact that it cannot be applied in the absence of observed
transaction prices.
5.7.5.2.2 Short Term Forecasting
Short-term forecasting relates to the method Marsoft uses to predict the average ship
values within the same quarter. For example, if we take Marsoft's predictions for the values
of the first quarter of 2010, as published in mid-January 2010, we can essentially treat that as
a current valuation. These values are summarized in Table 5.7-9 and are plotted along with
the Cape transactions between November 2009 and February 2010 in Fig, 5.7-17.
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Fig 5.7-17: Short-Term Forecasts vs. Actual Transaction Prices
There is a close match between the results and the data. However, similarly to the
previous case of comparables, this cannot be considered an external and independent
valuation method because transaction prices up to the data of the valuation are taken into
account when producing the results.
5.7.5.2.3 Hamburg Valuation
The Hamburg valuation was applied by GmbH to value a 2-year-old Cape as of
March 3 1st 2009. However, it was applied in a more conservative way than suggested by the
method, using earnings of $36,900/day after the first year and without multiplying the scrap
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Ship Age (Years) Short Term Forecasts
0 52.5
5 48.6
10 39.5
value by 3.45 to get the 20-year residual value. The result was $100.958M using a 20 year
horizon and $106.934M using a 25 year horizon [VHSS 2009].
The Hamburg valuation method has been described in great detail in Section 5.5.2.4.
We will follow the exact method, step by step to produce valuations for Capes of the various
ages considered for the period of November 2009 to February 2010. Fig 5.7-18 shows the
average daily earnings of a Baltic Cape (BCI) since they were have been reported by the
Baltic Exchange.
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Fig. 5.7-18: The Baltic Cape Daily Earnings (Average of 4-TC Routes) Since Reported
We start by a brief reminder of the main assumptions. For the first year, we have to
use current earnings so we take the average BCI between November 2009 and December
2010 which is $48,622/day. For the remaining life, we need the 10-year average, so we take
the average between January 2000 and December 2009, which is $51,523/day. As per [VHSS
2009], we assume 6.5% commissions, annual discounting with a 6.6% discount rate, 360
days/year except for years of class renewal (every 5 years) where we use 345 days/year,
annual operating expenses of $2,323,590, and a residual value of $5.5M. According to the
method, for ships up to 15 years old, we use a 20 year horizon and multiply the residual value
by 3.45. For ships older than 15 (our 20-year-old ship valuation), we use a horizon of 25
years with a residual value of 5.5 years, and discount the earnings after the 20h year by 30%.
Table 5.7-10 to 5.7-14 show the valuations. Fig 5.7-19 shows the results along with the
transaction prices.
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Year Operating Gross daily Net Operating Net Income PV(Income)
Days Rate Revenue Expenses
1 360 $48,622 $16,366,165 $2,323,590 $14,042,575 $13,173,147
2 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $13,216,854
3 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $12,398,550
4 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $11,630,910
5 345 $51,523 $16,620,032 $2,323,590 $14,296,442 $10,385,847
6 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $10,235,270
7 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $9,601,566
8 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $9,007,098
9 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $8,449,435
10 345 $51,523 $16,620,032 $2,323,590 $14,296,442 $7,544,942
11 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $7,435,553
12 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $6,975,190
13 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $6,543,330
14 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $6,138,209
15 345 $51,523 $16,620,032 $2,323,590 $14,296,442 $5,481,127
16 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $5,401,660
17 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $5,067,223
18 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $4,753,493
19 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $4,459,186
20 360 $51,523 $36,317,642 $2,323,590 $33,994,052 $9,468,013
$167,366,605
Table 5.7-10: Hamburg Valuation for New Cape
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Year Operating Gross daily Net Operating Net Income PV(Income)
Days Rate Revenue Expenses
1 360 $48,622 $16,366,165 $2,323,590 $14,042,575 $13,173,147
2 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $13,216,854
3 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $12,398,550
4 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $11,630,910
5 345 $51,523 $16,620,032 $2,323,590 $14,296,442 $10,385,847
6 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $10,235,270
7 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $9,601,566
8 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $9,007,098
9 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $8,449,435
10 345 $51,523 $16,620,032 $2,323,590 $14,296,442 $7,544,942
11 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $7,435,553
12 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $6,975,190
13 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $6,543,330
14 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $6,138,209
15 360 $51,523 $36,317,642 $2,323,590 $33,994,052 $13,033,014
$145,768,916
Table 5.7-11: Hamburg Valuation for 5-Year-Old Cape
Year Operating Gross daily Net Operating Net Income PV(Income)
Days Rate Revenue Expenses
1 360 $48,622 $16,366,165 $2,323,590 $14,042,575 $13,173,147
2 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $13,216,854
3 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $12,398,550
4 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $11,630,910
5 345 $51,523 $16,620,032 $2,323,590 $14,296,442 $10,385,847
6 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $10,235,270
7 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $9,601,566
8 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $9,007,098
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9 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $8,449,435
10 360 $51,523 $36,317,642 $2,323,590 $33,994,052 $17,940,349
$116,039,027
Table 5.7-12: Hamburg Valuation for 10-Year-Old Cape
Year Operating Gross daily Net Operating Net Income PV(Income)
Days Rate Revenue Expenses
1 360 $48,622 $16,366,165 $2,323,590 $14,042,575 $13,173,147
2 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $13,216,854
3 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $12,398,550
4 360 $51,523 $17,342,642 $2,323,590 $15,019,052 $11,630,910
5 360 $51,523 $36,317,642 $2,323,590 $33,994,052 $24,695,448
$75,114,910
Table 5.7-13: Hamburg Valuation for 15-Year-Old Cape
Year Operating Gross daily Net Opex Net Income PV(Income)
Days Rate Revenue
1 360 $34,035 $11,456,316 $2,323,590 $9,132,726 $8,567,285
2 360 $36,066 $12,139,849 $2,323,590 $9,816,259 $8,638,366
3 360 $36,066 $12,139,849 $2,323,590 $9,816,259 $8,103,533
4 360 $36,066 $12,139,849 $2,323,590 $9,816,259 $7,601,813
5 360 $36,066 $17,639,849 $2,323,590 $15,316,259 $11,126,708
$44,037,705
Table 5.7-14: Hamburg Valuation for 20-Year-Old Cape
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5.7-19: Hamburg Valuation Results Compared to Actual Transaction Prices
It is clear from Fig 5.7-19 that the Hamburg valuations are much higher than current
transaction prices across all ship ages.
5.7.5.2.4 Shadow Pricing
We will apply the shadow pricing method as described in Section 5.5.2.2, using our
database of -700 Cape Transactions between 1987 and 2010. This is a very complete
database of reported Cape transactions, compiled with data from many sources and also
includes the database of Sydney Levine who introduced the Shadow Valuation method. The
first step is to identify the periods during which charter rates were the same as today.
According to the method, we have to look at the rates of specific fixtures over time.
However, that would introduce uncertainty, because the details of the ship and the particular
route and cargo come into play. Therefore, it is better to look at time series of average charter
rates, as reported by brokers. Fig 5.7-20 shows historic 6-Month charter rates for 150,000dwt
Capes and their current value (average from November 2009 to February 2010, which is
$35,981/day), and the 1-Year charter rates for 127,500dwt Capes.
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Cape Charter Rates for Shadow Pricing
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Fig 5.7-20 cape Charter Rate Series for Shadow Pricing
The reason for including the 1-Year charter rates of 127,500dwt Capes was because
its is highly correlated to the more relevant data series and because that data goes further
back in time. We see that the periods we are concerned with are all after 2003. As we saw in
Chapter 2, all the Cape time charter series are almost perfectly correlated, so it doesn't make
a big difference, which we look at. However, due to the extreme volatility of the market,
particularly after 2003, it is important to look at daily data. With these considerations in
mind, the most transparent and simplest thing to look at would be the BCI. This shows the
spot rate which is almost identical to 6-month charter rates suggested by the Shadow pricing
method.
The average BCI between November 2009 and December 2010 was $48,622/day. In
the Shadow Pricing example of Section 5.5.2.2, a range between $14,000/day and
$14,999/day was used when current rates were $14,000/day. Therefore, we will examine the
range between $48,000/day and $48,999. Table 5.7-15 shows all the dates during which the
BCI was within this range, along with the number of transactions closed on these dates.
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Dates when BCI was BCI Number of Cape
Between $48,000 and $48,999 ($/day) Transactions Closed
13-May-04 48,820 0
3-Jun-04 48,011 0
1-Jul-04 48,809 0
24-May-05 48,136 0
7-Oct-05 48,972 0
24-Oct-05 48,890 0
25-Oct-05 48,608 0
26-Oct-05 48,835 0
27-Oct-05 48,992 0
28-Oct-05 48,773 0
31-Oct-05 48,356 0
10-Nov-05 48,627 0
17-Nov-05 48,248 0
31-Jul-06 48,363 0
6-Aug-09 48,000 0
Table 5.7-15: Dates When BCI was at Current Levels and Number of Cape Transactions
We identified 15 days during which the BCI was within our range, a zero transactions
closed within those days. This shows the weakness of the Shadow-Pricing method,
particularly for the valuation of Capes. The Ship-Charter rate pair that we examined is far
less popular than the Panamax-$14,000/day pair used in the example by [Levine 2009]. More
importantly, the Cape market is very volatile (see Fig 5.7-18), so earnings do not stay within
a small range for long enough periods to allow transaction data to accumulate. Furthermore,
if we try to relax the constraints and look at dates surrounding those of table 5.7-15, we will
be looking at transactions that took place when rates were very different. Even doing so
within reasonable limits, however, does not result in enough transactions to produce a
distribution for each of the considered ship ages (from which we would then infer a shadow
price).
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I am sure one could relax some of the constraints and make alterations to increase the
data sample in order to produce some shadow prices. However, we see that the method is
currently inapplicable in its original form for this specific valuation.
5.7.5.2.5 Summary of Adopted Alternatives
The Comparables-based pricing and Short-Term forecasts cannot be considered
independent valuations since they take market prices into account. We are mainly concerned
about methods that produce independent valuations, in order to validate them using current
transactions. These are essentially the Hamburg Valuation, the Shadow Pricing method, and
our risk-adjusted forward-looking (RAFL) ship valuation model. Unfortunately, we saw that
Shadow pricing cannot be used in the current situation due to various limitations. Fig. 5.7-21
compares our valuation model results and the Hamburg valuations to current transaction
prices.
We see that our model produces results very close to real transaction prices, whereas
the Hamburg Valuation method grossly overestimates ship values. Table 5.7-22 shows our
valuation model results along with the real transaction prices, the comparables based
valuations and the short-term forecasts.
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Fig. 5.7-21: Comparison of New Valuation Model (RAFL) with Alternative Independent Methods
886
Current Methods and Transaction Prices
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Fig. 5.7-22: Comparison of RAFL with Comparables-Based values and Short-Term Forecasts
In Fig 5.7-22, we see that the RAFL ship valuation results are almost identical to the
Comparables-based values, which are inferred directly from the transaction prices. The
Short-Term forecasts, which are partly based on market levels (until mid January), produce
slightly lower results throughout all ship ages.
5.7.5.3 Valuations by Proposed Alternatives
5.7.5.3.1 Three Modified Shadow Price Versions
Here we will propose some modifications to the conventional shadow pricing method.
We noticed that the method could not be applied in it original form because there was not
enough data. The first modification attempts to solve that problem simply by looking at a
wider range of dates. Instead of using the daily BCI, we will use the monthly data of average
6-Month time charters of 15,000dwt capes, that were shown in Fig 5.7-20. The current (over
our 4 month period) average rate was $35,981/day (shown as a straight red line in Fig 5.7-
20).
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We identify 14 months in 5 distinct historical periods, during which the
corresponding earnings passed through that range. Within this wide time frame, 60 Cape
transactions are identified in our database. By taking the mean of the transaction prices for
each age, we obtain the shadow price modification-I valuations.
In the first modification, we only used a fraction of the 60 transactions (those of
relevant ages). Alternatively, we can plot all the 60 transactions on a price vs. age plot and
conduct a linear regression. Then we can calculate the shadow price modification-2
valuations for any age by simply solving the regression formula. A plot of the 60 transactions
is shown in Fig 5.7-23, along with the linear regression.
Cape Sales in Similar Charter Markets
160
120
0-
An y = -2.5238x 
+ 65.338
0WU 40
0 5 10 15 20 25
Ship Age
Fig. 5.7-23: Shadow Price Transaction Sample with Linear Regression for Modification-2
The scatter of the data reduces our confidence in the data. The outlier new Cape that
cost $146.6M in August 2009 could have been a renegotiation from an earlier transaction that
occurred before the market decline. Using the regression formula, we calculate the shadow
price modification-2 valuations.
The third modification is based on value time series as opposed to real transactions.
This is the modification discussed in Section 5.5.2.3 along with its reasoning and advantages.
Instead of using the 60 identified Cape transactions, we look at Clarksons' valuations during
the 5 identified periods with charter rates similar to current levels. Valuations had been
discontinued by Clarksons but were recently filled out in retrospect. For each of the 5
periods, we calculate the average monthly valuation, and then we take the average across the
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5 periods. That is because we want each period as opposed to each month to have the same
impact on the result (to net out effects specific to each period). The results are summarized in
Table 5.7-16. Table 5.7-17 summarizes the results of the three modifications to Shadow
Pricing.
Month Newbuilding 5-Year-Old 10-Year-Old 20-Year-Old
(175-180kdwt) (15 0kdwt)
Sept - Oct 2003 43.00 38.00 25.75 8.50
June 2004 56.00 45.00 32.50 14.00
May - Nov (Exc. Jul) 2005 61.08 64.13 44.67 19.50
Jun - Jul 2006 61.50 58.25 41.00 18.50
May - Aug (Exc Jun) 2009 66.00 56.33 46.33 19.33
Average 57.52 52.34 38.05 15.97
Table 5.7-16: Clarksons Valuations for 5 Periods with Similar to Current Charter Levels
Ship Age (Years) MODIF 1 MODIF 2 MODIF 3
0 70.84 63.34 59.25
5 45.00 51.20 56.52
10 37.15 39.06 40.93
15 28.40 26.91 -
20 29.14 14.77 17.36
Table 5.7-17: Modified Shadow Price Method Results
The results of the three modified shadow price methods are plotted along with
transaction prices in Fig. 5.7-24
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Fig. 5.7-24: Modified Shadow Price Method Results and Transaction Prices
We see that the modified shadow price valuations are very close to transaction prices
but they all generally understate the values across all ship ages. Modifications 2 and 3 in this
case give the results closest to the transactions. Modification 1, which is the most similar to
the original method gives the least accurate results, though it is again in the ballpark. It is
important to note that Modification 3 is the only one that can be applied without requiring a
whole database of transactions.
5.7.5.3.2 Three Company Value-Based Valuations
In Section 5.5.3, we discussed the prospect of extracting ship values from company
valuations. In Section 5.5.3.5, we carried out a valuation of DSX as of December 2009, using
financial statements (discounting of abnormal earnings), and used it as an example. The
reason we chose Diana Shipping was that it is very convenient for the valuation of Capes due
to the composition of its fleet. The results of that analysis (found in Section 5.5.3.5) will be
our first set of ship values based on company valuations ("Our DSX Valuation").
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A second alternative would be to look at the average stock price at which DSX traded
between November 2009 and February 2010. That was approximately $14.8. The price
history of the DSX shares over that period is shown in Fig. 5.7-25.
Price history-Ds (1/1 2009 - 2!'28/2010)
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Fig 5.7-25 DSX Share Price Between November'09 and February'10 [moneycentral 20101
We can simply use the $14.8 share price instead of our $12.34 share valuation, in the
analysis of Section 5.5.3.5 to calculate a second set of Cape valuations with the same set of
assumptions and fleet point allocation system.
The third alternative is to base the company valuation on external valuations by
analysts, which are normally carried out using discounted cash flows. In November 2009,
Credit Suisse carried out a valuation of Diana Shipping (using a 10% WACC) and to get a
target price of exactly $20 (when the stock price was trading at 14) [Lewis 2009]. We will
apply that value in the analysis of Section 5.5.3.5 to obtain the third set of Cape Valuations
("Analyst Valuation").
Table 5.7-18 summarizes the resulting Cape valuations based on company values, and
Fig 5.7-26 compares them to the actual transactions.
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Ship Age (Years) Points DSX Valuation DSX Share Price DSX Analyst Valuation
0 1 $82.77 $96.27 $125.27
5 0.82 $67.87 $78.94 $102.72
10 0.64 $52.98 $61.61 $80.17
15 0.46 $38.08 $44.28 $57.62
20 0.28 $23.18 $26.96 $35.07
Table 5.7-18: Company Value-Based Results
Company Values Inferences and Transaction Prices
(Nov'09 to Feb'10)
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Fig. 5.7-26: Company value-Based Results and Transaction Prices
All the company value-based valuations tend to overstate the ship values relative to
actual transactions. That could be partly because we may have underestimated the value
attributable to intangible assets, company strategy, reputation etc. We simply used the book
value of the non-ship assets (including goodwill and intangible assets), which may not be
very accurate. The results based on our valuation lie the closest to the transaction prices,
followed by the actual trading price of the stock, and the least accurate results are those
inferred from the aggressive company valuation by Credit Suisse.
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5.7.5.3.3 Summary of Proposed Alternatives
Our three modifications to shadow pricing tend to understate ship values, and our
three company value based valuations tend to overstate ship values relative to ship prices in
the considered time frame. The best results of each category were produced by the third
shadow price modification and our DSX valuation. Fig 5.7.27 shows a plot of those two,
along with our RAFL ship valuation model and the Cape transaction prices.
Fig. 5.7-27: Best Proposed Valuation Results and Transaction Prices
Of the three, the most accurate and reliable appears to be our RAFL model. The
easiest to apply for a ballpark estimate is Shadow Modification-3, which appears to slightly
understate the results in this case. The results inferred from our valuation using financial
statements overstate ship values in this case but they are also useful to have as an alternative
ballpark estimate.
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Proposed Valuations vs. Transaction Prices
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5.8 Real Option Valuation
5.8.1 Introduction
An important issue during ship transactions is the subject to board of directors
approval placed by the buyer or the seller. After the price and terms are agreed upon, one of
the parties may not (or may pretend not to) have the authority to finalize the deal before the
Board of Directors (BoD) approves it. The deal is signed "subject to BOD approval".
Depending on the company, the frequency of BOD meetings can vary. Typically, US
listed companies require subjects of 1 week, while the major Japanese companies, commonly
referred to as "the Big Three" (NYK, Mitsui and K-Line), often place subjects of 2 weeks. In
the past few years, so called "hunting licenses" have also emerged, under which a buyer
makes purchase agreements subject to raising the equity from investors. In those cases,
typical subjects last for about 2 months. Options of longer tenures are also relevant when a
vessel is sold with forward delivery in which case the buyer puts a deposit of 10% to 20%.
Therefore, we will also consider a 6-month option and evaluate its value as a percentage of
the ship value.
More often than not, the BOD approval to carry out the transaction is granted when
the market value has moved favorably since the price was agreed, while the deal often fails
on the subjects when the market moves unfavorably. Due to the high volatility of the
shipping market, the implicit option to buy or sell a ship at the agreed upon price is very
valuable. The party placing the subjects has that option, while the counterparty is tied to their
agreement. It is vital to understand the value of these options when negotiating. A price
premium can then be commanded in exchange for the option.
Modem financial technology allows us to estimate the value of these options by
combining portfolio theory, option pricing theory, and the ship valuation model that we have
developed.
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5.8.2 Estimating the Volatility of Base Revenues
The key parameter required to value the option is the volatility of the ship value. In
the valuations, we used average data over a 4 month period centered about Jan 1st, 2010,
during which the markets were relatively stable. We could assess the daily volatility of the
ship value by re-calibrating using the data available each day. This approach is limited by the
time over which we can apply it. We could examine the historic volatility of earnings
projected throughout the ship's life using time series of futures with various tenures. This is
more practical but is arbitrary in the historic period that we choose to consider and its
relevance going forward.
A more relevant approach would be to consider the forward looking volatilities for
the ship's revenues based on today's at-the-money option prices. This was discussed in
Section 5.6.3.1.10 and the results are repeated again here for your convenience.
Table 5.8-1
Description Average Movement
IVCTCCURMON Mar (10) 81.86 0.46
IVCTCCURQ Mar (10) 81.86 0.46
IVCTC_+1Q Q2 (10) 84.29 0.29
IVCTC_+2Q Q3 (10) 71.07 -0.43
IVCTC_+3Q Q4 (10) 62.21 -0.49
IVCTC_+4Q Q1 (11) 61.00 -0.4
IVCTC_+1CAL Cal 11 56.14 -0.66
IVCTC_+2CAL Cal 12 51.71 -0.39
IV CTC_+3CAL Cal 13 49.57 -0.23
Implied Volatilities for Baltic Capesize Earings as of March 22"d2010 Baltic 20101
Using the same method as for projecting the base revenues throughout the ship's life,
we can estimate the volatility for each year's base revenues for the next 10 years, including a
continuation value. Base revenues refer to the earnings of a Baltic Cape before discounting
for age. The results are shown in Fig. 5.8-1.
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Fig.5.8-1 Implied Volatility of Revenues of a Baltic Cape, with Projections
The next step is to use portfolio theory in order to convert this result to a volatility of
the ship value.
5.8.3 Application of Portfolio Theory
First, let's start with some basic definitions and identities of volatility (aY) and
expectation (E):
2 = E X- )2
o- =E[(x- )(y-)])=pX,,o-y
E (A+ B)= E(A)+ E(B)
E(cA) = cE(A)
(5.8-1)
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Base Revenue Implied Annualized Volatility
We are concerned with the volatility of a portfolio (p) of several assets (a, b, c etc). It
is easier to start by deriving the volatility of a small portfolio. Below, we derive the volatility
of a 2-asset portfolio and a 3-asset portfolio before moving on to the general case.
2-Asset portfolio: p = WaXa + wbXb (5.8-2)
o2 = E (waxa +wbxb -wax. -w- ) 2
=E[(wa (Xa -a)+wbXb 2))]
= E wa2{x, 
-3a2 +2wawb b.-)},-sw2 2] (5.8-3)
=waE {-.)+2 
--E{x -iX~6)+w E{,-)
- [(Xa _-)2]+2 wab [(xa -- )(xb 2)]wE [(xb )2]
=w2o +2wawa +a b2b~
-W Wba +WW0JO
a a o wbab b + 2wa 2Pab
3-Asset portfolio: p = WaXa + WbXb + wxc (5.8-4)
o =E[(WX+wx+wxwxwx-wi)
- =E [(wax -x)+w ,xb ,+- w - 2]
~~E~a~~a + b (xb Yi)--i(~)
L2wa (xaa(X , ) + WWc (Xa -)(x )2]Cxb-i)(~-)E 2 2 2 2 2+ 2 aX iY 2 w a 2 +
2Waa b b)+2waw - xc-7c)+2wbwc - xc -a
w2a +w + w a + 2wawbab + 2wa,+ 2w 2wp+w 2
=wa a +w b +w a 22p +2wawcoa2qcopac +2wwqb2cPbc
(5.8-5)
N
General Case: p = w,x, (5.8-6)
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o= E LWx, 
- ) Eiz = X wx-z
N N N N N N
L 2 + I - 20 1 ,,+j wIw co--j p (5.8-9)
i j#i i i jti
N N
i j
Where: p: Returns on portfolio
N: Number of assets in portfolio
wi Percentage of portfolio in asset "i"
x,: Returns of asset "i"
o-, : Volatility of returns on asset "i" (% volatility of asset "i")
p : Correlation between returns of asset "i" and "j"
o: Covariance of returns of asset "i" and "j"
Note that by setting N equal to 2 and 3 we get the expressions for the volatility of the
2-asset portfolio and the 3 asset portfolio respectively.
5.8.4 Volatility of Ship Value
The next step is to treat the ship as a portfolio of assets, each with its own volatility.
Each year in the remaining life of the ship is treated as a separate asset. The volatility of the
expected cash flows in each year is then the volatilities of the assets. Recall the ship
valuation formula in which the time increment is months.
ShipValue = -Age Rev, - OpEx, - RepCost, - P(fail), FailCost
Y, (1+ i')"n=1
(5.8-10)
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The numerator is the cash flow that can be evaluated for each year "j". The
denominator corresponds to a discount factor applied to each cash flow. The numerator
defines the year's cash flows "CFj" or equivalently, the value of the portfolio's assets, while
the denominator defines the weight of each asset "wj" as shown in Eq. 5.8-11:
CF.
Ship Value=' = wCF1  (5.8-11)j (1+i,)' j
First, let's concentrate on the volatility of the assets. Due to the nature of the shipping
industry, the volatility of the revenues will be orders of magnitude greater than the volatility
of the other terms (operating, repair and failure costs). The volatility of the residual value
will also be low and far out, so we can neglect it in this part of the analysis. Recall our
calculation of the monthly revenues:
Revn = ED(Ageo +n)* BCIn * ARF (Age, + n)* (1-%Com)
(5.8-11)
The revenues are equal to a constant that is defined for each time period multiplied
by the daily earnings of a new ship for the same time period. The cash flows, will therefore
be of the form:
CF = cj (BCI ) + c2,j (5.8-12)
Where: C1j: Constant to account for commissions, age and off-hire time in year "j"
C2,j: Constant to account for the non-revenue cash flows in year "j"
CF :Cash flows of year "j"
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BCIj :Equivalent daily revenues of a new (Baltic) ship for year "j"
Since Ci, and C2,j are constants, the following identities apply, where "c" is a
constant, "X" is the variable and the bar denotes the mean value:
.2 (c+X)=E [(c+X-c-) =E[(X- )2] = 2(X) (5.8-13)
02 (cX) =E [(cA - cX)] =E[ c2 (X- ) = c2E [(X- X)2 = c 2 2 (X)
(5.8-14)
Applying Eq. 5.8-13 and 5.8-12 to 5.8-12 would lead to:
o-(CF = co(BCIj (5.8-15)
This would be the appropriate approach if we were concerned with absolute
volatilities. It is equivalent, and in our case more convenient to carry out the analysis using
volatility in percentage terms. This simplifies our analysis because we want to use a 10-asset
portfolio where the 10 *h asset accounts for all years after the 9 h. The percentage volatility
will have a continuation value allowing us to do that. The value of ci, however keeps
decreasing, so the absolute volatilities keep changing which would require a 28-asset
portfolio for a new ship. Also, note that our implied volatilities are in percentage terms, and
the portfolio volatility has been derived in percentage terms (volatility of returns), making it
more convenient to carry out the whole analysis using % volatilities. Using volatility in
percentage terms, we can modify our identities as follows:
O's(X)K= a-= = E[X -J (5.8-16)XX
900
A) cA c A -
O(cA)= a C= Er _ = Eo = -%(A) (5.8-17)
A cAA
c+c XE -c -5Y X -(
a-(c+ X)= E[(c+X )1 c E X =wso-(X)
(5.8-18)
Eq. 5.8-17 tells us that the percentage volatility of the ship's total earnings is equal to
the percentage volatility of the daily earnings of a Baltic Cape. Eq. 5.8-18 tells us that the
percentage volatility of the cash flows is equal to the weight of the revenues multiplied by the
percentage volatility of the revenues. Applying 5.8-17 and 5.8-18 to 5.8-12, we get the
percentage volatility of the cash flows as follows:
CFj % (CFj = - [c1 ( BCI,) j+c] = WCFc% (BCI,) = wRev,jRev
(5.8-19)
Note that this also follows directly by considering each year's cash flows as a 2-asset
portfolio consisting of revenues and costs, and applying Eq. 5.8-3 for the 2-asset portfolio
volatility. The percentage volatility of the cash flows becomes:
F raeV~v rWceost cost 2-e ct 1.vOsc-t w. 0, (5.8-20)
From now on, we will only be concerned with percentage volatilities denoted by the
symbol u.
The value of the asset is the present value of the cash flows of the corresponding year.
The weight of the revenues (in each 2-asset portfolio) is equal to the present value of the
revenues divided by the present value of the cash flows. For each year "j" we have:
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Wrev'J -PVPV (Re v). 58-1
W'v ~PV (Rev - OpEx - Re pCost - P(fail)FailCost) j(5.8-21)
The weights of the revenues will be calculated separately for each asset "i". The
percentage volatility of the revenues is taken directly from Table 5.8-1. Then we simply
calculate the percentage volatilities of each portfolio asset "i" as follows:
= Wrev,i Urev,i (5.8-22)
Note that the absolute volatility of the cash flows is equal to the absolute volatility of
the revenues, but the percentage volatility will be higher for the cash flows (the assets).
Having the percentage volatilities of the assets "j", we proceed to calculate the percentage
volatility of the 10-asset portfolio which is the ship value. Using the portfolio volatility
definition derived in Eq. 5.8-9, we get:
10 10
'ShipVal j W i a j a i (5.8-23)i=1 j=1
The revenues of future years are almost perfectly correlated. In other words, futures
rates of earnings for the next years increase and decrease simultaneously. This is a good
approximation which allows us to set all the correlations in our portfolio equal to one.
Therefore, we have:
10 10
UShipVal W i (5.8-24)
is j=1
Where the weight of each asset is given by its contribution to the portfolio:
902
Wi PV ( Re v - OpEx - Re pCost - P( fail)FailCost) (58-5
ShipVal
Combining 5.8-21 to 5.8-25, we can express the percentage volatility of the ship
value as follows:
110 141
0ShipVal = P (Rev)PV (Revj ara, rev,] (5.8-26)Ship Val =
Using this method, we can proceed to calculate the annualized percentage volatility of
the ship value for each ship age.
5.8.5 Application of Black-Scholes To Value Real Options
The final step is to use the Black-Scholes formula (described in section 5.6.3.1.10) to
value an at-the money European option (strike price equal to the current ship value). Having
calculated the volatility of the ship value, we can use the Eq. for geometric Brownian motion
to describe the stochastic evolution of the ship value as follows:
dV
= pdt +adz (5.8-27)V
Where: V: Value (log-normally distributed)
dV: Incremental change in value
p : Drift term
(7: Volatility
dt: Incremental change in time
z: Wiener Process (Standard Brownian motion) - Normally distributed
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Recall that we have treated the ship value as a portfolio of securities. The fact that the
asset is replicable by a linear combination of securities, allows us to replace the drift term
with the risk free rate. This enables us to use the risk-neutral valuation of Black-Scholes for
option pricing on the ship value.
We choose European as opposed to American options because the ship will often be
chartered and non-deliverable until the option expiration. When this is not the case, the real
option is equivalent to an American option (exercisable any time before expiration) which is
more valuable. We will use European options throughout for consistency.
The tenure will be chosen to correspond to the length of period of the subjects
evaluated. We will consider 1-week, 2-week, 2-month and 6-month options and we will
value both a call and a put since we are concerned with subjects placed by both buyers and
sellers. The call option is the buyer's option (value of buyer's subjects) while the put option
is the seller's option.
One approach would be to account for the dividend yield (equal to the present value
of the profits per year divided by the ship value), and for the ship depreciation over time.
These two effects will counteract each other. In our case, since we are concerned with short
option tenures, it is simpler to assume that the delivery will be at a pre-specified date (which
is typically at the end of the current voyage) and that the ship will be of the given age upon
delivery. That way, convenience yield and depreciation do not come into play and we can
apply a zero-dividend yield.
For the 1-week and 2-week options, the annualized risk free rate is taken to be 0.11%
(1-Month T-Bill yield). For the 2-Month options, we look at the 2-Month T-Bills which have
a yield of 0.15%, and for the 6-Month options we use the 6-Month T-Bill yield of 0.22%.
For a sensitivity analysis, we look at the "Greeks". The Black-Scholes formulae for
pricing zero-dividend calls and puts were discussed in Section 5.6.3.1.10 and are presented
again here.
C=SN(d,)-PV(K)N(d 2) (5.8-26)
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P=C-S+PV (K)=PV(K)(1-N(d2)]
(5.8-27)
Where:
In S
d PV (K ), -
+ 2
d2 = d2 - "IT
The Greeks are defined as follows:
Delta =S=
8Ship Val
Gamma =1' =
aFTheta = 0 =
8aFRho = p-=r
a2F
2Ship Val
Vega = A = -
aShipVal
Where: F: price of the option (either a put or a call)
t: time to expiration (in years)
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(5.8-28)
(5.8-29)
(5.8-30)
(5.8-31)
(5.8-32)
(5.8-33)
(5.8-34)
-S[I-N(dl)]
The Greeks tell us how the value of the subjects will change with respect to a change
in the ship value, the length of the subjects (how worth is it negotiating the time you or the
other party has to decide before the closing), the interest rate and the volatility of the market.
5.8.6 Results
5.8.6.1 New Cape
Ship Val = $61.85M
7shi-val =67.06%
Table 5.8-1: Portioio Volatilities for New Cape
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Asset "i" w(i) c(i)
1 0.16 78.83%
2 0.11 66.41%
3 0.09 63.91%
4 0.08 63.25%
5 0.07 60.13%
6 0.06 61.73%
7 0.06 57.04%
8 0.05 58.68%
9 0.04 58.77%
10 0.28 70.34%
Tenure 1 Weeks 2 Weeks 2 Months 6 Months
Call $2,294,602 $3,244,238 $6,741,625 $11,620,174
Put $2,293,294 $3,241,621 $6,726,162 $11,552,171
Call delta 0.51863 0.52634 0.55480 0.59461
Put delta -0.48137 -0.47366 -0.44520 -0.40539
Gamma 6.93E-08 4.89E-08 2.33E-08 1.32E-08
Call rho $572,795 $1,127,405 $4,595,993 $12,579,535
Put rho -$616,693 -$1,251,521 -$5,710,751 -$18,313,808
Call theta -$59,632,431 -$42,129,593 -$20,116,760 -$11,425,985
Put theta -$59,564,392 -$42,061,556 -$20,024,001 -$11,290,054
Vega $3,418,275 $4,828,896 $9,979,023 $16,955,912
Put theta -$59,564,392 -$42,061,556 -$20,024,001 0.239412669
Vega $3,418,275 $4,828,896 $9,979,023 -0.234773138
Table 5.8-2: Option Prices and Greeks for New Cape
Value % of Ship Value
1 Week Call $2,294,602 3.71%
1 Week Put $2,293,294 3.71%
2 Week Call $3,244,238 5.24%
2 Week Put $3,241,621 5.24%
2 Month Call $6,741,625 10.90%
2 Month Put $6,726,162 10.87%
6 Month Call $11,620,174 18.79%
6 Month Put $11,552,171 18.68%
Table 5.8-Summary of Option Prices for New Cape
907
5.8.6.2 5-Year Old Cape
Ship Val = $52.21M
0ShipVal -71.88%
Table 5.8-4: Portfolio Volatilities for a 5-Year Old Cape
Tenure 1 Weeks 2 Weeks 2 Months 6 Months
Call $2,075,800 $2,934,703 $6,095,866 $10,513,049
Put $2,074,696 $2,932,495 $6,082,816 $10,413,948
Call delta 0.51996 0.52822 0.55866 0.60175
Put delta -0.48004 -0.47178 -0.44134 -0.39825
Gamma 7.66E-08 5.41E-08 2.58E-08 1.45E-08
Call rho $482,118 $947,779 $3,845,104 $10,451,434
Put rho -$521,856 -$1,060,127 -$4,854,016 -$15,602,901
Call theta -$53,939,365 -$38,100,776 -$18,171,897 -$10,319,455
Put theta -$53,881,938 -$38,043,350 -$18,093,605 -$10,121,442
Vega $2,884,693 $4,074,464 $8,410,858 $14,245,908
Table 5.8-5: Option Prices and Greeks for a 5-Year Old Cape
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Asset "i" w(i) (T(i)
1 0.17 84.43%
2 0.12 68.75%
3 0.10 66.72%
4 0.09 65.33%
5 0.08 62.35%
6 0.06 67.77%
7 0.06 59.87%
8 0.05 64.19%
9 0.04 72.36%
10 0.23 77.73%
Value % of Ship Value
1 Week Call $2,075,800 3.98%
1 Week Put $2,074,696 3.97%
2 Week Call $2,934,703 5.62%
2 Week Put $2,932,495 5.62%
2 Month Call $6,095,866 11.68%
2 Month Put $6,082,816 11.65%
6 Month Call $10,513,049 20.14%
6 Month Put $10,413,948 19.95%
Table 5.8-6: Summary of Option Prices for a 5-Year Old Cape
5.8.6.3 10-Year Old Cape
Ship Val = $41.92M
'ShipVal 79.08%
A sset "i" w (i) 0 8 (i)
1 0.18 89.51%
2 0.14 71.61%
3 0.11 72.24%
4 0.08 78.95%
5 0.08 69.26%
6 0.06 75.84%
7 0.07 65.35%
8 0.05 75.63%
9 0.04 88.51%
10 0.19 88.08%
Table 5.8-7: Portfolio Volatilities for 10-Year Old Cape
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Value % of Ship Value
1 Week Call $1,833,352 4.37%
1 Week Put $1,832,466 4.37%
2 Week Call $2,591,686 6.18%
2 Week Put $2,589,913 6.18%
2 Month Call $5,379,915 12.83%
2 Month Put $5,369,437 12.81%
6 Month Call $9,261,493 22.09%
6 Month Put $9,181,924 21.90%
Table 5.8-9: Summary of Option Prices for 10-Year Old Cane
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Tenure 1 Weeks 2 Weeks 2 Months 6 Months
Call $1,833,352 $2,591,686 $5,379,915 $9,261,493
Put $1,832,466 $2,589,913 $5,369,437 $9,181,924
Call delta 0.52194 0.53101 0.56442 0.61140
Put delta -0.47806 -0.46899 -0.43558 -0.38860
Gamma 8.67E-08 6.12E-08 2.91E-08 1.64E-08
Call rho $385,489 $756,438 $3,046,608 $8,183,721
Put rho -$420,613 -$855,732 -$3,938,015 -$12,735,601
Call theta -$47,629,944 -$33,634,578 -$16,011,886 -$9,046,021
Put theta -$47,583,835 -$33,588,470 -$15,949,024 -$8,887,034
Vega $2,315,548 $3,269,726 $6,737,907 $11,360,812
Table 5.8-8: Option Prices and Greeks for 10-Year Old Cape
5.8.6.4 15-Year Old Cape
ShipVal = $30.83M
'ShipVal -88.18%
Asset "i" W(i) a(i)
1 0.22 95.81%
2 0.17 77.09%
3 0.12 83.37%
4 0.08 94.27%
5 0.09 79.48%
6 0.05 109.28%
7 0.07 81.12%
8 0.03 132.91%
9 0.03 134.43%
IL 101 0.141
Table 5.8-10: Portfolio Volatilities for
70.98%
15-Year Old Care
Tenure 1 Weeks 2 Weeks 2 Months 6 Months
Call $1,503,147 $2,124,616 $4,406,502 $7,567,473
Put $1,502,495 $2,123,312 $4,398,797 $7,508,961
Call delta 0.52445 0.53455 0.57169 0.62355
Put delta -0.47555 -0.46545 -0.42831 -0.37645
Gamma 1.06E-07 7.46E-08 3.54E-08 1.98E-08
Call rho $281,979 $552,035 $2,202,671 $5,826,701
Put rho -$310,798 -$633,494 -$2,933,553 -$9,556,568
Call theta -$39,040,799 -$27,558,575 -$13,085,740 -$7,341,351
Put theta -$39,006,892 -$27,524,669 -$13,039,514 -$7,224,438
Vega $1,702,142 $2,402,672 $4,939,108 $8,275,196
Table 5.8-11: Option Prices and Greeks for 15-Year Old Cape
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6 Month Put $7,508,961 24.36%1
Table 5.8-12: Summary of Option Prices for 15-Year Old Cape
5.8.6.5 20-Year Old Cape
ShipVal = $18.41M
O'ShipVal 98.07%
Asset "i" w(i) a(i)
1 0.25 117.29%
2 0.18 92.22%
3 0.09 133.72%
4 0.08 134.15%
5 0.10 96.41%
6 0.05 162.98%
7 0.07 112.34%
8 0.17 16.97%
9 0.00 0.00%
10 0.00 0.00%
Table 5.8-13: Portfolio Volatilities for 20-Year Old Cape
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Value % of Ship Value
l Week Call $1,503,147 4.88%
1 Week Put $1,502,495 4.87%
2 Week Call $2,124,616 6.89%
2 Week Put $2,123,312 6.89%
2 Month Call $4,406,502 14.30%
2 Month Put $4,398,797 14.27%
6 Month Call $7,567,473 24.55%
Tenure 1 Weeks 2 Weeks 2 Months 6 Months
Call $998,190 $1,410,666 $2,922,730 $5,005,299
Put $997,800 $1,409,888 $2,918,128 $4,970,355
Call delta 0.52717 0.53839 0.57957 0.63663
Put delta -0.47283 -0.46161 -0.42043 -0.36337
Gamma 1.59E-07 1.12E-07 5.30E-08 2.94E-08
Call rho $167,434 $326,950 $1,291,127 $3,357,258
Put rho -$186,582 -$381,066 -$1,776,306 -$5,829,872
Call theta -$25,917,479 -$18,286,507 -$8,656,501 -$4,816,620
Put theta -$25,897,229 -$18,266,258 -$8,628,894 -$4,746,797
Vega $1,016,096 $1,433,643 $2,938,418 $4,885,528
Table 5.8-14: Option Prices and Greeks for 20-Year Old Ca2pe
913
Value % of Ship Value
1 Week Call $998,190 5.42%
1 Week Put $997,800 5.42%
2 Week Call $1,410,666 7.66%
2 Week Put $1,409,888 7.66%
2 Month Call $2,922,730 15.88%
2 Month Put $2,918,128 15.85%
6 Month Call $5,005,299 27.19%
6 Month Put $4,970,355 27.00%
Table 5.8-15: Summary of Option Prices for 20-Year Old Cape
5.8.6.6 Summary of Results
Fig.5.8-2 shows the percentage volatility of the ship value as a percentage of ship age.
Since all the options are at-the-value meaning that the strike price is equal to the current
value, and because the dividend yield is zero, the call prices are almost identical to the put
options. Fig.5.8-3 shows the mean option value as a function of time to expiration, for ships
of various ages.
Ship Value Volatility
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Fig. 5.8-2: Ship Value Volatility as a Function of Ship Age
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Fig. 5.8-3: Option Value vs. Option Tenure for Various Ship Aaes
5.8.7 Discussion
As expected, the percentage volatility of the ship's value increases substantially with
age. That is in agreement with historical trends and is partly explained by the fact the costs
(which have negative weights and zero volatilities) are higher for older ships. In a bad
market, the value of an old ship is close to the scrap value so when freight rates rise it is
impacted much more than that of a new ship.
As shown by the results, the option values are very significant and have to be
considered when negotiating subjects. The option value as a percentage of the ship value
increases with ship age, but more importantly, it increases with the option tenure. This can be
seen by examining the "Theta" values of the options and by looking at Fig. 5.8-3. The value
of 2-week subjects (typical with Japanese companies) is slightly less than twice the value of
1-week subjects (typical with US listed companies).
In practice, there are reputational constraints that may hinder some companies from
failing a deal on the subjects. For many companies, the subjects are simply a formality with
no implicit option. In some cases, particularly when a deposit has been paid and a deal has
been signed, they might also be legally bound. This would decrease the value of the option
assuming that it would still be exercised if the loss is small. There is also a factor that may
increase the value of the options in some cases. Sometimes, the option can be exercised
before expiration. Modeling the subjects as an American option (as opposed to European)
would be more appropriate in that case and would result in a higher value.
It is important to understand that the option prices do not correspond to appropriate
deposit amounts. After the expiration of the option, the full value of the ship must be paid.
The calculated option values correspond to the fair non-recoverable amount the party who
places the subjects should pay.
It is common practice to accept a better price in order to compensate for the option
value. This in fact corresponds to giving out an out-of-the-money option (with the strike
price being "worse" than the market value), for free. Say we are the seller of a new ship
which has a market value at $61.9M. If a buyer wants to lock the price but have a week to
decide, they have to pay us $2.3M. This will compensate us for holding on to the ship in the
event that the market value increases. Even if the agreed upon price is $100M, the
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assumption is that after 1 week, they will only buy the ship if it is worth more than $1 OOM
(in which case we would want to keep it). No matter how high the strike price, one should
not give out an option at zero value (under our assumptions).
In reality, there may be cases where the buyer values the ship above market values
and the need for approvals is sincere. However, we are assuming a liquid market in which
they can simply buy another vessel at market value and we can sell ours to someone else at
the market value.
One may think that a high enough deposit, which will then be deducted from the price
upon delivery, can also compensate for the option value. This is not possible if the agreed
upon price is equal to the market value. One is always better off by selling the ship today at
its market value. Note that the delivery date is constant so convenience yield does not come
into play. We can see that by formulating the problem as follows. We have to value a call
option (C) which is paid as a deposit, and for which the strike price (K) is equal to the ship
value less the deposit:
Deposit = C(K = Ship Val -Deposit) (5.8-27)
This can be solved by iteration and has only one solution whereby the full amount is
paid as a deposit and the strike price is equal to zero. In other words, the total amount paid
for the ship should be higher than the market value if an option is involved regardless of the
deposit amount.
This analysis can be very valuable when quantifying the fair price premium and
deposit when buying or selling a ship with subjects, and also when designing the payment
structure for a newbuilding (price and % paid upon signing, steel cutting, keel laying and
delivery etc).
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CHAPTER 6
Summary Conclusions and
Recommendations
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6.1 Introduction
The objective of this work was to examine the capesize industry both from a technical
and a financial perspective and to analyze data in order to produce results and tools that will
be valuable to various constituents of the shipping industry. We examined both market and
structural safety characteristics of Capes as well as maintenance costs and hedging options to
ultimately produce results that can guide important decisions and also to create a state of the
art valuation model that is urgently needed in the industry.
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6.2 Summary
We started with a detailed analysis of the economics of the capesize industry and the
various factors affecting the market. This involved the use of large amounts of real data to
examine ship earnings, second hand values, newbuildings and the paper market. Particular
attention was paid to the behavioral aspects and the way these influence newbuilding
ordering patterns and ship prices depending on the ship's age. This whole analysis provided
the necessary background for making the relevant decisions in the later stages of the thesis,
particularly when analyzing existing valuation methods and when deciding the right
approach and details for the new valuation model that was developed.
We then shifted gears to focus on cracks which are a technical aspect that is of critical
importance to Capes. An extensive literature survey was carried out focusing on several
aspects related to cracking. These include factors such as fracture mechanics, monitoring,
repairing and designing against cracks, ship design, steels, operating stresses and cargo
operations etc. Hull stresses were examined in order to compare their distribution to that of
cracks throughout the hull. The still-water bending moments acting throughout a cape's
service life were investigated using ships' log books and cargo loading software. Wave
induced bending moments were sourced from tabulated values of classification societies.
A location coding system for data recording and processing was specifically devised
in order to present the frequency, size and estimated crack growth rates with respect to
location in the hull and ship age. It was modified and improved several times throughout the
process and is now recommended for further use in future similar projects. It is easily
adaptable to a variety of applications. A sample of 29,567 cracks from 240 ships was
assembled and analyzed using this system and proved to be representative of the world fleet.
This is perhaps the largest ship crack survey ever conducted and is one of the few to be so
specific regarding the type of ship and damage. More importantly, it focuses on one of the
most critical issues in the industry. Whenever possible, data for each repair was sourced from
both shipowners, classification societies' records and ship yards to ensure its completeness.
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Similarities were observed between the stress and crack distributions throughout the
hull. Some noise exists due to other causes of cracking and the structural enhancement of
certain areas. The results indicate that many cracks can be avoided by remaining within
certain stress limits. This can be achieved by avoiding heavy weather, adjusting the sailing
speed and direction to weather conditions, care during discharging, and reducing the rates of
cargo operations to avoid deviating from loading plans. An interesting finding was that the
mean and median crack size decreases with ship age. This is due to tighter inspection
intervals and requirements combined with, design improvements during repairs.
The results were compared to those of similar surveys conducted over the past 50
years. Many similarities were observed while discrepancies were often attributed to the
different focus of each work cited. For example, the work of [Yamaguchi, I. 19681 focuses
on relatively young ships and identifies different numbers of cracks per ship with respect to
ship age, while [Antoniou, 1977] has probably not captured the initial slope of the crack size
vs. ship age graph in oil tankers. Classification societies are often only concerned with a
small subset of cracks which are threatening, as is clear by the number and size of cracks in
some of their surveys and investigations. The differences in results from other studies
highlight the importance of sample size and lead to the conclusion that cracks follow
different patterns from other damages and that Capes behave differently from other ships.
This emphasizes the importance of highly specific projects based on a large data set, focusing
on a particular type of damage in a specific ship type and size range.
The types of repairs and design modifications for the various cracks were also
recorded and analyzed. This analysis led to conclusions regarding the general approach
depending on the crack size, cause and location. Some of the recommended repairs by
classification societies, such as the use of a face plate instead of a collar plate in manholes,
were reported less frequently than others, presumably because they are less practical.
Crack growth rates were analyzed and compared to theoretical fracture mechanics
predictions. Paris Law was found to be over-conservative, in line with recent independent
findings. Three alternative, less conservative approaches were introduced and tested using
the data of cracks in shell frame brackets. The one which appears to be most accurate
requires the calibration of a parameter throughout the hull which was beyond the scope if this
922
project. Using the data, we found that a linear approximation is accurate enough within the
range that we are concerned with.
Crack growth rates were determined to follow a bathtub curve with respect to age,
which is the superimposed effect of an initial value, design modifications during repairs and
corrosion as the ship ages. This had not been identified before in shipping. The independent
effects that result in the bathtub curve were decomposed at the aggregate level by making
some assumptions based on the data and on results of previous research. Crack growth rates
were higher at the hull locations where still water bending moment stresses was greater,
whereas higher crack frequencies were observed at locations where wave induced bending
stresses and deflections are greater. This supports recent independent findings which suggest
that crack initiation results mainly from high frequency, low amplitude stresses, while crack
growth rates are mainly governed by large amplitude, low frequency stresses.
A Danger Model was developed using the crack growth rates derived from the
database and the criticality of each location based on previous accidents, wave induced
bending moments and a survey of industry experts. The Model was applied to the ships of the
database and an average safety parameter was determined as a function of age. Safety was
found to decrease with age until about 20 years, after which it gradually increases again.
Although very little scrapping occurred during the past 10 years, during which most the data
was collected, the results could be partly influenced by the fact that lower quality ships tend
to be scrapped early, resulting in a biased sample of older ships. The Danger Model was also
used to determine how much danger is contributed by each location in the hull depending on
the ship's age. This is particularly useful to inspectors when deciding which areas to focus
on.
A crack failure database was collected, consisting of 82 Capes, 740 ship years, and 36
crack failures (34 emergency repairs and two sinkings). A reliability model was developed by
modifying the Weibull duration model so it starts from a non-zero value and then combining
a series of modified Weibull models to represent repair intervals. The danger model results
were validated using the crack failure database and then the two sets of results were
combined and used to calibrate the reliability model which gives hazard function throughout
the ship's life. The hazard function gradually increases between repairs with significant
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sudden drops during each repair. Its maximum value is reached just before the fourth special
survey at 20 years of age.
The present value of expected failure costs was estimated as a function of ship value
throughout the ship's life. Historical average values of ship earnings and prices were used to
do that, along with the cost of repairs as of Sept 2008, the hazard function throughout a
ship's life, average bunker costs and repair times etc. Approximately half of the cost was
accounted for by expected loss of hire. The present value of crack failure costs as a
percentage of ship value peaks at -5.7% at 19 years of age based on historical data.
Repair procedures and design modifications were also examined and a model was
designed to assess their cost effectiveness based on the present value of projected cracks in
each location. The crack repair costs were calculated as a function of ship age to be used in
conjunction with the safety assessment for decision making that involves cost and safety
tradeoffs.
Having calculated the hazard function, the crack repair costs and the crack failure
costs, we proceeded to develop a much needed state of the art ship valuation model. This
combines the technical and economic insights gained from earlier chapters with additional
analysis, to produce a fundamental valuation based on risk-adjusted discounting of expected
cash flows.
Even when looking at the same data, people's perceptions of the market outlook,
which translates to ship values, differs greatly. As of April 15t 2010, the world fleet stands at
1,001 Capes of 178.6Mdwt while there are another 768 of 146.8Mdwt on order including
VLOCs of 400,000dwt each. Due to the high shipbuilding capacity that has been built over
the past decade, shipyards are hungry for orders and are reducing prices prompting more
orders. Since the containership and tanker markets are currently in a worse situation, most of
the new orders will come from the bulker sector. This means that more ships will probably be
delivered over the next four years than indicated by the current orderbook, while scrapping
will continue to be limited unless the market declines to the point were older ships are
unprofitable. I believe that oversupply will cause the market to decline and that sooner or
later we will see ship values at levels comparable to those of the 1990s. Others on the other
hand cite the projected needs of developing countries including China and India and have a
more optimistic view.
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To get around this issue of subjectivity, people often use historical values as
projections for the future. This is equivalent to driving on a highway while constantly
looking at the rearview mirror. A more relevant approach is to deduce a forward view of
what the market currently thinks the various parameters will be in the future. The benefit of
this is that one can bet against those views if they disagree. In our new risk adjusted forward
looking (RAFL) ship valuation model, a forward view of the main parameters is obtained
from derivatives and financial securities that include shipping futures, FFAs, options, interest
rate swaps and inflation protected bonds. The inherent risk of cracks is treated as a fictitious
credit risk, derived from the reliability model, and is incorporated into the discount rate along
with other risk premiums.
Other inputs to the model include repair costs and off-hire time. A database of 348
Cape repairs, involving the replacement of 135,780 tons of steel was compiled and analyzed
to estimate these as a function of ship age. The operations of publicly traded and private
companies are then compared, before using records and conducting surveys with both types
of companies to project operating expenses. An inflation analysis is also carried out for this
purpose using inflation protected bonds to get a forward view on inflation.
The valuation results were in very close agreement with real market data. The model
was compared against other proposed valuation methods and the results indicate it is
significantly more accurate and reliable. A sensitivity analysis was carried out and the credit
spreads due to cracks were determined as a function of ship age. The model was also
extended to estimate the volatility of the ship value and uses it to price optionalities that are
often included in ship transactions. These proved to be very expensive and should be
carefully considered during transactions by shipowners, or shipyards. The model provides a
framework for doing so.
The derivatives markets are getting traction and new instruments are continuously
being introduced. This year, Clarksons introduced a SWAP on container freight, while tanker
futures in $/day as opposed to World Scale (WS) were traded for the first time this month.
This will increase liquidity and the involvement of non-shipping related investors including
hedge funds, prompting more advancements in derivatives markets. It is likely that new
derivatives will be introduced relating shipping returns to S&P 500 returns. This will enable
us to determine a forward view of the market beta for public investors as a function of time
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(described in Section 5.6), allowing us to calculate a completely forward looking estimate of
the discount rate. The method for applying it when the financial technology catches up has
been described.
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6.3 Conclusions
Our analysis of cracks led to results of crack safety and cost with respect to ship age,
that is particularly useful to ship owners, classification societies, underwriters and others.
The danger contributions of each compartment and specific location in the hull were
estimated as a function of ship age. This, together with the crack distribution results can be
used to guide inspectors to the most critical locations and to those more likely to have cracks
depending on the ship's age. This applies equally to inspectors of classification societies, the
port state control or flag authorities. We also used the safety model to analyze inspection
intervals and produce results that can be used by classification societies to decide at which
ship age and for which locations inspection intervals may be tightened or relaxed.
Regarding the fracture mechanics community and researchers concerned with cracks
in ships, our investigation of Paris Law applicability in ships and the three proposed
modifications that were tested with the data give some potential direction of future research.
They also highlight the need for further research in the area. Equally important is our
approach to quantifying the magnitude of the problem in terms of cost and to demonstrate the
potential savings that could be achieved by further research. The existence of a Bathtub curve
to describe crack growth rates and its decomposition to the constituent components is also an
important new discovery.
The model that was used to evaluate the cost effectiveness of design modifications is
valuable both to shipyards that make new designs as well as to ship owners who often change
the local design following the emergence of cracks. The reliability model which yields the
hazard function throughout the ship's life is very useful to insurance companies in deciding
which ships to insure and what premiums to demand depending on the ship's age. It is also a
useful guide to the IMO and other organizations when setting regulations, classification
societies when setting their rules and monitoring the safety of the vessels, charterers when
weighing the safety tradeoffs in deciding which ships to charter and to ship owners when
making operational or investment decisions such as buying, selling, repairing or scrapping
ships of a certain age.
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Finally, the RAFL ship valuation model is particularly needed in the shipping
industry because market changes have rendered traditional methods inaccurate and very often
inapplicable, while alternatives that have been introduced are inaccurate and in several cases
have received significant criticism for the bias involved in their design. The integration of the
effect of cracks both in the costs, as well as in the discount rate as a risk factor, and the use of
derivatives to obtain a forward look on the key model parameters are elements that have not
been applied before in the shipping industry and are major contributions of this thesis.
The model's volatility estimation of the ship value is particularly useful for a variety
of purposes including the pricing of optionalities included in subjects to deal approval,
delivery time, payment structure e.g. in newbuilding contracts etc. No other existing model
produces these results. Another important advantage of the model is that it yields the
sensitivity and. decomposes the ship value in terms of various parameters, over which a
shipowner may potentially have some influence. Besides combining the important technical
and financial elements in an innovative way, the ship valuation model produces results that
are in excellent alignment with the real transaction data and is also applicable even in
dysfunctional markets when there are often no alternative methods. This makes it very
valuable to many involved in the shipping industry who are concerned with ship values.
In summary, the.thesis combines closely interlinked technical and financial elements
to produce results and develop tools that are of great value to many members of the shipping
industry. This includes brokers, accountants, analysts, shipping banks and investors
interested in valuation; ship owners when making managerial or investment decisions;
shipyards when designing ships, setting prices and deciding payment structures and options;
insurance companies when covering total loss or emergency repairs; the IMO and other
organizations when setting regulations; researchers when attempting to quantify the potential
benefits and cost savings from their research; and classification societies when scheduling
inspections and deciding which areas to examine more closely in each survey.
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6.4 Recommendations
Although it hasn't been the main focus of this research, investigating the frequency of
cracking with respect to the shipbuilding yard would be an interesting and important area for
future research. Classification societies and shipowners would also be interested in the
effects of hull maintenance on cracking while the effect of corrosion and wear of scantlings
would be useful to IACS and individual classification societies for the development of new
rules. Further research in the effect of cracking with respect to ship age would mainly be of
interest to underwriters, charterers and cargo terminal operators who have imposed an age
limitation of 25 years on Capes that are used for the transportation of iron ore. Another
aspect which has become of outmost concern in the last few years is that of high loading and
discharge rates. An investigation into the influence of loading rates on cracking and its safety
implications would be of great interest to many including ship owners, cargo terminal
operators and the IMO.
The demonstrated over-conservativeness of the Paris Law led us to introduce three
new modified Paris-law models. One of them can be particularly useful but involves a
parameter that needs to be calibrated for each ship location. This could be a useful future
project, similar to the calculation of stress intensity factors for various geometries. Future
research could also focus on further investigation of the bathtub curve that was identified
with respect to crack growth rates and ship age.
A promising area of future research would be to apply various elements of our
research to other ship types including tankers or other size groups such as Panamaxes.
Examples include the research done on cracks and the valuation model developed.
Alternatively, one may investigate the potential of improving the RAFL ship valuation
model. One approximation of the model was the risk neutrality of investors when
incorporating the Hazard function as a credit spread. This partly relies on adequate
diversified investors. In cases where this does not hold, the effect of cracks on the discount
rate is understated, resulting in a higher valuation. The effect will be different for each
investor. One could examine the possibility of adjusting the hazard-spread in each case by
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using the utility function or risk averseness of the investor in question, perhaps based on
portfolio Sharpe-Ratios and investment decisions.
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